Complete Works of Onasander

by Onasander

  [6] εἶτ’ αὖ νικῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐχέτω προμήθειαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν ἀμελῶν, ἣν ἂν εἰς τὸ δρᾶσαί τι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ῥᾳθυμοῦντας εἰσενέγκαιτο. φόβος γὰρ εὔκαιρος ἀσφάλεια προμηθής, ὡς καὶ καταφρόνησις ἄκαιρος εὐεπιβούλευτος τόλμα.

  [6] On the other hand, if victorious, the general should take the same precautions against suffering harm through negligence which he would use in trying to inflict upon the enemy if they were off their guard. Seasonable fear is wise precaution, as ill-timed contempt is recklessness that invites attack.

  XXXVII. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν καιρῷ εἰρήνης μὴ ἀφυλάκτως εἶναι

  XXXVII. PRECAUTIONS IN TIME OF PEACE

  [1] Ἀνοχὰς δὲ ποιησάμενος μηδ’ ἐπιτιθέσθω μηδ’ αὐτὸς ἀφύλακτος ἔστω· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἥσυχον ἐχέτω πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, ὡς ἐν εἰρήνῃ, τὸ δ’ ἀσφαλὲς εἰς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν, ὡς ἐν πολέμῳ.

  [1] After making a truce he should neither make an attack nor himself remain unguarded; he should, on the one hand, make no move against the enemy, as in peace, but, on the other, he should be protected against danger, as in war.

  [2] δεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἀσύνθηκον ἐν σπονδαῖς εἶναι οὔτ’ αὐτόν τι φθάνειν ἀσεβὲς δρῶντα, ἀλλ’ ὕποπτον, ὡς φυλάττεσθαι τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ὕπουλον· ἄδηλοι γὰρ αἱ τῶν σπεισαμένων γνῶμαι.

  [2] He must not break faith in a treaty, nor be the first to commit any sacrilegious act, but he must be suspicious enough to watch for festering deceit on the part of the enemy, for the intentions of those with whom the treaty has been concluded are uncertain.

  [3] καὶ παρὰ σοι μὲν ἔστω τὸ βέβαιον τοῦ μὴ ἀδικῆσαι διὰ τὸ εὐσεβές, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑπονοείσθω τὸ μὴ πιστὸν διὰ τὸ ἀπεχθές· ἀσφαλὴς γὰρ οὗτος καὶ προμηθής, ὃς οὐδὲ βουληθεῖσι τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐπιθέσθαι τὸν τοῦ δύνασθαι παρασπονδῆσαι καιρὸν ἀπολείπει.

  [3] Let your part be a firm resolution not to transgress, because of the sacred nature of the treaty, but suspect a breach of faith on the part of the enemy due to their hostility. That general is wise and cautious who affords the enemy, even when they desire to attack, no opportunity to break their compact.

  [4] οἵτινες δ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ποιοῦνται τὴν ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν πάθωσιν ἐκδικίαν, εὐσεβὲς μὲν φρονοῦσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀσφαλῆ ποιοῦσιν.

  [4] Those who leave to the gods revenge for what they have suffered are piously minded but certainly do not act safely.

  [5] κομιδῇ γὰρ ἀνοήτων ἐστὶν ἐλπίδι τοῦ τοὺς παρασπονδήσαντας ἐκτίσειν δίκας ἀπρονοήτους ἔχειν τοὺς περὶ σφῶν κινδύνους, ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς σώζεσθαι μέλλοντας ἅμα τῷ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἐξὸν μετὰ τῆς τῶν ἰδίων πραγμάτων ἀσφαλείας πεῖραν λαμβάνειν τῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἀσεβείας· οὕτως γὰρ αὐτοί τε διὰ τὸ προμηθὲς οὐκ ἂν πταίσαιεν ἐπιβουλευθέντες, ἀσεβήσουσί τε οἱ πολέμιοι τῷ ἐπιχειρῆσαι καὶ δοκεῖν πεποιηκέναι ἄν, εἰ ἐδυνήθησαν.

  [5] For it is absolute folly to be careless of the danger to oneself in the hope that treaty-breakers will pay the penalty — as if one would himself be saved as soon as the enemy perish! — when it is possible to make trial of the irreligion of the enemy while at the same time safeguarding one’s own interests. With this precaution one will save himself from defeat if plotted against, but the enemy will commit sacrilege both if they attempt a breach of the truce and if they let it be seen that they would have done if it they could.

  XXXVIII. α´. Περὶ τοῦ τὰς προσαγόμενος πόλεις ἐν ἀδείᾳ ἔχειν καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ

  XXXVIII. (1) TREATMENT OF SURRENDERED CITIES WITH TRUST AND HUMANITY

  [1] Ταῖς δὲ προσχωρούσαις πόλεσιν, εἴ τινες ἐπιτρέποιεν αὑτὰς ἀρξάμεναι, φιλανθρώπως καὶ χρηστῶς προσφερέσθω· προσαγάγοιτο γὰρ ἂν οὕτως καὶ τὰς ἄλλας. ἡ γὰρ ἐλπὶς τοῦ τῶν αὐτῶν τεύξεσθαι δελεάζουσα προσάγεται τοὺς πολλοὺς αὑτοὺς ἑκόντας ἐγχειρίζειν.

  [1] If any cities should open their gates in surrender early in the war, the general should treat them in a manner both humane and advantageous, for thus he would induce the other cities also to submit. The enticing hope of a similarly fortunate fate leads the majority to surrender voluntarily.

  [2] ὅστις δὲ πικρῶς εὐθὺς καὶ πολεμικῶς προσφέρεται κύριος γενόμενος πόλεως ἢ διαρπάζων ἢ κτείνων ἢ κατασκάπτων, ἀλλοτριωτέρας διατίθησι τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, ὥστε καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὑτῷ ἐπίπονον καὶ τὴν νίκην δύσελπιν κατασκευάζειν·

  [2] But he who acts in a harsh and savage manner, immediately after becoming master of a city, plundering, slaying, and destroying, makes other cities hostile, so that the war becomes laborious for him and victory difficult of attainment.

  [3] εἰδότες γάρ, ὡς ἀπαραίτητόν ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ὑποχειρίων πρὸς τοῦ κρατήσαντος τιμωρία, πᾶν ὁτιοῦν ὑπομένουσι καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παραδοῦναι τὰς πόλεις.

  [3] Since they know that the punishment of the conquered by the conqueror is merciless, they are ready to do and suffer anything rather than surrender their cities.

  [4] οὐθὲν γὰρ οὕτως κατασκευάζει γενναίους, ὡς φόβος ὧν μέλλουσι πείσεσθαι κακῶν εἴξαντες· ἡ γὰρ προσδοκία τῶν δεινῶν ἐκ τοῦ καθυφεῖσθαι τὰ σφέτερα δεινὴν ἐντίθησι φιλοτιμίαν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις.

  [4] For nothing makes men so brave as the fear of what ills they will suffer if they surrender; indeed the expectation of the evils which will ensue from their subjection produces a terrible pertinacity in danger.

  [5] χαλεπαὶ δὲ αἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπεγνωσμένους πεῖραι μάχης· οὐδὲν γὰρ χρηστότερον ἐλπίζοντες ἐκ τοῦ παραχωρεῖν ὧν πείσονται κινδυνεύοντες αἱροῦνται μετὰ τοῦ πολλὰ δρᾶν καὶ πάσχειν.

  [5] Moreover, fighting is dangerous against desperate men, who expect from surrender no amelioration of the fate which will be theirs if they continue to fight, and therefore prefer, if they can inflict much harm, also to suffer much.

  [6] ὅθεν αἱ πολιορκίαι τοῖς ὧδε στρατηγοῖς ἄφροσι καὶ τεθηριωμένοις ταλαίπωροι γίγνονται καὶ πολυχρόνιοι, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἀτελεῖς, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ σφαλεραί τε καὶ ἐπικίνδυνοι.

  [6] On this account the sieges of such insensate and savage generals become wearisome and long drawn-out, sometimes even fail of accomplishment, and are extremely dangerous and precarious.

  �
�´. Πῶς χρηστέον προδόταις

  (2) HOW TO TREAT TRAITORS

  [7] Τοῖς δὲ προδόταις τάς τε πίστεις καὶ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας φυλαττέτω, μὴ διὰ τοὺς γεγονότας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς ἐσομένους, ἵν’ εἰδότες, ὡς ὀφείλεταί σφισι χάρις, ἑλόμενοι τὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς εὐεργεσίας τρέπωνται· λαμβάνει γάρ τι μᾶλλον ὁ προδότῃ διδοὺς ἢ χαρίζεται.

  [7] One should keep promises and pledges to traitors, not on account of what they have done but of what others will do, in order that these, knowing that gratitude will be due them, may choose the interests of their country’s enemies and turn to the same sort of service. For he who gives to a traitor receives much more than he bestows.

  [8] διὸ χρὴ προθύμως ἐκτίνειν τὰς ἀμοιβάς· οὐ γὰρ δικαστὴς τῆς ἀδικηθείσης πόλεώς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ στρατηγὸς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος.

  [8] On this account it is necessary to pay the reward cheerfully, for the general is not an avenger of the betrayed city but the commander of the army of his own country.

  XXXIX. α´. Περὶ τοῦ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐν γνώσει εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἄστρων κινήσεως

  XXXIX. (1) ON THE GENERAL’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE COURSES OF THE STARS

  [1] Πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐπιθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ προδοσίας νυκτερινὰς καταλήψεις τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἄπειρον εἶναι δεῖ τῆς ὑπεργείου κατὰ τὴν νύκτα φορᾶς τῶν ἀπλανῶν, ἐπεὶ πολλάκις ἀπράκτους ἕξει τὰς ἐπιβολάς.

  [1] In night attacks and surprises of towns through treason, the general must know the heavenly courses of the stars by night, otherwise his plans will often be of no avail.

  [2] ἔστιν γὰρ ὅτε συντέτακταί τις τῶν προδοτῶν τρίτην ἢ τετάρτην ἢ ὁπόστην ἄν τις εὔκαιρον ὥραν νομίζῃ τῆς νυκτός, ἀνοίξειν τὰς πύλας ἤ τινας κατασφάξειν τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀντιπραττόντων ἢ φρουρᾷ τῶν ἔνδον πολεμίων ἐπιθήσεσθαι· κἄπειτα δυεῖν θάτερον συμβέβηκεν, ἤτοι θᾶττον ἢ ἔδει προσπελάσαντα τὸν τῶν πολεμίων στρατὸν κατάφωρον γενέσθαι, πρὶν ἢ τοὺς προδότας ἑτοίμους εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως ἀποκωλυθῆναι τῆς πράξεως, ἢ ὑστερήσαντα τοῖς μὲν προδόταις αἴτιον γενέσθαι θανάτου φωραθεῖσιν, αὐτὸν δὲ μηδὲν τῶν προκειμένων ἁνύσαι.

  [2] For instance, some traitor has appointed the third or fourth, or whatever hour of the night he considers most favourable, for opening the gates or slaying some of the opposing faction in the town or attacking the hostile garrison within the town; then one of two things has happened; the general has reached the camp of the enemy too early and has been detected before the traitors are ready and has been thwarted in his attempt, or else he has arrived too late and has thus been the cause of the traitors’ being detected and put to death and of his own failure to accomplish any of his plans.

  [3] διόπερ χρὴ καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν τεκμαιρόμενον, ὅθεν ἐξοδεῦσαι δεῖ, καὶ τῶν σταδίων καὶ τῆς ὥρας στοχαζόμενον, ὅσον εἰς τὴν πορείαν ἀναλώσει, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρων ὁρῶντα, πόσον τὸ παρῳχηκὸς ἤδη καὶ πόσον τὸ ἀπολειπόμενον μέρος, οὕτως ἀκριβῶς συλλογισάμενον, ἵνα μήτε φθάσῃ μήτε βραδύνῃ, πρὸς αὐτὴν ἥκειν τὴν ὥραν τοῦ συντεταγμένου καιροῦ καὶ ἔτι προσιόντα ἀκούεσθαι καὶ ἐντὸς εἶναι τῶν τειχῶν.

  [3] Accordingly he should form an estimate of the road, deciding at what point he is to set out; then he must determine the distance and the time — how much of each he will have to spend on the journey; — and finally, he must, from his observation of the stars, estimate exactly what part of the night has passed and what part remains, in order that he may arrive neither too early nor too late; then he must get there at precisely the appointed time, so that news of his attack may not reach the enemy until he is actually inside the fortifications.

  β´. Πῶς ἡμέρας αἱρειν χρὴ πόλιν

  (2) HOW TO CAPTURE A CITY BY DAY

  [4] Εἰ δ’ ἡμέρας ἀναστήσας ἄγοι στράτευμα πόλεις ἐκ προδοσίας ληψόμενος κατὰ τὴν συγκειμένην ὥραν, τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ὑποπίπτοντας ἅπαντας προαποστέλλων ἱππεῖς συλλαμβανέτω, μή τις τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας φθάσας ἀποδραμὼν μηνύσῃ τὴν ἔφοδον τῶν πολεμίων, ἀλλ’ αἰφνιδίως ἀφυλάκτοις ἡ ἐπιφάνεια γένηται τοῦ στρατεύματος.

  [4] If setting out by day, he lead his army to capture at an appointed hour towns that are to be betrayed, he should send horsemen ahead to seize every one met on the road, that no native of the country may run ahead and warn of the approach of their enemy but that the army may appear suddenly to the enemy and catch him off his guard.

  [5] ἐπελθόντα δ’ ἐξαίφνης ἀπροσδοκήτοις χρή, κἂν μὴ κατὰ προδοσίαν μέλλῃ λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ προρρήσεως ἀγωνίζεσθαι διὰ μάχης, μὴ ἀναβάλλεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα φθάνειν προσβάλλοντα εἴτε φρουρίῳ εἴτε χάρακι εἴτε πόλει, μάλιστα δ’ ὅτ’ ἂν ὀλίγον εἶναι δοκῇ τὸ φίλιον στράτευμα καὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐλαττούμενον·

  [5] He must fall unexpectedly on an unsuspecting enemy, even if he is not expecting to seize the towns through treachery but to fight openly after a declaration of war, and he must not hesitate but strive in every way to attack fort or camp or town before his advance is known, especially if he knows that his own army is small and inferior to that of the enemy.

  [6] αἱ γὰρ ἀπρόληπτοι τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιφανείαι διὰ τὸ παράλογον ἐκπλήττουσι τοὺς ἐναντίους, κἂν ὦσι κρείττους, ἕως, ἄν γε συνθεωρήσωσιν αὑτοὺς καὶ βουλεύσασθαι καὶ ἀναθαρρῆσαι καιρὸν λάβωσι, κατὰ μικρὸν ἀναγκάζονται καταφρονεῖν· οὕτως ἐνίοτε τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἀρχόμενα φοβερωτέρα τῶν χρονιζομένων εἶναι δοκεῖ.

  [6] For unexpected appearances of an enemy, because they are unforeseen, terrify their opponents, even should the latter be stronger; but at length, if those who have been taken by surprise should observe their own forces or get the chance to plan and renew their courage, they gradually and of necessity come to despise their foes; in this way the beginning of a war sometimes seems more terrible than the latter part.

  [7] διὸ πολλάκις ἤδη τινὲς τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς ἐπιφανείας καταπληξάμενοι τοὺς ἐναντίους ἢ ταχὺ καὶ ἄκοντας ὑπέταξαν ἢ ποιεῖν ἑκόντας ἠνάγκασαν τὰ προσταττόμενα.

  [7] On this account, armies have often so terrified their opponents by the unexpectedness of their appearance that they have either quickly subdued them against their will or else have forced them to agree to comply with thei
r own demands.

  XL. Περὶ πολιορκίας

  XL. SIEGES

  [1] Πολιορκία δὲ στρατιωτῶν ἀνδρίαν ἐπιζητεῖ καὶ στρατηγικὴν ἐπίνοιαν καὶ μηχανημάτων παρασκευήν· ἀσφαλὴς μέντοι καὶ μὴ ἧττον ἀπροόρατος τῶν πολιορκουμένων ἔστω· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιβουλευόμενον, ὅτ’ ἂν οἶ κακοῦ τυγχάνει γινώσκῃ, τηρεῖ μᾶλλον τὸ ἐπιβουλεῦον·

  [1] A siege demands courage on the part of the soldiers, military science on the part of the general, and equipment of machines of war. The general must take no fewer precautions and be no less observant than the enemy; for the army attacked, when it knows just what its danger is, guards especially against the army attacking.

  [2] ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔξω κινδύνου δοκῶν εἶναι πράττει τι τῶν προκειμένων, ὁπότ’ ἂν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ὁ δ’ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ κινδυνεύειν ὑπάρχων ζητεῖ φθάσας δρᾶσαι, ὁπότ’ ἂν καιρὸν λάβῃ· διὸ χρὴ τὸν πολιορκοῦντα καὶ τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι καὶ φυλακαῖς τὸ ἴδιον ἀσφαλίζεσθαι στρατόπεδον.

  [2] The army that believes itself out of danger does what work is at hand when it pleases, but that which is in danger strives to surprise its enemy by dealing him a blow whenever it has an opportunity. Hence it is necessary for the besieging general to fortify his camp with trenches, palisades, and guards.

  [3] καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολιορκοῦντες, ὅ τι ἂν μέλλωσι πράττειν, ὁρῶνται τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους, οἱ δὲ πολιορκούμενοι πρόβλημα τὸ τεῖχος ἔχοντες ἀόρατοι πολλάκις ἐκχυθέντες διὰ πυλῶν ἢ μηχανὰς ἐνέπρησαν ἢ στρατιώτας ἐφόνευσαν ἤ, ὅ τι κατὰ χεῖράς σφισιν εἴη, τοῦτο ἐποίησαν.