The Sieges of Alexander the Great

by Stephen English

  We know almost nothing about Alexander’s visit with Langaros, save that it lasted for some time and that, before moving west towards Pellium and the growing Illyrian threat, Alexander persuaded Langaros to deal with one of the three revolting tribes, the Autaratians, himself.42 We know nothing at all about Langaros’ campaign against the Autaratians, other than to say it was evidently highly successful, as they were never again a problem to either Alexander or Antipater, his regent once the invasion of Asia began.

  The Pellium campaign lasted around two months, considerably more time than the events narrated by Arrian would appear to have taken. The only conclusion must be that the delay with Langaros, persuading him to support Alexander, took rather longer than we may have expected. Either way, it was time well spent as the Agrianians were amongst Alexander’s finest troops throughout his career and were invaluable in almost every military situation, not least during his many sieges.

  The deal with Langaros had been crucial in securing Alexander’s flank for this march; Langaros moved west against the Autaratians at the same time Alexander was making his march, preventing any potential attack on the Macedonian column. From the territory of the Agrianians, Alexander marched most likely via Prilep, arriving at the upper reaches of the Erigon River around Cepikovo, and then he followed the river south towards Fiorina and the central Lyncestis plain. There had been unrest in this area since Alexander’s murder of two of the sons of Aëropus upon his succession. The route Alexander took into Lyncestis was also the route that would be taken by the Roman consul P. Sulpicius Galba in 200.43

  Alexander arrived without incident before the gates of a city which Arrian calls Pellium; unfortunately he was too late to prevent Cleitus from occupying the city. Arrian’s descriptions of Pellium and the surrounding area are too vague to allow identification, but are substantial enough to allow us to recreate the siege with a degree of certainty. We do know, however, that Pellium was on the border with Macedonia, close to the western city of Edessa, and its hostile occupation was, and would remain, a threat to the security of Macedonia’s western border; something Alexander simply could not allow if his Persian expedition were to proceed. An Illyrian threat would have been a particularly sensitive issue for a Macedonian king, given the historical wars between the two areas, culminating in the death of Perdiccas III at the hands of Bardylis that precipitated Philip’s reign.

  Immediately upon arriving at Pellium, Alexander made camp outside of the city by the Eordiacus River, with the intention of beginning the siege of the city the following morning. Cleitus had not only occupied the city, but sensibly had also occupied the heights that ringed it to the northeast and southeast; although he did not quite have the manpower to surround the Macedonians on every side as Arrian suggests.44 Cleitus’ ridge-based troops can not have been visible in that area immediately upon Alexander’s arrival on the plain, as it would have been evident that he was walking into a trap; they must have been some distance away, awaiting a prearranged signal before advancing. Despite Cleitus having occupied the city before Alexander’s arrival, the Macedonians were quick enough to prevent him from linking up with his Taulantian allies, which would have been a considerably more difficult problem for Alexander to deal with. The other problem, of course, was that Alexander did not know the location of the Taulantians, or when they would arrive; ancient intelligence networks were rudimentary at best. Alexander simply had to make the most of the situation while he could, and remain flexible enough to deal with the imminent threat of a secondary column.

  The city of Pellium was in a naturally-strong defensive position; it was surrounded on three sides by a heavily-wooded ridge with a plain before it. The ridge essentially formed a horseshoe with the city at the apex, and the open end leading to a narrow wooded canyon along the Eordaicus River that led to the Wolf Pass, itself only wide enough for four men to march abreast.45

  Alexander marched the bulk of his army through the Wolf Pass, and through the wooded canyon by the Eordaicus River and into the plain before the city of Pellium. Once Alexander arrived in the plain, Cleitus brought up his Dardanians to the edge of the ridge that surrounded Alexander on three sides. The Macedonians suddenly found themselves in an extremely-difficult position and at a serious tactical disadvantage. Alexander would have been aware that one of Philip’s few defeats in his entire career came in almost identical circumstances at the hands of Onomarchus of Phocis. In that instance Onomarchus had drawn Philip into a horseshoe-shaped canyon in order to unleash his catapults and other missile weapons upon him from above: this was one of the first times in Greek warfare that catapults were used as field artillery. If Cleitus had possessed artillery, Alexander could have been faced with a similar humiliating defeat, but throughout his career, Alexander was always lucky.

  After what must have been a very tense night, in which Alexander would have been compelled to keep most of the army under arms in case of a night attack by the Dardanians, morning broke with the two armies in exactly the same position as they had been the previous night. Cleitus had missed two golden opportunities to bloody the collective noses of the Macedonians: he had failed to employ missile troops at a time when they could have been devastating, and failed to offer any sort of a night skirmish that would have come from three sides, which also would have been potentially devastating to the Macedonians. Even though Cleitus had failed to act decisively, the fact that Alexander was forced to keep his troops under arms meant that they would have been tired, and in theory at a disadvantage the following morning. It was only then that Cleitus chose to act.

  Once Cleitus did decide to make his move, his actions were so negative as to surrender his main advantage; that of having the Macedonians surrounded. Cleitus feigned an attack upon the Macedonians in which there was very little fighting, and he withdrew his troops stationed along the ridge, within the walls of the city. Cleitus evidently felt little confidence in the quality of his own troops, as compared to the Macedonians; coupled with the fact that Glaucias had not yet arrived with the anticipated reinforcements, defence became the preferred strategy.

  After Cleitus had withdrawn within the protection of the city walls, Alexander had a perfect opportunity to assault the city before any reinforcements could arrive and potentially alter the balance of power. The fact that apparently all of Cleitus’ troops were able to be garrisoned within Pellium rather suggests that their force was not particularly large as Pellium was certainly nowhere near the size of the great Greek cities like Athens or Thebes. We must ask why Alexander failed to take advantage of the opportunity to assault the city immediately. The answer is not difficult to find: throughout the period prior to Alexander’s career the defenders always held the advantage in any siege. We see during the Peloponnesian War, for example, the Spartans reluctant or perhaps unable to conduct any sort of significant siege of Athens, despite having numerous opportunities to do so. They contented themselves with trying to force a hoplite battle – which of course the Athenians consistently refused – and to ravaging the Attic countryside. The real reason for this defensive advantage was the relative lack of effective siege equipment; catapults were a recent invention, as discussed above, and were only just working their way into Greek warfare. Stone-throwing catapults were revolutionary when they were first introduced in 334. The besiegers were usually reduced to the use of ladders and rams, and frequently to reliance upon deception and betrayal from within for a city to fall without the application of force.

  Alexander’s force at Pellium was relatively small, and although the troops were of undoubted quality, there was no siege train and therefore even the limited siege equipment available at the time was not available to Alexander. Without the ability to assault the city, and lacking in Phillip’s guile and cunning that may have led to the city being betrayed to him, Alexander had only one real option: to blockade the city. In order to achieve an effective blockade, Alexander built a circumvallation around its walls. The circumvallation can not have been particularly hi
gh, as Arrian tells us that ‘on the following day Glaucias appeared with a large force’.46 Glaucias’ arrival again put Alexander in a perilous position. Glaucias positioned his force of Taulantians across the mountain pass that Alexander had used to enter the plain before Pellium; this had the effect of cutting Alexander’s lines of supply and communication back to Macedonia, as well as giving Alexander no possibility of a safe withdrawal. With retreat out of the question, and any attack on Pellium likely to be costly in manpower given the lack of siege equipment and the likelihood of a flanking attack from Glaucias, Alexander’s position was extremely difficult. If Alexander had known of the imminent arrival of Glaucias then his decision to advance upon Pellium and build the circumvallation was a significant tactical mistake. He should have withdrawn through the pass and formulated another strategy. If he had not known of Glaucias’ movements, this is an excellent example of the poor quality of military intelligence in the ancient world; that such a large force operating close by, and whose arrival on the scene was imminent, was utterly unknown to Alexander.

  Alexander had almost certainly begun the Pellium campaign expecting it to be brief; the city would be captured and the local tribesmen forced into submission without much difficulty. Along with this expectation, Alexander had begun the expedition with only basic supplies, expecting to be able to live off the land for the brief time he would be in the Balkans. The arrival of Glaucias caused two significant logistical problems for Alexander. Firstly, he needed to be able to send out foraging parties to gather the food and water needed to keep the army supplied. Secondly, he needed to be able to graze the pack animals. The very presence of pack animals is a clear shift in organizational policy from Philip’s reign, he had reduced the size of the baggage train massively and pack animals were rarely used.

  These two key logistical requirements forced Alexander to risk detaching the baggage animals to the nearby plain of Korce, some 8km to the northwest of the city. The baggage animals were accompanied by Philotas and a group of cavalry to act as a guard and, presumably, to double as a foraging expedition.47 This foraging expedition was a significant risk for Alexander, and illustrates that supplies must have been running very low indeed.

  When Glaucias saw the column setting off for grazing lands, he seized the opportunity to force a confrontation: he detached a portion of his troops to occupy the high ground surrounding the plain that Philotas was heading for. When the danger to the foraging expedition that resulted from Glaucias’ movements was reported back to Alexander, he took the Agrianians, hypaspists, archers and 400 cavalry and advanced quickly on Philotas’ new position. Upon seeing their approach, Glaucias decided not to risk a battle, and withdrew his troops to their former positions. The baggage animals were then safely escorted back to the plain of Pellium by Alexander’s larger escort force. It is unclear as to the level of success of their expedition, but given its brevity it seems unlikely that much forage was gathered.

  The foraging expedition had been a tremendous risk by Alexander, and shows the desperate nature of his situation; it was also a situation that could have been better exploited by Glaucias. It would have taken at least a couple of hours for Alexander’s relief force to have reached a plain 8km distance from Pellium; this should have been enough time for Glaucias’ advance force to have at least harassed, and perhaps directly engaged, the Macedonians. Coupled with this was the possibility of both Glaucias and Cleitus’ failure to attack the remnants of the Macedonian force that were left in the plain of Pellium when Alexander set off to relieve Philotas. Many key troops had been taken by Alexander, and we can only guess at the chaos that could have resulted from a two-pronged attack from front and rear by both Glaucias and Cleitus on those who remained, without the guiding hand of Alexander being present.

  Following the probable failure of the foraging mission, Alexander’s logistical situation was becoming increasingly desperate, and he was still essentially surrounded on the plain before Pellium. If he were to attempt a direct withdrawal then he would almost certainly have to fight his way out at a significant tactical disadvantage, along with the likelihood of being attacked in the flank and rear as he did so. Alexander’s only option was to come up with some sort of ruse to clear the surrounding foothills of defenders before he made his escape.

  Alexander’s solution was an incredible display of parade ground drill, described by Arrian:48

  Alexander drew up the main body of his infantry in mass formation 120 deep, posting on either wing 200 cavalrymen with instructions to make no noise, and to obey orders smartly. Then he gave the order for the heavy infantry first to erect their spears, and afterwards, at the word of command, to lower the massed points as for attack, swinging them, again at the word of command, now to the right, now to the left. The whole phalanx he then moved smartly forward, and, wheeling it this way and that, caused it to execute various intricate movements. Having thus put his troops with great rapidity through a number of different formations, he ordered his left to form a wedge and advance to the attack.

  The Taulantians had been drawn onto the plain during the manoeuvres, for reasons that are not altogether clear. After this brief display of drill, Alexander’s troops formed up into the wedge formation and advanced upon them. This incredible display of discipline conducted initially in absolute silence, save for the shouting of orders, struck fear into the untrained Taulantians to such an extent that they broke without a fight and fled the field in confusion.

  A small number of evidently more hardy Taulantians remained in the hills overlooking the pass through which Alexander had entered the plain, and through which he planned to leave. In order to drive out the remnants of Glaucias’ Taulantians, Alexander attacked with the hypaspists, Agrianians, archers and Companion Cavalry. The decision to use the Companions to assault a defensive position in the hills on either side of a pass is curious, particularly with Arrian’s reference to half of them being ordered to dismount and fight on foot: either the pass was not as mountainous as we may believe, or Alexander wanted to attack them without any delay, and cavalry would reach them faster than infantry; I assume the latter.49 Alexander probably wanted to ensure that the defenders were dislodged by the time the infantry reached the pass, and the only way to engage them quickly was by using the cavalry in this unorthodox manner. The Companions were not required to actually engage the remaining defenders as they fled further into the mountains at the approach of Alexander’s elite cavalry units.

  With the Companions occupying the hills, the Agrianians, hypaspists and archers set up a defensive position on the Pellium side of the river to cover the retreat of the remainder of the heavy infantry across the river and back through the Wolf Pass. With the Macedonians essentially in retreat, at least from the perspective of Cleitus and Glaucias, the natives were able to join forces and advance upon the rear of the Macedonian column. The heavy infantry units evidently crossed the river before the Dardanians and Taulantians could engage them, and made it through the Wolf Pass without incident. The Agrianians, archers, hypaspists and Companions who had set up a defensive position, however, now came under pressure from the advancing native tribesmen. These troops then conducted an orderly withdrawal under cover of archer fire and javelins thrown by the Agrianians. Alexander’s artillery were also set up along the far bank of the river to further provided covering fire. This artillery was with the siege train that was evidently on its way to Pellium, but had not arrived in time to be used against the city. The catapults were evidently arrow-throwing and not terribly effective as anti-personnel weapons, but the fear that they inspired was far more significant; the natives refused to come within range of the weapons, despite their relative ineffectiveness. The fighting withdrawal across the river is a superb example of such an operation; Alexander was able to extricate himself from the failed siege with no loss of life by a combination of leadership, the discipline of his troops, and tactical inventiveness. This was only the second incident in history of artillery being used to support
a field operation, the first being their use against Philip by Onomarchus of Phocis in 354, noted above.

  Once safely across the river, Alexander moved his troops several miles from the pass, with the intention of tricking Cleitus and Glaucias into believing that he was retreating back to the safety of Macedonia. Once at a reasonable distance, the Macedonians made camp and sent out several reconnaissance parties to establish whether they were being followed, and to see how their opponents had responded to their withdrawal. Arrian tells us that after three days these scouts reported back that the Dardanians and Taulantians were celebrating their apparent victory and were drinking heavily. They had also extended their lines dangerously, no palisade or trench had been constructed and no sentries posted; so convinced were they that Alexander had been completely defeated and was long gone from the region.50

  As soon as he received the news, Alexander reformed a column of troops consisting of the hypaspists, Agrianians, archers and two taxeis of pezhetairoi (Perdiccas and Coenus). This advance column was followed at a slower pace by the remainder of the army. Under cover of night, the column marched back through the Wolf Pass and crossed the River Eordaicus without interference. The moment was ripe for an attack, and without waiting for the rest of his force to be brought up with the possibility of losing the element of surprise if he were to be discovered, Alexander immediately ordered the Agrianians and archers to make a surprise assault across a narrow front. Many of the Illyrian tribesmen were either killed in their beds or cut down whilst fleeing in panic at the unexpected turn of events. The attack was pressed by all members of the advanced column and Arrian tells us that the only way the defenders escaped was to abandon their weapons.51 Cleitus and what remained of the Dardanian force fled into the relative security of the fortress of Pellium, whilst Glaucias and the Taulantians evidently fled into the mountains, a broken force.