The Sieges of Alexander the Great

by Stephen English

  Ora and Bazira

  After the fall of Massaga, the army was again divided into a number of flying columns, which had by now become standard practice during the campaign on the northeast frontier. This policy had the effect of allowing Alexander to conquer more territory, to do so with greater speed as smaller columns moved rather more quickly, and to reduce the logistical difficulties of having the whole army together for a march in difficult and unknown terrain. With this further division of the army, Coenus was sent to blockade the city of Bazira whilst Attalus, Alcetas and Demetrius advanced upon Ora, probably to be associated with the modern Ude-Gram as identified by Stein.220 Attalus was instructed to blockade the town pending Alexander’s arrival, and presumably to make preparations for a siege, if preparations were required (such as the bridging of a chasm for example, or the construction of siege engines). This is a curious instruction and suggests either Attalus’ force was very small and not capable of carrying the siege, or that Alexander wanted the glory of the capture himself, or perhaps that Alexander was growing impatient of the preparations that were required before each siege and he was trying to save himself time by ensuring that as soon as he arrived before the city, he could launch his assault. Whatever the reason for the orders, the defenders were not prepared to sit and wait for the arrival of greater numbers of Macedonian troops, and made a sally against Alcestas’ force soon after it arrived; they were quickly repulsed, however. At this point Alexander was undecided as to whether to make for Bazira or Ora first. The decision was effectively made for him by the news that Bazira was in a better defensive position, and that the townspeople showed no signs of surrender. Alexander initially set off for Bazira but quickly diverted his men to Ora upon receiving a report that some of the Indians in the region were gathering under the leadership of Abisares with the intention of moving secretly to Ora to help defend the city. Alexander made straight for Ora:221

  Sending an order to Coenus to construct a blockhouse outside Bazira, garrison it sufficiently to prevent the people of the town from making free use of the surrounding country, and then join him with the remainder of his troops.

  Again we have the strong implication that there were very few troops operating with Alexander in this region. The remainder must have been campaigning elsewhere, or following on slowly behind. Most likely Alexander’s flying column was conquering areas and the remainder of the army moving more slowly whilst conducting final mopping up operations once Alexander had moved on. The fact that Alexander needed the bulk of Coenus’ detachment tells us that he was undermanned and that he took the threat posed by Abisares’ Indians seriously. Alexander would also have been conscious of his experience outside Pellium, where he was engaging a city and found himself trapped by newly-arrived reinforcements.

  The Indians in Bazira watched Coenus withdraw with the bulk of the Macedonians with joy. They assumed, with natural contempt for the invaders, that they were withdrawing in fear and that the remainder would be easy prey for an Indian sortie. Probably within a day of Coenus moving off, the Indians made a sally from Bazira. The engagement was rapid and bloody; at its conclusion, 500 Indians lay dead on the field and more than 70 were captured. After this, the defenders were so shaken that they did not make another move against the remaining Macedonians, whilst the Macedonians strengthened their own fortifications outside of the town and awaited the return of Coenus or Alexander to complete the reduction of the city.

  The siege of Ora gave Alexander no problems at all. The city fell at the first assault and the expected relief column led by Abisares never materialized. It is also evident that the town was not as well defended, either in troops or by nature, as some of the fortresses that Alexander had encountered in the previous two years. With the fall of Ora, Alexander also captured a number of elephants that had been left there. This is the second reference to elephants in the sources, the first being at Gaugamela where they almost certainly were not present (taking no part in any of the battle narratives at all). It could be, therefore, that this was the first time the Macedonians had encountered elephants, and not when they faced Porus at the Hydaspes in 327.

  When news arrived in Bazira of the fate of those defending Ora, they realized that their position was hopeless, especially given their abject failure in the sortie against Alexander’s blockading force; if they could not even defeat Coenus then what hope would they have once Alexander returned? At midnight of the day following the fall of Ora, the Indians inhabiting Bazira abandoned the town and melted away into the surrounding countryside, as had happened so often in the previous few months. They were not simply abandoning the city, however. Resistance was still their intention: they gathered together with what would today be called local insurgents, and made their way to the imposing fortifications of the Aornus Rock.

  The Rock of Aornus

  After Alexander had occupied a virtually-empty city and garrisoned it (as well as Ora in order to provide a permanent military presence in this unsettled region), he set off in the direction of the Indus River and the Rock of Aornus. Along his route a number of minor towns surrendered without resistance to Alexander, and were also occupied. These towns surrendered to the Macedonians partly out of fear of Alexander’s reputation, and partly because Alexander had with him a number of ‘local chiefs’ from the region; namely Cophaeus and Assagetes. The use of the local nobility was a major strategic variation from his early campaigns and demonstrates once again Alexander’s desire to bring those he conquered onboard with the expedition and into the growing empire. This policy is also seen in the recruiting of the 30,000 youths and the increasing use of Oriental troops in the cavalry units.

  After a march of probably only a few days, Alexander arrived at Embolima (which Curtius calls Ecbolima), a town close to Aornus, and a perfect base of operations against the fortress.222 Sir Aurel Stein was the first to identify the Rock of Aornus with the modern Pir-Sar in 1926, although he didn’t produce his book until three years later. Stein described the mountain as follows:223

  Pir-sar is but one of a series of narrow spurs which… range, stretching east from above Upal, throws out to the south before it drops rapidly and flattens out fanlike towards the low plateau of Maira, washed at its foot by the Indus. Of those spurs Pir-Sar preserves its height for the longest distance, and owing to the uniform level and the very fertile soil of its summit, affords most scope both for cultivation and grazing. The practically level portion of the top extends at an average elevation of about 7,100 feet for over a mile and a half. At its upper end this flat portion is bordered for some distance by gentle slopes equally suited for such use… Pir-Sar forms a dominating position over-looking all the other spurs.

  Stein described the site after travelling around the region extensively; his identification has been questioned, but not conclusively disproved as yet. It has the advantage of tallying closely with Arrian’s account, which gives a height of 8,000ft and describes the Rock in similar terms to Stein, also noting the abundant natural water springs on the plateau. This final point is key, as it meant they were better equipped than some more naturally-strong defensive positions, as all they needed to store was food, not water. What Stein does not say is that the summit is of a very significant size, having a circumference of some 40km.

  This natural fortress was known to the Greeks. Legend, as reported by Curtius, tells us that Heracles himself had attempted to storm the city and failed.

  Diodorus has a slightly less violent account, but Heracles fails in his attempt none the less:224

  It is said that Heracles of old thought to lay siege to this ‘rock’ but refrained because of the occurrence of certain sharp earthquake shocks and other divine signs, and this made Alexander even more eager to capture the stronghold when he heard it, and so to rival the god’s reputation.

  Even if it were not for the opportunity to outdo Heracles, Alexander would still have besieged the fortress. It was an opportunity to test his skills yet again and Alexander simply could not have pass
ed without making the attempt. He could also not allow large numbers of un-subdued Indians to remain free on his lines of supply and communication, with the inherent dangers that presented.

  The local tribal chiefs, Cophaeus and Assagates, would have told Alexander of the impregnable nature of Aornus, and immediately upon arrival at Embolima, Craterus was detached from the army with orders to gather supplies from the surrounding countryside, as well as its towns and villages. Enough supplies were to be gathered together to survive the protracted siege that Alexander expected. Although Alexander was no doubt expecting a lengthy siege, he still would have wanted to carry the fortress by assault if at all possible. In an attempt to do so he set off immediately with:225

  The archers, the Agrianians, Coenus’ taxis, the best-armed and most active of the other infantry units, 200 Companions and 100 mounted archers.

  It is unclear why Alexander took 300 cavalry with his assault party. Perhaps to provide a means of mobile protection in the event of an ambush en-route, or perhaps more likely these troops were here being used as infantry. Horse archers were likely of a higher quality with greater accuracy than regular infantry archers. This was a relatively large force for an initial probing assault, or at the very least a reconnaissance mission. They would have quickly discovered that they were ill prepared or equipped to undertake a direct assault against this formidable fortress.

  We must examine Alexander’s strategic decision to besiege Aornus at all. Alexander could easily have blockaded the fortress with a relatively small force (much the size of the initial assault/reconnaissance force) and moved the main army on towards India to carry on with the campaign. The defenders would have been penned in with no easy means of exit from the fortress; its natural defences would have worked in reverse too, acting as a prison, and they would have had no opportunity to spread disaffection amongst the local population. The siege of Aornus is a fine example of Alexander’s character impinging on strategic decisions; it was simply not in his nature to allow a fortress to stand against him effectively unchallenged. This was a very different situation from Tyre, as that city had to be captured in order to affect the strategic defeat of the Persian navy, or Halicarnassus where he did leave the city before it was conquered and left a small force to complete the reduction. At Halicarnassus, however, he had completed much of that siege himself before moving on.

  Alexander’s advanced force marched towards Aornus slowly. In reality it was more for reconnaissance than in any real belief that this force would capture the fortress, and events bear this out. Over the course of a day or two it made a number of small and slow advances, stopping each time at a convenient and safe point. This indicates two things. Firstly, that Alexander was cautious of being ambushed by the defenders; Indians in a number of cities had shown themselves willing to sally from their defences if they saw the opportunity to inflict heavy losses on the attacker. Secondly, Alexander was investigating the terrain and topography of the area thoroughly, looking for a potential means of attack, however unorthodox, including back routes to the summit and so on.

  During one of these pauses, Alexander was approached by a number of natives who, in return for his protection, would guide him to the most vulnerable point of the fortress. This proved to be a ridge that overlooked the Rock fortress, a ridge now called Bar-Sar. Alexander, of course, immediately accepted the offer and ordered Ptolemy with a hand picked force consisting of the Agrianians, a detachment of hypaspists and ‘the other light armed units’, probably the archers, to occupy the ridge, fortify it and inform the king by signal when this was complete. In order that the defenders remained unaware that Alexander had discovered this higher ridge, Ptolemy was ordered to march at night and without the benefit of torches; we can only imagine how dangerous this kind of operation was on these rocky slopes.

  Whatever the dangers, Ptolemy was successful in first gaining, and then securing the heights with a ditch and stockade, and early the following morning sent a fire signal to Alexander that he was in position. Alexander was already prepared to make a frontal assault, and as soon as he saw Ptolemy’s signal, he ordered the advance. Alexander’s frontal assault was fought at close quarters and the Indians must, therefore, have left the relative safety of Pir-Sar and occupied what is now called the Danda-Nurdai spur, adjacent to Pir-Sar.226 The skirmish was brief and bloody; Alexander encountered tremendous difficulty from the terrain and the Indians fought stoutly, driving back the attackers. In Arrian’s words, Alexander’s assault ‘achieved nothing’. As soon as Alexander’s assault was stopped, the Indians turned their attention to Ptolemy’s force that was occupying the ridge. They realized the strategic importance of this area, and it should be considered a significant tactical error that they had not secured it before Alexander’s arrival. The Indian assault on the stockade is vividly described by Arrian:227

  They moved to the attack, and there was a fierce struggle, the Indians doing all they could to tear down the stockade, while Ptolemy fought to maintain his hold. The weight of the Macedonian missiles overpowered the Indians, who at nightfall were forced to withdraw.

  It was clear to Alexander that another frontal assault would have the same effect, and he could not afford a siege of attrition. Arrian does not make it clear why the assault failed so badly, simply noting the difficulties in the terrain. Diodorus and Curtius both mention a ravine at the foot of the rock, now called the Burimar Ravine, which goes a long way to explaining the difficulty.228

  The night after the failed frontal assault, Alexander selected one of several Indian deserters, or more likely one of his local guides who had special knowledge of the area, to carry a message to Ptolemy. Ptolemy was ordered not simply to be happy to maintain his defensive position, but to assault the enemy at a prearranged signal. The intention was to link the two forces and offer the Indians a coordinated two pronged assault, an identical tactic of attacking the enemy in more than one direction that we see repeatedly through Alexander’s career.

  At dawn of the following day, Alexander, with a picked detachment of troops, began to march along the same track that Ptolemy had used a week earlier to reach Bar-Sar. By attempting to link up his two forces he believed that the assault would be carried far more effectively. It would also allow him to further reinforce the heights with fresh troops. The morning’s fighting was again difficult and many more died on both sides. The Indians used the natural defence of being higher than the attackers to launch missiles of all kinds (arrows, rocks etc.) against the attackers in a desperate attempt to drive them off. By noon, after a morning of hard fighting, Alexander made contact with Ptolemy; the now reunited force together began an assault on the fortress. The assault was again a failure and was abandoned, probably along with Bar-Sar.

  In order for Alexander to make a successful frontal assault again, the ravine needed to be bridged to allow catapults to be brought to bear against the defenders. This was a tried and tested tactic of Alexander that he had used repeatedly at earlier sieges: if a natural obstacle stood in the way, remove it. We see many examples of this, first at Tyre, and then on several occasions in Bactria, Sogdiana and now in India. The sources all speak in terms of the ravine being filled rather than bridged, but the shear volume of space that would have to be filled surely precludes this possibility. A bridge spanning the gap would be a major engineering feat, but more practical than filling the ravine.

  Alexander ordered the trees in a nearby forest to be stripped, felled and hauled to the ravine with a view to constructing a bridge across the 450m chasm, and avoiding the 180m drop, Alexander as always leading the way by felling the first tree. Curtius tells us that the bridge was constructed within seven days of Alexander felling that first tree; this seems a remarkable rate of construction, although Arrian seems to be faster still:229

  During the first day the earthwork was carried forward about 180m; by the second, slingers and catapults operating from the portion already completed were able to check enemy raids on the men still working; within
three days the entire space was filled.

  In reality what Arrian is telling us is that after four days, the work was advanced enough for the defenders to be engaged, but that work continued after that point. Thus Curtius’ seven days (or perhaps more) is feasible.

  In an echo of the successful tactic at the Sogdian Rock, Alexander ordered the archers, Agrianians and thirty of the bravest young men to scale the cliffs in order to regain the heights above Pir-Sar. This time the attempt was made during the day, and the Indians were expecting it and had prepared their missile troops to pepper the mountaineers. Missiles of all kinds rained down upon them, and many slipped from the cliffs into the fast-flowing waters below. Slowly, after a long and arduous climb with the ever present danger of slipping to their death, or being struck by missiles launched by the defenders, more and more troops gained the heights and began to engage the Indians in hand-to-hand combat. Alexander’s use of archers on this mission was important as they could return fire as the Agrianians fought their way to Bar-Sar. Gradually the Indians were forced from the heights and the Agrianians secured their objective, which was again now fortified with a stockade, as Ptolemy had done earlier.