by Onasander
XXVII. SOLDIERS SHOULD NEVER LEAVE THE RANKS WHETHER IN FORMATION OR IN RETREAT
One should command both retreats and pursuits to be made in formation, so that, if defeated, the soldiers may suffer less injury, when in their flight they encounter the enemy, by not being scattered, man by man, and, if successful, they may inflict greater injury on the enemy by keeping their ranks and companies unbroken, appearing stronger to the fugitives, and moreover being safer themselves. For often the enemy, observing their opponents advancing without order, by a concerted plan about-face, form ranks once more and reverse the pursuit. In a word, the general should say that nothing is more advantageous to his men than remaining in rank, and nothing more dangerous than breaking ranks.
XXVIII. Περὶ τοῦ δι’ ἐπιμελείας ἔχειν τὸν στρατηγὸν λαμπρὸν ἐκτάττειν τὸ στράτευμα
Μεμελημένον δ’ ἔστω τῷ στρατηγῷ λαμπρὸν ἐκτάττειν τὸ στράτευμα τοῖς ὅπλοις, ῥᾴδια δ’ ἡ φροντὶς αὕτη παρακαλέσαντι τὰ ξίφη θήγειν καὶ τὰς κόρυθας καὶ τοὺς θώρακας σμήχειν· δεινότεροι γὰρ οἱ ἐπιόντες φαίνονται λόχοι τοῖς τῶν ὅπλων αἰθύγμασι, καὶ πολλὰ τὰ δι’ ὄψεως δείματα προεμπίπτοντα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ταράττει τὸ ἀντιπόλεμον.
XXVIII. THE GENERAL MUST BE ATTENTIVE TO THE SPLENDOUR OF THE ARMY’S EQUIPMENT
The general should make it a point to draw up his line of battle resplendent in armour — an easy matter, requiring only a command to sharpen swords and to clean helmets and breast-plates. For the advancing companies appear more dangerous by the gleam of weapons, and the terrible sight brings fear and confusion to the hearts of the enemy.
XXIX. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῆς συμβολῆς ἀλαλάζειν
XXIX. SHOUTING IN THE MIDST OF BATTLE
[1] Ἐπαγέτω δὲ τὸ στράτευμα καὶ σὺν ἀλαλαγμῷ, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ σὺν δρόμῳ· καὶ γὰρ ὄψις καὶ βοὴ καὶ πάταγος ὅπλων ἐξίστησι τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας.
[1] One should send the army into battle shouting, and sometimes on the run, because their appearance and shouts and the clash of arms confound the hearts of the enemy.
[2] ἀνατεινόντων δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐφόδους ἀθρόοι, πρὶν εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὲρ τὰς κεφαλὰς μετέωρα τὰ ξίφη πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον θαμὰ παρεγκλίνοντες· ἐσμηγμέναι γὰρ αἰχμαὶ καὶ λαμπρὰ ξίφη καὶ ἐπάλληλα παραμαρμαίροντα πρὸς ἀνταύγειαν ἡλίου δεινὴν ἀστραπὴν πολέμου προεκπέμπει· καὶ ταυτὶ μὲν εἰ γίγνοιτο καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀντικαταπλήττειν ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ δὲ μή, προεκπλήττειν.
[2] The dense bands of soldiers should spread out in the attack before coming to close quarters, often waving their swords high above their heads toward the sun. The polished spear-points and flashing swords, shining in thick array and reflecting the light of the sun, send ahead a terrible lightning-flash of war. If the enemy should also do this, it is necessary to frighten them in turn, but if not, one should frighten them first.
[3] Ἐνίοτε δέ ποτε χρήσιμον ἐν καιρῷ μὴ φθάνειν ἐκτάττοντα τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ τέως ἐντὸς τοῦ χάρακος κατέχειν, ἄχρι ἂν κατοπτεύσῃ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παράταξιν, ὁποῖα τίς ἐστι καὶ ὡς τέτακται καὶ ἐφ’ οἵων ἵσταται χωρίων.
[3] It is sometimes advantageous before a critical battle for the general not to be the first to form a line of battle but to wait within the camp for a time until he observes the battle array of the enemy, its character, arrangement, and position.
XXX. Ὅτι δεῖ τὸν στρατηγὸν πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου συλλογίζεσθαι, τίς ὀφείλει ὑπαντῆσαι κατὰ τὴν συμβολὴν τῷ δεῖνι καὶ τίς τῷ ἄλλῳ καὶ οὕτως καθεξῆς ἐξετάζειν τοὺς ἰδίους ἄρχοντας πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ἐναντίων
Εἶτά που τότε συλλογισάμενον, τίνας τίσιν ἀντιτάττειν χρὴ καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν προκατανοήσαντα νόσον σώματος ἀντεπάγειν τὰ ἀλεξήματα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἐκτάττειν, ὡς ἂν ἄριστ’ αὐτῷ δόξαι συμφέρειν· ἀναγκάζονται γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοὶ πολλάκις καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὁπλισμοὺς τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἔθνη καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἤθη τὰ ἰδία στρατεύματα κοσμεῖν καὶ παρατάττειν.
XXX. THE GENERAL MUST DECIDE BEFORE BATTLE WHO SHOULD OPPOSE WHOM AND THUS IN ORDER ARRANGE HIS OWN OFFICERS AGAINST THOSE OF THE ENEMY
Next the general must consider which troops to oppose to which of the enemy, and in what manner; just as a good doctor who foresees an illness of the body, he must bring forward his defences and arrange his forces as it seems to him most advantageous; for generals are often compelled to equip and marshal their own armies with reference to the armament, nationality, and customs of the enemy.
XXXI. Περὶ τοῦ, ἐὰν οἱ ἐναντίοι προτερεύωσι τῷ ἱππικῷ, ἐκλέγεσθαι στενοὺς τόπους
XXXI. NARROW PLACES MUST BE CHOSEN IF THE ENEMY ARE SUPERIOR IN CAVALRY
[1] Ἱπποκρατούντων δὲ τῶν πολεμίων, ἐὰν ᾖ δυνατόν, ἐπιλεγέσθω χωρία τραχέα καὶ στενὰ καὶ παρ’ ὄρη, ἃ ἥκιστα ἱππάσιμα, ἢ φυγομαχείτω κατὰ δύναμιν, ἕως ἂν ἐπιτηδείους εὕρῃ τόπους καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἁρμόζοντας πράγμασιν.
[1] If the enemy are superior in cavalry, the general should choose if possible a locality that is rough and hemmed in, near mountains which are least suitable for riding, or he should avoid battle so far as he may until he finds an appropriate place, adapted to his own circumstances.
[2] ἀπολελείφθων δέ τινες καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χάρακος οἱ παραφυλάττοντες τὴν παρεμβολὴν στρατιῶται καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοὺς ἀποσκευῆς φυλακήν, ἵνα μὴ κατανοήσας ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν πολεμίων ἔρημον ὄντα πέμψῃ τοὺς ἁρπασομένους τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ καταληψομένους τὸ χωρίον.
[2] A certain number of soldiers must be left behind at the palisade to guard the camp and the baggage in order that the general of the enemy may not discover that the camp is deserted and send men to plunder its contents and seize the place.
XXXII. Περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν παρακεκινδυνευμένον ποιεῖν τὸν στρατηγὸν
XXXII. THE GENERAL MUST DO NOTHING RASH
[1] Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἢ τὰ ἰδία καθαιροῦντας ἐρύματα στρατηγοὺς ἢ ποταμοὺς διαβαίνοντας ἢ κρημνοὺς καὶ βάραθρα κατόπιν ποιουμένους τῶν φιλίων, ἵν’ ἢ μένοντες νικῶσιν ἢ βουληθέντες φεύγειν ἀπόλωνται, οὔτε πάμπαν ἐπαινεῖν οὔτε ψέγειν ἔχω. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ παρακεκινδυνευμένον μᾶλλον τόλμης ἐστὶν ἢ γνώμης καὶ τῇ τύχῃ κεκοινώνηκε πλεῖον ἢ τῇ κρίσει.
[1] Generals who destroy their own defences or cross rivers or who post their armies with steep cliffs or yawning gulfs in the rear in order that the soldiers may either stand and conquer or in their desire to escape be killed, I am not wholly able to praise nor yet to blame, for everything that is ventured rashly is rather than the part of recklessness than of wisdom, and has a greater share of luck than of good judgement.
[2] ὅπου γὰρ ἢ νικῶντα δεῖ κρατεῖν ἢ ἡττηθέντα τοῖς ὅλοις ἐσφάλθαι, πῶς ἐνταῦθ’ ἄν τις ἢ φρονήσει τὸ νικᾶν ἢ προαιρέσει τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι μαρτυρήσειεν;
[2] For in a case when one must either win a victory and prevail, or else be defeated and lose everything, in such a case how could anyone attribute victory to foresight or defeat to deliberate choice?
[3] ἐγὼ δὲ στρατιώταις μὲν ἐκ στρατεύματος φιλοτόλμως κινδυνεύειν ἐπιτρεπτέον εἶναι νομίζω — καὶ γὰρ δρῶντές τι μεῖζον ὤνησαν καὶ παθόντες οὐθὲν τοσοῦτον ἐλύπησαν — , στρατεύματι δὲ παντὶ τὴν ἄδηλον ἐκκυβεύειν τύχην οὐ δοκιμάζω.
[3] But I do believe that certain soldiers of the army must be allowed to run desperate risks — for if they succeed they are of great assistance, but if they fail they do not cause corresponding loss, — yet I cannot countenance gambling with the entire army as the stake.
[4] μάλιστα δ’ ἁμαρτάνειν οὗτοί μοι δοκοῦσιν, οἵ τινες ἐν μὲν τῷ νικᾶν ὀλίγα λυπήσειν μέλλοντες τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐν δὲ τῶν ἡττᾶσθαι μεγάλα βλάψειν τοὺς φίλους ἀποχρῶνται τοιούτοις στρατηγήμασιν.
[4] Most of all those generals seem to me to be at fault who make use of stratagems which in the event of victory will cause small loss to the enemy, but in defeat the greatest loss to their own army.
[5] Εἰ δὲ πρόδηλος μέν σφισιν ὁ ὄλεθρος εἴη, κἂν μὴ παραβόλοις ἐγχειρήσωσι στρατηγίαις, πρόδηλος δὲ καὶ ἡ τῶν πολεμίων ἡττηθέντων ἀπώλεια, τότ’ οὐκ ἄν μοι δόξειεν ἁμαρτάνειν ἀποφράττων τὰς φυγὰς τῶν φιλίων· ἄμεινον γὰρ ἐν τῶν τολμᾶν ἐπ’ ἀδήλῳ τῷ τάχα μηδὲ πείσεσθαί τι δεινὸν ἅμα καὶ δρᾶσαι ζητεῖν, ἢ ἐπὶ προδήλῳ τῷ μηδὲν δρῶντας ἀπολέσθαι πάντας ἀτόλμως ἡσυχάζειν.
[5] If the destruction of one’s army is evident, except through the use of some daring strategy, and if the destruction of the enemy by defeat is also evident, then I do not think a general would be at fault in cutting off the retreat of his own army. For it is better, by showing courage at a time when it is uncertain whether one will perhaps escape a severe defeat himself, to endeavour at the very same time to inflict a defeat, rather than, when it is certain that all will perish if they remain inactive, to keep quiet like cowards.
[6] ὑποδεικνύτω μέντοι μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις χωρίοις, ὅπου κατ’ ἀλήθειαν οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρία τοῖς φεύγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ καὶ πάσῃ μάχῃ διδασκέτω διὰ πλειόνων, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν φεύγουσι πρόδηλος ὁ ὄλεθρος, ὡς ἂν ἤδη μετ’ ἐξουσίας ἐπικειμένων τῶν πολεμίων μηδενὸς ἔτι δυναμένου διακωλύειν τοὺς διώκοντας πᾶν ὃ βούλονται διαθεῖναι τοὺς φεύγοντας, τοῖς δὲ μένουσιν ἄδηλος ὁ θάνατος ἀμυνομένοις.
[6] He should not only point this out in those localities where in actual fact there is no safety for fugitives, but also in every locality and every battle he must show by many reasons that death is certain for those who flee, since the enemy would at once press on freely, as soon as no one is able to hinder the pursuit, and could dispose of the fugitives as might suit them; but for men who stand and defend themselves, death is not certain.
[7] οἵ τινες γὰρ πεπεισμένοι τυγχάνουσιν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν, ὡς φεύγοντες μὲν αἰσχρῶς ἀπολοῦνται, μένοντες δ’ εὐκλεῶς τεθνήξονται, καὶ χεῖρον’ ἀεὶ προσδοκῶσιν ἐκ τοῦ καταλιπεὶν τὴν τάξιν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ φυλάττειν, ἄριστοι κατὰ τοὺς κινδύνους ἄνδρες ἐξετάζονται.
[7] For the men in the lines who chance to believe that if they flee they will perish shamefully while if they remain in rank they will die a glorious death, and who constantly anticipate greater dangers from breaking the ranks than from keeping them, will prove themselves the best men in the face of danger.
[8] διόπερ ἀγαθὸν μέν, εἰ πάντας οὕτως ἔχειν γνώμης πεῖσαι στρατηγός, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ μέντοι γ’ ὡς πλείστους· ἢ γὰρ παντελεῖς περιεποιήσατο νίκας ἢ μικροῖς ἐλαττώμασι περιέπεσε.
[8] On this account it is a good plan if the general can win over his whole army to this opinion, or, if not all, at least as many as possible, for thus he either gains an absolute victory or meets with but a slight defeat.
[9] Τῶν δ’ ἐκ προλήψεως καὶ πρὶν ἢ συμβαλεῖν ἐπινοουμένων στρατηγοῖς αἱ παρ’ αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς μάχης καιρὸν ἐπινοίαι νίκης καὶ ἀντιστρατηγήσεις ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ πλείους καὶ θαυμασιώτεραι γίγνονται τοῖς τὴν στρατηγικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἠσκηκόσιν, ἃς οὐκ ἔστιν ὑποσημῆναι λόγῳ ἢ προβουλεῦσαι.
[9] Plans and counter-stratagems for victory that are originated at the very moment of battle are sometimes preferable to those which are conceived and contrived by generals in anticipation and before the engagement, and they are sometimes more worthy of remark, in the case of those made by men who are skilled in military science, through they are things which cannot be reduced to rules or planned beforehand.
[10] ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ κυβερνῆται πρὸς μὲν τὸν πλοῦν ἐκ λιμένων ἀνάγονται πάντα ἐξηρτυμένοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν ναῦν, ἐπειδὰν δ’ ἐμπέσῃ χειμών, οὐχ ὁ βούλονται ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἀναγκάζονται, πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης ἐπείγοντα κίνδυνον εὐτόλμως παραβαλλόμενοι, καὶ οὐ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς μελέτης εἰσφερόμενοι μνήμην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν βοήθειαν· οὕτως οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἐκτάξουσιν, ὅπως σφίσι νομίζουσι συνοίσειν, ἐπειδὰν δ’ ὁ τοῦ πολέμου περιστῇ χειμὼν πολλὰ θραύων καὶ παραλλάττων καὶ ποικίλας ἐπάγων περιστάσεις, ἡ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψις ἐπιζητεῖ τὰς ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν ἐπινοίας, ἃς ἡ ἀνάγκη τῆς τύχης μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ μνήμη τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑποβάλλει.
[10] For just as pilots for their voyages, before sailing from the harbour, fit their ship out with everything that a ship requires; yet when a storm blows up they do, not what they wish, but what they must, boldly staking their fortunes against the driving peril of chance and calling to their aid no memory of their past practice but assistance appropr
iate to the existing circumstances; just so generals will prepare their armies as they believe will be best, but when the storm of war is at hand repeatedly shattering, overthrowing, and bringing varied conditions, the sight of present circumstances demands expedients based on the exigencies of the moment, which the necessity of chance rather than the memory of experience suggests.
XXXIII. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ τὸν στρατηγὸν αὐτοχειρὶ πολεμεῖν
XXXIII. THE GENERAL SHOULD NOT HIMSELF ENTER BATTLE
[1] Μαχέσθω δὲ ὁ στρατηγὸς αὐτὸς προμηθέστερον ἢ τολμηρότερον, ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀπεχέσθω τοῦ τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰς χεῖρας ἰέναι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατὰ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἀνυπέρβλητον ἀνδρίαν εἰσενέγκαιτο, τοσοῦτον οὐδὲν ὠφελῆσαι δύναται στράτευμα μαχόμενος, ὅσον ἀποθανὼν βλάψαι· στρατηγοῦ γὰρ ἡ γνώμη πλέον ἰσχύει τῆς ῥώμης· σώματος μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρίᾳ δρᾶσαί τι μετὰ καὶ στρατιώτης δύναται, γνώμης δὲ προμηθείᾳ βουλεῦσαί τι κρεῖττον οὐκ ἄλλος.
[1] The general should fight cautiously rather than boldly, or should keep away altogether from a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy. For even if in battle he shows that he is not to be outdone in valour, he can aid his army far less by fighting than he can harm it if he should be killed, since the knowledge of a general is far more important than his physical strength. Even a soldier can perform a great deed by bravery, but no one except the general can by his wisdom plan a greater one.