The Sieges of Alexander the Great

by Stephen English

  In contrast to Alexander’s shortcomings, Memnon and Ephialtes showed themselves to be commanders of the highest order. Memnon successfully sealed breaches in the walls where they occurred, he constructed a huge tower from which to shower the attackers with missiles and he conducted a series of sorties that always had Alexander on the back foot whilst Ephialtes led the first sortie with distinction.

  With hindsight, Alexander was certainly successful in the capture of Halicarnassus, and it did not take too long, for which he should be given credit. We can also say that he learned tough lessons from his mistakes here that he was to put into practice during later sieges (i.e. Tyre and Gaza). We can add that Alexander was certainly lucky that Memnon died when he did.

  Chapter 4

  Tyre: 332

  From Gordium Alexander marched towards the region of Cilicia where he was ultimately to meet Darius for the first time, and convincingly defeat the Persian host with a brilliant series of flanking attacks. After Darius had fled the field, Alexander was faced with a significant strategic decision: chase Darius and force a final resolution, or continue south down the Phoenician coast and complete the capture of the Persian naval bases. To pursue Darius would be to leave the major Persian strongholds of Phoenicia and Egypt unconquered, as well as leaving the still-powerful and active Persian fleet with bases from which to operate and potentially take the war to the Greek mainland, as had been Memnon’s strategy the previous year. The decision appears not to have been a difficult one for Alexander. He immediately set off south along the Phoenician coast towards Tyre, and ultimately Egypt. We also have to realize that for a man raised in the Greek world it would have been natural for him to wish to complete the conquest of the Mediterranean basin before moving further into the Persian heartlands. The decision left Darius free to move into the heartland of Persia and gather a new army, but Alexander reasoned that as he had defeated the Great King once, he could do it again.

  Most of the coastal cities in Alexander’s path south from Cilicia, such as Byblos and Sidon, surrendered without a struggle; the citizenry were evidently rather enthusiastic about the Macedonian conqueror. At Sidon, the king, Stratton II, a friend of Darius, was deposed by his people so that they could accept Alexander’s terms peacefully. Tyre was to prove to be a far more reluctant addition to the growing Macedonian empire.90 Before the siege began, Alexander was presented with the opportunity of preventing bloodshed by a delegation offering terms. On the way to Tyre, Alexander was met by representatives from the island city offering peaceful terms that would have allowed the Macedonians, Persians and Tyrians to co-exist. Curtius presents the Tyrians as more willing to accept an alliance with Alexander than subjugation to the Macedonians, which is supported by later events.91 Alexander, perhaps realizing the strength of the Tyrian position, did not consider the offer for long, and gave an initially-positive response; he thanked them for their offer and informed them of his intention to make sacrifice in the temple of Heracles within the city.92 The timing of Alexander’s arrival at Tyre was unfortunate; his request for sacrifice coincided perfectly with the Tyrian festival of Melqart in February 332. Allowing Alexander to sacrifice in the temple at this time would have been tantamount to recognizing Alexander as king in the eyes of the citizens, and this they found impossible to accept. The Tyrian response was a refusal to permit any Persian or Macedonian entry to the city, and offered Alexander the opportunity to use the temple of Heracles in Old Tyre, on the mainland. Alexander’s anger at this refusal by the citizens of Tyre is reported by both Arrian and Curtius, with the latter reporting it as more of an irrational temper tantrum.93 It is possible that Alexander anticipated the Tyrian response, or at the very least used it to his advantage as a pretext to storm the city, although Alexander seldom felt the need to act only once a pretext had been found. Curtius is by far the most plausible source in describing the Tyrian reliance upon their defensive fortifications as their primary motive for resisting Alexander; they simply would not have imagined that Alexander would even have contemplated a siege of the island, especially with the still-active Persian fleet in the eastern Aegean. Diodorus on the other hand saw it as part of a grand strategy from the Persians to resist Alexander. This seems unlikely to say the least.

  The question of weather Alexander needed to besiege and ultimately capture the city is an interesting one. It can be argued that Tyre could have been isolated by the Macedonians by the capture of every other port on the coast, and by the presence of a permanent garrison in Old Tyre to prevent them gaining access to the mainland. This would have resulted in the fortress being a true island surrounded by the growing Macedonian empire. If this had occurred, there is no reason that the Tyrians could not have held out indefinitely, as long as the Persians maintained control of the larger islands such as Crete and Rhodes. Even if Tyre were to have come over to Alexander voluntarily after some years of isolation, the potential to cause trouble in Greece could not be tolerated, nor could the challenge to Alexander’s authority that the Tyrians had inadvertently made.94 Alexander’s thinking regarding the prospective siege is summed up in a speech in Arrian delivered to the Companions and other officers before the siege began:95

  Friends and fellow soldiers, I do not see how we can safely advance upon Egypt, so long as Persia controls the sea; and to pursue Darius with the neutral city of Tyre in our rear and Egypt and Cyprus still in enemy hands would be a serious risk, especially in view of the situation in Greece. With our army on the track of Darius, far inland in the direction of Babylon, the Persians might well regain control of the coast, and thus be enabled with more power behind them to transfer the war to Greece, where Sparta is already openly hostile to us, and Athens, at the moment, is but an unwilling ally; fear, not friendliness, keeping her on our side. But with Tyre destroyed, all Phoenicia would be ours, and the Phoenician fleet, which both in numbers and quality is the predominant element in the sea-power of Persia, would very likely come over to us. The Phoenician seamen, ships’ crews or fighting men, once their towns are in our hands, will hardly endure to face the perils of service at sea for the sake of others. The next step will be Cyprus: it will either join us without trouble on our part, or be easily taken by assault; then, with the accession of Cyprus and the united fleets of Macedon and Phoenicia, our supremacy at sea would be guaranteed, and the expedition to Egypt would thus be a simple matter, and finally, with Egypt in our hands we shall have no further cause for uneasiness about Greece: we shall be able to march on Babylon with security at home, with enhanced prestige, and with Persia excluded not only from the sea, but from the whole continent up to the Euphrates.

  The island city of Tyre was, from the strategic standpoint, superbly sited. Its capture would prove to be the most difficult and challenging campaign of Alexander’s entire career. The island was separated from the mainland by a strait four stades wide, of the order of 750m. Curtius also tells us that it was particularly exposed to southwesterly winds, a fact that would prove to be extremely important in the construction of the mole. Curtius states that it was this wind, and the waves it generated, that was the greatest obstacle to the construction of the mole. The strait was relatively shallow, until a couple of hundred metres from the fortress; at that point the sea bed fell away quite dramatically where the water reached three fathoms deep.96 Tyrian confidence was further boosted by a delegation from Carthage who promised help against the Macedonians, help that in reality never materialized.

  Curtius goes on to describe the quite-formidable Tyrian defences: catapults lining the walls, harpagones constructed to use against Alexander’s siege engines, along with ‘ravens’ and other defensive siege devices. Harpagones were grappling irons, originally invented by Pericles; they are known to have been used by Alcibiades, and Livy describes their use by the Carthaginian navy. They were therefore something new to Alexander, but certainly not new to Greek warfare. The corvus (Greek korax) or raven (perhaps crow) was not the complex grappling hook and boarding bridge made famous by Duil
ius in the First Punic War, and described by Polyaenus. Curtius is imagining a simple grappling hook of the type used at Mycale in 36.97 From both the perspectives of geography and defensive armaments, Tyre was extremely well situated to resist any proposed siege by Alexander, and could be re-supplied at will with food, water and fresh troops from the sea by the Persian fleet.

  As a supreme tactician, Alexander would have considered all the options available to him; ultimately he came to the conclusion that leaving Tyre independent was an unacceptable risk. The only thing that remained to be considered was how to capture the city. The capture of fortified cities in the ancient world was difficult to say the least; the advantage always had been with the defenders behind their walls. In the case of Tyre, it was one of the richest cities in the Mediterranean and could easily be re-supplied. It also had a population probably in excess of 40,000 and thus was not short of men to defend the walls if necessary. Alexander would have been aware of his father’s failed attempts to capture Perinthus and Byzantium; on both occasions the Macedonians were in a better position than at Tyre given that both were on land, and Philip was in possession of a fleet. He would also have known of the failed siege lasting thirteen years by the Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar in the sixth century. A besieging army before the career of Alexander would typically have to rely upon treachery or starvation to capture a city, unless the walls were so weak they could be easily breached. A city with reasonable and well-kept defences was virtually impregnable. Tyre had almost every advantage that defenders in the ancient world could hope for, yet still Alexander resolved to besiege the fortress.

  Alexander did have the advantage of stone throwing-catapults that Philip and earlier Greeks did not, but Tyre was too far offshore for them to reach the walls, so they were essentially useless from the land. If Alexander wanted to capture the city he had the two choices of treachery or force. His clumsy attempt at diplomacy had not worked, and treachery seemed unlikely, particularly given that there was no need for anyone within the city to feel threatened enough to try and save themselves by metaphorically, or actually, opening the gates to the conqueror. There was only one option: the city would have to be taken by force. The only way to do that was to directly engage the walls, and this line of reasoning lead Alexander unavoidably to the construction of the mole, one of the more celebrated military acts of his career. Once the decision to storm the fortress had been made, operations began almost immediately.

  The siege of Tyre can be divided into two operational phases, the first of which began with the construction of the mole and ended with its destruction. The second was the construction of a much larger mole and the two giant siege towers, and eventually resulted in the fall of the city.

  The first phase of the siege began with a tremendously symbolic act by Alexander: he apparently filled a wicker basket with rubble, carried it to the shore opposite Tyre and dropped it into the sea. Alexander himself had begun the construction of the mole. This act is reminiscent of Alexander standing at the prow of the first ship to cross the Hellespont and throwing a spear into the beach claiming Asia as ‘spear-won territory’, and is also reminiscent of dignitaries today laying the first foundation stone to symbolize the beginning of a major construction project. Alexander’s act was no different.98

  The mole itself was intended to be essentially a causeway from the mainland to the island, a means of directly engaging the city walls and enabling a slightly more traditional siege. It is a sobering thought that the final breakthrough of the walls did not come from the sector where the mole was being constructed, but it is certainly a mistake to say that the mole was unnecessary; it enabled Alexander to attack from various directions simultaneously as was his favoured strategy. More on this later.

  For the construction of the mole to proceed without interruption, vast quantities of raw materials were required. Considerable numbers of trees must have been felled in nearby Lebanon, and the city of Old Tyre on the mainland facing the island was completely destroyed to provide the rubble required for the mole.99 Considerable numbers of men were also required. We do not know their origins, but the only workers referred to in the sources are soldiers of the army. These were the ones who were attacked by the Tyrians onboard their ships. The construction workers likely were not all soldiers, however. The most menial tasks (felling trees, fetching water, etc.) were probably performed by local villagers, but of these people we hear nothing, nor do we know if they were paid or press-ganged into service. It is not surprising that the sources do not mention these people, if indeed they existed at all. Ancient writers almost never mention the lowest rungs of society, and at Tyre there were far more exciting and interesting things to write about than the local peasantry.

  The construction process was quite simple, and it is perhaps surprising that the mole has survived to the present day. Alexander’s mole is the only reason that the city of Tyre is now no longer an island, but is still connected to the mainland by that mole, now greatly silted up along its northern shore. Boulders of various sizes were physically carried from the ruins of Old Tyre and dropped into the water where they formed a more solid foundation than the sand and mud of the sea bed. The trees that had been felled and transported to the coast were cut into the shape of huge stakes that were driven into the sea bed on either side of what Alexander wanted to be the causeway. These would have the effect of holding the boulders in position and resisting the surging tides that ran down the coast. On top of the boulders was dropped sand which would fall between the larger rocks and provide stability, otherwise the weight of the catapults and siege towers that would ultimately be dragged along the mole would cause it to become dangerously unstable. As the mole began to rise above the level of the waves, a layer of earth was added, and then compacted, to add further stability as well as a platform from which to conduct operations. The mole was a tremendous engineering undertaking and it is a testimony to the ability of Alexander’s engineers that it was initiated quickly with little or no planning; they simply knew what had to be done and started work.

  The accounts of the siege are somewhat truncated; the actual construction of the mole seems to take place very rapidly when, in reality, it took months to get anywhere near the city. The first part of the construction work probably did proceed relatively quickly, however, as the water was shallow and the logistical problems were less acute given the proximity to the coast and the resources of Old Tyre. At first the Tyrians considered Alexander’s attempts to be comical and indicative of extreme hubris; to attempt to capture an island by effectively taming the ocean and joining it to the land was considered preposterous. As progress was rapid during the early construction phase, the Tyrian response quickly changed. The first phase proceeded relatively quickly and Alexander would no doubt have been greatly encouraged, but the mole soon hit deeper water; something like a third of the way to the island the sea bed drops away rapidly to a depth of around 5.5m. The Macedonians continued to drop boulders into the sea, but they had little effect, it would have looked as though the sea was simply swallowing them whole. Alexander was not a man who easily gave in when faced with a difficult situation, and with the same kind of determination that allowed him to believe that constructing a mole was the best course of action, he simply continued pouring stone and rocks into the sea. Eventually, and very slowly, the mole proceeded towards the island again.

  Figure 2: Sketch of the Siege of Tyre

  The Tyrians probably began to get worried at around this time; they would have been well aware that the ocean floor dropped away rapidly as the island was neared, and they would have seen this as yet another line of defence against this novel form of attack, but seeing the mole continue its inexorable approach to the walls would have forced them to act more proactively. Once the mole, and therefore the workers, came within range of projectile weapons fired from the city walls, the construction teams came under constant attack, both from archers and defensive weaponry upon the walls and from seaborne raids at various points al
ong the mole, led by marines based on board ships.100

  These naval raids were in the form of missile troops, specifically archers and slingers, perhaps along with small arrow-firing artillery. The triremes that they were aboard sailed up and down the growing mole with impunity, attacking wherever there were vulnerable workers. The construction crews were almost completely defenceless; they were unarmed and there seemingly were few troops stationed on the mole to protect them from such an attack. It is curious that Alexander did not anticipate a sortie from the defenders as he had experienced several at Halicarnassus, and the defensive measures taken with the siege towers (hide coverings for example) clearly indicate that the previous siege was uppermost in his mind. Often during Alexander’s career, he would use a small body of men to lure out the defenders onto ground of his choosing, and if Alexander had possessed a fleet, or had laid some kind of trap, then we may have speculated that this was what occurred at Tyre, but he did not. He must have anticipated the Tyrians using ships to attack the mole, and yet he did nothing to counter the threat immediately; this has to be considered a tactical mistake by Alexander.

  Attacks from men aboard ship were almost impossible for Alexander to counter. His men on the mole were sitting ducks for the ship-borne archers, the casualties inflicted may not have been severe (it seems that ancient archers were far less effective than their counterparts carrying longbows of the later medieval period), but the effect upon morale, as well as on the progress of the mole, would have been severe.