A credible threat refers to the source. What makes a source credible? Generally, if the source has in the past provided specific (see above) information that has turned out to be correct, then it is credible. Usually, a credible source is a foreign government, as was the case for the 9/10/11 threat, according to U.S. officials. Another source of credible information: a terrorist or bad guy recently apprehended, who may feel some incentive to provide accurate information to interrogators.
What about uncorroborated or unconfirmed? These terms are mostly interchangeable. It means that the government’s massive global surveillance network has not intercepted or yet processed any information that correlates to the specific details provided by the source. That is to say, the National Security Agency has not intercepted a phone conversation that provides verification; liaison services haven’t picked up the same information; a cursory link analysis of names, financial transactions, transits to and from the United States, and other data searched with reference to the terms associated with the specific threat has not resulted in any pattern than would corroborate the threat. Or as a senior FBI agent who works counterterrorism cases told the authors, “We call something uncorroborated when it meets other thresholds but we haven’t proven it to be false.”
Why the government can’t—or won’t—explain this is not obvious. It may be that counterterrorism specialists simply don’t know how to effectively communicate often sophisticated information in an accessible manner. It may be that some within the intelligence community believe that providing even such basic definitions would compromise sources and methods. (If that’s the reason, then only the president can change the communication posture.)
A major source of post-9/11 tension between the FBI and the New York Police Department has been the NYPD’s decision to better communicate with New Yorkers about threats. The FBI wants to be general. Ray Kelly, commissioner of the NYPD, and Michael Bloomberg, the mayor of New York, want to be specific. This is one reason the NYPD wants the FBI to have a presence at its press conferences, but also a reason the FBI rarely gives a statement.
To the Obama administration’s credit, when word of the September 10 threat first leaked (and a government official says that there was no plan to divulge the information precisely because there was nothing that Americans could do with it), the Department of Homeland Security released a very short statement confirming the threat. The spokesman used the aforementioned confusing set of words, but he also tried to put them into context, pointing out that as “we always do before important dates like the anniversary of 9/11, we will undoubtedly get more reporting in the coming days. Sometimes this reporting is credible and warrants intense focus; other times it lacks credibility and is highly unlikely to be reflective of real plots under way.”
Transparency is generally a good thing. And it is very difficult to keep the existence of a credible threat from the American people, which is also a good thing. Part of our implicit bargain between the government and the governed is the state’s responsibility to treat us as adults when it comes to the level of danger we face going about our daily lives.
Complicating matters, in the post-9/11 rush to share information, plenty of inaccurate details got out. Bad information adds to the collective anxiety we all feel when cable networks flash their “Breaking News” banners. Just as bad is a slow trickle of accurate details, which can compromise an active investigation. (Special agents don’t necessarily want potential attackers to know how close an arrest looms.)
When it comes to real potential terrorist threats, it is reasonable to expect the government—the people who know as much as there is to know—to keep some things secret, and it is reasonable for us to allow them the discretion to do so. That’s the public’s end of the bargain. But the government is obliged to present a case with due diligence and to make sure that when it does communicate, whether to clarify leaks or simply to inform, that it makes a good-faith effort to ensure that the end result is a shared understanding.
When he became the principal deputy director of national intelligence (PDDNI),∗ David Gompert set out to institute precisely this approach. He believed that the intelligence community had to keep faith with the public, which had granted the secret world an enormous amount of power. He wanted the national security establishment to incorporate among its procedures the requirement to share as much information with the American people as possible. It is their intelligence agencies, after all. It’s their values that are reflected in intelligence community operations. But Gompert received no support from his colleagues, and his ideas died.6
Still, that forward thinkers like Gompert can make it to the highest echelons of government suggests that the national security establishment is beginning to understand the value of effective communication with the public. That it is far better to preempt irresponsible activists like WikiLeaks, and easier to co-opt (from their perspective) the responsible ones, like the New York Times. The only way for the government to keep secrets from being stolen is to proactively give them away.
The press, which gets a bad reputation among the majority of high-level secret keepers, is due for a reckoning. The generation of Americans who will produce the judges who decide secrecy cases twenty years from now will not remember Watergate. They will not see national security journalists as serving a special, if informal, function, because newspapers—even highly respected ones—will be as ancient as papyrus scrolls. Already, this generation actively mistrusts the press.7 They will likely be less willing to allow broad interpretations of normative concepts, which means that partisan politics will certainly intrude on secrecy cases in the future.
Journalists of today share their craft with the likes of WikiLeaks. They compete with WikiLeaks for the same information. We can use words like reputation and quality and context ad infinitum, but there is no useful (or legal) way to distinguish between what WikiLeaks does and what Dana Priest does. Presently, most Americans intuitively understand that Priest is performing a public service, whereas WikiLeaks is—well, we’re still not sure.
Julian Assange understands this changing world. As we’ve demonstrated, WikiLeaks took advantage of the New York Times’s access to the government as a way to negotiate and bargain and claim legitimacy. He knew that the world wasn’t ready for unmediated information, and that the institutions of old still matter. In the future, this may change.
Another powerful check on secrecy is the budget cuts to the national security establishment. (Perhaps “cuts” isn’t the right word, as it implies a pair of scissors. Economic and political forces are so aligning as to suggest a harvester.) The intelligence community will have to justify everything it does, and not just to Congress. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) decided on its fiftieth anniversary to open the barn door and give journalists an unprecedented briefing about its programs and some of its special projects. Of course there were things that NRO didn’t disclose, but they have invited more scrutiny—respectful and orderly scrutiny—that may redound to their benefit, and to ours.
Yet another check we’ve discovered is that the reputation of a national security entity rests on how well its policies work and how they are presented. As we’ve noted, it may well have been necessary for the NSA to create its special programs after the attacks on September 11, 2001, but it did so at the cost of reputation. It remains to be seen how rapidly the agency adapts to its next big mission: to protect the country from massive, crippling cyber attacks.
Openness is coming. Whether it’s a press demonstration at NRO headquarters in Chantilly or curious tourists in Dam Neck, it’s coming. The implicit bargain between the government and the governed will have certain terms renegotiated. The hidden hand that controls secrecy policy is really one side of a handshake, and trust is the essential condition.
∗Pronounced “P-Didney.” Really.
Notes
1. Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, Information Security Oversight Office, http://www.archives.gov/isoo/overs
ight-groups/iscap/index.html; Mandatory Declassification Review Appeals, Information Security Oversight Office, http://www.archives.gov/isoo/oversight-groups/iscap/mdr-appeals.html; National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/index.html.
2. Office of the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Memorandum, Subject: “Changing the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to an Overt Organization,” July 30, 1992, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB35/17-01.htm.
3. Tim Shorrock, “Out of Service,” Mother Jones, September-October 2009, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/09/out-service.
4. Barton Gellman, “Revealing a Reporter’s Relationship with Secrecy and Sources,” excerpts from lectures, http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reportsitem.aspx?id=100824.
5. Ibid.
6. Interview with David Gompert, April 2011.
7. Lymari Morales, “Americans Regain Some Confidence in Newspapers, TV News,” Gallup, June 27, 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/148250/americans-regain-confidence-newspapers-news.aspx. Note: eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds have seen a ten-point drop in year-to-year confidence in newspapers.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A number of officials agreed to be interviewed on the record, including James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence; Michael Morrell, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and Bill Leonard, Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. To them, and to the one-hundred-plus current and former government officials who worked with us—including several sitting cabinet members, military flag and general officers, and outside consultants—thank you for your time and encouragement.
Many public affairs officers were as helpful as they could be, given the subject matter. We appreciate those who balance a duty to their oaths and a responsibility to history and to truth. They include Preston Golson and his colleagues at the Central Intelligence Agency Office of Public Affairs; Lt. Col. James Gregory, the spokesperson for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Col. Tim Nye and Kenneth McGraw of U.S. Special Operations Command; Todd Breasseale, George Little, Doug Wilson, Carl Woog, and Rear Admiral John Kirby in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Michael Allen, staff director for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, put together an unclassified briefing for us on the intelligence budget, which proved quite helpful. David Grannis, the staff director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, patiently answered many questions about process and procedure.
The White House was no help at all. We acknowledge their silence, despite our numerous attempts to discuss a range of issues, both sensitive and mundane, about secrecy.
Bill Arkin was collecting information about government secrecy before we were born. All writers in this field stand on his shoulders. His most recent work, Top Secret America, written with Dana Priest, draws different conclusions than we do, but it proved extremely helpful, as did Arkin’s 2005 opus, Code Names. We found many useful documents on such websites as Cryptome, PublicIntelligence.net, Cryptocomb, and Government Attic. John Young, Deborah Natsios, Michael Ravnitzky, and their peers provide an invaluable service.
We can’t overstate the insight, help, and guidance offered by Julian Sanchez of the Cato Institute, Gabriel Schoenfeld, Richard Gid Powers, Jon Eisenberg, Amy Zegart, Yochi Dreazen, Barton Gellman, Dafna Linzer, Matthew Aid, Shane Harris, Jennifer Sims, David Gomez, Matthew A. Miller, Kris Gallagher, John Gresham, Bob Gourley, Lewis Shepherd, James Lewis, Frank Blanco, Robert Chesney, Ben Wittes, Ken Gude, Mieke Eoyang, Chris Jordan, Michele Malvesti, and the staff of the National Security Archive at George Washington University.
This book benefitted tremendously from the supreme research skills of Adam Rawnsley. His encyclopedic knowledge of the subject matter, and meticulous methods and information-gathering added significant value to the book.
At FinePrint Literary Management, Janet Reid took us from a one-paragraph concept to a completed manuscript. We are grateful for her insight and guidance. At John Wiley & Sons, Eric Nelson sharpened arguments, challenged assertions, and turned the manuscript into a book. It was our great fortune to work alongside him for over a year. Lisa Burstiner and her team, who copy edited this and The Command: Deep Inside the President’s Secret Army, have our sincerest thanks.
The Fund for Investigative Journalism provided a grant that helped make this book possible. Thank you for assisting us, and for all the things you do to bring the truth to light, and make the world a more just place.
INDEX
Abdullah (king of Saudi Arabia)
Abdul-Rahman al-Iraqi, Abu
Abramson, Jill
Ackerman, Spencer
“active defense”
Adams, John
Addington, David
Afghanistan War
Cross Functional Teams
executive power and
Flynn and
JSOC role in
NSA and
“Salt Pit”
social media used by soldiers
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud
Aid, Matthew
Air Force One
American Black Chamber
American Black Chamber, The (Yardley)
American Civil Liberties Union
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)
Amory, Robert
Area 51
Areeda, Phillip
Arkin, William
Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA)
Asad, Bashar, al-
Ashcroft, John
A-Space
Assange, Julian
AT&T
Awlaki, Abdulrahman, al
Awlaki, Anwar, al
Babbin, Jed
Baginski, Maureen
Baker, James
Baldwin, Hanson
Baltimore Sun
Bamford, James
Bash, Jeremy
Bazari, Haj al-
Beckwith, Charlie
BellSouth
Ben Ali, Zine El Abidine
Benjamin, Daniel
Bigelow, Katherine
BIGOT
Billingslea, Marshall
bin Laden, Osama, identity confirmed. See also Operation Neptune’s Spear
Bissell, Richard
“black bag missions”
Black Hawk Down (Bowden)
Blair, Dennis
Blair, Tony
Bloomberg, Michael
Boal, Mark
Boehner, John
Boeing
Booz Allen Hamilton
Bowden, Mark
Boyd, John
Bradbury, Steve
Brennan, John
Britain
CTU and
M15
Secret Intelligence Service
Special Air Service
U.S. intelligence cooperation with
Brookings Institution
Brown, Bryan Douglas “Doug”
Brown, Tom
“burn notice”
Burns, William
Burr, William
Bush, George H. W.
Bush, George W.
Cheney and
Continuity of Government program
cyber security policy
domestic surveillance and
Iran policy
JSOC and
McChrystal and
NSA and
partisan transparency and
press management by
Secret Service/Ahmadinejad incident
on state secrets privilege
2000 election of
Buthi, Soliman, al-
Bybee, Jay
Call Detail Records (CDRs)
Cambone, Stephen
Camp Nama (Iraq)
Carle, Glenn L.
Carlucci, Frank
Carter, Jimmy
Cartwright, James
Casey, Bill
Castro, Fidel
Cenciotti, David
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
agents
and cases officers of, defined
Area 51
Center for the Study of Intelligence
CIA/NSA Special Collection Service teams
classified information levels (See also classified information)
conspiracy theories
“covert action” and JSOC
creation of
cyber warfare
domestic surveillance (1970s)
Eisenhower and
FOIA
GREYSTONE
JSOC and
El-Masri and
McChrystal and
National Clandestine Service
National Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Requirements Tasking Center
Operation Neptune’s Spear
partisan transparency
press and confidential information
Primoris Era and
Soviet Union and
state secrets privilege
See also drone warfare
Cheney, Dick
classified information record of
Continuity of Government program
NSA and
Powell and
Chesney, Robert
China
Area 51 and
cryptography
cyber security and
cyber warfare and
press and confidential information
WikiLeaks on
Church, Frank
Church Committee
Churchill, Marlborough
Clapper, James
Clarke, Richard
classified information
Cheney and
“covert action”
cyber security and
declassification issues
FOIA process
intelligence jobs, postings
interagency competition and
levels of
“necessary secrecy”
overclassification problem of
special access programs
Special Capabilities Office
threat terminology
“unleaked” information, defined
U.S. population with security clearance
whistleblowers and
See also interrogation practices; partisan transparency; state secrets privilege
Clinton, Bill
Deep State Page 37