Hard Measures

by Jose A. Rodriguez, Jr.

  We got DOJ and White House authorization to begin the urgent interrogation of Abu Zubaydah in August of that year. Congress was in recess. Immediately upon their return I led a team from CTC that went to the Hill to brief the seniormost members of our oversight committees on this highly classified program. A briefing was given on September 4, 2002, to the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Congressman Porter Goss, and the ranking member, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi. In addition there were a couple of their senior staffers present. We went through each of the specific techniques used in the interrogation of AZ that had been used for a couple of weeks in August. By the time we were briefing the Hill, Abu Zubaydah was compliant and providing good intelligence. We held nothing back and made clear that only authorized techniques, including waterboarding, had been used on Abu Zubaydah.

  The interrogation program that was developed was designed to disabuse the detainees of the notion that they were able to control the situation or manipulate us. Each step was designed to drive home to them a sense that their fate was in our hands and that the only way to ensure some semblance of order in their lives was to cooperate. Detainees were brought to a point of cooperation when they concluded that the hopelessness of their situation could end only by cooperating with interrogators. Hopelessness was not defined by pain, but by complete lack of control over one’s fate. Detainees were brought to a state of cooperation with the least amount of discomfort because gratuitous pain is counterproductive. The quality of intelligence derived from the process was dependent on the quality of intelligence guiding the debriefer and the skill of the interrogator.

  The team came up with a list of thirteen techniques, which was eventually whittled down to ten before the program was implemented. The plan was to use the techniques in a graduated fashion. If a terrorist cooperated with us from the start, none would be employed. If he was nonresponsive, the most benign tactics were used first, and only after the detainee showed that he continued to be noncompliant and after specific written authorization from Agency headquarters would a more aggressive technique be used.

  I brought a team of CTC officers to a “Principals Meeting” at the White House at which we described the techniques in some detail. Among those present were the national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, the attorney general, John Ashcroft, the president’s counsel, Alberto Gonzales, and my boss, CIA Director George Tenet. I got the sense from no one that our menu of techniques had gone too far.

  The list of enhanced interrogation techniques, known as EITs, had been assembled and was being reviewed by lawyers at the Agency, White House, and Department of Justice. A series of very explicit memos from the Department of Justice laid out exactly what our officers were allowed to do and made clear that in the view of the DOJ none of these steps, when appropriately applied, amounted to torture or any other illegal act. Having seen our officers hung out to dry in the past—for example, during the Iran-Contra period, when differing interpretations of what the law allowed left Agency officers who were doing what their superiors asked vulnerable to results ranging from career suicide to criminal prosecution—I wanted to be sure that we were on solid legal ground. The difficulty was that the program was so closely held that it could not be opened up for a broad public debate.

  Years later, the Obama White House authorized the release of many of the underlying documents that revealed the precise language that our officers were operating under. Many critics have inaccurately referred to the legal opinions we received as “the torture memos.” In fact they were anything but. Since we specifically asked for guidance to avoid what was illegal under U.S. law—torture—one might say that the DOJ guidance amounted to “nontorture memos.” The documents show with extraordinary precision how hard we worked to avoid inflicting lasting harm or pain to our detainees. The documents also reveal something else, something that has gone almost unnoticed. Many of the techniques are essentially bluffs. They were designed to convince the detainees that their situation was considerably more dire than it actually was. For example, one of the techniques that (when described by critics) sounds particularly harsh is “walling.” Opponents of our interrogation techniques falsely say that caused detainees’ heads to be thrown against walls. In fact the document reveals that special “rooms within rooms” were created with flexible plywood paneling. Interrogators would carefully propel detainees backward so that their shoulder blades would bounce against the plywood, creating a “boom,” much like the noise made when professional wrestlers throw each other around the plywood ring without getting hurt. We were after the shock value. In addition to being counterproductive, actually bouncing a detainee’s head off a solid wall would be illegal and against what we were all about.

  The approval of interrogation techniques came to us in a memo from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). In very precise terms it laid out what actions we could take against Abu Zubaydah. There was never an intent to just unload the entire menu of possible techniques on AZ, or on the handful of other al-Qa’ida terrorists who were later subjected to some of the techniques, nor did we ever do so. Initially, the detainee was jolted by the simple reality that he was now in custody and on totally unfamiliar turf.

  Most of the al-Qa’ida detainees in our custody received absolutely no—zero—EITs. The common misconception is that we treated prisoners harshly for months or years on end. The handful who did receive EITs were subjected to them for significantly less time than the authorized thirty days before they became compliant, and then were never subjected to them again.

  Arriving detainees had their heads and beards shaved and were given thorough physicals to determine if they had any medical conditions that might make the techniques unsafe for them. CIA officers would then conduct what was basically an entrance interview. This was referred to as a “neutral probe.” They simply informed the detainees that they were now in our control and asked if they were willing to cooperate. Some did. If they refused, or cooperated only in a limited way, with headquarters approval, some subset of the techniques could be used.

  Getting “confessions” was generally not a problem. They were proud of what they had done in the past; they just didn’t want to talk about attacks that might happen in the future.

  Initially, those who refused to cooperate were subjected to “conditioning” techniques. These included sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, and enforced nudity.

  If detainees continued to be unwilling to cooperate, they might receive some of the next level of procedures, which were known as “corrective” techniques. These included things like “the attention grasp,” in which the detainee was grabbed on both sides of the collar of his prison garb and in a controlled, quick motion pulled toward the interrogator. Also used was the “facial hold,” in which the interrogator would place a hand on each side of the individual’s face and hold his head immobile (while taking care to make sure his hands were well away from the detainee’s eyes). Finally there was the “insult slap,” in which the detainee was slapped somewhere between his chin and the bottom of his earlobe. The interrogators were trained and instructed to make sure their fingers were spread out so that the slap was not particularly painful. The intent was to surprise and humiliate the detainee, not to hurt him. More than one detainee expressed surprise when slapped, and told the interrogator, “Hey, you aren’t supposed to do that!” The al-Qa’ida training manual told them that Americans would treat them with kid gloves.

  If the detainee still refused to cooperate, then, and only then, would he be subjected to what were called “coercive” techniques. These included being placed in a confined space—essentially a large box in which he could stand up and sit down but in which his movements were physically constrained and uncomfortable, or a smaller box in which there was enough room to sit but not stand. We knew that Abu Zubaydah had an intense fear of bugs, and we were given authority to place a nonbiting, benign insect in the box with him, but the lawyers said that we would have to inform him be
fore doing so that the caterpillar we intended to use was essentially harmless and would not produce severe pain or death. With the psychological sting taken out of this technique, we opted to skip it.

  Long before the interrogation techniques became known and the subject of public and media debate, we elected to stop using some of them. Despite the fact that we had been given legal authorization, we simply weren’t comfortable with their use and never again employed them.

  Another technique that was used from time to time was called “wall standing.” The detainee was directed to stand four to five feet from a wall with his arms in front of him and his fingertips resting on the wall. It was intended to produce fatigue but not pain.

  Finally, should all else fail, with specific headquarters approval, the detainee might be “waterboarded.” The procedure is one that had been safely and widely used for many years in the training of U.S. military personnel. According to the Department of Justice, waterboarding had been used on 26,829 U.S. Air Force personnel between 1992 and 2001. Eventually the air force stopped using the technique, not because it didn’t work, and not because they thought it was torture, but because it was too effective. The airmen subjected to it found it almost impossible to resist. While the numbers of other service personnel who were subjected to waterboarding is not readily available, it is clear that this was a widely used and understood technique. The navy continued to employ it as part of its SERE training, long after the air force stopped. If it has abandoned the practice, it is likely because of the publicity generated by leaks concerning our interrogation program, rather than concern about the harshness of the technique itself. Since it was so widely used in training of our own military personnel, we were then (and remain now) quite confident that a carefully implemented waterboarding program, such as we envisioned, in no way could accurately be considered “torture.”

  The description of waterboarding in the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel memo was explicit. It read in part: “… the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench, which is approximately four feet by seven feet. The individual’s feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, airflow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. This causes an increase in the carbon dioxide level in the individual’s blood. This increase in the carbon dioxide levels stimulates increased effort to breathe. This effort plus the cloth produces the perception of ‘suffocation and incipient panic’ i.e., the perception of drowning” (italics mine). Some people argue that because a detainee thinks he might be drowning, that makes it torture, whereas military trainees knew that they were in training and could stop the procedure by saying a single word. I’m told that military trainees wonder if their “captors” are going too far and almost immediately come to believe that their situation is dire. Al-Qa’ida detainees also could have ended the session with a single word, a word indicating that they were ready to cooperate. Additionally, KSM was observed counting the seconds off with the fingers of his hand as the waterboarding proceeded, because he knew most applications would last only a few seconds. He quickly figured out that the procedure did not foreshadow imminent death.

  The memo went on to say: “The individual does not breathe any water into his lungs. During those 20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of twelve to twenty-four inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted and the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full breaths. The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of the cloth. The procedure may then be repeated.” Although we were authorized to conduct waterboarding as described above, in fact our officers in the field used far less water for far shorter periods of time than they were allowed.

  Unfortunately, once the matter of waterboarding became generally known, the public was only given (quite literally) a cartoon version of what others imagine the technique was like. Irresponsible animations showed detainees practically being dowsed by a fire hose.

  The EITs were employed by our officers with great reluctance and solemnity. No one enjoyed doing it, but we were absolutely convinced that people like AZ had information in their heads that would save countless American lives. We were right.

  Once Abu Zubaydah broke under waterboarding, he told our officers something remarkable. “You must do this for all the brothers,” he said. AZ explained to them that Allah knew that they were only human and once they had been tested to their limits there was no shame in their cooperating with us. He understood why we were doing what we were doing and explained that when al-Qa’ida got their hands on their enemies, and especially when they caught one of their own members who they thought was a spy, their treatment was infinitely harsher.

  Once he became compliant, the information AZ willingly provided us was by any reasonable measure some of the most important intelligence collected since 9/11. Those who say otherwise are simply ill informed or misleading the public.

  Chapter 4

  KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED

  For those working in the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, the first six months of the post-9/11 world was a blur. There wasn’t time to grieve over the loss of thousands of our countrymen, a loss that, despite great effort, the Agency and our counterparts throughout government had failed to prevent. Every ounce of our energy had to be poured into the response. As I have said, while the awful hours of September 11 were inarguably the worst in the CIA’s history, I believe the days that followed were our best.

  In some ways I was like many of my new colleagues. I was performing in a job that days before did not exist. Our ultimate goal was clear, but the path to it was not. Countless new people poured into CTC, and many were crammed into a maze of cubicles so confusing we had to hang cardboard street signs above the narrow aisles so that officers could find their counterparts. “Want to see Jim? Sure, take a right on Usama Bin Lane and it is the third cubicle on the left. If you get to Zawahiri Way you’ve gone too far.”

  The war against terrorists was being fought on many fronts, but none was more important in the near term than the one in Afghanistan. A CTC veteran by the name of Hank Crumpton was brought back from an overseas assignment, at which he had just arrived, and at considerable sacrifice for him and his family, to orchestrate the efforts to roust al-Qa’ida from its comfortable lair in Afghanistan and drive its Taliban protectors from power. The plan was not just a CIA plan. It was so well conceived that it became the nation’s plan. A relative handful of CIA officers, in concert with a couple of hundred special operations forces troops, worked miracles. The story of how that plan was formulated and implemented is a remarkable one, but it is one that has been well told in books such as George Tenet’s memoir and Hank Crumpton’s soon-to-be released The Art of Intelligence, and I won’t devote much space to it here. As the plan was being built and carried out, Cofer Black, CTC’s leader, was jetting around the world building partnerships with allies and former foes alike to capitalize on the near-universal revulsion at what al-Qa’ida had done and to enlist new partners in the fight against them and their associates. Cofer’s deputy, Ben Bonk, a soft-spoken, gentle, and insightful analyst, was spending countless hours in meetings at the White House with DOD, State Department, and other interagency colleagues trying to maintain focus on the critical task at hand.

  With CTC’s two top leaders fully consumed, I focused on keeping our rapidly growing organization on track. I made it a priority to keep the Agency’s top leadership (collectively known as the “seventh floor”) informed of what CTC was doing and taking guidance from them and passing it along to our troops. After a short period of complete cooperation post-9/11, as time passed there were occasionally ruffled feathers within other parts of the CIA that suddenly found themselves on the losing end of personnel, space, money, and responsibility realignmen
ts. I tried hard to patch up any hard feelings and to get everyone to feel as though they were part of a great team effort, which they were.

  Operationally, things were going pretty well. Cooperation from international partners was at an all-time high. The Taliban had been routed. Al-Qa’ida was spending most of its efforts to preserve its own existence and therefore had less time to spend trying to end ours. Yet our increased intelligence-collection capabilities produced a continuing flood of threat information. Working in conjunction with the FBI, CTC was producing a product called the “Threat Matrix,” which went to the president and other senior leaders, cataloguing the latest threats to come in over the transom. Many of the threats were cataclysmic in nature. We knew that most of them were bogus; we just didn’t know which ones.

  It is impossible to overstate the stress our officers were under. Every sign pointed to the fact that al-Qa’ida was planning another wave of attacks, and we were convinced then and remain convinced today that they hoped to exceed the devastation of 9/11 with the next wave. The so-called chatter picked up from intercepted communications was just one of the indicators we had to go on. There were other even more ominous signs.

  Among the material found at the time of Abu Zubaydah’s capture were videotapes he had prepared in advance to celebrate another yet-to-happen al-Qa’ida success. The tapes were designed to rally supporters and solicit funds from backers of their evil jihad. At least one of them suggested that Abu Zubaydah had been to Iran or was somehow cooperating with the Iranians. Surely Abu Zubaydah would not have gone to the trouble of making these tapes unless they had some very specific and sizable plans in mind. But what were those plans?