Stealing the Atom Bomb: How Denial and Deception Armed Israel

by Roger Mattson

  If Cohen was correct, Israel had enough fissile material “to conduct a full-yield nuclear test in the second half of 1966” and to assemble “virtually all the components, including the handful of nuclear cores it had, into improvised but operational explosive devices” by May 1967. Cohen maintains that the devices were plutonium fueled.251

  If plutonium had been available in 1966, and if the Dimona reprocessing facility began operating in the second half of 1965, then Israel equaled or bettered the ten months that elapsed between America’s first production of plutonium at Hanford and the Trinity test of the world’s first atom bomb, which was fueled by plutonium. In addition, Israel accomplished the feat despite “a major industrial accident . . . that took weeks to clean up.”252 That would have been a significant accomplishment by the Israelis in view of the relative sizes of the Manhattan Project (large) and the Dimona Project (much smaller). If the “improvised devices” used plutonium fuel, then most likely they were implosion weapons and Israel would have had to develop precision machining technology for both plutonium and high explosives in that same time. In addition, if Israel conducted a hydrodynamic experiment with plutonium in 1966 and had enough plutonium left over to field one or more weapons in the second half of 1966 (Cohen implies more than one), then Dimona’s production equaled or bettered the production of plutonium by the Manhattan Project (one bomb for Trinity, one bomb for Nagasaki and one spare).

  If the “improvised devices” were gun-assembled weapons fueled with HEU, the technology requirements were not as great. It would have been a much easier task to fabricate several gun-assembled atom bombs before the Six-Day War using HEU diverted from NUMEC. That approach would not have required the precision machining of explosives and pits required of implosion devices using plutonium.

  James Coates of the Chicago Tribune recounted events differently.253 He said that at the time of the Six-Day War, CIA analysts concluded,

  Israel had been working on a weapons plan based on making bomb fuel at the nation’s Dimona reactor. However, the Israelis decided it would be several years before the reactor produced bomb grade material. Fearing that Israel’s Arab adversaries would destroy the reactor before a bomb was produced, Israeli officials attempted to obtain a bomb elsewhere.

  Henry Myers, former staff member of the NRC oversight committee in the House of Representatives (chaired by Morris K. Udall, D-AZ), came to a similar conclusion in 2007 when he reviewed Cohen’s new information.254

  Cohen did not say whether the weapons’ core material was plutonium or highly enriched uranium . . . but he includes at least one suggestion that it might not have come from the Dimona plutonium-production complex. Cohen mentions March 1967 correspondence in which U.S. Ambassador to Israel Walworth Barbour “dismissed U.S. intelligence reports that asserted Israel was only weeks from the bomb,” presumably basing his assessment on progress at Dimona, which U.S. intelligence agencies were believed to be monitoring closely. If Dimona had not produced sufficient plutonium before the 1967 war for a “handful” of weapons, where did the fissile material in Israel’s first weapons come from? . . . Israel had the motive, the opportunity, and the capability to obtain HEU from NUMEC.

  This reasoning applies if the Israelis used the Apollo HEU for bombs. However, there is also the possibility that the Israelis used the HEU from Apollo to improve the performance of Dimona.

  * * *

  13 In 1978, Shapiro told Congressman Udall the amount was $135 per share.

  Chapter 7

  Desert near Dimona (1968)

  In January 1968, President Johnson entertained Prime Minister Eshkol at his Texas ranch. The president was vigorous as usual in reiterating America’s unconditional commitment to Israel’s security. In preparation for the conversation with Eshkol, the State Department told Johnson “We are reasonably, though not entirely, confident that Israel has not embarked upon a program to produce a nuclear weapon.”255 The State Department apparently discounted Ambassador Barbour’s information of a year earlier and was not privy to the information that Edward Teller had been pressing on Carl Duckett at CIA for the past year, i.e., Israel already had the bomb. And no one knew what CIA was about to find in the desert near Dimona.

  ***

  In the late 1960s, at CIA’s request, American embassy personnel in Israel stepped up their surveillance of Dimona in an attempt to detect when it first began to produce plutonium. The Americans collected environmental samples near the site for analysis in a radiochemistry laboratory. Such a lab can discern the relative abundance of various radionuclides in environmental samples. Scientists then can deduce the characteristics of the operations being conducted inside the facility that released the radioactivity in its effluents.

  Hersh told it this way, “In an attempt to determine whether the chemical reprocessing plant was in operation, the CIA began urging attaches to pick up grass and shrubs for later analysis.”256 As a senior DOE scientist told Fialka, the embassy personnel were “walking through the daisies,” collecting dust on their shoes.257 The CIA was looking for traces of fission products, including plutonium, which would appear in the environment as soon as the reprocessing facility began to operate.

  John Hadden, CIA’s station chief in Tel Aviv, told Raviv and Melman about his efforts to collect radioactive samples near Dimona. “He would make a point in driving as close as he could to the nuclear reactor and occasionally stopped his car to collect soil samples for radioactive analysis. Shin Bet was obviously tailing him, and an Israeli helicopter once landed near his automobile to stop it. Security personnel demanded to see identification, and after flashing his U.S. diplomatic passport Hadden drove off, with little doubt there were big doings at Dimona.”258 John Hadden, Jr. recalled a time in 1965 when his father took the family on a picnic in the Negev desert where the dome of the Dimona plant could be seen. While he and his siblings ate peanut butter sandwiches, John, Jr., aged 12, watched his father clip branches from the shrubbery and put them in the trunk of their car.259

  There are no public reports of whether CIA ever found plutonium near Dimona in 1968. However, there are various reports that in early 1968 CIA was surprised to find traces of HEU in the environment near Dimona. Since there were no uranium enrichment facilities in Israel at the time, the HEU in the environmental samples had to come from outside the country.

  Furthermore, radiochemical analysis of the environmental samples enabled CIA to identify the source of the uranium because the relative abundance of uranium isotopes in such a sample can be a telltale of where the uranium was enriched. All accounts of the discovery of HEU near Dimona said that the isotopic “signature” proved that some of the HEU was enriched at the AEC plant in Portsmouth, Ohio.260 Such a signature would have been readily associated with the Portsmouth plant because it was the only source of 97.7 percent enriched uranium anywhere in the world.261

  If CIA discovered such very highly enriched uranium near Dimona, thus indicating that it came from Portsmouth, the discovery also confirmed that at least some of the HEU diverted from Apollo came from naval fuel contracts, not just the 93 percent U-235 in the HEU in the Astronuclear contract. Since there was only one HEU scrap recovery line at Apollo, and since HEU had been disappearing from Apollo for several years, such a constellation of facts is technically feasible.

  ***

  On April 11, 1968, CIA issued National Intelligence Estimate 35-68 addressing Israel’s security situation in the aftermath of the June 1967 Six-Day War. Redactions account for a little more than one page in the copy that CIA released to the public. In discussing Israel’s military policy the Estimate says,

  Israel will maintain a military superiority over the Arabs, with a view to deterring them or, if war comes, defeating them quickly enough to prevent serious damage to itself. This means modern weapons. . . . The Israelis see a need not only to be militarily stronger than the Arabs, but to be able to defeat them quickly and without suffering much damage in return. The Israelis are convinced that if thei
r own armed forces were badly defeated or if their small country suffered serious physical damage, it would mean the end of Israel as a state. Hence, they are determined to stay well ahead of their Arab neighbors in modern weapons. . . . But in some types of advanced weapons, Israel has the know-how and the resources to supply itself, if need be. . . . In 1962 Israel made an agreement with the French firm of Marcel Dassault for the design, building and testing of the MD-620, a missile with a payload of 3,000 pounds and a range of about 280 nautical miles. . . . If they propose to use a high-explosive or chemical warfare warhead, they will presumably see a need for many more missiles than if a nuclear explosive were used. It may well be that Israel will decide to have some warheads of each type.

  The location and concentration of redactions in the report and the absence of any other discussion of nuclear matters suggest that the redactions addressed CIA’s conclusion that Israel had nuclear weapons either assembled or ready to be assembled at the time of the Six-Day War. The redactions might have included information about CIA’s discovery of HEU near Dimona. It is also possible that another National Intelligence Estimate with such conclusions was issued as early as January 1968.262

  Carl Duckett, by then the CIA’s Deputy Director for Science and Technology, told NRC investigators that a 1968 National Intelligence Estimate concluded, “that the Israelis had nuclear weapons.”263 Duckett went on to say,

  He showed it to Mr. Helms. Helms told him not to publish it and he would take it up with President Johnson. Mr. Helms later related [to Duckett] that he had spoken to the President [Johnson], that the President was concerned, and that he had said, “Don’t tell anyone else, even Dean Rusk [Secretary of State] and Robert McNamara [Secretary of Defense].”

  ***

  Beginning in March 1968, there was lively correspondence at high levels within the FBI concerning a “Possible Atomic Energy Act Violation” and Dr. Zalman Mordecai Shapiro.264 The documents were highly redacted when released by the FBI, but they referred back to an AEC physical inventory of Apollo in 1965 resulting in “a quantity of U-235 [that] was unaccounted for.”265

  On April 2, 1968, Richard Helms wrote to Attorney General Ramsey Clark to ask FBI to reopen its investigation of Shapiro. The cover note for the letter from Helms to Clark has been released in unredacted form and says, “Since the subject matter of this letter is so sensitive for obvious reasons, I would appreciate if you would return it to me when you have taken whatever action you feel appropriate.” In the recently declassified copy of the letter, immediately following a twelve-line redaction, Helms asked Clark to initiate an investigation.14

  You are well aware of the great concern which exists at the highest levels of this government with regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. . . . It is critical for us to establish whether or not the Israelis now have the capability of fabricating nuclear weapons which might be deployed in the Near East. . . . Given the aforementioned circumstances, I urge that the Federal Bureau of Investigation be called upon to initiate a discreet intelligence investigation of an all source nature of Dr. Shapiro in order to establish the nature and extent of his relationship with the Government of Israel.

  It is clear from the frequency and content of subsequent internal FBI memoranda that the Bureau reopened its investigation of Shapiro at that time. It is likely that the redacted portion of the letter told Clark of CIA’s discovery in the environment near Dimona of traces of HEU enriched by the AEC at Portsmouth, Ohio.266

  In September 2015, as a result of an FOIA lawsuit brought by Grant F. Smith, CIA released a summary of documents it sent to the JCAE in April 1976.267 One of the documents was an April 1, 1968 covering memorandum for the April 2, 1968 DCI letter to Attorney General Clark. The covering memorandum reports that

  DCI letter cleared with Brown (AEC) and incorporates Brown’s suggestion. Brown’s reaction was that purpose of letter correct and last two paragraphs acceptable; he believed, however, it contained an [line redacted] but declined to revise that portion. DDO [name redacted] belief is that Brown wants to avoid responsibility for letter but cannot disapprove it.

  It is likely that the purpose of Brown’s review was to confirm the conclusions that CIA was drawing about the importance and nature of the uranium or other evidence it had found in Israel. In Smith’s lawsuit, the CIA recently has argued that some of its documents about NUMEC contain Restricted Data as that term is defined in the Atomic Energy Act, i.e., information about nuclear weapons. The line that was redacted by CIA in the aforementioned Brown correspondence could have been such Restricted Data.

  On May 6, 1968, FBI Deputy Director DeLoach wrote to FBI Associate Director Clyde Tolson concerning the new investigation of Shapiro that CIA had requested.268 DeLoach expressed misgivings about the investigation. “The fact that the said disappearances have occurred over a period of several years would certainly make investigation a questionable item if, in fact, there has been no report of such matters to us previously.” Director Hoover penned his approval of the new investigation with his scrawl and initials at the bottom of the two-page memo, “OK, but I doubt advisability of getting into this [redacted].”

  It is likely that the new investigation included a concern with Shapiro’s foreign travel because on May 20 FBI was seeking “a live source who will be familiar with the subject’s travel arrangements.”269

  On May 24, a 13-page memorandum circulated within the Bureau concerning “Dr. Zalman Mordecai Shapiro, Internal Security – Israel, Atomic Energy Act.”270 The cover memo, including the names of the originator, the recipient and the receivers of carbon copies (except “Liaison”), and all 13 pages of the attachment were redacted when released by FBI in 2009 pursuant to my FOIA request. All that remains in the document comes under the heading of Action, “The above information and enclosure are being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.” Within the FBI Intelligence Division, a Counterintelligence Branch supervised investigations and other operations directed against hostile foreign intelligence services and espionage activities. The Counterintelligence Branch included an Espionage Section, a Liaison Section and a Nationalities Section.271 Apparently, FBI considered Shapiro’s alleged activities to be inimical to the interests of the United States. The fact that nearly everything in the 13-page document is redacted indicates that it dealt with information supplied by the CIA.

  The voluminous correspondence in 1968 within FBI, between FBI and Justice, and between unidentified persons and organizations concerning the second investigation of Shapiro did not mention CIA. However, some of the correspondence in this period, like the memo of May 24, is so highly redacted that it is impossible to determine the subject of the correspondence, other than it related to Shapiro, or the identity and affiliation of the correspondents. It is likely that such highly redacted correspondence was between FBI and CIA, especially when the words “Liaison Officer” were included and not redacted in the cover letters.

  In mid 1968, the CIA informed AEC that it had “received reports that the Israelis had somehow obtained a supply of enriched uranium.”272 Seaborg reasoned,

  Although Israel was known to be capable of producing plutonium at a French-supplied test reactor at Dimona in the Negev desert, it was not believed capable of producing U-235, and Israel’s reported possession of a supply of that material directed attention once more toward NUMEC. Because the CIA is enjoined by law from conducting domestic investigations, the agency called on the FBI for assistance.

  ***

  Meanwhile, NUMEC’s losses at Apollo continued to grow. On June 17, 1968, a NUMEC employee and former AEC staffer, James Lovett, compiled a handwritten summary of the uranium inventory at Apollo on a cumulative basis. He prepared it for a phone conversation with General Delmar Crowson, Director of AEC’s Office of Safeguards and Materials Management, regarding an article in the Wall Street Journal.273 Lovett’s inventory showed that NUMEC had processed 13,471 kilograms of U-235 in the form of HEU from plant startup throu
gh May 31, 1968 and had a cumulative inventory difference associated with that material of 287 kilograms of U-235, i.e., 2.1 percent. NUMEC was continuing to lose HEU at a far higher rate than the rest of the industry.

  ***

  The Bureau used warrantless wiretaps in its renewed investigation of Shapiro. Several FBI memoranda referred to the fact that “no grand jury subpoena is being used in this instance in view of the sensitive nature of this investigation.”274 The wiretap authority was updated from time to time.275 At that time, warrantless wiretaps on U.S. citizens were legal so long as they involved national security concerns. Until 1972, the Bureau used warrantless wiretaps and bugs against American citizens and foreigners within the United States to collect intelligence and counterintelligence information, to monitor subversive and violent activity and to determine the sources of leaks of classified information.

  The CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) also have used electronic surveillance techniques for intelligence purposes. The CIA’s Office of Security recorded fifty-seven individuals that were targeted by telephone wiretaps or microphones in the U.S. between 1947 and 1968. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 2001, the NSA now eavesdrops electronically on the entire U.S. population.276

  By the time of its NUMEC investigations, FBI had been using warrantless wiretaps for many years based on a 1939 directive from President Franklin Roosevelt empowering the Bureau to deal with foreign interests “clearly and directly.” Even though all the presidents and attorneys general after Roosevelt allowed Hoover to conduct warrantless surveillance of suspected spies, including wiretapping, the information that was gained wasn’t used in court because the Bureau and the Justice Department feared the courts would find the practice to be unconstitutional.277 Despite the fact that warrantless wiretaps had become less popular by the mid 1960s because of concerns about their legality, on July 5, 1968 Attorney General Ramsey Clark specifically authorized wiretapping of Shapiro during the second FBI investigation of the alleged diversion of HEU to Israel.278 Although the FBI used the wiretap information to guide its investigation, the warrantless nature of the information predetermined its inadmissibility in court.