Stealing the Atom Bomb: How Denial and Deception Armed Israel

by Roger Mattson

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  On August 6, 2014, the Wall Street Journal published a story by John Emshwiller about newly declassified documents about NUMEC.733 It included recent interviews of Zbigniew Brzezinski, John Marcum and Jessica Tuchman Matthews who served in the National Security Council under President Carter and wrote some of the documents that were partially declassified by ISCAP. Emshwiller reported,

  The evidence suggested that “something did transpire,” said Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mr. Carter’s national-security advisor in a recent interview. “But until you have conclusive evidence you don’t want to make an international incident. This is a potentially very explosive, controversial issue.” Besides, he added, even if a theft was proved, “What are we going to say to the Israelis, ‘Give it back?’”

  Marcum opined that Carter’s diplomatic efforts to produce the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt probably wouldn’t have been possible “if there was some huge scandal at the time about this [NUMEC affair].” Mathews sidestepped Emshwiller’s question of whether CIA had found HEU in Israel in 1968. “That’s not something that’s declassified,” she replied, which apparently was a guarded “yes.”

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  A diversion from Apollo could have occurred with or without the knowledge of President Johnson. There were several possible reasons for him to hide a diversion. He might have been

  •Expressing empathy for Zionism,

  •Avoiding alienation of voters,

  •Improving diplomatic relations by granting a favor to Israel,

  •Deceiving Israel’s Middle Eastern neighbors,

  •Balancing power in the Middle East, or

  •Avoiding the scandal of a successful diversion on his watch.

  Henry Myers said Johnson was simply distracted by the Viet Nam War and did not want to be bothered by what Helms told him. Seymour Hersh had a similar explanation:734

  Johnson’s purpose in chasing Helms—and his intelligence—away was clear: he did not want to know what the CIA was trying to tell him, for once he accepted that information, he would have to act on it. By 1968, the President had no intention of doing anything to stop the Israeli bomb, as Helms, Duckett, Walworth Barbour, William Dale,45 and a very few others in the U.S. government came to understand.

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  Rafi Eitan responded to questions about NUMEC several times. In the early 1990s, Peter Stockton met him in East Germany to discuss the case of Israeli General Rami Dotan. The General had plea-bargained a 13-year stint in an Israeli prison after being caught in receipt of $10 million in bribes and kickbacks from American defense contractors. U.S. investigators suspected Dotan was laundering the money for use in intelligence operations.735 Consequently, Congressman Dingell threatened to stop American military aid to Israel. That is when Eitan asked to meet with Stockton to discuss the Dotan case. In 2009, Stockton recalled, “Rafi is a great storyteller. He told me how he captured Eichmann. He wanted Dingell to intervene in the Pollard case. I said no fucking way. Then I said ‘Come on Rafi, what about NUMEC?’ He said ‘What is NUMEC?’ I said ‘we have your fingerprints all over NUMEC; you went there a couple times. Did you steal the uranium at NUMEC?’ He replied, ‘Oh, that NUMEC, I don’t know anything about that.’”736 In 2015, Stockton told journalist Scott Johnson about this same meeting. “But when Stockton asked about NUMEC, Eitan grew quiet, before saying, ‘I’ve never been to NUMEC. I don’t know what you’re talking about.’ Stockton kept pushing. ‘I said, that’s bullshit; you know we have your signature [on the AEC documents]’ And then he said, ‘Well, OK, I was there ... but I was getting batteries for listening devices.’”737

  John Emshwiller of the Wall Street Journal received a similar reception from Eitan when he brought up NUMEC in a telephone interview in the summer of 2010. Eitan denied any connection with a diversion; said he was at NUMEC in 1968 to discuss surveillance equipment; and said he loved America, “the second greatest country in the world.”738

  On October 3, 2015, the Jerusalem Post published an interview of Eitan. It was a human-interest article, chronicling the life of the 88-year-old man that “has been at the heart of the Israel story since before the creation of the state.”739 The story had extensive quotations of Eitan extolling the accomplishments of his life, including the following summary paragraph.

  He continued his career in Mossad, heading or involved in many secret operations—some public knowledge today, others never acknowledged. These included unmasking Israel Beer, a Lieutenant Colonel in the IDF found to be spying for the Soviet Union; thwarting German armaments sales to Egypt; involvement in the diversion of highly enriched uranium from an American nuclear fuel plant (“The Apollo Affair”); advising the British MI6 on counterterrorism operations in Northern Ireland; helping Moroccan ruler King Hassan II to make a political rival in Paris “disappear”; and planning the Israel Air Force attack on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981.

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  During an interview by Avner Cohen in 1992, Avraham Hermoni offered his opinion on whether a diversion occurred. Cohen recently recounted that interview.740

  Avraham Hermoni was perhaps my best source. I met him about a dozen times. We became friends over time, and he shared with me a great deal of information, including many sensitive issues that I never published. In retrospect I believe that Hermoni really trusted me and in a sense he wanted me to be the carrier of his legacy to future generations. Officially, Hermoni was the science attache at the Israeli embassy in DC in the period 1968-1972, which meant that he was the LAKAM Liaison (spymaster) in the United States, reporting to LAKAM chief, Binyamin Blumberg. It was in one of those meetings, after Hermoni already treated me as a trusted friend, that, at the end of that meeting, Hermoni took me to his study—the main interview was always in his large dining room, next to the kitchen—and showed me some memorabilia from Zal Shapiro and told me that “a great deal of injustice was made to my friend Zal Shapiro, and it cost him a great deal.” Hermoni added, “Zal Shapiro was a great friend of Israel in many ways, he helped and advised us a great deal, but he did not divert nuclear stuff to us. I want you to know that.” I recall that Hermoni was quite emotional when he said that. I must also add that this was the only time that I wondered to myself whether this was the full and complete truth. I recall vividly thinking whether I should believe him on that or not. And this was also one of the reasons why I have been silent on NUMEC.46

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  In 1978, during the administration of President Carter, CIA officer John Hadden came to an opposite conclusion from his Israeli counterpart, Avraham Hermoni. Hadden was circumspect to avoid violation of security classifications or his CIA oath of secrecy, but it is clear what he thought.741

  A crime was committed ten or twenty years ago; a crime considered so serious that for its commission the death penalty is mandatory and no statute of limitation applies. The appropriate authorities became aware of the circumstances of the crime at the time it was committed but excused the man involved on grounds of carelessness for which he was punished by a heavy fine.

  If the crime had been committed intentionally and was not the result of carelessness, then the circumstances warranted a finding of high treason with the mandatory death penalty.

  The fine did not persuade other authorities with interests in the same area of activity that the act was unintentional.

  A number of years passed. Various investigations were undertaken. For a variety of reasons, the authority which made the original finding of carelessness refused to consider or to aid further investigation.

  Information presently available permits the making of a strong case for the presumption that the crime of high treason against the state has been committed.

  The crime is of such a nature that the authority directly concerned as well as the government itself will be embarrassed as the crime could only have been committed through gross incompetence on the part of those responsible for security in certain areas.

  It is also possible that ther
e will be domestic political uproar, which may affect support for the administration by a powerful element of the population.

  It is also possible that if the case is pursued and the findings become known to the public, the government may have difficulty in persuading other nations to adopt certain policies which we consider important and which they may not find convenient or palatable.

  There is therefore great resistance on pragmatic grounds to further investigation.

  When I think of what we have been discussing in the above terms, I conclude that we should not obstruct the course of justice in a case of this nature. To permit high treason to go unpunished to avoid embarrassment or to make the pursuance of government policy less difficult is a crime in its own right.

  In my own case, the above comments are sufficient to decide between the only two choices: to do nothing or to make every effort to establish guilt or innocence of those involved.

  An exhaustive investigation aimed at establishing the facts to the very best of our ability may, even at this late date, uncover elements in or out of government who abetted the original act of treason. Even if they cannot be brought to justice, steps can be taken to remove them from positions of trust and thereby prevent them from further betrayal or otherwise damaging our interests.

  This same investigation may also define the weaknesses in our security practices in a sensitive area. By discovering the techniques used in penetrating our government we can more easily protect ourselves in the future from similar injurious action undertaken against us by outsiders of all stripes.

  Earnest and serious efforts to get to the bottom of this affair now may save our political leadership embarrassment in the future—embarrassment perhaps even greater than that which may be caused by the realization of the laxity of our security procedures. Not only will the public become aware of the incompetence of certain officials or branches of the government in the past, it will also become aware of the pusillanimity of our political leadership in not making every effort to get to the bottom of this matter once they became aware of the situation.

  I would like to close by repeating the kernel of thought, which underlay my short conversation with you in your office. We are dealing here with a continuing conspiracy of a community located both within and without our body politic. It involves patriots of the Nathan Hale variety—not criminals of the ilk of Rosenberg and Philby. It behooves anyone acting in this atmosphere to be most circumspect. I would despair of any success attending further action in this case if any members of the community involved were to become aware of the height of any renewed interest.

  It is likely that Hadden sent these words to one or both of the chairmen of the Congressional oversight committees (Udall and Dingell) and to the DOE Inspector General who summoned him to Washington in 1978. His conclusions and recommendations are strengthened by the additional information that has emerged since that time. None of the evidence that has emerged since then detracts from his conclusions.

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  It is clear that motive, opportunity and means for a diversion from Apollo to Israel were all present. The motive was immeasurable assistance to Israel, a U.S. ally and a sacred cause of Zalman Shapiro, in preparing to defend itself against attack by neighboring states with overwhelming numerical superiority. Opportunity was provided by the oddly sloppy material accounting practices at NUMEC and the rules of AEC that allowed simple and reasonable payments for missing material, no questions asked. The means included the ease of handling HEU when appropriately packaged and the ready availability of shipments to Israel in approved radioactive shipping containers, personal suitcases or even diplomatic pouches, whose contents were not subjected to third party inspections. The means also included the possible assistance of a highly placed insider and the absence of creditable security at the Apollo plant.

  If Seaborg, Duckett, Shackley, Starbird, Knauf, Anderson, Hersh, Fialka, Newsweek, Weissman and Krosney were correct in their statements about the discovery of highly enriched uranium with a Portsmouth signature near Dimona in 1968, that was convincing evidence, not just circumstantial evidence, of a diversion from Apollo.

  If the Justice Department had enough evidence to prosecute Shapiro, it would have done so. Instead, without relying on the information it obtained through questionable means of surveillance, FBI could only muster enough evidence for Hoover to recommend reducing Shapiro’s opportunity to commit espionage, i.e., removing his security clearance and his company’s classified contracts. The AEC rejected even those limited recommendations.

  Evidence that emerged after the original investigations adds credence to the idea that something happened at NUMEC, and not just the diversion of weapons-grade uranium. The evidence includes not only the Portsmouth HEU, but also the unresolved eyewitness account of suspicious activity on the uranium plant dock in 1965, extensive contacts between Shapiro and confirmed Israeli spies and Hadden’s numerous revelations about the extent of Israeli nuclear espionage.

  When viewed fifty years after the fact, AEC’s coverup of NUMEC had an enduring effect on the moral authority of the United States to promote restraint in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In addition, if Seaborg’s statement about “what good would it do.” reflected the attitude of the AEC commissioners at the time, it is no wonder President Ford and Attorney General Levi asked FBI to determine if someone in authority had covered up a diversion. John Fialka said it this way: “The scariest possibility in the whole scary area of SNM safeguards is . . . if something happens to nuclear materials that is profoundly embarrassing to the state, it will be self concealing.”742

  The blame for failing to tell the truth about Apollo lies with the U.S. government. The government started the lie when it failed to face the truth about the amount of HEU that was missing from Apollo in the period 1957 to 1968 and the associated circumstances. The deception continued for nearly a half-century because of the government’s refusal to acknowledge that proof of the theft was provided by clandestine means in Israel and perhaps by an eyewitness. The most important deception has been the failure to confront the implications of those discoveries. Just as NRC said it must assume the diversion occurred and take steps to ensure it would not happen again, so the entire U.S. government should acknowledge that it happened or could have happened and take steps to guard against it happening again.

  Because the issues are moral, not technical, political or organizational, they require telling the truth. The United States needs to be trusted if it is to lead the world out of the current morass of nuclear proliferation. Therefore, its leaders must begin by telling the truth. Udall showed more courage than others when he joined Carl Duckett and John Hadden in shining light down this dark tunnel.

  ***

  This chapter recounted the conclusions about NUMEC by the major participants in the saga. However, there is a nagging loose end that none addressed. It concerns a possible eyewitness account of a diversion that a former employee of NUMEC provided to the FBI via the NRC in 1980. He told of a suspicious shipment from Apollo, late one night in early 1965, of canisters normally used for highly enriched uranium. The suspicious shipment allegedly happened around the time when AEC discovered 93.8 kilograms of U-235 in the form of HEU were missing. The story involved an armed man on the dock at a time when the company employed no armed guards. The details in the statement by the eyewitness were convincing, including the shipping manifest for an Israeli shipping line. But questions remain: Did the witness really see what he described? Was he really warned the next day to never speak about what he saw? Was that warning corroborated with the person who made it? Why is there no record of FBI discussing this late-breaking information with Zalman Shapiro, who the eyewitness claimed was present? Who were those people on the dock? Did FBI communicate this information to the Justice Department? The NRC? What did Justice or NRC do with it? Did the FBI close this lead or ignore it? There may be simple answers to such questions, but some FBI documents from that period are entirely redacted. Now, more
than 50 years after the event this eyewitness described, how are we to know if we can trust his statement or if we can trust the FBI if our government stubbornly, apparently without just cause, maintains its secrecy?

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  43 Baron was then a special assistant to the attorney general. During the Clinton administration, Attorney General Janet Reno selected Baron to head the Office of National Security in the Justice Department.

  44 John C. “Jack” Keeney joined the Department of Justice as a lawyer in 1951 and served there until 2010, under 12 presidents and two-dozen attorneys general. He was the longest-serving federal prosecutor in history, served for decades in the criminal division, and occasionally served as acting assistant attorney general.

  45 William N. Dale served as Barbour’s deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Israel starting in 1964. He worked with the embassy’s science attache and the CIA station chief John Hadden in monitoring Dimona. Hersh described Dale’s role and accomplishments, including his assessment of the change in attitude of the U.S. government towards Dimona in the Nixon administration.