Ireland

by Joseph Coohill

  When Northern Ireland Assembly elections were held in early March 2007, Paisley’s DUP and Sinn Féin were again the big winners. By this time, both the British and Irish governments had come to accept that the hope of Northern Ireland’s two moderate parties, the SDLP and UUP, returning to power were long gone, and they urged Paisley and Gerry Adams to meet and agree on power-sharing. To the astonishment of the British and Irish communities, this actually happened. Near the end of March, Paisley and Adams met and hammered out the details and agreements required to re-establish the Northern Ireland Assembly as the governing force in the province. ‘We must not allow our justified loathing of the horrors and tragedies of the past to become a barrier to creating a better and more stable future,’ Paisley said in a prepared statement. Adams echoed this with, ‘We are very conscious of the many people who have suffered. We owe it to them to build the best possible future.’ While there had been an undercurrent of speculation that Sinn Féin would be willing to join an administration with the DUP, almost no one expected Paisley (known for decades as ‘Dr No,’ for his consistent refusal to consider republican aspirations) to take this leap. Why he did so is not clear, and may never become so. The Northern Ireland Assembly is back at work, with a coalition headed by Paisley from the DUP and Martin McGuinness from Sinn Féin, installed in 2007. With the two most extreme parties in the province now in government together, the case for hope is perhaps stronger than it has ever been.

  In April 2008, Paisley stepped down as leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, and was replaced by Peter Robinson, who became the Northern Ireland First Minister. He and McGuinness were impressive in how quickly and seriously they took the governing of Northern Ireland. Some of the political chattering classes of Britain and Ireland had argued during the peace process that once Northern Irish politicians were faced with the responsibilities of practical and mundane day-to-day governing, the ideological bitterness between unionist politicians and nationalist politicians (at least within the Northern Ireland Assembly itself) would become secondary and, it was hoped, eventually irrelevant.

  The Assembly started to function as a normal government, without the difficulties it experienced in the previous ten years – a cycle of mutual hostility and distrust with only brief cooperation. This had shut down government functioning, with the London parliament stepping in and imposing direct rule, all of which stalled political progress in Northern Ireland.

  Sectarian violence remained a problem, although it was carried out by fringe groups and individuals, who were often looking for personal vengeance against terrorists who had given up violence and joined the peace process. The most disturbing killing was that of Ronan Kerr, a Roman Catholic constable in the new Police Service of Northern Ireland in April 2011. Dissident republicans, why may have been former members of the Provisional IRA, were blamed for the murder. The reaction across Northern Ireland and the Republic was near-universal condemnation. A Peace Rally was held in Belfast, and was notable for being attended by a great cross-section of Northern Irish society – nationalists, unionists, and leaders from various political parties.

  IRELAND IN RECENT DECADES

  To concentrate solely on the peace process during the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century is to leave out important developments across Ireland. Northern Ireland has seen significant improvements in living standards since 1998. Some argue that this is because of inward investment, particularly from the British government, enhanced by what looks like a lasting peace. What is more likely is that Northern Ireland is capitalizing on the benefits of the money that the British government has been pumping into the province for decades. Security required infrastructure, especially quality roads, an advanced electrical grid and other utilities. In many ways, these aspects of Northern Ireland were more advanced than some regions of Britain itself. This has made Northern Ireland an attractive area for investment, and multinational corporate money flowed in fairly swiftly.

  There is some evidence that sectarianism is on the wane in public education, and some elements of fairness from the Agreement have seeped into Northern Irish consciousness, so that it is now rare to find religious discrimination by government officials in allocating public housing and health care, which was commonplace just a few decades ago. In the arts and cultural arenas, Northern Irish writers have gained much international attention, and the beauty and dramatic scenery of much of the countryside have been opened up for increased tourism.

  The four most prominent aspects of the Republic’s contemporary history have been: the continuing and disturbing revelations of physical and sexual abuse in Catholic Church institutions; the Republic’s up and down economic relationship with the European Union; the collapse of the Celtic Tiger and the serious financial crisis starting in 2008; and disclosures of extensive long-term government financial corruption and mismanagement during these scandals.

  Perhaps the most stark and shocking change in Irish social life since the mid 1990s has been the decline in respect for the Catholic Church, its weakened power and influence over politics and social life, and the drop in the number of people attending Mass. Revelations of wrong-doing seemed to come one immediately after the other. Bishop Eamonn Casey and Father Michael Cleary were both exposed as having fathered children in the early 1990s. Far more serious were the twenty-first century revelations of sexual and other abuse of children by priests. Twenty-one priests in the Diocese of Ferns (in the south-east corner of Ireland) were investigated for over 100 allegations of sexual abuse of children between 1962 and 2002. A condemnatory report was issued in 2005, which implicated successive bishops in ignoring or covering up abuse, numerous priests in committing the actual abuse, and even the Garda Siochána in their investigations of the charges.

  The Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (also known as the Ryan Commission) was set up to investigate abuse in reform schools, industrial (or trade) schools, and orphanages that were run by the Church and supervised by state authorities. The commission’s report in 2005 was quite damning. Known as the Ryan Report, it found that ‘physical abuse, sexual abuse, neglect, and emotional abuse were features of these institutions.’ It also concluded that the police concealed evidence of this abuse, and that the Gardaí as an institution were more concerned with avoiding the embarrassing nature of the abuse rather than investigating it fully.

  The Archdiocese of Dublin was the next institution to fall (at least in public opinion), because of the work of the Murphy Commission into child sex abuse in Dublin parishes. Starting its investigations in 2006, it published its findings in 2009, and they were troubling indeed. The same sorts of scandals were uncovered: priests engaged in sexual acts with children, cover-ups by church officials, and foot-dragging by the police. Since it was the Dublin Archdiocese (the largest and most prominent in the country), this inquiry was closely watched. It was perhaps the most damaging of all these investigations. Pope Benedict XI condemned the actions of the guilty parties. Bishops (including those who had gone on to head other diocese) resigned. Public reaction against the church and against the state authorities who ignored or covered up these schedules reached its height of outrage. There were further complications, however, when, in late 2010, Wikileaks exposed alleged Vatican documents that indicated that the Holy See tried to intervene in the Murphy Commission’s investigations. The Vatican had apparently claimed that the Irish government was treading on the sovereignty of the church, which, they argued, should be allowed to police itself.

  It seemed as if these types of investigations would never end and, indeed, they might continue for several years into the future. The Cloyne Report into abuses in the diocese of Cloyne (County Cork) in July 2011. It contained the same, almost predictable, evidence and charges. Further, the consequences were the same and equally predictable. Official apologies were given, the Vatican issued public condemnations, and political outrage from inside the Dáil and from the public at large dominated the news for months.

  Citize
ns of the Republic had every reason to think that their economy would remain strong in the early twentieth-century. On 1 January 2002, the Irish punt was officially replaced by the Euro, which was indicative of the Republic’s positive connections with the European Union and its desire to move beyond a junior economic partnership with the British economy (which has so far stayed out of the ‘Euro-zone’). Perhaps most symbolic of all the Republic’s embracing of the European Union was that Irish voters agreed to add ten new member states to the EU in October 2002 (after rejecting a similar proposal in June 2001). And on 1 May 2004, Ireland, as holder of the EU presidency, hosted ceremonies to welcome the EU’s new members. So, one of the smallest countries in Europe, one that, until recently, was considered a backwater, could now think of itself as a European leader. If generally unhappy with the political division of Ireland, at least nationalists of the past and of the present may have looked upon this transformation with a good deal of pride.

  It was not to last, however. Prominent and powerful Irish financial institutions failed. The government’s economic policies only exacerbated the effects of these failures, and the European Union has been forced to implement financial constraints on the Irish government in return for re-floating the Irish economy. The underlying causes of these economic crises started in the 1980s, but they were not sufficiently addressed by successive governments. And when the crunch came in 2007, there were no solid contingency plans upon which to draw.

  The Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat coalition of 1997–2011 stressed individualism publically, but cut corners and ignored checks and balances within government in order to advance their agenda. Some of the civil service became politicized, and some senior servants lined their own pockets rather than concentrate on their administrative responsibilities. The Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, and especially his finance minister, Charlie McCreevey, continued to push free market policies that had been somewhat responsible for the rise of Ireland’s economic prowess during these years. The Celtic Tiger reached its height of power and intensity between 2000 and 2007, aided by government incentives for private saving by Irish citizens, and the decentralization of government department (including moving headquarters of certain departments to cities outside Dublin). This was an attempt to cut the high costs of running offices, and housing officials, in Dublin (the most expensive city in the country), and to move the department to cheaper cities. The problem was that it greatly undermined the effective running of these departments, and government business actually became more complex and costly. Further, this decentralization was extremely expensive because it was implemented at the height of Irish property prices, even outside Dublin.

  The government continued its policy of deregulation of business, including banks. Unlike most of the other free market policies of the Ahern government, the deregulation of bank practices, and moves to internationalize Irish banks and insurance companies, had been happening since the early 1980s, although at a slowish pace, and one that did not cause public alarm. Problems had arisen in the late 1980s, and only grew through the 1990s, as banks and other financial institutions became too big and powerful due to deregulation. For example, Allied Irish Bank (AIB) acquired the Insurance Company of Ireland (ICI) in 1983 but the finances were mismanaged and ICI collapsed under the weight of its own debt two years later. AIC-ICI was granted a government bailout in mid-1985 very similar to government bailouts for firms deemed ‘too big to fail’ in the twenty-first century (but without nearly the level of public attention or scrutiny). By 2000, it became clear that some important Irish banks had also been evading taxes totaling billions or euros. After several investigations over many years, those banks paid enormous fines.

  These bank problems, especially over-borrowing and poor debt management, were the central blows that brought down the Celtic Tiger. A mortgage was broke out between AIB and the Bank of Ireland, risky property loans were handed out, and banks ended up borrowing more or less constantly from each other (and from international banks) in order to maintain solvency. This put their debt at dangerously high levels. The dot.com bubble burst, the September 11th attacks stalled international trade, and the influx of capital slowed greatly. Since government regulation of banking practices had been greatly relaxed, there was no effective financial safety net in the event of a serious economic crisis.

  There were two of these, and they happened more or less simultaneously in late 2007. This was because the causes were virtually identical. The first crisis was within Ireland itself. The mortgage system collapsed, and bank stocks lost value immensely. The government, under new Taoiseach, Brian Cowen (the new Fianna Fáil leader), decided to rescue the banks in September 2008. The government bought the banks’ debt, which cost Irish tax payers more than 100 billion euros. The economy stalled and nearly crashed completely. Further government attempts to prop up the banks and to stabilize the economy were ineffective. Ultimately, in November 2010, the European Central Bank had to bail out Irish banks, and essentially bail out the Irish economy as a whole. This bailout included a high interest charge, and the government had to cut back on services and other domestic expenditure.

  The second economic crisis was international. Touched off by conditions very similar to the Irish domestic financial system (bank over-extension, shoddy mortgages, and government collusion), brought on the most serious international financial crisis in decades. The US government, taking the same ‘too big to fail’ course, failed to stave off a deep recession. Many European economies experienced similar conditions, and the stability of the European banks and the viability of the euro currency looked questionable. These conditions remain, especially for poorer EU countries such as Portugal, Greece, and Turkey.

  These two blows more or less caused the Irish economy to collapse. Unemployment doubled, from 4.8 percent in 2007 to 13.5 percent in 2011. Despite numerous investigations, both official and journalistic, respect for the government, economic experts, bankers and stockbrokers fell. This was further exacerbated by the fact that, despite the fame of the Celtic Tiger, and the bluster of its early champions, Irish society as a whole did not benefit from the economic rise of the 1990s. Bankers and elites not only realized the vast majority of the rewards, they escaped punishment for helping create the conditions for the inevitable collapse. They retained a great deal of their wealth and status while the rest of the country suffered.

  The main party of government during these economic and social troubles was Fianna Fáil, and it suffered greatly in terms of public confidence. Much of public opinion held that they had been responsible for what looked like entrenched corruption in government, and massive over-influence that the Church had on society. It was not surprising, therefore, that a Fine Gael-Labour coalition were elected in February 2011 with the largest majority in the history of the Dáil. The new Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, quickly gained a reputation as a new broom. He spoke out against Vatican hypocrisy for condemning Irish church abuses more harshly than those in other Catholic countries, including the US, all the while side-stepping their responsibility to control their own clerics. Further, in a crucial speech on 20 July 2011, Kenny exposed the Vatican’s internal communiqués complaining that the Irish government was investigating its priests and parishes. The Irish government, he argued that, no matter how collusive it had been regarding past abuses, had every right and duty to investigate crimes in its own country. No politician had ever spoken out so strongly against the Catholic Church, and the speech was received very positively in the Republic. This, along with steady decline in attendance at mass showed how far confidence in the church has fallen in the Republic.

  Kenny also tried to revive some Irish pride by not swallowing whole the European directives on how to fix the Irish economy. This too was a popular stance with Ireland itself, even though EU leaders were not receptive to it. His government tried to re-attract foreign investment and re-emphasize Ireland’s business-friendly environment.

  But even Kenny and the Fine Gael-Labour could not escape what ha
d become a tradition in modern Irish politics – corruption. A new Dáil inquiry in 2011 (the Moriarty Tribunal) found that an important Fine Gael politican, Michael Lowry, was embroiled in a corruption scandal over the granting of mobile phone licenses, and was also accused of evading taxes. The new image that Kenny had quickly built for responsible Irish government was in danger of crumbling just as quickly.

  The Republic, therefore, entered the second decade of the twenty-first century with nearly the same struggles it had in the early years of the young state (the 1920s through the 1950s). Its economic future was largely in the hands of a larger and more power entity. Then it was the over-shadowing dominance of the British economy. Now it is the European Union. Similarly, emigration had been a dominant theme of Irish life and lore from the Famine until the birth of the Celtic Tiger. The 1980s and 1990s saw a reversal of that tradition, and the Republic experienced net immigration. Emigration has returned, unfortunately, and it will likely remain a feature of Irish life for some time.

  ELEVEN

  Themes in Irish History

  Several important themes have appeared throughout this book, as indeed they run through Irish history from very early times. Some of the most significant are: politics, religion, the land, Irish identity and history itself. While it would be impossible to show unbroken thematic links across the centuries, some interesting things stand out.

  Irish politics has been nothing if not complex. Political groups have sometimes shared common ideologies and strategies, but this has been the exception rather than the rule. In medieval and early modern Ireland, different groups allied themselves politically in very different ways, and not always with the groups closest to them in religion, class or economic status. Some looked to outside allies, such as the Vikings and the Normans, to help change politics and power in Ireland. Other groups tried to form ‘native’ power blocks in an effort to keep out foreigners and invaders. In the modern period, political behaviour was equally diverse. Theobald Wolfe Tone looked to the French to help gain Irish independence from Britain, whereas Daniel O’Connell used the British political system to gain rights for Catholics and to attempt to repeal the Act of Union. Young Irelanders and Fenians were more radical than O’Connell, and broadened Irish politics by using propaganda and social activities to gain support. Yet they too looked to supporters in the United States and Australia in attempts to bring about political change. Home Rulers disagreed not only over tactics, but also over the legacy of Parnell after his fall. Those who wished to retain the Union were also not monolithic in their political ideas and activities. Some, such as the Orange Order and the Brunswick Clubs, mirrored O’Connell’s political tactics, and insisted that the defence of the Union was also the defence of Protestantism. In the early twentieth century, politics was equally complicated. Nationalists were split between supporters of John Redmond and parliamentary tactics, and Sinn Féin and militant separatism. The Irish Civil War symbolized the continuing divisions over strategy, as well as the nature of Ireland as a country. Unionists clung desperately to their connection to Britain, yet stockpiled arms to fight against the threat of Home Rule imposed by the British government. And throughout the twentieth century, in both the Free State/Republic and in Northern Ireland, politics did not settle down to the mundane aspects of running each country, as chapter seven has shown. Most dramatic, perhaps, were the changes that occurred at the end of the twentieth century. This was particularly the case in Northern Ireland, where unionists and republicans have made massive shifts towards the centre. David Trimble and a slight majority of his Ulster Unionist party have been willing to sit in government with Sinn Féin, which would have been unthinkable twenty years ago. Similarly, republicans such as Gerry Adams now recognize the political existence of Northern Ireland by agreeing to sit in a Northern Ireland Assembly. The fact that Gerry Adams’ salary as a member of the Assembly ultimately comes from the British Treasury is something that would have shocked republicans of earlier generations. Politics in Éire has also undergone significant change. Two women presidents, Mary Robinson and Mary McAleese (1951– ), were elected in the 1990s, and an increasing presence of women in Irish politics has been a feature of recent decades. New parties have arrived on the scene, and many young people now participate in political pressure groups outside mainstream politics. In fact, young people on both sides of the border are increasingly unwilling to ally themselves with political parties, as evidenced by the significant numbers of non-aligned, twenty-something voters who campaigned hard for a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum on the Good Friday Agreement.