The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict
Page 42
The first election held after the war and Syria’s emancipation brought longtime nationalist Shukri el-Quwatli to power. The principle concern at the time was to maintain Syria’s newly won independence, which was now threatened primarily by the Hashemite kings in Transjordan and Iraq who hoped to unite the three nations, along with Lebanon and Palestine, under their banner.
Tumultuous Times
The war over Palestine in 1948 once again was a catalyst for change as the Syrians joined the invading forces seeking to destroy Israel and replace it with an Arab state in all of Palestine were defeated. The public was angry at the humiliation. The government and army blamed each other for what was popularly viewed as a catastrophe for the Arabs. The head of the army, Colonel Husni Zaim, responded by seizing control of the government.
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Tut Tut!
Anger over events in Palestine and later Israel would frequently stir protests in Arab states that deflected attention from many of the domestic ills in those countries.
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Zaim alienated many of his supporters, however, by retreating from his support for closer ties with the Hashemites and seeking alliances with Egypt and Saudi Arabia instead. This decision, along with other missteps, provoked another military coup in August 1949 in which Zaim was executed. The new military leader, Colonel Sami Hinnawi, agreed to the creation of a new civilian government, which began to again express interest in close ties with Iraq and Jordan. To prevent the unionist movement, another army leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Adib Shishakli, deposed Hinnawi. Three governments in less than a year, and we’re not done yet.
Shishakli initially allowed a civilian government to function, but grew dissatisfied with its direction and took total control of the country in late 1951. His despotic rule provoked increasing opposition and he was finally forced by the military to resign just three years later. The old president, Hashim el-Atassi, was reinstated.
Moving to the Other Side
Opposition to the Baghdad Pact, Western support for Israel, and the Anglo-French conspiracy with Israel in the Sinai campaign all contributed to the growing popularity in Syria of socialism, communism, and pan-Arabism. When Egypt signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union, Syria followed suit, and the Syrians gradually became close allies of both governments. This culminated in February 1958 with the announcement that Egypt and Syria were uniting. This marked a temporary end of Syrian independence as it became the northern province of the United Arab Republic.
The marriage lasted barely three years. The two countries had vastly different histories, economies, and foreign policies. The bottom line for the Syrians, especially the army, was that they resented Egypt’s effort to dominate them. It was not a union of equals from Egypt’s perspective, and Egypt’s Nasser left no doubt who was calling the shots. In 1961, a group of Syrian army officers led a successful coup that resulted in a divorce with Egypt.
A civilian government was again elected to rule Syria in December 1961, but the army was not content with the results and seized control again the following March. Less than a year later, the regime changed again as the Syrian branch of the Baath Party, backed by members of the army, established a dictatorship, following the Baath’s ascendancy in Iraq by a month. The two nations subsequently concluded agreements to unify their military and economies while remaining separate nations.
Musical Governments
The revolving door turned again in February 1966 when yet another coup brought Nureddin Atassi to power. Syria subsequently became increasingly close to the Soviet Union and hostile toward the United States. Syria also took a more belligerent posture toward Israel and cross-border incidents became more frequent, leading ultimately to the 1967 war.
Syrian forces were routed in the war. The humiliating defeat did not prompt Syria to negotiate peace with Israel; rather, it stimulated even greater hostility that manifested itself in increased support for terrorist organizations. Several of the major Palestinian groups set up headquarters in Damascus, and Syria sponsored its own terrorist organization, al-Saiqa. Syria was careful, however, to maintain tight control over the terrorists and not to allow them to mount operations from Syrian territory. Doing so helped spare Syria the problems that Jordan and Lebanon faced, namely, provoking Israeli counterattacks on its territory and allowing the terrorists to create their own state within the state.
In September 1970 King Hussein decided to take action against the Palestinian terrorists in Jordan who were threatening his regime. Syria intervened on behalf of the Palestinians and sent tanks into Jordan. The Syrian minister of defense—the former commander of the air force, Hafez Assad—opposed the move and refused to use the air force to support the incursion.
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Mysteries of the Desert
The Syrian move into Jordan raised the specter of a confrontation between the superpower patrons of the two combatants. Although a U.S.–Soviet conflict did not arise, Israel played an important role. Responding to Hussein’s secret request, Israel made it clear that it would intervene on Jordan’s behalf if necessary. This deterred the Syrians from launching an all-out assault.
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Assad Takes Command
Assad claimed the debacle was a result of the government’s failure to coordinate its actions with the military and that it had strengthened Israel. Assad and his allies then forced Attasi to resign, and, within a few weeks, the defense minister had assumed control of the country. In the succeeding years, Assad skillfully solidified his power by a combination of popular moves, such as announcing that a new constitution would require that the president of the Republic be a Muslim, and by ruthless suppression of his enemies.
Under Assad, Syria became one of the Soviet Union’s closest allies and received large amounts of military and economic assistance. In October 1973, Syria joined Egypt in the surprise attack against Israel. Although it initially reclaimed the Golan Heights, Israel successfully repulsed the Syrian forces and was ultimately in a position to threaten Damascus (see Chapter 16).
Despite suffering a defeat, Syria emerged from the war with a sense of accomplishment at having demonstrated the vulnerability of the Israelis. While Anwar Sadat used this restoration of Arab honor as the basis for entering peace negotiations with Israel, Assad took the exact opposite approach, and although he agreed to a disengagement-of-forces agreement with Israel under Kissinger’s auspices in May 1974, he became a leader of the Arab Rejectionist Front.
Despite his obsession with Israel, Assad was committed to the policy of creating a Greater Syria that would include Lebanon. He got his chance to achieve his ambition when the civil war broke out in Lebanon and Assad ordered his troops to invade in April 1976, under the pretext of acting as peacekeepers. The troops began their withdrawal only in the spring of 2005. The troops’ presence enabled Syria to take effective control of the Lebanese government in the ensuing period. This also brought the Syrians into conflict, however, with Israel. With the exception of a few instances, such as the air battles during the Lebanon war in 1982 (see Chapter 18), Syria has been very careful not to directly take any action against Israel that might provoke retaliation, preferring to use terrorist groups in Lebanon as proxies to make mischief along Israel’s northern border.
Hama Rules
Although he ruled with absolute power, Assad was not without his domestic opponents. In 1982, he decided to deal with his rivals, and to do so in a way that would send the message to anyone else with thoughts of challenging his rule that he would brook no dissent. On February 2, Assad sent thousands of troops to the city of Hama to crush an uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood (more about this group in the next chapter). As many as 20,000 people may have been killed. Journalist Thomas Friedman refers to this tactic as “Hama Rules.”
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Tut Tut!
No international outcry was heard after the Syrian massacres in Hama or in Beirut. The United Nations did not condemn Syria’s actions, no investigations were called for,
and no Arab leaders came forward to condemn Assad’s actions.
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Syria applied these tactics again in October 1990, while the world was distracted by events in Kuwait. To end Christian-led opposition to Syria’s occupation of Lebanon, Syrian troops overran the Beirut stronghold of Phalangist leader General Michel Aoun. Approximately 700 people were massacred in the fighting, which eliminated the last remaining threat to Syrian dominance of Lebanon. A few months later, the Lebanese president went to Damascus to sign a treaty that allowed Syria to keep its troops in his country.
Syria Loses Its Patron
A turning point for Syria occurred with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Syrians had relied on the Soviets for more than three decades to provide financial assistance to keep their economy afloat and military hardware to threaten Israel. When the money and arms stopped flowing with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria’s economy deteriorated and its military strength declined. It remained strong enough to control Lebanon, but not to seriously threaten Israel. Syria has tried to compensate for the loss of Soviet support by seeking aid from the components of the former Soviet Union and by building alliances with other radical regimes—in particular with Iran, which now uses Damascus as the transit point for arms to Hizbollah in Lebanon. Also to offset the growing imbalance in its conventional capability vis-à-vis Israel, the Syrians have been more actively building an arsenal of unconventional chemical and biological weapons.
Assad maintained control over Syria until the end of his life. As he grew old and sick, he groomed his son, Bashar, as his successor. Hafez al-Assad died on June 10, 2000.
As planned, his son Bashar succeeded him. (Assad’s oldest son and expected heir, Basil, died in an accident in 1994.) As a young, partially Western-educated man, many people in the West held out hope that he would radically change Syria’s policy by trying to reconcile with the United States and enter peace negotiations with Israel. Instead, he has essentially continued his father’s policies and shown little evidence of moderation.
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Ask the Sphinx
Hafez Assad was the first modern Syrian leader to die of natural causes in office. The Syrian constitution then had to be amended to change the mandatory minimum age of the president from 40 to 34 to allow his son to succeed him.
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The Least You Need to Know
The Arab/Islamic world was divided into states largely at the whim of France and Britain after World War I.
The dispute over Israel/Palestine has consistently been a lightning rod for Arab countries, drawing several into repeated conflicts, and often creating domestic turmoil for their leaders.
Iraq and Syria have long tumultuous histories of violent changes of government before strongmen take charge and establish lasting dictatorships.
The independence of Arab countries was threatened by inter-Arab rivalries, and efforts to unify under the banner of Pan-Arabism failed.
Chapter 26
Shifting Arabian Sands
In This Chapter
Egypt champions unity, then goes it alone
Finally, peace with Israel
King Hussein’s balancing act
Oil changes Arabia
Egypt and its people have a long, proud history dating back to the beginning of recorded civilization, which influences their views of themselves, their neighbors, and their fellow Arabs.
Egypt also has been a strategically important area because of its location at the junction of Africa and the Middle East. Its value was enhanced after the construction of the Suez Canal in 1869, which provides a shortcut for ships operating between European ports and ports located in southern Asia, eastern Africa, and Oceania.
As the dominant imperial power in the region, Great Britain exercised significant influence over Egypt. Because of its established role, Egypt was not included in the secret wartime negotiations and the British used the country as a base of operations during World War I.
After the war, Egypt became gripped with nationalist fervor as growing numbers of Egyptians protested against the British presence in the country. As violence escalated, the British gradually came to the conclusion that it was best to end its status as a protectorate and allow Egypt to become independent. Of course, the British also reserved the right to protect their interests, especially the Suez Canal zone.
Egypt was led by King Faud (Fuad) I, who was succeeded by Farouk I in 1936. Like Faud (Fuad), Farouk was favorably disposed toward the British and signed a treaty creating an alliance that secured Britain’s interests in the Suez Canal.
Egypt’s Internal Conflict
Two competing internal movements developed over the course of WWI. One was the pro-Islamic, anti-Western Muslim Brotherhood, which was formed in 1929 by Sheikh Hassan el-Banna, and the other was the secular, anti-Western intellectuals and students drawn to communism. Both were opposed to the government, which cracked down on both of them.
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Mysteries of the Desert
A member of the Muslim Brotherhood assassinated Prime Minister Nokrashi Pasha in December 1948. A few months later, the brotherhood’s leader, Hassan el-Banna, was murdered.
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After World War II, the British and Egyptians feuded as the former were reluctant to withdraw their troops. Egypt soon became distracted by the Palestine issue and joined the invading armies that sought to destroy Israel in 1948. The defeat at the hands of Israelis was a particular humiliation for the proud Egyptians who, after all, had a population of 20 million from which to raise an army that was bested by an army of 40,000 Jews.
Despite its defeat, Egypt did not end its belligerent stance toward Israel. It blocked shipping and sent terrorists to attack Israeli targets. This would ultimately provoke the Suez War of 1956 (see Chapter 13).
Riots broke out to protest the British presence, and the Egyptian government abrogated its treaty with Great Britain. Egypt also was adopting a hostile policy toward the United States, largely because of the American support for Israel.
Revolutionary Tidings
While Egypt was in turmoil, a group of army officers was secretly plotting to overthrow the government. On July 23, 1952, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) made up of 11 officers seized power and forced King Farouk to leave the country 3 days later. Mohammed Naguib took control of the military, and Ali Maher Pasha became prime minister. They began to institute a series of social and economic reforms, but also adopted repressive measures that stifled political opposition and provoked internal dissension.
The RCC had its own internal conflicts, and one of the younger officers—who had been the real leader of the group from the beginning—gradually stripped Naguib of power and took it for himself. That officer was Lieutenant-Colonel Gamel Abdul Nasser. As Nasser came to assume power, he began to focus more attention on foreign affairs than on domestic reforms. He was particularly angered by Western influences in the Arab world and opposed the alliances that the United States was trying to promote against the Soviet Union. Still, Nasser was willing to deal with the Americans if he thought he could get something from them. In particular, Nasser was interested in obtaining arms and money to build a new dam on the Nile in the area of Aswan to provide electric power and increase the cultivable area of Egypt (see Chapter 13).
When the United States expressed reluctance about providing arms to Nasser, he began to negotiate with the Soviet Union. The United States was prepared to help fund the dam project until Eisenhower learned that Nasser had gone behind his back to the Soviets for arms. He was further angered when Egypt recognized Communist China, at which point he rescinded the U.S. offer.
Although the United States would consistently try to win his favor, Nasser never again seriously negotiated with the Americans and came to be the Soviets’ principal client in the region. Nasser also decided to finance the Aswan Dam with revenues from the Suez Canal, which he nationalized, and money that he coaxed from the Soviets. This step—along with Nasser�
�s decisions to set up a unified military command of the Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian armies—to block Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba and to send terrorists to attack Israel helped to provoke the 1956 Suez War.
All for One—as Long as It’s Nasser
After the war, Nasser focused his attention on trying to eradicate Zionism, imperialism, and feudalism. Most other Arab states shared these goals, but they were less enthusiastic about his pan-Arab ideas—especially when it became clear that Nasser wanted to dominate the unified Arab nation he sought to create. This was one of the main reasons the union with Syria (1958 to 1961) ultimately failed.
Egypt also had a brief union with Yemen, but it collapsed because of the differences between the conservative Yemeni monarchy and the revolutionary socialist Egyptian government. In 1962, the Yemeni military overthrew the monarchy and proclaimed a republic. Egypt offered assistance to the revolutionary leaders, but the Saudis decided to back the conservative monarchy in an effort to return it to power.
For Nasser and Egypt, Yemen became a quagmire. He did not extricate himself from the country until the end of 1967, after his army had been humiliated by the Israelis in the Six-Day War. Shortly after Egyptian troops withdrew from the country, the pro-Nasser government was overthrown by a group that resented Egypt’s domination of the country.