The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict

by Mitchell G. Bard, Ph. D.

  As the Soviets continued to pour weapons into the region, Kissinger decided that the United States could not afford to allow the Soviet Union’s allies to win the war. The secretary of state wanted to show the Arabs they could never defeat Israel with the backing of the Soviets. He also couldn’t afford to let U.S. adversaries win a victory over a U.S. ally. By sending arms to Israel, the United States could ensure an Israeli victory, hand the Soviets a defeat, and provide Washington with the leverage to influence a postwar settlement.

  * * *

  Sage Sayings

  The war has retrieved Arab honor. Even if we will be defeated now, no one can say that the Egyptian solider is not a superior fighter.

  —Egyptian chief of staff Sa’ad Shazli, October 8, 1973

  * * *

  On October 12, Nixon ordered an emergency airlift to Israel. Cargo planes carrying spare parts, tanks, bombs, and helicopters flew round-the-clock to Israel. The resupply efforts were hampered by America’s NATO allies who, capitulating to Arab threats, refused to allow American planes to use their air space. The one exception was Portugal, which as a consequence became the base for the operation. Between October 14 and November 14, 1973, 22,000 tons of equipment were transported to Israel by air and sea. The airlift alone involved 566 flights. To pay for this infusion of weapons, Nixon asked Congress for and received $2.2 billion in emergency aid for Israel.

  Although Nixon consistently denied it, U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict before, during, and after the war was clearly related to the oil question. The United States unquestionably had more leverage over Israel than it did over the Arab states. Consequently, officials believed that forcing the Israelis to make concessions would ease the pressure applied by the Arab oil producers.

  The View from Egypt

  In the greatest tank battle since the Germans and Russians fought at Kursk in World War II, roughly 1,000 Israeli and Egyptian tanks massed in the western Sinai from October 12 through 14. On October 14, Israeli forces destroyed 250 Egyptian tanks in the first 2 hours of fighting. By late afternoon, the Israeli forces had routed the enemy, accomplishing a feat equal to Montgomery’s victory over Rommel in World War II.

  Meanwhile, Israeli General Ariel Sharon had been chomping at the bit to cross the Suez Canal but had been ordered not to do so until after the main Egyptian force had been defeated in the Sinai. With that mission accomplished, Israeli paratroopers snuck across the canal and established a bridgehead. By October 18, Israeli forces were marching with little opposition toward Cairo. For the Israelis, the crossing was a great psychological boost; for the Egyptians, it was a humiliation.

  About the same time, Israeli troops were on the outskirts of Damascus, easily within artillery range of the Syrian capital. Prime Minister Meir did not want to attack Damascus, so the IDF stopped its advance and focused its activities on recapturing Mount Hermon—the highest peak in the region and a key Israeli radar and observation post that had fallen to the Syrians early in the fighting. On October 22, Israel once again controlled the Golan Heights.

  The Brink of Nuclear War

  As Israeli troops began to advance on Damascus, the Soviets started to panic. On October 12, the Soviet ambassador informed Kissinger that his government was placing troops on alert to defend Damascus. The situation grew even more tense over the next two weeks, as Israeli forces reversed the initial Egyptian gains in the Sinai and began to threaten Cairo. The Egyptian Third Army was surrounded, and Israel would not allow the Red Cross to bring in supplies. At this point, Sadat began to seek Soviet help in pressing Israel to accept a cease-fire.

  On October 24, the Soviets threatened to intervene in the fighting. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that the Soviet airlift to Egypt had stopped and that it was possible the planes were being prepared to change the cargo from weapons to troops. Responding to the Soviet threat, Nixon put the U.S. military on alert, increasing its readiness for the deployment of conventional and nuclear forces.

  The United States was in the midst of the political upheaval of the Watergate scandal, and some people believed Nixon was trying to divert attention from his political problems at home, but the danger of a U.S.–Soviet conflict was real. In fact, this was probably the closest the superpowers ever came to a nuclear war other than the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Fortunately, the Soviets backed down and never sent troops to fight.

  Saving the Losers

  The Soviet Union showed no interest in initiating peacemaking efforts, so long as it looked like the Arabs might win. The same was true for UN secretary-general Kurt Waldheim. After the situation on the battlefield changed in Israel’s favor, however, desperate calls were made for the fighting to end.

  * * *

  Ask the Sphinx

  Israel lost 114 planes during the war—only 20 in aerial combat. Israeli pilots shot down at least 450 Arab aircraft in dogfights.

  * * *

  On October 22, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 338 calling for “all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately.” The resolution also called for the implementation of Resolution 242 (see Chapter 15). The vote came on the day that Israeli forces cut off and isolated the Egyptian Third Army and were in a position to destroy it.

  Israel reluctantly complied with the cease-fire, largely because of U.S. pressure, but also because the next military moves would have been to attack the two Arab capitals, something few believed would be politically wise. By the end of the fighting, 2,688 Israeli soldiers had been killed. Combat deaths for Egypt and Syria totaled 7,700 and 3,500, respectively.

  * * *

  Mysteries of the Desert

  After the war, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates pledged billions of dollars in economic and military aid to the front-line parties in the conflict with Israel—Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and the PLO. The oil producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, went on their own arms-buying binge. The Saudis purchased some of America’s most sophisticated weapons, over the objections of the Israeli lobby.

  * * *

  Disengagement Has a Ring to It

  Ironically, the United States had helped save Israel by its resupply effort—and then rescued Egypt by forcing Israel to accept the cease-fire. Henry Kissinger had used U.S. power and diplomacy to try to bring about a war result that would allow Egyptians to erase the stain of 1967 without allowing them to win or Israel to humiliate them again.

  In January 1974, Israel and Egypt negotiated a disengagement agreement thanks to Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy—so named because he flew back and forth between the two countries with American suggestions, as well as offers and counteroffers from the two governments. The Sinai I accord allowed the Egyptians to retain control of the Suez Canal, freed the Third Army, and drew a cease-fire line on the east side of the canal, with a buffer zone between the two forces.

  A second disengagement agreement (Sinai II) was signed in September 1975, which called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from two strategic passes in the Sinai and some surrounding territory. The Egyptians were not allowed back into this neutral zone. Instead, U.S. peacekeepers were deployed to monitor the area.

  Syria Fronts for the Rejectionists

  The negotiations with the Syrians were more tortuous. It was not until May 1974 that a separation of forces agreement was signed that created a UN–policed buffer zone, a reduction in troop deployment, and the return of the town of Kuneitra to Syria. And that came only after a renewal of fighting in March. Syria fired artillery at Israeli positions between March and May, during which 37 more Israeli soldiers were killed.

  The United States rewarded Syria for the agreement with a modest grant of financial assistance—the first in 30 years—in hopes of building a new relationship with the regime of Hafez Assad and encouraging him to negotiate a peace agreement. As Nixon’s successors would also discover, Assad was happy to take whatever the United States was willing to offer, but he gave nothi
ng in return. Rather than join the peace process, Assad became one of the leaders of the Rejectionist Front.

  * * *

  Hieroglyphics

  The Rejectionist Front consisted of Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, and the PLO. Today the first four remain the principal Arab opponents of peace with Israel. Once divided, Yemen is now united.

  * * *

  Assad was also determined to impede Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. He feared that an agreement between them would reduce Egypt’s willingness to fight for the Arab cause and that Sadat would accept a separate deal with Israel that would not address Syrian grievances.

  Israel’s Political Earthquake

  The fact that the Arabs had succeeded in surprising the IDF and inflicting heavy losses in the early part of the war against the supposedly invincible Israeli army was a traumatic experience for Israel. Its government reacted to the public’s calls for an inquiry by establishing a commission chaired by Shimon Agranat, the president of Israel’s Supreme Court.

  The Agranat Commission concluded that Israeli intelligence had sufficient warning of the impending attack, but, for a variety of reasons, had failed to interpret the information correctly. Chief of Staff Elazar bore the brunt of the commission’s blame and resigned. The commission did not assess the role of Prime Minister Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, but the public viewed them as the officials who were actually responsible for the mistakes that were made.

  The public was angered by what many viewed as scapegoating career military officials for the mistakes of their political leaders. This outrage ultimately led Meir to resign. Dayan would have been the logical heir, but his reputation was now in tatters. The alternatives of the dominant Labor Party for a successor came down to a choice between two very different men. One, Minister of Information Shimon Peres, was a popular nonmilitary man who had played a key role in building the nation’s military might through his diplomatic skills. The other was Yitzhak Rabin, a native-born Israeli and military leader from the days of the Haganah (see Chapter 6), who had served as chief of staff during the Six-Day War and later as ambassador to Washington. In a tight election that fueled a 20-year political rivalry, Rabin was chosen to be prime minister.

  The PLO Goes Legit

  When Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) believed it would be the beneficiary of a new base of Arab attack. The Palestinian territories are close to Israel’s population centers and could be the focal point of armed resistance. The PLO also expected the Arab citizens of Israel would rise up against the Jews and join in a popular uprising. It didn’t happen.

  Little Support from the Territories

  In the first decade of Israel’s administration of the territories, the Palestinians could not muster any serious resistance for a variety of reasons. One was that the general population lacked the will to do so. Another was that Israel’s military kept tight control over the areas. Israel also had excellent intelligence, thanks to informers and agents who infiltrated the refugee camps and terrorist cells.

  The Palestinians living in Israel never lost their Palestinian identity, but they also never felt compelled to challenge the government. These Palestinians, after all, had chosen to stay and become citizens of Israel rather than flee.

  Arab citizens of Israel are treated equally under the law. (Arabic and Hebrew are official languages.) Israeli Arabs have the right to vote and even pro-PLO representatives have served in the Knesset. Arabs have also served in the cabinet, foreign ministry, and the Supreme Court. The only difference between Jewish and Arab citizens is that most of the latter are exempt from military service. This exception was adopted because of security concerns and out of sensitivity over the possibility of an Israeli Arab having to fight an Arab relative. The Israeli Arabs have generally not objected, but they are upset by discrimination in other areas, such as government funding for their municipalities and institutions, and they have periodically protested land seizures, commemorated incidents in Palestinian history, and expressed dissatisfaction with the government’s foreign policy.

  Although they feel they are treated as second-class citizens, their lives were still much better than those of the Arabs in most of the surrounding states, and they never acted against Israel, even during wartime. Disparities remain, but the gaps between Jews and non-Jews have significantly narrowed in many areas.

  Arafat, the Diplomat

  After the Arab armies were defeated yet again on the battlefield, PLO leader Yasser Arafat decided it was necessary to alter his strategy. The PLO remained committed to the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle, but decided to shift from strictly terrorist activities to waging a diplomatic war against Israel.

  Up to this point, the PLO was seen largely as a card the Arab countries could play in the broader conflict. In October 1974, however, the Arab states decided to recognize the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This gave the organization an immediate political authenticity that was further bolstered by its international recognition by the United Nations, which invited Arafat to address the General Assembly on November 13.

  The Israelis certainly weren’t thrilled by the global community’s changing attitude toward the PLO. Now it would be necessary to fight the PLO on two fronts: military and political.

  Jordan’s King Hussein wasn’t much happier than the Israelis. Although he had little choice but to go along with the Arab consensus, the recognition of the PLO essentially marked the end of his hope to regain the West Bank and Jerusalem, and took the power to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians out of his hands.

  * * *

  Mysteries of the Desert

  Although the PLO launched a diplomatic offensive to convince the international community that it was interested only in gaining sovereignty over the occupied territories, Palestinian documents, rhetoric (which was uncompromising before Arabic-speaking audiences and conciliatory before English speakers), and policy called for the liberation of the occupied territories first, followed by the reconquest of the rest of Palestine. This strategy of stages is reflected to this day by the PLO and Palestinian Authority insignia, which show a map of Palestine that incorporates Israel.

  * * *

  War Outside Palestine

  By the end of the war, it had already become fashionable to refer to the Arab-Israeli conflict as the cause of all instability in the Middle East. The Palestinians insisted it was the failure to resolve their grievances that was the root of all evil in the region. Policymakers, the press, and pro-Arab scholars all repeated this mantra, as did the Arabists at the state department. The Nixon administration, like those that would follow, behaved as though this were true by focusing its Middle East policy on a “comprehensive” Arab-Israeli peace settlement.

  * * *

  Mysteries of the Desert

  On November 10, 1975, the credibility of the United Nations was seriously damaged when the General Assembly adopted a resolution defining Zionism as “a form of racism and racial discrimination.” U.S. delegate Daniel Moynihan said “the United States…does not acknowledge, it will not abide by, it will never acquiesce in this infamous act.” The resolution was eventually repealed on December 16, 1991.

  * * *

  The problem with this view was that it was patently false, as anyone who paid attention to anything else going on in the region could plainly see. All sorts of conflicts were brewing or exploding that had nothing whatsoever to do with Israel or the Palestinians. These included a Kurdish revolt in Iraq, tensions between Iran and Iraq, growing sectarian violence in Lebanon, and increasing repression inside Iran.

  The Least You Need to Know

  Israel ignored Egypt’s threats until it was too late, leading to devastating losses when Egypt and Syria invaded on Judaism’s holiest day, Yom Kippur.

  The Arab oil producers imposed an embargo that failed to undermine American support for Israel, but ultimately altered U.S
. energy policy.

  The Soviet Union resupplied the Arabs, prompting a superpower face-off.

  The 1973 war helped the Arabs regain their pride, but traumatized the Israelis; Golda Meir resigned.

  Failing in its terrorist campaign to liberate Palestine, the PLO attempted to fight on the diplomatic battleground as well.

  Chapter 17

  Peace at Last

  In This Chapter

  Israel confronts the dilemmas of holding the territories

  Carter seeks to fulfill a prophecy

  Sadat boldly goes where no one has gone before

  Campers make peace

  Perhaps the most important shift in the region in the last half of the 1970s was Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s move toward the Western camp. After more than two decades of trying to woo the Egyptians, the United States finally found a leader there who was amenable to courtship. Despite the opposition of the Israeli lobby, the United States began to provide Egypt with arms and aid to encourage Sadat to consider a peace agreement with Israel. Nevertheless, neither U.S. presidents Nixon nor Ford could convince Sadat to offer the kind of peace that would allow Israel to not make further territorial concessions. For the time being, Sadat insisted on the return of Egyptian territory, and he was not prepared to concede anything.

  By the late 1970s, the Israelis were growing tired of their administration of the West Bank and Gaza, and the desire to solve the Palestinian problem became stronger. Young Israelis performing their required military service were stationed in the territories and found their jobs increasingly distasteful. They had to maintain order, protect the burgeoning number of Jewish settlements near Palestinian population centers, and counter terrorist threats. The drain on the IDF’s resources also posed a threat to Israeli military readiness should another war break out.