Stealing the Atom Bomb: How Denial and Deception Armed Israel

by Roger Mattson

  Another FBI document from this period summarized interviews with two B&W employees (names redacted) at Apollo who previously worked for NUMEC. One of the employees had been a long time Transportation Supervisor and the other was a truck driver. They recounted details about the cans in which HEU was contained, the color of the coveralls worn by NUMEC workers (blue ones to indicate clean (not radioactive) and white ones to indicate hot (radioactive) areas of the plant) and the location of the storage vault for HEU relative to the loading dock. The transportation supervisor described the procedures for loading radioactive shipments onto trucks at the Apollo loading dock. Some of his detailed information confirmed what the ammoniator operator had told the FBI about the alleged shipment to Israel in 1965, while some of his details contradicted what the ammoniator operator said.

  The transportation supervisor said that the Apollo shipping department always trusted the vault handlers to have loaded the proper materials into the shipping containers and did not open the containers on the dock since it could have been dangerous to do so. The transportation supervisor listed four shipments to Israel in which he participated. All were large containers, all occurred between 1962 and September 1966, three via the port of New York and one via Newark. Two Israeli shipping companies were involved, Maheir Steamship Lines and Zim-Israel Steamship Lines.42 The supervisor said the only thing unusual about these shipments was that three of them were loaded directly from the NUMEC trucks onto the ships rather than being first placed in warehouse storage, and one of the shipments was met and handed over to a representative of the Israeli Defense Ministry. The Transportation Supervisor “advised that Dr. Shapiro made frequent visits at odd hours to the manufacturing area of the NUMEC, Apollo facility, but rarely said more than hello to the employees. He advised that Shapiro would often see something wrong and would tell the employee to correct it or contact the employee’s supervisor to see that a correction was made. He described Dr. Shapiro as a very calm man. He advised that he was aware and it was common knowledge throughout the Apollo, Pa., Facility that Dr. Shapiro made several trips to Israel during the 1962-1966 time frame.” The FBI Director followed up on these interviews by tasking various FBI field offices to conduct further interviews to ascertain information about shipping procedures at NUMEC in the 1960s.679

  A May 7, 1980 interview with a confidential source found, “The alleged shipment consisted of two crates, one measuring approximately eight feet by ten feet by eight feet, the other approximately four feet by five feet by four feet. The crates were marked with radioactive form symbols. . . . SF [San Francisco office of FBI] should conduct an interview of (deleted). If appropriate, the interviewee should be furnished his rights during interview.”680

  The San Francisco office of the FBI reported a May 9, 1980 interview with a confidential source about shipping practices at NUMEC in the 1960s. The source described containers used for Cobalt 60 food irradiators, i.e., cylindrical lead casks five feet by three feet that were encased in wooden boxes five by five by seven feet. The source went on to say, 681

  (Redacted) was a deviation from usual shipping procedures in this instance in that the containers were packed and sealed late at night. (Redacted) was not present at night to witness the packing procedures. (Redacted) there was excess space in the lead casks after the Cobalt 60 was packed and other materials could be placed into the casks in addition to the Cobalt 60 if someone desired to ship them in this manner. . . . On this particular occasion he placed a package of cigarettes and nylons in one cask (redacted). He did this as a friendly gesture and subsequently received a note of appreciation from those receiving the package. He placed the items in the shipping casks before they were turned over (redacted) for packaging. (Redacted sentence.)

  On June 11, 1980, the director of NRC’s Office of Inspector and Auditor wrote to the chief of the Internal Security Section in the Justice Department’s Criminal Division.682 He asked Justice to supply “copies of all existing and future FBI reports arising from FBI’s ongoing investigation of the allegations by Ronald E. Biesecker concerning NUMEC’s Apollo, Pennsylvania facility. As you are aware, an NRC inspector initially received these allegations and this office referred them to the FBI in March 1980. Since that time we have not been provided with any additional information developed by the FBI.” The letter went on to explain why NRC needed information from the FBI. In its response to various FOIA requests, the FBI has released no records showing that it ever honored the request from the NRC inspector and auditor for NRC to be informed of future reports arising from the FBI investigation of Biesecker’s allegations.

  On December 16, the special agent in charge of FBI’s Washington Field Office reported the results of an interview that was conducted 13 days earlier of another unidentified source. The report is highly redacted except for a portion that reads, “Although he cannot recall any specific shipment, he advised that there were about 12 shipments a year from that facility. All were ‘emergency’ shipments in the sense that they were usually late in departing and that trucks were standing by which were expensive to hire. Thusly, some shipments were loaded at night as soon as they were prepared.” The source went on to say he knew no diversion occurred because the uranium was lost in its processing.683 The estimate of 12 shipments per year must have applied to shipments of a special kind, e.g., food irradiators, because there were probably at least that many other shipments per month to domestic customers. In retrospect, a facility that shipped hazardous materials on a continuous basis surely would have developed practices that did not routinely require handling at night.

  On January 15, 1981, an agent from the FBI office in Columbia, SC interviewed a confidential source. The report of the interview is highly redacted. The interview report ends with, “He stated that he had no personal knowledge of what was actually contained in this cask, as he did not see the cask being packaged or have access to its actual contents. He said that the only thing that he could say regarding the contents is that the radiation emitted from the cask was consistent with what would be emitted by Cobalt 60.”684 A cask designed for transportation of a Cobalt 60 source would have been well shielded so that the gamma rays it emitted would not harm people who handled the cask. It was not feasible then or now, except in a laboratory environment, to detect radiation that would have been emitted by HEU hidden within the cask along with the cobalt. Furthermore, the addition of HEU to the lead lined cask, if controlled thoughtfully, would not have added significantly to the weight of the cask.

  ***

  The last document in the FBI records on NUMEC is dated April 22, 1976 and has appendices that extend into the early 1980s. It is six pages long and summarizes the investigative efforts by the Bureau up to that time. It is highly redacted at page three where the only remaining information relates to David Lowenthal and Zalman Shapiro and their relationships with Israel. Pages five and six of the report were added after April 1976 and update it to reflect the investigation ordered by President Ford. The added pages reflect the Bureau’s conclusion that “To date, there has been no substantive evidence to indicate that a diversion occurred, nor has there been evidence to prove the allegation that Government officials sought to overlook violations of security and accounting procedures that occurred at the NUMEC facility.” The reader will note that this second conclusion was not relevant to the question that Attorney General Levi asked FBI to address, i.e., had an agency or official covered up evidence of a diversion. The document also lists the various Congressional offices that were briefed on the Bureau’s investigation.685 There is an additional set of twenty-eight documents labeled “See” References. Most of their pages are redacted. They bear dates from 1949 to 1979, but most are in the 1968 to 1969 period. There are 794 documents in the FBI file bearing the identifying number FOIA 117-2564.

  Handwritten notations on FBI’s documents reflect an interaction, beginning in June 1982, among the Bureau, the Justice Department and Congress to determine the conditions under which FBI files could be
made available to members of Congress. The annotations on the documents show that someone went through the Bureau’s files to assure the correct classification on key documents. The annotations show many downward reclassifications beginning in the early 1980s. The criteria that the Bureau said it applied to the redaction process before granting access to the files were twofold, namely, protection of the privacy of individuals and nondisclosure of investigative techniques.

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  41 As described earlier in this account, the amount of the fine related to the Astronuclear contract was $764,000 out of about $2.2 million in fines paid by NUMEC for missing uranium up to and including the Astronuclear contract.

  42 Zim was Israel’s national shipping company. Doron and Gelman identified it as the same line used by Mossad and LAKAM in other ventures. One was the Cherbourg affair of 1969 in which Israel purloined five missile boats from France, bypassing the weapons embargo that followed the Six-Day War. Another was the 1968 Plumbat affair in which Israel took 200 tons of uranium yellowcake from a ship bound from Antwerp to Genoa and diverted the material to Israel.

  Part Five: Whodunit

  Chapter 16

  Shapiro’s Recollections

  Zalman Shapiro engaged in wide-ranging interviews in 1984 and 1994 for the Pittsburgh Section of the National Council of Jewish Women. The interviews are available on line.686 In the first interview, he described his service as vice president of the Zionist Organization of America, officer of Technion Society, director for Hillel, volunteer for the Jewish Federation, volunteer for the Anti-Defamation League, and affiliation with Young People’s Synagogue. He reminisced about Rickover, Bettis and the formation of NUMEC. He said that Rickover was a great man, but was petty and vindictive and held a grudge. He said that when he left Bettis in 1957 to form NUMEC he wrote to Rickover and “he black listed me, told people at Bettis and Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory not to deal with me. . . . Lots of people had problems with [Rickover]. In spite of him, we were able to succeed. Eventually, his lieutenants in Bettis had problems and came to me for help.” Shapiro said he formed a close relationship with Congressman Chet Holifield (D-CA), former chairman of the Joint Committee. He also opined on Israel’s financial problems and defense capabilities early in his career. When asked in 1984 whether Israel had nuclear capabilities, he said,

  I don’t know that Israel has anything the Arabs don’t have. Israel has a lot of scientific and technological skill. I suspect, given the resources, they could do whatever we’ve done here. Israel certainly doesn’t have the kind of money it requires to build the kind of massive capability that we are building. . . . [This] is all speculation. Speculation is what I am doing as well. . . . Israel would like the Arabs to think they have the capability. It’s probably acted as a deterrent to a degree. But even if they had a bomb what could they do with it? . . . It’s a futile game, this whole thing. . . .

  In both the 1984 and 1994 interviews, Shapiro described his work to create Americans for Energy Independence between 1973 and 1975. He said the organization’s goal was to sensitize Americans to the role of Arabs in controlling energy supply and to create a better attitude toward Israel. He commented on his efforts to promote alternative forms of energy, conservation of energy and atomic energy. He also discussed NUMEC’s purpose of making uranium fuel.

  He named other companies involved in the nuclear business. He said he started NUMEC with a Westinghouse colleague in 1957 and grew it to 1000 employees in 10 years. He described negative publicity about NUMEC’s burial of nuclear waste on private property in Pennsylvania and noted that all waste material was buried according to the rules of AEC. He described employees’ complaints about illnesses caused by working with radioactivity. He recounted that NUMEC supplied fuel to one half of the world’s nuclear reactors, including some in Japan, Italy, France and Sweden, and developed the first nuclear-powered pacemaker and the first plutonium laboratory in the world. He explained that the work was very difficult and confining. He worked seven-day weeks and created a large number of patents. He noted that he was trying to bring technology developed in the U.S. to Israel. He said Shimon Peres was a liar who could not be trusted and was only interested in winning the Nobel Peace Prize.

  He did not mention his connections with officials of Israeli defense, atomic energy and intelligence agencies. He did not mention nuclear batteries or food irradiation. Nor did he describe his joint business ventures in Israel. He also did not bring up the FBI, CIA and Congressional investigations of his activities.

  Dr. Zalman M. Shapiro

  NUMEC President

  1957-1970

  On April 13, 1993, Shapiro wrote a two-page thank you letter to Glenn Seaborg.687 He thanked the former AEC chairman for sending a copy of his “revealing new book with your personal inscription. . . .

  Needless to say, my immediate focus was on the NUMEC chapter. I cannot thank you enough for your determination and perseverance in upholding your principles and the rules of fairness established by the AEC, in spite of the pressures to which you were subjected by Attorney General Mitchell and his henchmen. It is interesting to note, in passing, that apparently those who are themselves dishonest have the attitude that everyone else is, as well. Your chapter on the NUMEC affair brought back many painful memories. Not only were my career and health adversely affected and my family traumatized, but it cost me a fortune in lawyers’ fees to defend myself against charges which had no basis in fact.

  Shapiro went on to recount for Seaborg the “snide remarks made by my peers and superiors” and his significant contribution to the security of America while working at Bettis, “as Admiral Rickover reluctantly admitted.” He said he was not aware of some of the difficulties Seaborg experienced “because of interest in the matter at the Cabinet and Presidential levels.”

  Shapiro said that new information about recovery of uranium during decommissioning of Apollo led to an “overage” of SNM that

  Obviously explained a significant portion of the losses reported and paid for by NUMEC. . . . These finds prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that there was no diversion, only process losses. What really hurts is the fact that the NRC has not seen fit to make this public and clear my name. They were quick to accuse, but obviously loath to admit error. Your book has make [sic] a significant contribution to the history of atomic energy. I am especially grateful for your treatment of l’affair NUMEC.

  ***

  In August 2002, the Valley News Dispatch, a newspaper published in the Pittsburgh area, ran a four-day series of articles on NUMEC. Henry Myers apparently was the primary source for the paper’s description of the various investigations. Shapiro declined to discuss the allegations of a diversion, opting instead to list numerous accomplishments by NUMEC in the nuclear field. He cited much the same list that he provided to the National Council of Jewish Women in 1994.688

  ***

  Finally, in deciding whether or not Shapiro committed the acts alleged, it is worth considering the fact that he has not followed the same path as Arnon Milchan, i.e., taking credit for services rendered to Israel’s nuclear weapons program. There are differences between the two cases, of course: Milchan is an Israeli citizen and Shapiro is not. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that Shapiro has been steadfast in maintaining his innocence. He will celebrate his 96th birthday in 2016, which is a long time to maintain one’s innocence and deserves some credit.

  Chapter 17

  Alternative Hypotheses

  Shapiro, Hersh and Seaborg advanced two hypotheses to explain the missing U-235. First, they opined that the material was hidden as contamination in the cracks, crevices, pipes and equipment of the Apollo uranium plant and was recovered during the decommissioning of the plant. The other hypothesis supported the first, namely, it was not feasible for anyone to steal a significant quantity of HEU from the plant because there were too many people around and the material was too closely guarded. This chapter addresses those two hypotheses.

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  Beginning in 1978, Babcock and Wilcox Company, the third owner of the Apollo uranium plant, decontaminated and disposed of it. The industrial facility adjacent to the uranium plant continued to operate as a steel fabricator until its owners demolished the building in 1992. The NRC and Pennsylvania regulators co-operated in overseeing the decontamination, demolition and disposal operations. By 1995 the buildings were gone, the entire site had been returned to green-field status and all radioactive material had been shipped to licensed disposal sites outside of the state. B&W decontaminated and disposed of the Parks Township site a few years later.

  The first step in decommissioning the Apollo site was removal of all equipment inside the building. The equipment was surveyed for radioactive contamination before disposal, and any significant amounts of uranium that were found were returned to the inventory of the plant. When only the outside structure of the plant remained, it was enclosed in a tent-like structure that moved along railroad tracks as demolition proceeded. The tent kept any dust from escaping when the steel superstructure and the bricks, blocks, and concrete were pulverized for shipment to radioactive waste disposal sites. Then the concrete foundation and underground piping were disposed in a manner that returned all significant quantities of uranium to the cumulative inventory of the plant. Finally, B&W monitored contaminated soil beneath the buildings and disposed as radioactive waste any soil that exceeded natural background radiation levels. In following this stepwise process, B&W returned significant quantities of uranium to inventory. Clean soil was brought to the site and used to restore natural grade in the area; then B&W reseeded the site. B&W installed groundwater monitors to assure that the site maintained long-term compliance with drinking water standards of the Environmental Protection Agency.