by Onasander
[7] But if the enemy remain in the crescent position, the general should post his light-armed troops and archers opposite them, who with their missiles will cause heavy loss.
[8] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ λοξῇ πάσῃ τῇ ἰδίᾳ φάλαγγι προσβάλλει κατὰ θάτερον κέρας τῶν πολεμίων, οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοι πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μηνοειδοῦς σχήματος κύκλωσιν οὕτως ἀντεπιών· ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ οἱ ἐξ ἐναντίας εἰς χεῖρας ἰέναι πανστρατιᾷ κωλυόμενοι κατ’ ὀλίγους κερασθήσονται, τῶν ἐπὶ θατέρου κέρως μόνων μαχομένων, οἳ καὶ πρῶτοι κατ’ ἀνάγκην συμμίξουσι διὰ τὴν λοξὴν ἔφοδον.
[8] However, if he advances with his whole phalanx obliquely against one wing of the enemy, he will make no mistake in attacking in this manner, as far as the encircling movement of the crescent formation is concerned; for the enemy will be prevented for a long time from coming to close quarters with their whole army, and will be thrown into confusion little by little, since only those of one wing will be fighting, that is, those who will necessarily be the first to be engaged because of the oblique attack.
[9] Οὐκ ἄχρηστον δέ ποτε καὶ ἀντιπαραταξάμενον ὑπὸ πόδα τῷ στρατεύματι χωρεῖν, ὡς καταπεπληγμένον, ἢ καὶ ἐπιστρέψαντα παραπλησίαν φυγῇ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιχώρησιν ἐν τάξει, εἶτ’ αὖθις μεταβαλόμενον ἀντεπιέναι τοῖς ἐπιοῦσιν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ὑπὸ χαρᾶς οἱ πολέμιοι δόξαντες φεύγειν τοὺς ἐναντίους λύσαντες τὰς τάξεις ἐπικέονται προπηδῶντες ἄλλων ἄλλοι, ἐφ’ οὓς ἀκίνδυνον ἐπιστρέψαντας μάχεσθαι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ παρ’ ἐλπίδα τοῦ στῆναι θάρσει καταπληξαμένους εἰς φυγὴν αὖθις τοὺς πάλαι διώκοντας τρέπεσθαι.
[9] It is sometimes a useful stratagem for an army facing the enemy to retire gradually, as if struck by fear, or to about-face and make a retreat similar to a flight but in order, and then, suddenly turning, to attack their pursuers. For sometimes the enemy, delighted by the belief that their opponents are fleeing, break ranks and rush forward, leaping ahead of one another. There is no danger in turning to attack these men; and those who have for some time been pursuing, terrified by the very unexpectedness of this bold stand, immediately take to flight.
XXII. Περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν κεχωρισμένους ἐπιλέκτους εἰς βοήθειαν τῶν καταπονουμένων. περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν ἐγκρύμματα
XXII. HOLDING RESERVES FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF EXHAUSTED TROOPS. HOLDING RESERVES IN CONCEALMENT
[1] Ἐχέτω δέ που καὶ στρατιώτας λογάδας ἰδίᾳ τεταγμένους ἀπὸ τῆς φάλαγγος ὥσπερ ἐφέδρους τοῦ πολέμου πρὸς τὰ καταπονούμενα μέρη τῆς δυνάμεως, ἵν’ ἐξ ἑτοίμου τοὺς ἐπικουρήσοντας ἐπάγῃ· καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ ὀλίγον ὤνησαν ἀκμῆτες ἐπελθόντες ἤδη κεκοπιακόσι· τούς τε γὰρ τεταλαιπωρηκότας ἤδη τῶν φίλων ἀνέλαβον καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐκλελυμένοις ἀκμάζοντες ἐπέθεντο.
[1] The general should also have somewhere a picked corps, stationed apart from the phalanx as military reserves, that he may have them ready to give assistance to those detachments of his force that are exhausted. These fresh troops are of not a little advantage in attacking tired men; for, besides relieving those of their own men who are worn out, they attack in their full freshness a wearied enemy.
[2] γίγνοιτο δ’ ἄν τι καὶ τούτου χρησιμώτερον, ἐκ τῆς παρατάξεως ἀπωτέρω σταδίοις, ὁπόσοις ἂν ἀποχρῆν αὐτῷ δοκῇ, ἐκπέμψαι μέρος τι τῆς αὑτοῦ στρατιᾶς ἀπροόρατον τοῖς πολεμίοις, παραγγείλας σφίσιν, ἐπειδὰν συμβάλῃ τοῖς ἐναντίοις, τότε πυθομένους παρὰ τῶν σκοπῶν ἀναστάντας ἐπείγεσθαι· καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ποιητέον, ὅταν προσδόκιμος οὖσα συμμαχία τοῦ καιροῦ καθυστερῇ· δόξαντες γὰρ οἱ πολέμιοι τούτους ἐκείνους εἶναι καὶ συμμάχους ποθὲν ἥκειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἴσως ἂν ἔτι καὶ προσιόντων πρὶν ἢ συμμῖξαι τοὺς ἐπιβάλλοντας εἰς φυγὴν ὁρμήσαιεν, οὐ τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πλεῖον ἐπιέναι πλῆθος νομίζοντες.
[2] It would be even more advantageous for the general to send a certain part of his army some little distance from the encampment — as far as seems best to him, — unseen by the enemy, with orders to rise up and hasten when the battle is begun, which they will learn from scouts. This is especially to be done when expected reinforcements come too late for the battle, for the enemy believe that these are the reinforcements arriving from some place or other for their opponents; then possibly even while these reinforcements are still advancing and before they enter the battle, the enemy will take to flight, judging this force to be, not what it is, but much greater.
[3] ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς δεινοῖς ἐπιφανείαι πολεμίων ἀπειράστων ἐκπλήττουσι τὰς ψυχάς· προλαμβάνουσαι γάρ τι χεῖρον, οὗ πείσονται, φοβερώτερον ἐκδέχονται τὸ μέλλον.
[3] Besides, the arrival of unfamiliar hostile troops at the very moment of battle lowers the morale; for anticipating some greater misfortune than they are about to suffer, soldiers regard the future with greater fear.
[4] Ἐκπληκτικωτάτη δ’, ἢ καὶ δραστικωτάτη μάλιστα πάντων, ἢ κατὰ νώτου τῶν πολεμίων αἰφνίδιος ἐπιβολή, εἴ πῃ δυνατὸν γένοιτο προεκπέμψαντι στρατιωτῶν σύνταγμα νύκτωρ ἐκπεριελθεῖν κελεῦσαι τοὺς πολεμίους, ἵνα κατόπιν αὐτῶν γένωνται πάντες, ὥστε ἕωθεν ἀναστάντας ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας μετὰ τὸ συμμῖξαι πρὸς μάχην τὰ στρατεύματα κατὰ τὴν οὐραγίαν ἐπιφαίνεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις· οὐδὲ γὰρ φεύγουσιν ἂν ἔτι σφίσιν ἐλπὶς ἀπολείποιτο σωτηρίας, οὐδ’ εἰς τοὐπίσω δυναμένοις ἐπιστραφῆναι διὰ τοὺς ἐξ ἐναντίας μαχομένους, οὐδ’ εἰς τὸ πρόσω φέρεσθαι διὰ τοὺς κατόπιν ἐπικειμένους.
[4] Most terrible, or rather most effective, of all manoeuvres, is a sudden attack against the enemy’s rear. For this purpose, if in any manner it should be possible, a detachment of soldiers should be sent ahead by night, with orders for all to march around the enemy in order to come to their rear, so as to start up from ambush early the next morning, after the battle is begun, and to appear suddenly on the enemy’s rear. For no hope of safety would remain for them in flight, and they would be unable to turn backwards, since the opposing army would attack, or to go forward, because of the detachment assailing their rear.
XXIII. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῶν καιρῷ αὐτῷ τῆς μάχης ἐκφωνεῖν χαρμόσυνα τοῖς ὑπηκόοις· εἰ καὶ ψευδῆ, ὅμως συμφέρει
XXIII. ANNOUNCING FAVOURABLE NEWS IN THE MIDST OF BATTLE
; EVEN IF FALSE IT IS ADVANTAGEOUS
[1] Καὶ δή ποτε παριππαζόμενος ἐμβοησάτω τοῖς φίλοις, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ τύχοι κέρως ὤν, “νικῶσιν ἄνδρες οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ λαιοῦ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν πολεμίων,” εἰ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ λαιοῦ, νικᾶν λεγέτω τὸ φίλιον δεξιόν, ἐάν τε καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ᾖ τοῦτο γινόμενον ἐάν τε μή· καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν, ὅπου “μέγα νεῖκος ὄρωρεν·” οἷον βοῆσαι πάλιν αὖ μακρὰν ἀποστατοῦντος τοῦ τῶν πολεμίων ἡγεμόνος ἢ ἐπὶ θατέρου κέρως ὄντος ἢ τὰ μέσα συνέχοντος τῆς φάλαγγος, “τέθνηκεν ὁ τῶν πολεμίων στρατηγὸς” ἢ “βασιλεύς,” ἢ ὅστις ἄν ποτε ᾖ.
[1] Sometimes the general should ride along the lines and call out to his men, if he happens to be on the right wing, “Our left wing is defeating the right wing of the enemy,” or if he is on the left he should say that his right wing is conquering, whether this is true or not, for deceit is necessary when “a great strife has arisen.” For example, when the leader of the enemy is some distance away either on one wing or holding the centre, he should call out, “The general of the enemy has been killed,” or “the king,” or whoever it may be.
[2] καὶ ταῦτα χρὴ βοᾶν οὕτως, ὥσθ’ ἅμα καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους κατακούειν· οἵ τε γὰρ φίλιοι τοὺς σφετέρους ἀκούοντες ἐπικυδεστέρους ἀναθαρροῦσι καὶ διπλάσιοι γίγνονται ταῖς προυθμίαις, οἵ τε ἐχθροὶ τὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐλαττώματα πυνθανόμενοι συγκαταπίπτουσι ταῖς διανοίαις, ὥστ’ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ εἰς φυγὴν ἅμα τῷ δέξασθαι τοιαύτην φήμην ὁρμᾶν.
[2] And one should shout this in such a manner that the enemy also may hear; for his own soldiers, learning that their side is more successful, are encouraged and doubly eager to fight, while the enemy, learning of the misfortunes of their side, lose heart, so that sometimes they start into flight immediately on hearing such a report.
[3] οὕτως πολλάκις συνήνεγκεν καὶ τοὺς φιλίους ἅμα τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐξαπατῆσαι, τοῖς μὲν τὰ κρείττω, τοῖς δὲ τὰ χείρω ψευδόμενον.
[3] In this way it is very often useful to deceive both one’s own army and that of the enemy by false news, good for the former, but bad for the latter.
XXIV. Περὶ τοῦ οἰκείους πρὸς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρὸς γνωρίμους τάττειν
Φρονίμου δὲ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τὸ τάττειν ἀδελφοὺς παρ’ ἀδελφοῖς, φίλους παρὰ φίλοις, ἐραστὰς παρὰ παιδικοῖς· ὅταν γὰρ ᾖ τὸ κινδυνεῦον τὸ πλησίον προσφιλέστερον, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀγαπῶντα φιλοκινδυνότερον ὑπὲρ τοῦ πέλας ἀγωνίζεσθαι· καὶ δή τις αἰδούμενος μὴ ἀποδοῦναι χάριν ὧν εὖ πέπονθεν αἰσχύνεται καταλιπὼν τὸν εὐεργετήσαντα πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἄρξαι φυγῆς.
XXIV. IN THE RANKS FRIENDS MUST BE PLACED BY FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES BY ACQUAINTANCES
It is the part of a wise general to station brothers in rank beside brothers, friends beside friends, and lovers beside their favourites. For whenever that which is in danger near by is more than ordinarily dear the lover necessarily fights more recklessly for the man beside him. And of course one is ashamed not to return a favour that he has received, and is dishonoured if he abandons his benefactor and is the first to flee.
XXV. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ διδόναι τὸν στρατηγὸν τὰ σημεῖα εἴτε τῆς συμβολῆς εἴτε ἄλλης τινὸς πράξεως, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων
XXV. THE GENERAL MUST NOT GIVE THE SIGNAL FOR BATTLE OR ANY OTHER ACTION TO HIS ARMY IN PERSON BUT THROUGH HIS OFFICERS
[1] Πᾶν δὲ παράγγελμα καὶ σύνθημα καὶ παρασύνθημα διδότω διὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων· ἐπιόντα γὰρ κηρύττειν ἅπασιν ἰδιώτου καὶ ἀπείρου κομιδῇ καθέστηκεν, καὶ χρόνος ἐν τῷ παραγγέλλειν ἀναλίσκεται, καὶ θόρυβος ὁμοῦ πάντων ἀλλήλους ἐρωτώντων· εἶθ’ ὁ μὲν προσέθηκέ τι πλεῖον ὧν ὁ στρατηγὸς εἶπεν, ὁ δ’ ἀφείλετο τοῦ ῥηθέντος παρὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν.
[1] The general should give every command or watchword or countersign through his officers, for to come and give orders personally to the whole army is the act of an unpractised and inexperienced commander. Time is lost in passing orders down the line, and confusion arises, as all the soldiers question each other at the same time. One man through ignorance adds something to what the general has said and another omits something.
[2] δεῖ δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἡγεμόσιν εἰπεῖν, ἐκείνους δὲ ἀπαγγεῖλαι τοῖς μετ’ αὐτούς, εἶτα τούτους τοῖς κατόπιν, εἶθ’ ἑξῆς ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων, τοὺς πρώτους τοῖς ὑπὸ πόδα σημαίνοντας· οὕτως γὰρ ἐν τάχει καὶ μετὰ κόσμου καὶ μέθ’ ἡσυχίας εἴσονται, παραπλησίου τοῦ παραγγέλματος τοῖς φρυκτωροῦσι γιγνομένου·
[2] But one should communicate his orders to his higher officers and they should repeat them to the officers next below them, who in turn pass them to their subordinates, and so on to the lowest, the higher officers in each case telling the orders to those below them. In this manner the soldiers will learn the commands quickly with order and calmness, just as a message is carried by fire-signals.
[3] καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων, ὅταν ὁ πρῶτος ἄρῃ τὸν φρυκτόν, ὁ δεύτερος τῷ μετ’ αὐτὸν ἐπύρσευσεν, εἶθ’ ὁ τρίτος τῷ τετάρτῳ, καὶ τέταρτος πέμπτῳ, καὶ πέμπτος ἕκτῳ καὶ καθ’ ἕνα πάντες ἀλλήλοις, ὥστ’ ἐν ὄξει διὰ μήκους σταδίων τὸ σημανθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου πάντας ἐπιγνῶναι.
[3] For after the first signaller uplifts his fire, the second signals to the next, and the third to the fourth, and the fourth to the fifth, and the fifth to the sixth, and one by one follows the other, so that in a short time, over a distance of many stades, the message signalled by the first is known to all.
XXVI. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ μόνον συνθήματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρασυνθήματα διδόναι
XXVI. ON GIVING BOTH WATCHWORDS AND COUNTERSIGNS
[1] Τὸ δὲ παρασύνθημα μὴ διὰ φωνῆς λεγέσθω, ἀλλὰ διὰ σώματος γινέσθω, ἢ νεύματι χειρὸς ἢ ὅπλων συγκρούσει ἢ ἐγκλίσει δορατίου ἢ παραφορᾷ ξίφους, ἵνα μὴ μόνον γενομένης ποτὲ ταραχῆς πιστεύσωσι τῷ λεγομένῳ συνθήματι — τοῦτο γὰρ δύνανται καὶ πολέμιοι καταλαβέσθαι πολλάκις ἀκούοντες — , ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ παρασυνθήματι.
[1] He should give the countersign not by the voice but by some gesture, as a wave of the hand, or the clash of weapons, or dipping a spear, or by a side-wave of his sword, in order that when confusion arises the soldiers may not have to
trust to the spoken watchword alone — for the enemy hear this so often that they are able to get it — but also to the countersign.
[2] χρησιμώτατον δέ που τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἑτερογλώσσους συμμαχίας τῶν ἐθνῶν· οὔτε γὰρ λέγειν οὔτε ξυνιέναι δυνάμενοι φωνῆς ἀλλοτρίας αὐτῷ τῷ παρασυνθήματι κρίνουσι τό τε φίλιον καὶ τὸ πολέμιον. διδόσθω δὲ ταῦτα, κἂν μὴ μάχεσθαι μέλλωσιν, ἐν ταῖς παρεμβολαῖς πρὸς τὰς ἀδήλους ταραχάς.
[2] This is most useful in the case of allies who speak a different language, for, unable to speak or to understand a foreign tongue, they differentiate between friends or enemies by this countersign. One should instruct the army in these signals in camp, even if it is not about to fight, as a protection against confusion and uncertainty.
XXVII. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ λύειν τὰς τάξεις μήτε ἐν ταῖς διατάξεσι μήτε ἐν ταῖς ὑποχωρήσεσι
Παραγγελλέτω δὲ καὶ τὰς ὑποχωρήσεις ἐν τάξει ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς διώξεις, ἵνα ἧττόν τε σφαλλόμενοι βλάπτωνται μὴ κατ’ ἄνδρα σποράδες ἐν ταῖς φυγαῖς ὑποπίπτοντες τοῖς πολεμίοις, πλέονά τε κατορθοῦντες βλάπτωσι κατὰ τάξεις καὶ λόχους ἰσχυρότεροι τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἐπιφαινόμενοι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀσφαλέστεροι· πολλάκις γὰρ ἀτάκτως ἐπιφερομένους οἱ πολέμιοι θεασάμενοι συμφρονήσαντες αὖθις ἐκ μεταβολῆς αὐτῶν καταστάντες εἰς τάξιν παλίντροπον ἐποιήσαντο τὴν δίωξιν· ὅλως δὲ μηδέν σφισιν ἄμεινον εἶναι λεγέτω τοῦ μένειν ἐν τάξει μηδ’ ἐπισφαλέστερον τοῦ λύειν.