Complete Works of Onasander

by Onasander

  XVII. PLACING THE LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS, JAVELIN-THROWERS, BOWMEN AND SLINGERS, BEFORE THE PHALANX

  The general will assign his light-armed troops — javelin-throwers, bowmen, and slingers — to a position in front of the phalanx, for if placed in the rear they will do more damage to their own army than to the enemy, and if in among the heavy-armed, their peculiar skill will be ineffectual because they will be unable to take a step backwards in throwing their javelins or to charge forward and cast them, as other soldiers are in front of them and at their heels, nor will the slingers be able to execute the whirling of their slings, as their fellow-soldiers stand at their side and, in their turn, are caused to stumble in trying to avoid the whirling slings. If the bowmen are placed in front of the army, they will shoot their arrows at the enemy as at a target; but drawn up behind the ranks or in among the heavy-armed they will shoot high, so that the arrows have impetus only for their upward flight, and afterwards, even if they fall on the heads of the enemy, will have spent their force and cause little distress to the foe.

  XVIII. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς τραχέσι τόποις τάττειν τοὺς ψιλούς

  Εἰ δὲ συμβαίνοι γίγνεσθαι τὴν μάχην ἐν χωρίοις τινὰς μὲν χθαμαλούς τινας δὲ βουνοειδὲς ἔχουσι τόπους, τότε δὴ μάλιστα τοὺς ψιλοὺς ἐν τοῖς τραχέσιν ταττέτω, καὶ δή, κἂν αὐτὸς τὰ πεδινὰ κατειλημμένος ᾖ, τῶν δὲ πολεμίων μέρη τινὰ τῆς φάλαγγος ὀχθώδεις διακατέχῃ τόπους, κατὰ τούτους ἐπαγέτω τοὺς ψιλούς· ῥᾷόν τε γὰρ βαλόντες ὑποχωροῦσιν ἀπὸ τῶν τραχέων, ῥᾷστά τε τοῖς ἀνάντεσιν ἐπαναθέουσιν, ἂν ἐλαφροὶ τυγχάνωσιν.

  XVIII. DISPOSITION OF LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS IN A BROKEN COUNTRY

  If the battle should happen to be in a country that is level in some places but hilly in others, then the light-armed troops should by all means be stationed in the uneven section, and then, if the general himself should have seized the plain and some part of the enemy’s phalanx should possess the heights, he should send against them the light-armed troops; for from the uneven ground they can more easily hurl their weapons and retreat, or they can very easily charge up the slopes, if they are agile.

  XIX. Περὶ τοῦ χωρία ἔχειν τὰς παρατάξεις δι’ ὧν ὀφείλουσιν οἱ ψιλοὶ ἐντὸς τῶν κοντῶν εἰσερχόμενοι ὑποστέλλεσθαι

  XIX. THE PHALANX SHOULD LEAVE INTERVALS FOR THE LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS TO RETIRE THROUGH THE RANKS

  [1] Ἔστω δὲ διαστήματα κατὰ τὰς τάξεις, ἵν’, ἐπειδὰν ἐκκενώσωσιν ἔτι προαγόντων τῶν πολεμίων τὰ βέλη, πρὶν εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν τὰς φάλαγγας, ἐπιστρέψαντες ἐν κόσμῳ διεξίωσιν μέσην τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ ἀταράχως ἐπὶ τὴν οὐραγίαν ἀποκομισθῶσιν· οὔτε γὰρ κυκλεύειν αὐτοὺς ἅπαν τὸ στράτευμα καὶ κάμπτειν κατὰ κέρας ἀσφαλές ἐστι — τάχα γάρ που φθάσουσιν αὐτοὺς ἐν τούτῳ συμμίξαντες οἱ πολέμιοι καὶ μέσους ἀπολαβόντες — , οὔτε διὰ τῶν πεπυκνωμένων βιάζεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τὰ ὅπλα ἐμπίπτοντας τάραχον ἐμποιεῖν ταῖς τάξεσιν ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλον ἐνσείοντος.

  [1] There should be intervals within the ranks, so that, when the light-armed troops have discharged their weapons while the enemy is still advancing, before the two armies come to close quarters, they may about-face, pass in good order through the centre of the phalanx, and come without confusion to the rear. For it is not safe for them to go around the whole army, encircling the flanks — since the enemy would quickly anticipate them in this manoeuvre, coming to close quarters and intercepting them on the way — nor is it safe for them to force their way through the closed ranks, where they would fall over the weapons and cause confusion in the lines, one man stumbling against another.

  [2] αἱ δὲ κατὰ κέρας ἔφοδοι τῶν ψιλῶν πλείονα λυμαίνονται τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐκ πλαγίων ἀκοντιζόντων καὶ εἰς τὰ γυμνὰ παραβιαζομένων παίειν.

  [2] Attacks of the light-armed troops on the flanks cause the enemy greater loss, since they cast their javelins from the side and of necessity strike the body where unprotected.

  [3] ἡ δὲ τῆς σφενδόνης ἄμυνα χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἐν τοῖς ψιλοῖς ἐστιν· ὅ τε γὰρ μόλιβδος ὁμόχρους ὢν τῷ ἀέρι λανθάνει φερόμενος, ὥστ’ ἀπροοράτως ἀφυλάκτοις τοῖς τῶν πολεμίων ἐμπίπτειν σώμασιν, αὐτῆς τε τῆς ἐμπτώσεως σφοδρὰς οὔσης καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥοίζου τριβόμενον τῷ ἀέρι τὸ βέλος ἐκπυρωθὲν ὡς βαθυτάτῳ δύεται τῆς σαρκός, ὥστε μηδ’ ὁρᾶσθαι, ταχὺ δὲ καὶ τὸν ὄγκον ἐπιμύειν.

  [3] The sling is the most deadly weapon that is used by the light-armed troops, because the lead slug is the same colour as the air and is invisible in its course, so that it falls unexpectedly on the unprotected bodies of the enemy,a and not only is the impact itself violent, but also the missile, heated by the friction of its rush through the air, penetrates the flesh very rapidly, so that it even becomes invisible and the swelling quickly closes over it.

  XX. Ὅπως δεῖ, ἐὰν ἀπορῇ ψιλῆς συμμαχίας ὁ στρατηγός, οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι εὐπορῶσιν, ἐπιφέρεσθαι αὐτοῖς

  XX. HOW TO ATTACK, WITHOUT LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS, AN ENEMY WHO HAS MANY

  [1] Εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη τῆς τῶν ψιλῶν συμμαχίας, οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι ταύτῃ πλεονεκτοῖεν, οἱ μὲν πρωτοστάται πυκνοὶ πορευέσθων ἔχοντες ἀνδρομήκεις θυρεούς, ὥστε σκέπειν ὅλα τὰ σώματα τοῖς μήκεσιν, οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους καὶ οἱ κατόπιν τούτων ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἀράμενοι τοὺς θυρεοὺς τέως ἐχόντων, ἄχρι ἂν ἐντὸς γένωνται βέλους· οὕτως γάρ, ὡς εἰπεῖν, κεραμωθέντες οὐθὲν πείσονται δεινὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἑκηβόλων.

  [1] If the general himself should lack an auxiliary force of light-armed troops while the enemy has a large force of them, the front rank men should advance in close formation, with shields the height of a man, tall enough to protect the whole body, and those who follow and the ones behind them, even to the last rank, should carry their shields above their heads, while they are within bowshot of the enemy. For thus roofed in, so to speak, they will suffer no danger from missiles.b

  [2] εἰ δὲ παρ’ ἑκατέροις ἡ τῶν ψιλῶν εἴη βοήθεια, πρῶτοι πρὸ τῆς ἐκ χειρὸς μάχης ἀκροβολιζέσθων τοῖς ἀντιπάλοις, ἢ μετὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν τῆς φάλαγγος ἐκ πλαγίων ἐπιθέοντες ἀποχρήσθων τοῖς βέλεσιν· συνελαύνονται γὰρ εἰς ὀλίγον καὶ οὐχ ἧττον θορυβοῦνται τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀμυντηρίοις.

  [2] But if each army should have a number of light-armed troops, the general should order his own light-armed men to be the first to hurl their weapons against their opponents before the hand-to-hand battle; or after the clash of the phalanx, attacking
from the flank, they should make use of their missiles, for thus the enemy will be forced together into a narrow space and will be greatly confused by such tactics.

  XXI. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἰς πολὺ μῆκος ἐκτείνειν τὴν φάλαγγα τὰς κυκλώσεις τῶν ἐναντίων φοβουμένους

  XXI. THE NEEDLESSNESS OF LENGTHENING THE PHALANX IN FEAR OF AN ENCIRCLING MOVEMENT OF THE ENEMY

  [1] Τὰς δὲ κυκλώσεις φυλάττεσθαι βουλόμενος μήθ’ οὕτως ἐπὶ μῆκος ἐκτεινέτω τὴν δύναμιν, ὥστε πάμπαν ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἀβαθῆ ποιῆσαι τὴν φάλαγγα — ταχὺ γάρ που συμβαίνει τοὺς πολεμίους διαρρήξαντας αὐτὴν δίοδον ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ μηκέτι παρὰ κέρας ἐνεργεῖν ταῖς κυκλώσεσιν, ἀλλὰ διεκπεσόντας μέσους κατὰ νώτου γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἐναντίων· τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ μὴ μόνον φυλαττέσθω παθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζητείτω ποιεῖν, ἐὰν ἀσθενῆ καὶ λεπτὴν κατανοήσῃ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων φάλαγγα — , μήθ’ οὕτως ἐπ’ οὐρὰν συστελλέτω τὴν παράταξιν εἰς πολὺ βάθος ὑποστέλλων, ὥστ’ ἐκ τοῦ ῥᾴστου τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπερκεράσαντας ἐντὸς αὐτὴν λαβεῖν.

  [1] The general who wishes to guard against an encircling movement of the enemy should not so extend his forces lengthwise as utterly to weaken the phalanx by giving it no depth. For this would result in the enemy somewhere quickly breaking through; and no longer attempting an encircling movement on the flank, but piercing the centre instead, they would take their opponents in the rear; and this very manoeuvre the general should not only guard against but also strive to execute if he discovers that the enemy’s phalanx is weak and thin. Nor should he contract his phalanx, drawing it out toward the rear to great depth to such an extent that the enemy would easily outflank and surround it.

  [2] ἰσχυροποιείτω μέντοι γε τὴν οὐραγίαν καὶ τοὺς παρὰ πλευρὰν τῶν κεράτων μὴ ἔλαττον τῶν πρωτοστατῶν· οὐχ ἧττον γὰρ ἀποκωλύουσιν οἱ κατ’ οὐρὰν τὰς κυκλώσεις τῶν ἐπὶ κέρας ἐκτεινομένων, ἐὰν ἤτοι φθάσας ὁ στρατηγὸς τὸ μέλλον ἁπλώσας τὴν οὐραγίαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ κέρατα τῆς φάλαγγος ἀναβιβάσας ἑκατέρωθεν παραστήσῃ τοὺς κατόπιν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον τῶν πολεμίων, ἢ καὶ παραγγείλῃ τοῖς ἐφθασμένοις ἤδη κυκλωθῆναι τὰ νῶτα τοῖς τῶν προηγουμένων νώτοις ἐγκλίνοντας ἀμφίστομον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μάχην.

  [2] But he should make his rear and the flanks of his wings as strong as the front ranks. For those in the rear will prevent the phalanx being encircled no less than those who are posted so as to extend the flanks, if the general, anticipating what is to happen, spreads out his rear guard and posting it on either flank of the phalanx opposes his rear to the front of the enemy, or if he commands those who are already encircled to turn their backs to the backs of the front ranks and fight on a double front.

  [3] Ἀγχίνους μὲν στρατηγός τις πολλοὺς ὁρῶν τοὺς πολεμίους αὐτὸς ἐλάττοσι στρατιώταις μέλλων κινδυνεύειν ἐξελέξατο καὶ ἐπετήδευσε τοιούτων ἐπιτυχεῖν τόπων, ἐν οἷς ἢ παρὰ ποταμίαν ὀφρὺν ταξάμενος ἀπωθεῖται ταύτῃ τὴν κύκλωσιν τῶν πολεμίων, ἢ παρώρειαν ἐκλεξάμενος αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὄρεσιν ἀποκλείσει τοὺς ὑπερκεράσαι βουλομένους, ὀλίγους ἐπιστήσας ἐπὶ τῶν ὑψηλῶν τοὺς ἀποκωλύσοντας ὑπὲρ κεφαλὴν ἀναβάντας γίγνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους.

  [3] A shrewd general who sees that the enemy has many troops when he himself is about to engage with fewer, will select, or rather make it his practice to find, localities where he may prevent an encircling movement of the enemy, either by arranging his army along the bank of a river, or, by choosing a mountainous district, he will use the mountains themselves to block off those who wish to outflank him, placing a few men on the summits to prevent the enemy from climbing above the heads of the main army.

  [4] οὐ μὴν ἡ στρατηγικὴ φρόνησις ἐνταῦθα συλλαμβάνεται μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τύχη· δεῖ γὰρ ἐπιτυχεῖν τοιούτων χωρίων· οὐ γὰρ αὑτῷ γε κατασκευάσασθαι δυνατὸν τοὺς τόπους· τῶν ὄντων μέντοι τοὺς ἀμείνους ἐκλέξασθαι καὶ τοὺς συνοίσοντας ἐννοῆσαι φρονίμου.

  [4] Not alone does knowledge of military science play a part in this matter but luck as well; for it is necessary to have the luck to find such places; one cannot prepare the terrain for oneself. To choose the better positions, however, from those at hand, and to know which will be advantageous, is the part of the wise general.

  [5] Πολλάκις δὲ εἰώθασιν οἱ μεγάλῃ δυνάμει καὶ πολυάνδρῳ κεχρημένοι μηνοειδὲς σχῆμα ποιήσαντες τῆς παρατάξεως ἐπιέναι, νομίζοντες ὅτι προσάγονται τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ κατ’ ἄνδρα βουλομένους συνάπτειν, εἶτα κατὰ τὸ ἡμικύκλιον εἰς ὁδὸν κυρτουμένους ἐναπολήψονται τῷ περιέχοντι κόλπῳ, τὰς ἰδίας κεραίας ἐπισυνάπτοντες ἀλλήλαις εἰς κύκλου σχῆμα.

  [5] It is often the custom of generals who are in command of a powerful and numerous army to march to battle in a crescent formation, believing that their opponents also wish the battle to come to close quarters, and that they will thus induce them to fight; then, as their opponents are bent back into the road at the points of the crescent, they will intercept them with their enveloping folds, joining the extremes of their own wings to form a complete circle.

  [6] πρὸς οὓς ἀντεπακτέον οὐχ ὧδε· τριχῇ δὲ διελὼν τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν τῶν μὲν δυεῖν ἑκατέρῳ μέρει κατὰ κέρας προσβαλλέτω τοῖς πολεμίοις, τῷ δὲ ἑνί, τοῖς εἰς τὸν μέσον κόλπον τοῦ μηνοειδοῦς ἀντπαρατεταγμένοις, ἐναντίος ἑστάτω καὶ μὴ προαγέτω· ἢ γὰρ μένοντες ἐπὶ τοῦ κυκλοειδοῦς σχήματος οἱ κατὰ μέσην τὴν φάλαγγα τεταγμένοι τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἄπρακτοι μηδὲν δρῶντες ἐστήξονται, ἢ προϊόντες εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν, εἰ βούλοιντο προάγειν φαλαγγηδὸν εἰς εὐθεῖαν ἐκ τοῦ σιγματοειδοῦς ἁπλούμενοι σχήματος, ἀλλήλους ἐκθλίψουσι καὶ λύσουσι τὴν τάξιν — τῶν γὰρ ἔτι κέρως ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς μενόντων χώρας καὶ μαχομένων οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ ἡμικύκλιον εἰς εὐθεῖαν ἀνελθεῖν — · ἔνθα δὴ τεταραγμένων αὐτῶν καὶ λελυκότων τὴν τάξιν τῷ τρίτῳ τάγματι καὶ ἐφέδρῳ προσβαλλέτω τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου κυρτώματος προάγουσιν ἀτάκτως εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν.

  [6] Against troops advancing in this fashion, one should not likewise adopt the crescent formation, but dividing his own army into three parts, the gene
ral should send two against the enemy, one against each wing, but the third division, that which faces the central hollow of the crescent, should stand still, opposite the enemy, and not advance. For if the enemy maintain this crescent formation, those drawn up in the centre of their army will be useless, standing still and doing nothing; but if marching forward they wish to advance in a body, changing from the crescent formation to a straight line, they will be crowded together and will lose their formation — for while the wings are remaining in the same position and fighting, it is impossible for a crescent to return to a straight line. Then when they are confused and their ranks disordered, the opposing general should send the third and reserve division against the men advanced in disorder from the centre of the curve.

  [7] ἐὰν δὲ διαμένωσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ κοίλου σχήματος, τοὺς ψιλοὺς καὶ ἑκηβόλους ἔνθα κατ’ ἀντικρὺ ταττέτω· βάλλοντες γὰρ αὐτοὺς πολλὰ λυπήσουσιν.