by Onasander
[4] δεῖ τοίνυν τὰς ὑποχωρήσεις ὑφορᾶσθαι τῶν πολεμίων καὶ μὴ ἀπειροκάλως ἕπεσθαι καὶ περιβλέπεσθαι δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς τόπους ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ δι’ ὧν ἄγει χωρίων ὁρᾶν, ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δ’ ὅτι ταύτῃ πάλιν ὑποστρέψαι δεῖ, καὶ ἤτοι μηδ’ εἰσβάλλειν, ἀλλ’ ἀποτρέπεσθαι δεῖ, καὶ ἤτοι μηδ’ εἰσβάλλειν, ἀλλ’ ἀποτρέπεσθαι τῆς πορείας, ἢ εἰσβάλλοντα προορᾶν καὶ εἰς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τοὺς συνάπτοντας αὐχένας τῶν ὀρῶν ἀπολείπειν τοὺς παραφυλάττοντας, ἵν’ ἀσφαλής σφισιν ἡ ἀνακομιδὴ γίγνηται.
[4] Therefore retreats on the part of the enemy should be suspected and not stupidly followed; the general should observe the country rather than the enemy, and notice through what sort of terrain he is leading his forces; and he should take into consideration that it is necessary to return by the same road by which he came, and should either refrain from advancing and turn aside from the route, or, if he does advance, he should take precautions, leaving forces to hold the mountain passes and connecting defiles in order that his return may be safe.
[5] ταῦτα δ’ εἰρήσθω καὶ τοῦ καταστρατηγεῖν οὕτως εἵνεκα καὶ τοῦ μὴ καταστρατηγεῖσθαι· καλὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ λαβεῖν οὕτω δύνασθαι πολεμίους, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ ληφθῆναι.
[5] This advice is given for the purpose both of outwitting the enemy by these tactics and of not being outwitted oneself; for though it is a fine thing to be able in this fashion to ensnare the enemy, yet it is absolutely essential to avoid being ensnared oneself.
β´. Περὶ τοῦ προσίεσθαι τοὺς ἀπαγγέλλοντάς τι
(2) RECEIVING MESSENGERS
[6] Προσιέσθω δὲ καὶ πάντα τὸν βουλόμενόν τι ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μέθ’ ἡμέραν καὶ ἐν πορείᾳ καὶ ἐν κατασκηνώσει καὶ ἀναπαυόμενος καὶ ἐπὶ λουτροῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τροφῆς· οἱ γὰρ ἀναβαλλόμενοι καὶ δυσπρόσιτοι καὶ τοῖς ὑπηρέταις τοὺς προσιόντας ἀνακόπτειν κελεύοντες πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων εἰκότως διαμαρτάνουσι πραγμάτων, ἢ καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις ῥᾳθυμοῦντες σφάλλονται· πολλάκις γὰρ ἐν ὄξει τὸ δυνάμενον καιρῷ φθασθῆναι πάρεισίν τινες μηνύοντες.
[6] The general should receive every man who wishes to report anything, whether slave or freeman, by night or day, on the march or in camp, while resting, in the bath, or at table. For generals who procrastinate and are difficult of access, and who order their servants to keep out those who come to see them, naturally either miss many important opportunities or even through their negligence suffer complete ruin; for often men bring information at a critical moment about something that can be frustrated in the nick of time.
XΙ
I. Περὶ ἀριστοποιΐας
XII. MEAL-TIMES
[1] Ἀντιστρατοπεδεύων δὲ πολεμίῳ χάρακι μηδὲ τῆς κατὰ καιρὸν ἀριστοποιΐας ἀμελείτω· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ νομίζῃ τὸ ὅτε βούλεται τὸ στράτευμα πρὸς μάχην ἐκτάττειν εἶναι, καὶ ἡνίκα ἂν ἐθέλῃ, παραγγελλέτω ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι· ἐὰν δὲ εἰς τοσαύτην ἀνάγκην ἐληλυθὼς τυγχάνῃ διά τινας τόπους ἢ χάρακος ἀσθένειαν ἤ τινας ἄλλας αἰτίας, ὥστ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀπολελεῖφθαι τὸ ἐξάγειν ὁπότε προαιροῦνται καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην σφίσιν ἐπιτιθέναι τοῦ τὰ ὅπλα λαμβάνειν καὶ ἀντιπαρατάττεσθαι, μὴ ὀκνείτω καὶ ἕωθεν ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι σημαίνειν, μὴ φθάσωσιν νήστισιν ἐπιθέντες οἱ πολέμιοι τὴν ἀνάγκην τοῦ μάχεσθαι.
[1] The general, if encamped opposite the camp of the enemy, should not be careless of the proper time at which to serve meals. For if he considers that it lies with him to lead out his troops to battle whenever he wishes, he may set a meal hour for his troops at whatever time he wishes. But if he should chance to have come into such extremities, because of the terrain, or the weakness of his camp, or for some other reason, that it is left in the power of the enemy to attack whenever they desire, and to compel his army to seize their arms and draw up for defence, he should not hesitate to order the first meal at sunrise, lest the enemy, by a prior attack, force his men to fight while still hungry.
[2] καὶ τὸ σύνολον οὐκ ἐν μικρῷ θετέον οὐδὲ παρορατέον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων πρόνοιαν· ἐμφαγόντες γὰρ στρατιῶται μετρίως, ὥστε μὴ πολὺν ἐνφορτίσασθαι τῇ γαστρὶ κόρον, δυναμικώτεροι πρὸς τὰς μάχας εἰσίν· πολλάκις καὶ παρὰ τοῦθ’ ἡττήθη στρατόπεδα τῆς ἰσχύος ἐλλειπούσης διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν, ὅταν μὴ ἐν ὄξει καιρῷ κρίνηται τὰ τῆς μάχης, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἡμέρας ὅλης λαμβάνῃ τὸ τέλος.
[2] On the whole, this matter must not be considered of slight importance nor should a general neglect to pay attention to it; for soldiers who have eaten moderately, so as not to put too great a load into their stomachs, are more vigorous in battle; armies have often been overpowered for just this reason, their strength failing for lack of food — that is, whenever the decision rests, not on a moment’s fighting, but when the battle lasts throughout the entire day.
XIII. Περὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὸν στρατηγὸν εὔθυμον ἐν ταῖς δυσπραγίαις
XIII. COURAGE ON THE PART OF THE GENERAL WHEN IN ADVERSITY
[1] Ὅτ’ ἂν δέ τις ἐμπέσῃ δυσθυμία στρατεύμασι καὶ φόβος ἢ συμμαχίας τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀφιγμένης ἢ προτερήματός σφισι γεγονότος, ὁ στρατηγὸς τότε δὴ μάλιστα τοῖς στρατιώταις ἱλαρὸς καὶ γεγηθὼς καὶ ἀκατάπληκτος φαινέσθω.
[1] Whenever despondency or fear has fallen on an army because the enemy has received reinforcements or gained an advantage, then especially the general should show himself to his soldiers gay, cheerful, and undaunted.
[2] αἱ γὰρ ὄψεις τῶν ἡγεμόνων συμμετασχηματίζουσι τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ὑποταττομένων, καὶ στρατηγοῦ μὲν εὐθυμουμένου καὶ ἱλαρὸν βλέποντος ἀναθαρρεῖ καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὡς οὐδενὸς ὄντος δεινοῦ, κατεπτηχότος δὲ καὶ λυπουμένου συγκαταπίπτουσι ταῖς διανοίαις ὡς μεγάλου σφίσι κακοῦ προφαινομένου.
[2] For the appearance of the leaders brings about a corresponding change in the minds of the subordinates, and if the general is cheerful and has a joyful look, the army also takes heart, believing that there is no danger; but should he have a frightened, worried appearance, the spirits of the soldiers fall with his, in the belief that disaster is impending.
[3] διὸ χρὴ πλέον τῷ σχήματι τοῦ προσώπου στρατηγε�
�ν τὴν τοῦ πλήθους εὐθυμίαν ἢ τοῖς λόγοις παρηγορεῖν· λόγοις μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ καὶ ἠπίστησαν ὡς τοῦ καιροῦ πεπλασμένοις εἵνεκεν, ὄψιν δὲ θαρσοῦσαν ἀνυπόκριτον εἶναι νομίζοντες ἐπιστώσαντο τὴν ἀφοβίαν· ἀγαθὴ δὲ ἡ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τε εἰπεῖν, ἃ δεῖ, καὶ ὀφθῆναι, ὁποῖον δεῖ.
[3] On this account, the general must inspire cheerfulness in the army, more by the strategy of his facial expression than by his words; for many distrust speeches on the ground that they have been concocted especially for the occasion, but believing a confident appearance to be unfeigned they are fully convinced of his fearlessness; and it is an excellent thing to understand these two points, how to say the right word and how to show the right expression.
XIV. α´. Πότε δεῖ φόβον ἐμβάλλειν τῷ στρατεύματι τῷ ἰδίῳ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων
XIV. (1) WHEN ONE’S OWN ARMY MUST BE MADE TO FEAR THE ENEMY
[1] Καθάπερ γε μὴν ἐν καιρῷ στρατεύματος ἀναθάρσησις ὤνησεν, οὕτως καὶ φόβος ὠφέλησεν. ὅτ’ ἂν γὰρ ῥᾳθυμῇ στρατόπεδον καὶ ἀπειθέστερον ᾖ τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ὑποσημαίνειν δεῖ κίνδυνον, οὐχ ἥκιστα φοβεροποιοῦντα τὴν ἐκείνων ἐφεδρείαν· οὐ γὰρ δειλοὺς ἔσται ποιεῖν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ ἀσφαλεῖς· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δυσθυμίαις θαρρεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ῥᾳθυμίαις φοβεῖσθαι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δειλοὺς ἀνδρείους ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ θρασεῖς προμηθεῖς.
[1] Just as the recovery of courage at a crucial moment benefits an army, so also fear is advantageous. For whenever an army becomes idle and inclined to disobey its officers, the general should suggest the danger from the enemy, especially by representing their reserves to be formidable. It will not be possible thus to make the soldiers cowardly but only steady, since in despondency it is necessary to be of good courage, but in idleness to fear; for fear makes cowards bold and the rash cautious.
[2] ἀμφότερα δὲ συμβαίνει στρατοπέδοις, καὶ οὕτως καταπεπλῆχθαι πολεμίους ὥστε μηδὲν ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν, καὶ οὕτως καταφρονεῖν ὥστε μηδὲν φυλάττεσθαι· πρὸς ἑκάτερον δὲ δεῖ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἡρμόσθαι καὶ εἰδέναι, ποτε δεῖ τἀντίπαλα ταπεινὰ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ σχήματι ποιεῖν, καὶ ποτ’ αὐτὰ δεῖνα καὶ φοβερώτερα.
[2] These two misfortunes happen to armies, to become so terrified of the enemy that they are unwilling to attempt any offensive, and so bold that they are unwilling to take any precautionary measures. With regard to each the general must arrange his plans, and know when by voice and look he must make the enemy appear weak, and when more threatening and formidable.
β´. Περὶ τὸ θαρρύνειν τὸ δεδιὸς στράτευμα
(2) ENCOURAGING THE FRIGHTENED ARMY
[3] Μελλούσης δὲ μάχης, ὅτε ἄδηλον ἔχοντα τὰ στρατεύματα τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ πολέμου διατετάρακται τῷ φόβῳ, δυνηθείς πῃ λαβεῖν αἰχμαλώτους ὁ στρατηγὸς ἢ ἀπὸ ἐνέδρας ἢ διακριβολισάμενος ἢ καὶ ἀποστατοῦντας τῆς ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς, εἰ μέν τινας γενναίους τοῖς φρονήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καταμάθοι, τούτους ἢ ἀποκτεινάτω παραχρῆμα λαβὼν ἢ δήσας παραδότω τοῖς ἐπὶ ταῦτα τεταγμένοις φυλάττειν κελεύσας, ὅπως μὴ πολλοὶ θεάσωνται τοὺς ἄνδρας, εἰ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἀγεννεῖς καὶ μικροψύχους, ἔτι καὶ προαπειλήσας σφίσιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας σκηνῆς καὶ προδουλώσας σφῶν τῷ φόβῳ τὰς ψυχὰς εἰς τὰ πλήθη προαγέτω δακρύοντας καὶ δεομένους, ἅμα λέγων καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος τοῖς στρατιώταις, ὡς ἀγεννεῖς καὶ ταπεινοὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, καὶ ὡς πρὸς τοιούτους ἐστὶν ἄνδρας αὐτοῖς ἡ μάχη δεδιότας οὕτως τὸν θάνατον, ἁπτομένους γονάτων καὶ προκυλιομένους τῶν ἑκάστου ποδῶν.
[3] On the eve of battle, when the army, uncertain of the outcome of the war, is distrustful and fearful, the general, if he is able, should manage to capture some prisoners by ambush or skirmishing, or some men who have strayed from their own camp. If he learns that they are strong in courage and in body, he should either kill them on the spot or turn them over, securely bound, to men assigned to this duty, with orders to guard them, so that not many of his own forces may see them; but if they are weak and cowardly and spiritless, after threatening them in the privacy of his own tent and enslaving their minds through fear, he should lead them, weeping and supplicating, before his army, pointing out to his soldiers how base and wretched and worthless they are, and saying that it is against such men that they are to fight, men who are so greatly afraid of death, who cling to the knees and grovel at the feet of every one.
[4] ἐπαναθαρρεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁ στρατὸς ἤδη προκατανενοηκὼς τῶν πολεμίων ὄψεις τε καὶ πάθη ψυχῆς· ἀεὶ γάρ, ὃ μηδέπω τις ἑώρακεν, ἐλπίζει μεῖζον γενήσεσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας, ἔτι καὶ τῷ τοῦ μέλλοντος φόβῳ τὴν ἐλπίδα μετρεῖ πρὸς τὸ χαλεπώτερον.
[4] The army is emboldened at all this, since they know before the conflict the appearance of the enemy and his state of mind. For what a man has never seen he always expects will be greater than it really is; so also because of his fear of the future, a man measures his apprehensions by reference to the more grievous outcome.
XV. Ὅτι διαφοραὶ πολλαὶ τῶν τάξεων
Τάξις δ’ οὐ μία πολέμου, πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ διάφοροι καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ὁπλισμοὺς καὶ παρὰ τοὺς στρατευομένους καὶ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ἀντιπολέμους, ὧν τὰς διαφορὰς ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπ’ αὐτῶν εἴσεται τῶν καιρῶν· ἃ δ’ ἂν οὐχ ἥκιστα πολλαῖς ἁρμόζοι παρατάξεσι δίχα τῶν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνάγκην ἐχουσῶν νοεῖσθαι, ταῦθ’ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δίειμι.
XV. THE DIFFERENCE IN BATTLE FORMATIONS
Battle formation is not of one but of many and various kinds, with regard to arms and soldiers and terrain and enemies. These differences the general will have to know on the occasions themselves, but what pertains in large part to many formations I shall briefly summarize, without considering the details which, in the actions themselves, must necessarily be understood.
XVI. Ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀντιπόλεμον καὶ τὸ ἴδιον συντάξει
Ἱππεῖς μὲν δὴ στρατηγὸς οὐχ οὕτως, ὡς βούλεται, μᾶλλον δ’ ὡς ἀναγκάζεται, τάξει· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀντιπόλεμον ἱππικὸν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον στήσει. ταττέτω δ’ ὡς τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐκ παρατάξεως μάχας ἐπὶ κέρως, ἵ�
�α καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον καὶ ἐκ πλαγίων προσβάλλοντες καὶ τόπῳ μείζονι χρώμενοι, μέθ’ οὓς οὐκ ἔτ’ ἄλλοι τεταγμένοι τυγχάνουσιν, ἔχωσιν ἀποχρῆσθαι τῇ τῆς ἱππικῆς ἐπιστήμῃ.
XVI. BATTLE FORMATION WITH REGARD TO THAT OF THE ENEMY
The general will arrange his cavalry not as he wishes but rather as he is compelled; for he will oppose his own cavalry to that of the enemy. As a rule, in pitched battles he should arrange his cavalry in column formation, in order that attacking both in front and on the flanks and covering a greater amount of space (if no other soldiers are drawn up in their rear), they may thus be able to make use of their skill in cavalry fighting.
XVII. Ὅτι τοὺς ψιλοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονιστὰς πρώτους στήσει τῆς φάλαγγος
Ψιλοὺς δέ, ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας, πρώτους πρὸ τῆς φάλαγγος τάξει· κατόπιν μὲν γὰρ ὄντες πλείονα κακὰ διαθήσουσι τοὺς ἰδίους ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐν μέσοις δ’ αὐτοῖς ἄπρακτον ἔξουσι τὴν ἰδίαν ἐμπειρίαν, οὔθ’ ὑποχωρεῖν ἀνὰ πόδα δυνάμενοι κατὰ τὴν ἀνάτασιν τῶν ἀκοντίων, οὔτ’ ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς βαλεῖν προηγουμένων ἄλλων καὶ παρὰ ποσὶν ὄντων, οὐδὲ μὴν οἱ σφενδονῆται κυκλόσε τὸν δῖνον ἀποτελεῖν τῆς σφενδόνης παρὰ πλευρὰν ἑστώτων φιλίων ὁπλιτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ῥόμβον ἀντιπταιόντων, οἵ τε τοξόται προϊόντες μὲν τῶν ἄλλων εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα καὶ κατὰ σκοπὸν ἐκτοξεύουσι τὰ βέλη, μετὰ δὲ τοὺς λόχους ἢ ἐν αὐτοῖς μέσοις ὄντες εἰς ὕψος τοξεύουσιν, ὥστε πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἄνω φορὰν τόνον ἔχειν τὸ βέλος, αὖθις δέ, κἂν κατὰ κεφαλῆς πίπτῃ τῶν πολεμίων, ἐκλελύσθαι καὶ μὴ πάνυ τι λυπεῖν τοὺς ἐχθρούς.