The Obama administration was right to use dilemmas as a negotiating strategy; a dilemma can force a clear choice and reveal the other side’s character and intentions. But the dilemma has to fit the context. Assad, who repeatedly attributed the unrest to Israeli and American meddling, has lost significant public support by using live fire on protesters, and he is not likely to risk further alienating his supporters by signing on the dotted line with Israel—at least anytime soon.
Dilemmas also only work if they are set up properly. The Obama administration tried to conduct its test by talking behind closed doors with Assad about peace with Israel and his destructive policies while keeping US sanctions in place. But it had not introduced new negative incentives in response to Assad’s regional meddling and hardhanded tactics that diametrically oppose US interests or values. And Assad had little fear that Washington would, especially when US officials made his case for him by repeatedly emphasizing their lack of leverage in Damascus. Pressure alone, much like engagement alone, would not be enough to change Assad’s policies. Both stood a far better chance of being effective if used in concert. That required focus and creativity—two things Washington’s Syria policy has historically lacked.
The unrest sweeping Syria and the rest of the Middle East provided Washington with an opportunity to launch a Syria policy that would allow the administering of more tests in better ways. First, Washington should continue to shine a light on the Assad regime’s human rights violations by bringing it before the UN Security Council. On the multilateral front, the administration should be working closely with European allies and Turkey to establish an effective sanctions regime—including diplomatic isolation—against Assad to push him to stop his bloody crackdown on protesters and follow through on his reform promises. Second, the Obama administration should continue to issue sanctions and executive orders targeting individuals responsible for human rights abuses in Syria. Third, it should use this remit to designate more Syrian officials and figures under Executive Order 13460, which targets rampant regime corruption—the mortar that holds Assad’s regime together and a key issue that has brought protesters out into the streets. Elite defections could play a key role in pressuring the regime either to cut a deal with the country’s Sunni majority or leave power. Along those lines, Washington should impose costs on other Syrian businesspeople who continue to back the regime. One way to do so is to lengthen the list of US Treasury Department designations aimed at businesspeople close to the regime, many of whom are the exclusive importers of a wide variety of goods on the Syrian market. This would not only create fissures in the regime’s traditional alliance with the Sunni business elite, it would also diminish government revenue, since many major trading families pay an increasingly larger share of state revenues via a flat 20-percent corporate tax.
Fourth, the Obama administration should target Syrian energy. Syrian oil production has been in steady decline since the mid-1990s and is now around 390,000 barrels per day. Of that, Syria exports around 148,000 barrels per day, with revenues accruing directly to the state. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) and US government estimates, oil sales account for between a quarter and a third of state revenue, with the remainder increasingly made up through corporate and public-sector employee taxes. As the protests decrease tax receipts, Damascus is likely to become increasingly reliant on oil revenue, forcing the regime to tap reserves and/or resort to deficit spending. This in turn would constrain the regime’s ability to maintain market subsidies (for example, for diesel fuel) and payoffs to patronage networks.
Accordingly, the Obama administration should prod the chief buyers of Syrian oil—Germany, Italy, France, and the Netherlands—to stop purchasing the regime’s heavy crude. It should also pressure multinational energy companies operating in Syria—Royal Dutch Shell; Total; Croatia’s INA Nafta; India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC); Canada’s Petro-Canada; and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Sinochem—to exit the country. In addition, it should ask Britain to halt the operations of Gulfsands Petroleum, the one-time Houston-based company specializing in extracting heavy oil from depleted fields. The firm relocated to Britain in 2008 to avoid US sanctions on Rami Makhlouf, Assad’s cousin and the regime’s primary businessman.
With these additional measures in place, Washington can rally allies around a common cause, send a strong message to Assad that his crackdown will cost him, and lead Assad toward a soft landing with his people and a transition toward a more accountable government in Damascus. In the meantime, Washington can also use these instruments on Assad’s worsening domestic position to extract concessions on his relationship with Iran, be it his relationship with Hezbollah or—eventually, if he holds on in some capacity and the time is right—peace talks with Israel. It will also teach Assad that Washington will judge him on his actions, not just his words to US officials behind closed doors.
In terms of regional dilemmas, perhaps the most intriguing—and the one with deep implications for the Syrian-Iranian alliance in the short term—remained the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) investigation into the 2005 murder of Rafik Hariri. On June 30, 2011, the tribunal indicted a number of members of Hezbollah for the murder operation itself based on forensic and communications evidence. While the Assad regime must have breathed a collective sigh of relief for being spared, the indictments of Hezbollah members placed the Assad regime in an awkward position—especially following a diplomatic effort by Saudi Arabia in 2010 to reconcile Assad and the former Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri and a simultaneous attempt by Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah to shift blame for Hariri’s assassination to Israel. Would Syria back Hezbollah as indictments were issued? Would Syria support a Hezbollah attempt to cut off Lebanon’s 51-percent share of funding for the tribunal?
The second dilemma involved the IAEA investigation into Syria’s nuclear program. As Syria continued to deny all access to the Al Kibar site, the IAEA and the Obama administration considered issuing a “special inspection” of suspected Syrian nuclear sites.18 The urgency had less to do with the Syrian program—by all accounts whatever was going on at Al Kibar was destroyed by Israeli aircraft—than with what kind of example Syria’s case held out to other would-be nuclear proliferators looking to buck the international nonproliferation regime. If the special inspection were ordered, Syria faced referral to the Security Council and possible UN sanctions. Would the Assad regime come clean on its activities in the face of a showdown with the IAEA that threatened the international community’s courting of the Assad regime? Or would it attempt to deflect pressure from the international community by reducing its demands for entering into peace talks with Israel?
The third dilemma involved the Assad regime’s economics. With oil revenue declining as a percentage of government revenue and waves of young Syrians hitting the job market every year, the Assad regime faced increasingly stark choices. While it could continue its alliance with Hezbollah and Iran against Israel, it would have a hard time maintaining its war footing and the corruption it generates while attracting the kind of foreign investment necessary for job creation. The deep economic problems these policies produce for the Assad regime’s finances presented the Obama administration with what would seem ample leverage through easing or tightening US sanctions.
But in the end, the hardest part for Washington will be reading Assad’s response. For if there is one thing I learned from my engagement with Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, it’s that there are at least three answers for every question—yes, no, and no response. In the words of a good friend, “The Assad regime cannot exist in a world of black or white—only shades of gray.”
NOTES
1. THE ARAB WORLD’S TWILIGHT ZONE
1. “The American–Syrian Crisis and the End of Constructive Engagement,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 4, April 2003.
2. Member of US embassy staff in Damascus, Syria, interview with the author, July 2008.
3. “Backg
round Note: Syria,” US State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, March 18, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm.
4. Former ambassador to Syria Edward Djerejian, interview with the author, April 2008.
5. The embargo included all countries designated as US state sponsors of international terrorism under the “Embargoed Countries,” US Department of State, Directorate of Defence Trade Controls, 56 FR 55630, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/docs/frnotices/56FR55630.PDF.
6. Following its addition to the state sponsor of terrorism list in 1993, Sudan remains the only other designated country with which the United States maintains diplomatic relations.
7. The request was still pending as of March 2010.
8. Michael Evans, “Syrian Pipeline Helps Iraq Evade UN Sanctions,” The Times, December 16, 2002.
9. A book published in 2001 in Syria by the defense minister Mustafa Tlass was rumored to have said that Rifaat received a large chunk of Syria’s foreign-exchange reserves in return for his peaceful departure.
10. Robert McMahon, “Syria’s U.S. Ambassador: Syria Can Play ‘Constructive Role’ in Resolving Lebanese War,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 7, 2006.
11. Alfred Prados, “Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues,” Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2003. Syria reportedly provided intelligence stemming from its interrogations of a German-Syrian national, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, suspected of playing a role in the September 11 attacks. Damascus also provided information on Mohamed Atta, one of those directly involved in the World Trade Center attack, who worked in Aleppo in the 1990s. Valuable information was also given about Ma’mun Darkazanli, a Syrian businessman who allegedly served as a financial conduit to al-Qaeda members. See International Crisis Group Report, no. 23, Syria Under Bashar (I): Foreign Policy Challenges, February 11, 2004. See also Seymour M. Hersh, “The Syrian Bet,” The New Yorker, July 28, 2003. However, Syrian intelligence did not give American investigators access to Zammar, leading analysts to question the degree of cooperation. See Ryan Mauro, “Has Damascus Stopped Supporting Terrorists?,” Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2009, pages 61–67, citing Washington Institute senior fellow Matthew Levitt.
12. Syria, which was the uncontested candidate of the UN’s Asia Regional Group for a rotating seat on the Security Council, received support from 160 of 178 nations voting in the UN General Assembly. As is the case in all elections to the Security Council, the United States did not disclose its vote. “Syria Gains Seat on U.N. Security Council,” United Press International, October 8, 2001.
13. My hard feelings about Egypt did not last long, and I continue to enjoy visits there and value my Egyptian friends. See Andrew J. Tabler, “Making Peace with Egypt,” Institute of Current World Affairs (newsletter), May 2006.
2. THE GREAT UNRAVELING
1. “U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council,” White House press release, February 5, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html#20.
2. UN Resolution 68 1441 became the basis for the US-led “coalition of the willing,” which invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003.
3. Cuba and Yemen voted against Security Council Resolution 678, which gave legal justification for the Gulf War of 1990–1991. It passed by a vote of 12 to 2 (China abstaining) on November 29, 1990.
4. “Security Council Wraps Up Two Days of Debate on Iraq,” UN News Centre, October 17, 2002, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?Cr=iraq&Cr1=&NewsID=5078.
5. Nicholas Blanford, “London Journalist Arrested in Syria,” The Times, January 1, 2003, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article807352.ece.
6. Asma al-Assad, interview with the author, February 2003; CV of Asma al-Assad.
7. Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, December 12, 2003, Section 2, Point 9.
8. As-Safir (Lebanon), March 27, 2003.
9. Neil MacFarquhar, “For Arabs, New Jihad Is in Iraq,” New York Times, April 15, 2003; Gary C. Gambill, “The American-Syrian Crisis and the End of Constructive Engagement,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, April 2003.
10. Neil MacFarquhar, “Syria Wants U.S. to Lose War, Its Foreign Minister Declares,” New York Times, March 31, 2003.
11. As cited in Gambill, “The American-Syrian Crisis.”
12. Ibid.
13. MacFarquhar, “For Arabs, New Jihad.”
14. As cited in Gambill, “The American-Syrian Crisis.”
15. Bill Gertz, “Iraqi Oil Pipeline to Syria Closed,” Washington Times, April 16, 2003, http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030416-1723360.htm.
16. As cited in Gambill, “The American-Syrian Crisis.”
17. Neil MacFarquhar, “Syria Fears the Unknown: What’s Behind U.S. Threats,” New York Times, April 15, 2003.
18. As cited in Gambill, “The American-Syrian Crisis.”
19. Paul Kerr, “Senior US Officials Voice Concern over Syria’s WMD Capability,” Arms Control Today, May 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/syria_may03.
20. Ziad Abdelnour, “The US-Syrian Crisis: Why Diplomacy Failed,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, October 2003.
21. Judy Miller, “Senior U.S. Official to Level Weapons Charges Against Syria,” New York Times, September 13, 2003.
3. PARADISE LOST
1. “Trying to Fit In,” Syria Today, zero edition, March 2004.
2. “Bush Signs Syria Sanctions Bill,” CNN.com, December 13, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/12/12/bush.syria/.
3. “US Sanctions Are Work of Israel’s Friends in Congress: Syria,” AFP, December 11, 2003.
4. Andrew J. Tabler, “US Sanctions Unjust, Unjustified,” Daily Star, May 13, 2004.
5. Executive Order 13338—Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria, Federal Register, May 13, 2004.
6. Ibid.
4. PRESSURE YIELDS RESULTS
Portions of this chapter originally appeared in the Institute of Current World Affairs member newsletter.
1. “Lebanon’s Government Quits in Face of Mass Protest,” Reuters, February 28, 2005.
2. Andrew J. Tabler, “The Gathering Storm,” Institute of Current World Affairs (newsletter), March 2005.
3. “Security Council Declares Support for Free, Fair Presidential Election,” Security Council press release 8181, September 2, 2004, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8181.doc.htm.
4. Nicholas Blanford, Killing Mr. Lebanon (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006).
5. “Rice on Death of Former Lebanon PM Rafik Hariri,” US Department of State press release, February 14, 2005.
6. White House press conference transcript, February 17, 2005.
7. Joel Brinkley, “Rice Says Syria Is at Least Indirectly Responsible for the Blast,” New York Times, February 17, 2005.
8. “Syria Must Withdraw from Lebanon: Bush,” Daily Times, February 24, 2005.
9. “Rice Turns Up the Heat on Syria,” BBC News, March 2, 2005.
10. Hassan Fattah, “Saudis Join Call for Syrian Force to Quit Lebanon,” New York Times, March 3, 2005.
11. Robin Wright, “U.S. Rejects Syria’s Withdrawal Plan for Lebanon,” Washington Post, March 6, 2005.
12. “Adviser to the Syrian President: Establish a Foreign Investment and We Expect Revenues of $7 Billion over the Next Five Years,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 26, 2005.
13. The initial signatories of the Damascus Declaration were the NDR, the Kurdistan Democratic Alliance, the Kurdish Democratic Front, the Committee for the Revival of Civil Society and the Future Party. Prominent opposition figures included Riad Seif, Jawdat Sa’id, Dr. Abd al-Razzaq Id, Samir Nashar, Dr. Fida al-Hourani, Dr. Adil Zakkar, Abd al-Karim al-Dahhak, Haitham al-Maleh, and Nayif Qaysiyah. Damascus Declaration, October 16, 2005.
14. Sami Moubayed, interview with the author, Damascus, Syria, October 20, 2005.
15. “Landis: Damascus Rife with Rumors on Whether UN’s Lebanese Investigation Im
plicates Syrian Leadership,” Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor, Council on Foreign Relations, October 21, 2005.
16. United Nations Security Council, 5,297th meeting, October 31, 2005.
17. “Security Council Demands Syria’s Unambiguous, Immediate Response to Commission Investigating Assassination of Former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri,” Security Council 5,329th Meeting (PM), December 15, 2005.
18. Abdel Khalim Khaddam, interview on Al Arabiya, December 30, 2005, transcript, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2005/12/31/19936.html#8.
5. THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND
Portions of this chapter originally appeared in the Institute of Current World Affairs member newsletter.
1. Katherine Zoepf, “Syrian Leader Says His Nation Is Being Made a Scapegoat,” New York Times, November 10, 2005.
2. Bashar al-Assad, “Comprehensive Political Speech Delivered by H.E. President Bashar al-Assad at the Damascus Auditorium,” official copy of speech issued by Tishreen newspaper, November 10, 2005.
3. Sami Moubayed, “Allied to, Created by or Friends of the Ba’ath,” Gulf News, March 7, 2006. Moubayed predicted that a multiparty law would be issued within a month. As of mid-2011, the law had yet to be enacted.
4. Michel Kilo, interview with the author, Damascus, Syria, March 24, 2006.
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