Complete Works of Onasander

by Onasander

  [1] So that general is to be praised who is good, wealthy, and well-born, but the excellent general who is not wealthy is not to be rejected, even if of humble family.

  [2] αἱρεθεὶς δ’ ὁ στρατηγὸς ἔστω χρηστός, εὐπροσήγορος, ἕτοιμος, ἀτάραχος, μὴ οὕτως ἐπιεικὴς ὥστε καταφρονεῖσθαι, μήτε φοβερὸς ὥστε μισεῖσθαι, ἵνα μήτε ταῖς χάρισιν ἐκλύσῃ τὸ στρατόπεδον μήτε τοῖς φόβοις ἀλλοτριώσῃ.

  [2] The general when chosen must be trustworthy, affable, prompt, calm, not so lenient as to be despised, nor so severe as to be hated, so that he may neither through favours loosen the bonds of discipline, nor estrange the army through fear.

  [3] λοχαγοὺς δὲ καθιστάτω καὶ ταξιάρχους καὶ χιλιάρχους, καὶ εἴ τινων ἄλλων ἡγεμόνων προσδεῖν αὐτῷ δόξαι, τοὺς εὐνουστάτους τῇ πατρίδι, πιστοτάτους, εὐρωστοτάτους, ἔνθεν δ’ οὐδὲν ἂν κωλύοι καὶ τοὺς εὐπορωτάτους καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους·

  [3] He must appoint as lieutenants, captains, and colonels, as well as other officers, if it seems necessary, men who are most loyal to their country, most faithful, and most vigorous — though there is nothing to prevent their being of the greatest wealth and nobility.

  [4] οὐ γάρ, ὡς ὀλίγους αἱρουμένους στρατηγοὺς ἐκ τρόπου δοκιμάσαι ῥᾷον, κἂν ἀπῇ ὁ τῶν χρημάτων μετ’ εὐγενείας ὄγκος, οὕτως που καὶ λοχαγῶν καὶ ταξιάρχων πλῆθος.

  [4] As the number of generals to be chosen is small, they may be easily judged from their characters, even if the dignity of wealth and birth is lacking; but this is not the case with the multitude of subordinate officers.

  [5] ὅθεν τὸ μὲν εὐγενὲς ἐπὶ τούτων προκριτέον εἰς πρόχειρον ἐν ὀξεῖ καιρῷ δοκιμασίαν, τὸ δὲ ἐν εὐπορίᾳ, ἐπειδὴ ἀναλῶσαί τε καὶ δοῦναι στρατιώταις οἱ ἐκ περιουσίας δυνατοί, χορηγία δ’ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡγουμένων ὀλίγη πρὸς τοὺς ὑποταττομένους εὐνουστέρα παρασκευάζει τὰ πλήθη· καὶ ἀσφαλεῖς αἱ μειζόνων πίστεις πραγμάτων τοῖς περὶ πλειόνων κινδυνεύουσιν, εἰ μὴ πάνυ τὸ πιστόν, ὡς ἂν εἰ στρατηγοὶ τις, ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου παρέχοιτο.

  [5] And so by off-hand judgment required at a crucial moment the nobility have to be preferred, but when there is no urgency, the wealthy, since those who have abundant means can spend money on the soldiery and make them gifts; for a slight expenditure by the officers for the benefit of their men makes the rank and file better disposed; and the pledges of greater rewards can be depended upon when made by those who have more at stake — that is, if the confidence a general ought to inspire is not altogether furnished by his character.

  III. Περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν τὸν στρατηγὸν βουλευτάς

  III. THE GENERAL’S ADVISORY COUNCIL

  [1] Αἱρείσθω δὲ ἤτοι συνέδρους, οἳ μεθέξουσιν αὐτῷ πάσης βουλῆς καὶ κοινωνήσουσι γνώμης αὐτοῦ οἱ τούτου εἵνεκα ἀκολουθήσοντες, ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἡγεμόνων τοὺς ἐντιμοτάτους μεταπεμπόμενος συνεδρευέτω, ὡς, ἅ γέ τις ἂν ἐννοήσῃ μὲν μόνος, ὡς τὰ αὑτοῦ, οὐ βεβαίως οἰκειοῦται.

  [1] The general should either choose a staff to participate in all his councils and share in his decisions, men who will accompany the army especially for this purpose, or summon as members of his council a selected group of the most respected commanders, since it is not safe that the opinions of one single man, on his sole judgment, should be adopted.

  [2] γνώμη γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀνεπικούρητος μονουμένη παπταίνει περὶ τὴν ἰδίαν εὕρεσιν, ἡ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πέλας ἐπιμαρτυρηθεῖσα πιστοῦται τὸ μὴ σφαλερόν.

  [2] For the isolated decision of one man, unsupported by others, can see no farther than his own ingenuity, but that which has the additional testimony of councillors guarantees against mistake.

  [3] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μήθ’ οὕτως ἄστατος ἔστω τὴν διάνοιαν, ὡς αὐτὸν αὑτῷ πάμπαν ἀπιστεῖν, μήθ’ οὕτως αὐθάδης, ὡς μή τι καὶ παρ’ ἄλλῳ τοῦ παρ’ αὑτῷ κρεῖττον οἴεσθαι νοηθῆναι· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἢ πᾶσι προσέχοντα καὶ μηδὲν αὑτῷ πολλὰ καὶ ἀσύμφορα πράττειν, ἢ μηδ’ ὀλίγ’ ἄλλων ἀκούοντα, πάντα δ’ αὑτοῦ, πολλὰ καὶ δεῖνα διαμαρτάνειν.

  [3] However, the general must neither be so undecided that he entirely distrusts himself, nor so obstinate as not to think that anyone can have a better idea than his own; for such a man, either because he listens to every one else and never to himself, is sure to meet with frequent misfortune, or else, through never listening to others but always to himself, is bound to make many very costly mistakes.

  IV. Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου ἐξ εὐλόγου αἰτίας ἐπάγειν

  IV. THE NECESSITY OF A REASONABLE CAUSE FOR WAR

  [1] Τὰς δ’ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου μάλιστά φημι χρῆναι φρονίμως συνίστασθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου πᾶσι φανερὸν γίγνεσθαι πολεμοῦντα· τότε γὰρ καὶ θεοὶ συναγωνισταὶ τοῖς στρατεύουσιν εὐμενεῖς καθίστανται, καὶ ἄνθρωποι προθυμότερον ἀντιτάττονται τοῖς δεινοῖς·

  [1] The causes of war, I believe, should be marshalled with the greatest care; it should be evident to all that one fights on the side of justice. For then the gods also, kindly disposed, become comrades in arms to the soldiers, and men are more eager to take their stand against the foe.

  [2] εἰδότες γάρ, ὡς οὐκ ἄρχουσιν ἀλλ’ ἀμύνονται, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀσυνειδήτους κακῶν ἔχοντες ἐντελῆ τὴν ἀνδρείαν εἰσφέρονται, ὡς, ὅσοι γε νομίζουσι νεμεσήσειν τὸ θεῖον ἐπὶ τῷ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐκφέρειν πόλεμον, αὐτῇ τῇ οἰήσει, κἂν μή τι δεινὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπαντήσειν μέλλῃ, προκατορρωδοῦσιν.

  [2] For with the knowledge that they are not fighting an aggressive but a defensive war, with consciences free from evil designs, they contribute a courage that is complete; while those who believe an unjust war is displeasing to heaven, because of this very opinion enter the war with fear, even if they are not about to face danger at the hands of the enemy.

  [3] διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν στρατηγόν, ὧν τε βούλεται τυχεῖν καὶ ὧν μὴ παραχωρῆσαι, λόγῳ καὶ πρεσβείαις προκαλεῖσθαι πρῶτον, ἵν’ ἐν τῷ μὴ συγκαταβαίνειν τοῖς ἀξιουμένοις τοὺς ἐναντίους ἀνάγκῃ δοκῇ, καὶ μὴ προαιρέσει τὴν δύναμιν ἐξάγειν πολεμήσουσαν, ἐπιμαρτυράμενος τὸ θεῖον, ὡς οὔτε καταφρονῶν ὧν συμβαίνει τοὺς πολεμοῦντας πάσχειν, ἀνεμεσήτως ἔπεισιν, οὔτε ἐκ παντὸς τρόπ�
�υ τὰ δεῖνα δρᾶσαι προῃρημένος τοὺς πολεμίους.

  [3] On this account the general must first announce, by speeches and through embassies, what he wishes to obtain and what he is not willing to concede, in order that it may appear that, because the enemy will not agree to his reasonable demands, it is of necessity, not of his own preference, that he is taking the field. He should call heaven to witness that he is entering the war without offence, since he has not failed to consider the dangers that fall to the lot of combatants, and is not deliberately seeking, in every possible manner, to ruin the enemy.

  [4] εἰδέναι δὲ χρή, καθότι οὐ μόνον οἰκίας καὶ τείχους ἐδραιότερον ὑφίστασθαι δεῖ τὸν θεμέλιον, ὡς ἀσθενοῦς γε ὄντος συγκαταρρυησομένων καὶ τῶν ἐποικοδομουμένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολέμου τὰς ἀρχὰς δεῖ κατασκευασάμενον ἰσχυρῶς καὶ κρηπῖδα περιθέμενον ἀσφαλείας, οὕτως ἐξάγειν τὰς δυνάμεις· ὧν γὰρ ἀσθενῆ τὰ πράγματά ἐστιν, ἐπειδὰν οὗτοι μέγα βάρος ἀναλάβωσιν πολέμου, ταχὺ θλίβονται καὶ ὑστεροῦσιν.

  [4] He should know that not only is a firm foundation necessary for houses and walls — for if this is weak the superstructures will also collapse — , but that in war also it is only after one has prepared a firm beginning, and has laid a safe foundation, that he should take the field. For those whose cause is weak, when they take up the heavy burden of war, are quickly crushed by it and fail.

  [5] ὅθεν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸν κυβερνήτην ἐκ λιμένος ἐξαρτυσάμενον τὸ σκάφος καὶ τὰ παρ’ αὑτῷ ἅπαντα ποιήσαντα, τότ’ ἐπιτρέπειν χρὴ τῇ τύχῃ, ὡς αἴσχιστόν γε καὶ σφαλερὸν ὑποδείξαντα πολέμου κίνησιν, ὥστε καὶ διὰ θαλάττης ἤδη καὶ διὰ γῆς ἄγειν τὸ στράτευμα, κἄπειτα πρύμναν κρούεσθαι·

  [5] Just as a careful ship-captain, after he has given his ship a thorough overhauling and outfitting while in harbour, and has done everything within his own power, must then commit his craft to Fortune, so it is most disgraceful and dangerous for a general, after he has given intimations of a beginning of war, implying an immediate advance of his forces by both land and sea, then to back out.

  [6] τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀνοίας καὶ προπετείας ἕκαστος κατεγέλασεν, τῆς δ’ ἀσθενείας κατεφρόνησεν, οἱ δ’ ἐχθροί, οἵτινές ποτ’ ἂν ὦσιν, κἂν μὴ πάθωσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ μὴ βουληθέντας ἀλλ’ οὐ δυνηθέντας διαθεῖναί τι δικαίως ἐμίσησαν.

  [6] For while every one laughs at folly and rashness, we despise weakness, and the enemy — whoever they may be — even if they experience no harm, have good reason to hate the would-be invaders, as men who have not lacked the will, but lacked the ability to put a matter through.

  V. Περὶ τοῦ ἐξιλεοῦσθαι πρῶτον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὸ θεῖον ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐξάγων εἰς πόλεμον

  Ἐξαγέτω δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ὁ στρατηγὸς καθαρὰς ἢ οἷς νόμοι ἱεροὶ ἢ οἷς μάντεις ὑφηγοῦνται καθαρσίοις, πᾶσαν, εἴ τις ἢ δημοσίᾳ κηλὶς ἢ ἰδίου μολύσματος ἑκάστῳ σύνεστιν, ἀποδιοπομπούμενος.

  V. PROPITIATION OF THE DIVINE POWER BY THE GENERAL BEFORE LEADING THE ARMY INTO BATTLE

  Before the general leads out his army he must see that it is purified, by such rites as either the laws or soothsayers direct, and must avert whatever taint there is in the state or in any citizen, by expiatory sacrifices.

  VI. Περὶ τοῦ ἄγειν ἐν τάξει τὸ στρατόπεδον

  VI. ON MAINTAINING MILITARY FORMATION

  [1] Ἀγέτω δὲ τὸ στράτευμα πᾶν ἐν τάξει, κἂν μήπω μέλλῃ συμβάλλειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ μακρᾶς ὁδοῦ περαιοῦσθαι καὶ πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ἀνύειν πορείαν, καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ· διὰ μὲν τῆς φιλίας, ἵνα ἐθίζηται τὰ στρατεύματα μένειν ἐν τάξει καὶ συμφυλάττειν τοὺς ἰδίους λόχους καὶ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν, διὰ δὲ τῆς πολεμίας πρὸς τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐπιβουλὰς γιγνομένας, ἵνα μὴ ἐν ὄξει καιρῷ θορυβούμενοι καὶ ἐπαναθέοντες καὶ ἄλλοι πρὸς ἄλλους φερόμενοι μηδὲν μὲν ἀνύσωσι φθασθέντες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ δεῖνα πάθωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἅμα καὶ εἰς πορείαν ὦσιν ἐπιδέξιοι καὶ εἰς μάχην εὐτρεπεῖς, ἔχοντες καὶ τὸ σύνθημα καὶ ἀλλήλους ἐν τάξει βλέποντες.

  [1] The general must lead his entire army in military formation, even if he is not on the point of battle, but is completing a long journey and a march of many days through either a friendly or a hostile country; through a friendly country, that the soldiers may become accustomed to remaining in rank, to keeping to their own companies, and to following their own leaders; through a hostile country, to guard against sudden attacks from ambush, that the soldiers may not be thrown into disorder at a critical moment, running against and stumbling over one another, and so accomplishing nothing but rather suffering severe loss; they must proceed, prepared at the same time for marching and for battle, remembering their watchword and keeping their eyes on their comrades in the ranks.

  [2] συστέλλειν δὲ πειράσθω τὴν πορείαν τοῦ στρατεύματος, ὡς ἑνὶ μάλιστα, πρὸς ὀλίγον, καὶ διὰ τοιούτων, ἂν δυνατὸν ᾖ, χωρίων ἀγέτω τὰς τάξεις, δι’ ὧν οὐκ ἂν ἐκθλιβόμεναι στεναὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσαι πλάτος ἐκ πλευρᾶς ἐπὶ μήκιστον ἐκταθεῖεν·

  [2] The general must attempt to make the marching order of his army as compact as possible, and should lead his troops through such a country — so far as he is able — that the ranks may not be so cramped, being narrow and having no width, that they cannot be deployed to a considerable distance laterally.

  [3] καὶ γὰρ εὐπαθέστεραι γίγνονται πρὸς τὰς αἰφνιδίους τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιφανείας αἱ τοιαῦται καὶ ἥκιστα δραστήριοι· ἂν τε γάρ σφισι κατὰ μέτωπον ὑπαντήσωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι πλατύτεροι τεταγμένοι, ῥᾳδίως αὐτοὺς τρέπονται, καθάπερ οἱ τοὺς ἐπὶ κέρως ὄντας ἐν ταῖς μάχαις κυκλούμενοι, ἄν τε κατὰ μέσην τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ πλευρᾶς ἐπιβάλωσι, ταχὺ διέσπασαν αὐτῶν τὴν πορείαν καὶ διέκοψαν — ἐπιστρεψάντων γὰρ αὐτῶν εἰς φάλαγγα πρὸς ἄμυναν ἀσθενὴς ἡ μάχη γίνεται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα βάθος — , ἐάν τε τοῖς κατόπιν, ἡ κατὰ νώτου μάχη δεινὴ καὶ προφανῆ τὸν ὄλεθρον ἔχουσα, κἂν ἐπιστρέψαι δὲ τολμήσωσιν εἰς μέτωπον, ἡ αὐτὴ γίγνεται μάχη τοῖς ἐν τῇ πρωτοπορείᾳ τεταγμένοις· ταχὺ γὰρ αὐτοὺς περιστήσονται.

  [3] For lines so disposed suffer more under sudden attacks of the enemy and are least effective; should the enemy with a more extended front encounter the head of the
column, they would easily put it to flight, just as in battle one army, by outflanking an enemy advancing in column formation, routs it. Should the enemy attack the centre of the column from the flank, they would quickly pierce it and cut through — for if the column wheels to meet the enemy, forming a phalanx, even this, lacking depth, will make but a weak resistance — ; and, finally, should the enemy attack the rear of the column, the fighting with back to the foe would be dangerous and entail obvious destruction; and even if the soldiers in the column venture to face about and form a new front, the battle would amount to the same thing as the previous attack on the advance guard, i.e., the enemy would quickly surround them.

  [4] συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τὰς παραβοηθείας δυσχερεῖς καὶ ἀπράκτους γίνεσθαι· τῶν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐραγίας τοῖς εἰς τὴν πρωτοπορείαν βουλομένων βοηθεῖν ἢ τῶν πρώτων τοῖς κατόπιν βραδεῖα ἡ ἄφιξις καὶ οὐ κατὰ καιρὸν γίγνεται, διὰ πολλῶν, ὧν ὑστεροῦσιν ἢ προηγοῦνται, σταδίων ἰέναι προθυμουμένων.

  [4] Furthermore, assistance is difficult to give and ineffectual, for when those in the rear desire to give aid to the head of the column, or those at the head to those in the rear, their arrival is delayed and ill-timed, however eager they may be to cover the many stades which separate them from the van or the rear respectively.

  [5] Ἡ δὲ συνεσταλμένη πορεία καὶ τετράγωνος ἡ μὴ πάνυ παραμήκης εἰς πάντα καιρὸν εὐμεταχείριστός ἐστι καὶ ἀσφαλής. ἔστι δ’ ὅτε καὶ συνέβη τι τοιοῦτον ἐκ τῶν ἐκτεινομένων στρατευμάτων, ὥστε Πανικὰ καὶ πτοίας ἀμφιδόξους ἐμπίπτειν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἱ πρῶτοι καταβεβηκότες ἐξ ὀρεινῶν εἰς ψιλὰ καὶ ἐπίπεδα χωρία θεασάμενοι τοὺς κατόπιν ἐπικαταβαίνοντας ἔδοξαν εἶναι πολεμίων ἔφοδον, ὥστε μελλῆσαι προσβάλλειν ὡς ἐχθροῖς, τινὰς δὲ καὶ εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν ἤδη.