The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict

by Mitchell G. Bard, Ph. D.

  Oil Blackmail

  Although the Arab oil embargo ended in 1974, its repercussions continued to be felt for the remainder of the decade. The Carter administration believed it could buy moderation from the Saudis and other Arab oil producers by plying them with weapons. Thus, in 1978, Carter decided to sell advanced fighter planes to the Saudis, provoking an all-out lobbying war in Congress between the administration, defense industry, and Arab lobby on one side, and the Israeli lobby and its supporters on the other.

  Carter cleverly decided to offer the Saudis F-15 fighter planes as part of a package that included less sophisticated planes for Egypt and all the F-15s and F-16s the Israelis requested. The president insisted that the package be approved as a whole, thereby making it impossible for Israel to get what it wanted without acquiescing to the sale to the Arabs.

  * * *

  Tut Tut!

  The rationale for the sale of jets to the Saudis was that it would encourage them to support the peace process, cooperate with the United States on strategic issues, and be a force for moderation within OPEC. Instead, the Saudis vigorously opposed the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations, disagreed with the United States as to the most pressing regional threats, and used their clout to help triple oil prices.

  * * *

  In the end, Carter agreed to place some limitations on the equipment provided to the Saudis and sold the Israelis additional planes. These compromises were sufficient to win Congressional approval of the sale. The battle had severely strained relations between the President and the Israeli lobby and also was a distraction from the peace process, which became further sidetracked by events in Lebanon.

  Israel’s Slippery Slope

  After intervening in the Lebanese civil war, the Syrians decided not to move their troops too far south to avoid provoking Israel. This relieved Israel of the immediate threat of a conflict with them, but the lack of any authority in the region created a new danger. Palestinians south of the Litani River in southern Lebanon turned their fire on Israel. The PLO had been operating from there for some time, and the Syrians saw no reason to discourage them from continuing to do so.

  By 1978, terrorist infiltrations from Lebanon had become intolerable. After a PLO terrorist attack on 2 buses near Tel Aviv in which 37 civilians were murdered and 76 wounded, Israel decided to act, invading Lebanon in March and advancing to the Litani River. Under pressure from the United States and the United Nations, Israel agreed to withdraw, leaving control of the area in the hands of a Christian Lebanese army, which the Israelis then supported with arms and financial aid.

  In addition, the UN created a multinational peacekeeping force, UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), to act as a buffer between the belligerents, but it proved to be ineffective in preventing terrorist attacks against Israel. The peacekeepers were meant to be an “interim” force; however, they have now been in Lebanon for more than two decades.

  Camping with Jimmy

  Sadat had not reacted to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon as negatively as many expected. This encouraged Begin, who continued to offer to withdraw from most of the Sinai and even parts of the West Bank and Gaza that had large Arab populations. Neither Sadat nor Carter was satisfied, however, with these concessions. Both wanted more.

  Talks continued despite growing tensions between the parties, but it became evident to Carter that the only way to achieve a breakthrough was to take the kind of dramatic step Sadat had done with his trip to Jerusalem. Carter decided to invite the Israeli and Egyptian leaders to Camp David for a summit meeting.

  On September 5, 1978, the three heads of state arrived by helicopter. A news blackout was subsequently imposed for the duration of the talks. Initially, the Israelis and Egyptians negotiated with the Americans, rather than each other. In their first trilateral meeting, Sadat offered a very hard-line peace plan, which Begin picked apart in the next meeting. Begin wasn’t much happier with Carter’s proposal that Israel freeze new settlements in the territories, and it seemed the summit would quickly break up.

  After just the second meeting between the three men on September 7, they never met together again during the summit. Instead, Carter met individually with Begin and Sadat, offering compromises and refinements to the positions of each man.

  For the next several days, the leaders and their subordinates batted ideas back and forth. Israel sought normalization of relations with Egypt without a complete withdrawal from the Sinai, while the Egyptians wanted a total withdrawal without offering complete normalization. Egypt wanted the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination recognized, and Israel opposed this as a formula for the creation of a Palestinian state run by PLO terrorists.

  By the twelfth day of the summit, Carter had nudged the parties’ positions closer to each other. Sadat finally agreed to exchange ambassadors within nine months of signing a peace treaty, a key symbol of normalization for the Israelis. He also accepted a compromise that effectively separated the requirement that Israel withdraw from the Sinai from any territorial concessions in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, or Golan Heights.

  Breakthrough!

  Begin meanwhile was willing to give up the Sinai, but would not abandon either the military bases or settlements in the desert. When it became clear this position was a deal breaker, Moshe Dayan threatened to leave if Begin did not agree to this concession. Before deciding, Begin received an unexpected call from Ariel Sharon, one of the leading hawks in his party, who told the prime minister that if withdrawing from the Sinai was the only obstacle to an agreement, he should give it up. In the meantime, the United States offered to provide financial assistance to help Israel rebuild its air bases in the Negev. Begin then agreed to dismantle the bases and settlements, provided that the decision was approved by the Knesset.

  Israel also agreed to recognize the rights of the Palestinians. In a move to satisfy Israeli concerns over Palestinian representation and Arab criticism that he was selling them out, Sadat consented to represent the Palestinians in consultation with the Jordanians and Palestinian representatives.

  A major source of dissension between the United States and Israel occurred over the question of settlements. Carter believed that Begin had committed to freeze settlements until autonomy talks were completed; however, the Israeli leader maintained he had approved only a three-month freeze. Although Begin stuck to his interpretation and fulfilled that commitment, Carter remained angry and was convinced for the duration of his presidency that he’d been betrayed.

  A last snag arose over the issue of Jerusalem. An American draft said that the United States considered East Jerusalem to be occupied territory, and the Israelis would not accept this, interpreting it to mean that they would be forced to withdraw from their capital. Ultimately, the Americans agreed to an exchange of letters stating each party’s position. The United States’s letter simply restated the positions of its three previous UN ambassadors.

  Camp David Accords

  On September 17, Carter, Begin, and Sadat signed two agreements that came to be known as the Camp David Accords:

  The first laid out Israel’s commitment to withdraw from all the Sinai within three years in exchange for the normalization of relations.

  The second described a five-year transition period during which arrangements would be made to give the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip autonomy. By the third year of the transition period, negotiations would begin to determine the final status of the territories.

  The agreements represented a monumental shift in Middle East relations. Begin had made the startling concessions of not only the entire Sinai, with its settlements and military bases, but also agreed to withdraw from parts of the West Bank and grant the Palestinians a measure of self-rule. In exchange for these tangible compromises, Israel received nothing more than Egyptian promises of a new peaceful relationship—but those commitments were the fulfillment of a 30-year dream.

  Trick or Treaty

  Carter expected the Camp Da
vid Accords to be the catalyst to the comprehensive peace he sought. The other Arab leaders made clear that he was mistaken when everyone, including the supposed moderates in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, excoriated Sadat for making a separate peace. To assuage their anger, Carter made a number of statements that supported their positions on key issues, such as the status of Jerusalem and the occupied territories. This did not win any new support from the Arabs and only succeeded in angering the Israelis.

  Six More Months

  With the prospects of broader negotiations being remote, Carter focused on nailing down a final peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. This time, instead of two weeks, it took six months of torturous discussions. These talks were complicated by a variety of factors:

  Begin and Carter were constantly at odds over the settlements and other issues.

  The Arab states continued to condemn the Camp David agreements and warned that Egypt would be suspended from the Arab League, the League headquarters moved from Cairo, and other sanctions imposed if Sadat signed a peace agreement with Israel.

  OPEC states continued to raise oil prices.

  Iran was becoming increasingly unstable and its pro-American ruler, the Shah, was forced to leave the country, distracting Carter’s attention.

  A Treaty, at Last

  As the months dragged on and it looked more and more likely that the already signed agreements might unravel, Carter decided to again intervene directly and personally—this time by flying to the region to perform his own version of shuttle diplomacy. He arrived in Egypt on March 8 to begin consultations with Sadat. He spent almost six full days flying between Jerusalem and Cairo, trying to coax the two leaders into compromises that would complete the deal. He succeeded, and the treaty was signed on the White House lawn on March 26, 1979.

  Prime Minister Menachem Begin, President Jimmy Carter, and President Anwar Sadat after the signature of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty at the White House, March 26, 1979.

  The final treaty called for Israel to withdraw from the western half of the Sinai within nine months and from the entire Sinai within three years. Begin also agreed to withdraw earlier from El Arish and the oil fields Israel had developed in the Sinai—in exchange for Sadat’s guarantee that Egypt would allow Israel to purchase Sinai oil. Sadat also said he would exchange ambassadors with Israel and begin the process of normalizing relations.

  A key ingredient to the deal was the U.S. commitment to support Israel if Egypt violated the treaty. Carter also received approval from Congress for a total of $5 billion in economic and military assistance for both countries.

  Despite the disagreements between Begin and Carter, U.S.–Israel relations emerged from the negotiating process much more closely intertwined, with Israel enjoying greater security cooperation and higher levels of foreign assistance. Politically, however, Carter had caused irrevocable damage to his standing in the pro-Israel community by the degree of pressure he placed on Israel to make concessions, as well as for taking positions and making statements that many Israelis regarded as too pro-Arab.

  In contrast to his relations with Begin, Carter enjoyed a warm friendship with Sadat that helped the United States accomplish its long-sought goal of bringing Egypt into the pro-Western camp.

  * * *

  Ask the Sphinx

  In recognition of his willingness to join Sadat in making compromises for peace, Begin shared the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize with the Egyptian leader.

  * * *

  Israel’s High Price

  Israel—which had repeatedly been the target of shipping blockades, military assaults, and terrorist attacks staged from the area—made far greater economic and strategic sacrifices than did Egypt in order to reach a peace settlement. Although it received additional U.S. aid for withdrawing, Israel gave up much of its strategic depth in the Sinai, returning the area to a neighbor that had repeatedly used it as a launching point for attacks. Israel also relinquished direct control of its shipping lanes to and from Eilat—1,000 miles of roadways, homes, factories, hotels, health facilities, and agricultural villages.

  Bye-Bye, Territory

  Because Egypt insisted that Jewish civilians leave the Sinai, 7,000 Israelis were uprooted from their homes and businesses, which they had spent years building in the desert. This was a physically and emotionally wrenching experience, particularly for the residents of Yamit, some of whom had to be forcibly removed from their homes by soldiers.

  Israel also lost electronic early-warning stations situated on Sinai mountaintops that provided data on military movement on the western side of the Suez Canal, as well as the areas near the Gulf of Suez and the Gulf of Eilat, which were vital to its defense against an attack from the east. Israel was forced to relocate more than 170 military installations, airfields, and army bases after it withdrew.

  Bye-Bye, Oil

  By turning over the Sinai to Egypt, Israel might have given up its only chance to become energy independent. The Alma oil field in the southern Sinai, discovered and developed by Israel, was transferred to Egypt in November 1979. At the time Israel gave up this field, it had become the country’s largest single source of energy, supplying half the country’s energy needs. Israel, which estimated the value of untapped reserves in the Alma field at $100 billion, had projected that continued development there would make the country self-sufficient in energy by 1990.

  The withdrawal from the Sinai, which was completed in 1982 (except for Taba, which is explained in the accompanying sidebar), meant that Israel had given up more than 90 percent of the territories it captured in 1967. It could be argued, and some Israelis made this case, that Israel had partially, if not wholly, fulfilled its obligation under UN Resolution 242.

  * * *

  Ask the Sphinx

  In 1988, Israel relinquished Taba—a resort built by Israel in what had been a barren desert area near Eilat—to Egypt. Taba’s status had not been resolved by the Camp David Accords, and Israel insisted it should remain in its hands. When an international arbitration panel ruled in Cairo’s favor on September 29, 1988, Israel turned the town over to Egypt.

  * * *

  Israel also agreed to end military rule in the West Bank and Gaza, withdraw its troops from certain parts of the territories, and work toward Palestinian autonomy. The Begin government did this although no Palestinian Arab willing to recognize Israel came forward to speak on behalf of residents of the territories.

  Running Out of Steam

  The Israeli-Egyptian negotiations had exhausted all the parties. Begin and Sadat were confronted with widespread dissatisfaction at home because of their concessions, and the Egyptians were ostracized by their fellow Arabs. Carter was also worn down, and he had a series of other issues to confront: an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union (which was then short-circuited by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), inflation, the implosion in Iran, and his own reelection campaign.

  This situation was not conducive to negotiating autonomy for the Palestinians as was called for in the Camp David Accords. In fact, the circumstances were even worse. Begin was still committed to holding on to the territories and building settlements, Sadat did not have the authority to negotiate on the Palestinians’ behalf, and neither the Palestinians nor Jordanians would participate in autonomy talks.

  Israel further complicated matters by deciding, in July 1980, to reaffirm that Jerusalem would remain the united capital of the state. This had little practical impact, but was meant to send the political message that Israel would never make concessions on Jerusalem. This inflamed the Arab world and provoked Sadat to suspend participation in the autonomy talks.

  By now, Carter’s time had run out. He was consumed with his election campaign and freeing the American hostages in Iran. Progress toward a Palestinian-Israeli accord would have to wait for more than a decade.

  The Least You Need to Know

  A scandal brought down Rabin and the Labor Party’s dominance of Israeli politics, heralding a new era of hawkishness, whi
ch helped to accomplish peace.

  Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem altered the psychology of the Arab-Israeli conflict and paved the way to the eventual Israel-Egypt treaty.

  Carter brought Sadat and Begin together at Camp David, which led to an Israeli agreement to withdraw from the Sinai in exchange for Egypt normalizing relations.

  Begin proposed autonomy for the Palestinians in the territories, unwittingly setting in motion events that would later bring the Palestinians to the verge of statehood.

  Chapter 18

  Israel’s Vietnam

  In This Chapter

  A wacky fight over AWACS

  Israel takes out Iraq’s reactor

  Sadat is murdered

  Sharon drives Arafat from Lebanon

  When President Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981, he was viewed warily by the Arabs because of his staunch anti-communism and professed love of Israel. More than any other president since Eisenhower, Reagan sought to form alliances in the Middle East to contain the Soviet Union, but unlike his predecessors, he was willing to include Israel in the alliance. This flew in the face of arguments that ties to Israel compromised U.S. relations with the Arabs.

  Still, for all his goodwill, Reagan had an unusually difficult relationship with Israel, in part because of personal animosity toward Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, which was particularly striking, given Reagan’s well-known affability. Beyond personality, Reagan saw several Israeli actions as contrary to U.S. interests, which prompted him to punish Israel in a way no other president had ever done. And, as with Carter, a persistent source of friction would be the Israeli settlements.