by Onasander
[15] Sometimes those parts of a city that seem precipitous and are fortified by the sheer rocky cliffs, offer the besiegers greater chances for victory than do fortresses erected by human hands, for those places whose fortification relies upon natural strength are wont to be less carefully watched and guarded by soldiers.
[16] ἔνθα στρατηγὸς ἀγαθὸς ἐνόησεν ὃ δεῖ ποιῆσαι, καί τινας τῶν εὐτολμοτάτων παρακαλέσας ἐπαγγελίαις καὶ τιμαῖς ὀλίγους, οἷς ῥᾷον ἀναβαίνειν εἴτε δι’ αὐτῆς τῆς δυσχωρίας, εἴτε διὰ κλιμάκων, ἐκράτησε τῆς πράξεως ὑποκαταβάντες γὰρ ἐντὸς τείχους ἢ πυλίδα διέκοψαν ἢ πύλην ἀνέῳξαν.
[16] Then the wise general considers what he must do, and encouraging a few of his bravest soldiers with promise of reward, men who are best able to climb up by using either the natural unevenness of the ground or else ladders, he accomplishes his attempt; for descending stealthily within the walls they break down a postern or open a gate.
ζ´. Περὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν σαλπίγγων ὠφελείας
(7) THE ADVANTAGE OF TRUMPETS
[17] Μέγα δ’ ἂν ὀνήσειε καί τι τοιόνδε συνεπινοηθέν, εἰ καὶ σαλπιγκτὰς οἱ φθάσαντες ἐπιβῆναι τοῦ τείχους ἀνιμήσαιεν· ἀκουσθεῖσα γὰρ πολεμία σάλπιγξ ἀπὸ τειχῶν ἐν νυκτὶ πολλὴν ἔκπληξιν ἐπιφέρει τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις ὡς ἤδη κατὰ κράτος ἑαλωκόσιν, ὥστε τὰς πύλας καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπολιπόντας φεύγειν· ὅθεν δήπου συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἔξω στρατιώτας ῥᾳδίαν τήν τε τῶν πυλῶν ἐκκοπὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη διὰ τῶν κλιμάκων ἀνάβασιν, οὐδενὸς ἔτι τῶν πολεμίων ἀπείργοντος· οὕτως που δυνατὸν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀνόπλῳ σαλπιγκτῇ πόλιν ἁλῶναι.
[17] Some such device as this would be of great assistance — if those who have succeeded in mounting the walls draw up trumpets after them. For a hostile trumpet heard at night from the walls brings great terror to the besieged, as if they had already been overcome by force, so that abandoning the gates and fortifications they flee. The result is that breaking down the gates and meeting the walls by ladders is easily accomplished by soldiers on the outside since no one of the enemy resists any longer. Thus in some such way it is possible that one trumpeter, even without arms, can capture a city.
η´. Τί χρὴ ποιεῖν τὸν στρατηγὸν μετὰ τὸ ἑλεῖν τὴν πόλιν
(8) CONDUCT OF A GENERAL AFTER THE CAPTURE OF A CITY
[18] Εἰ δὲ δή τινα ἀκμάζουσαν ἔτι πλήθει τε καὶ δυνάμει πόλιν ἐρρωμένως ἑλὼν εἰς φόβον ἢ ὑπόνοιαν ἥκοι, μή ποτε κατὰ τάγματα καὶ συστροφὰς ὑπαντιάζοντες ἀμύνωνται τοὺς ἐπεισπίπτοντας ἢ τὰ μετέωρα καταλαμβανόμενοι καὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς πόλεως ἔνθεν ἀντεπίοιεν ἐπὶ πολὺ κακώσοντες τοὺς πολεμίους, κηρυττέτω τοὺς ἀνόπλους μὴ κτεῖναι.
[18] If the general capture by force some city, flourishing in power and in the number of its citizens, and if he fear or suspect that the inhabitants advancing in companies and crowds may defend themselves against the invaders, or that seizing the heights and the citadel of the town they may advance from there and cause great loss to their opponents, he should command his own soldiers not to slay unarmed men of the enemy.
[19] ἕως γὰρ ἕκαστος ἐλπίζει ληφθεὶς τεθνήξεσθαι, βούλεται φθάνειν δράσας καὶ πάσχων ἀλλά τι καὶ δρᾶν, πολλοί τε ἤδη πολεμίους εἰσκεχυμένους ἐξήλασαν ἢ καὶ μὴ δυνηθέντες εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἐρυμνὴν κατειλήθησαν, ἔνθεν αὖθις εἰς πόνον καὶ ταλαιπωρίαν κατέστησαν τοὺς πολεμίους, ὥστε δευτέραν ἐπαναιρεῖσθαι πολιορκίαν . . . ἢ καὶ πολυχρονιωτέραν, ἔστιν δ’ ὅτε καὶ ἐπαλγεστέραν μετὰ πολλῆς πείρας κακῶν.
[19] For so long as every man expects to be killed after capture, he wishes first to do some deed of bravery, and even though he suffer, yet to accomplish something, and many inhabitants of towns have driven out enemies even when introduced into the town, or, failing in this, have crowded into the fortified citadel from which they have caused great labour and loss to their adversaries, who must enter into a second . . . and longer siege, one that is sometimes more distressing and attended by great hardships.
[20] εἰ δὲ διαβοηθείη τόδε τὸ κήρυγμα, τάχα μὲν καὶ πάντες, ὡς δὲ πρόδηλον εἰπεῖν, οἵ γε πλείους τὰ ὅπλα ῥίψουσι· τῶν τε γὰρ βουλομένων δι’ ὀργῆς ἕκαστος εἰς ἄμυναν ἰέναι δεδιὼς τὸν πέλας, μή ποτε οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ταῦτα φρονῇ, ῥίπτειν ἀναγκασθήσεται, ὥστε, κἂν πάντες βούλωνται τὰ ὅπλα φυλάττειν, διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπόνοιαν αὐτὸν ἕκαστον δεδιότα, μὴ μόνος ὡπλισμένος ληφθῇ, σπεύδειν ἀποτιθέμενον — οἱ γὰρ ὀξεῖς καιροὶ τὴν κοινὴν γνώμην φανερὰν οὐκ ἔωσι γίγνεσθαι — , οἵ τε ἕτοιμοι πρὸς τὸ σώζεσθαι, μέχρι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰς ἐλπίδα κεκήρυκται σωτηρίας, εἰ καὶ μὴ γνώμῃ, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκῃ τὸ ἐπιὸν ἀμύνονται κακόν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ μικρὰν ἐλπίδα τοῦ σώζεσθαι λάβωσιν, ἱκέται τὸ λοιπὸν ἀντὶ πολεμίων ὑπαντῶσιν.
[20] But if the above-mentioned command should be published, quickly all the inhabitants, or, needless to say, at least the majority, would throw down their arms. For every one who through anger wishes to defend himself, will be compelled to lay down his arms for fear that his neighbour may not be of the same mind, so that even if all should wish to keep their weapons, on account of this suspicion of one another, each one fearing that he alone may be taken with arms on his person, hastens to give up his weapons. For a sudden emergency does not give time for the common opinion to become known. And those who are ready to protect their own lives so long as no hope of safety has been announced, strive to avert the imminent danger, if not as they wish, then as they must, but when they perceive a small hope of safety, they become suppliants instead of enemies.
[21] οὕτως τε ὁ μὲν κηρύξας καὶ τοὺς τὰ ὅπλα φυλάττειν βουλομένους ῥίπτειν αὐτὰ ἀναγκάζει· στρατιωτῶν δὲ θάνατος ἐν μὲν μάχαις εὐπαραμύθητος — δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῦ νικᾶν ἕνεκεν γεγονέναι — , ἐν δὲ νίκαις καὶ καταλήψεσι πόλεων τοῖς νικῶσιν οἴκτιστος, ἀφροσύνης τε μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνδρίας μαρτύριον·
[21] Thus this proclamation compels even those who wish to keep their arms to throw them down. The death of soldiers in battle admits of easy consolation, for it seems to have been the price of victory, but in victory and the occupation of cities it is a matter of sorrow to the conquerors, as an evidence of thoughtlessness rather than bravery.
[22] εἰ μέντοι μνησικάκως ἔχοι τοῖς ἡττημένοις στρατηγός, μὴ παρὰ τού�
�οις οἰέσθω τι φέρεσθαι βλάβος, ὅτι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας μὴ εὐθὺς κτενοῦσι· σχολῇ γὰρ βουλεύσεται μετὰ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου τὴν ἄμυναν ἀνανταγώνιστον ἔχων, τί χρὴ διαθεῖναι τοὺς ἑαλωκότας.
[22] If, however, the general is revengeful toward the conquered, he should not think that no harm is done them if his men do not slay on the spot all whom they meet, since at his leisure he will be able to plan in perfect safety his uncontested vengeance and the fate that the conquered must undergo.
θ´. Τὸν λιμῷ μέλλοντα πόλιν αἱρήσειν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἀσθενεῖς εἰς αὐτὴν χρὴ πέμπειν
(9) NECESSITY OF SENDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN INTO A CITY TO CAPTURE IT BY FAMINE
[23] Εἰ δὲ τὴν κατὰ κράτος ἀπεγνωκὼς ἐκπόρθησιν εἰς χρόνιον καταβαίνοι πολιορκίαν οἰόμενος λιμῷ πιέσας τὴν πόλιν αἱρήσειν, ἅ τινα ἂν ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας ἔτι καταλάβῃ σώματα, τούτων τὰ μὲν ἐρρωμένα καὶ ἀκμάζοντα ταῖς ἡλικίαις εἰς ἄμυναν πολέμου λαβών, ὅ τι περ ἂν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, διαθέσθω, γύναια δὲ καὶ παιδάρια καὶ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρώπους καὶ γεγηρακότας ἑκὼν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀποπεμπέτω· ταῦτα γὰρ ἄχρηστα μὲν εἰς τὰς πράξεις ἔσται, τὰς δὲ παρεσκευασμένας τοῖς ἔνδον τροφὰς θᾶττον συναναλώσει, καὶ πολεμίων μᾶλλον ἢ φιλίων ἐφέξει τρόπον.
[23] If the general should despair of sacking a city by force and should settle down to a prolonged siege, believing that he will capture the city if he has pressed it hard by famine, he should take prisoners whatever persons are still in the country. Of these, to the men in the prime of life he should assign work on the defences such as seems best to him, but the women and children and feeble men and old people he should send of his own accord into the city. These will be useless in action but will consume more quickly the supplies of the besieged and will serve the purpose of enemies rather than friends.
ι´. Ὁποῖον εἶναι χρὴ τὸν στρατηγὸν μετὰ τὴν νίκην
(10) CONDUCT OF THE GENERAL AFTER VICTORY
[24] Εἰ δέ τῷ πάντα κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ νοῦν χωρήσειεν, ὥστε τοῖς ὅλοις ἐπιθεῖναι τοῦ πολέμου πράγμασι τέλος, ἔστω μὴ βαρὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς εὐπραγίαις, ἀλλ’ εὔφορτος, μηδὲ τῦφον ἀπήνη περιφέρων, ἀλλ’ εὐμένειαν προσφιλῆ ἔχων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φθόνον ἐγέννησε, αὕτη δὲ ζῆλον ἐπεσπάσατο.
[24] If the war should chance to turn out in everything according to the general’s desire, so as to put a complete end to the enemy’s activity, he should not be overweening in his good fortune, but gracious; he should not show violent stupidity but kindly goodwill; for the former excites envy, the latter causes emulation.
[25] φθόνος μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὀδύνη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς πέλας ἀγαθῶν, ζῆλος δὲ μίμησις τῶν παρ’ ἄλλοις καλῶν, τοσοῦτόν τε διενήνοχεν ἀλλήλων, ὥστε τὸ μὲν φθονεῖν εὐχὴν εἶναι τοῦ καὶ παρ’ ἄλλῳ τι καλὸν μὴ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ζηλοῦν ἐπιθυμίαν τῆς τῶν ἴσων κτήσεως.
[25] Now envy is a pain of mind that successful men cause their neighbours, but emulation is imitation of the good qualities of others; such is the difference between them that envy is the desire that another may not have good fortune, but emulation is the desire to equal the possessions of another.
[26] ἀνὴρ οὖν ἀγαθὸς οὐ μόνον πατρίδος τε καὶ στρατιωτικοῦ πλήθους ἄριστος ἡγεμών, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν εἰς αἰεὶ εὐδοξίας ἀκινδύνου οὐκ ἀνόητος στρατηγός.
[26] A good man, then, will be not only a brave defender of his fatherland and a competent leader of an army but also for the permanent protection of his own reputation will be a sagacious strategist.
The Biography
Roman copy of a portrait bust of Plato by Silanion for the Academia in Athens, c. 370 BC — Onasander was a Platonic philosopher, who composed a lost commentary on the ‘Republic’.
Introduction to Onasander by William A. Oldfather
OF ONASANDER, the author of the present Στρατηγικός (sc. λόγος), or The General, we know from the biographical article in Suidas that he was a Platonic philosopher who, in addition to a military work,1 composed a commentary upon Plato’s Republic.2
Traces of Platonic philosophy have been sought in the present work, especially in the admonition that friends should fight beside friends (Ch. 24), and in the distinction made between φθόνος and ζῆλος (Ch. 42.25). But the essence of the first idea is as old as Nestor’s advice in the Iliad (Β 362 f.); it was practised among the Eleans, Italic Greeks, Cretans, and Boeotians, being characteristic of the Sacred Band of Thebes, and something similar may not have been unknown at one time in Sparta,3 hence it can hardly have escaped the attention of military writers. The same topic is treated also in extant literature from before the time of Onasander by Xenophon in his Symposium, VIII.32, 34, 35, so that, although Onasander can hardly have been ignorant of the famous passage in Plato (Symposium, 178E ff.), it is hardly necessary to assume that this was its immediate source.
As for the discrimination between φθόνος and ζῆλος there is no real parallel in Plato, whereas an almost exact counterpart exists in Aristotle (Rhet. II.11.1), a circumstance which escaped Schwebel.4 Such definitions, however, were the stock in trade of philosophers,5 and do not presuppose a specific source unless there is some marked similarity in expression. On the contrary, one would rather be inclined to wonder that, in an ethical study of warfare like the present, a commentator upon Plato’s Republic should have failed to show at any point some trace of the not infrequent references to war and its basic cause, the character of the good soldier, the need of constant military exercise, the style of life of the soldier, the professional aspect of successful military preparation, mathematics as a necessary element in an officer’s education, proposals looking toward the elimination of certain of the more cruel aspects of warfare, at least between civilized states, and similar topics discussed in that great work. Such silence on the part of Onasander, although not sufficient, perhaps, to cast doubt on the identity of our author with the writer mentioned by Suidas, would more naturally suggest that in The General we have a study anterior to a period of preoccupation with Plato.
The only other references to Onasander from antiquity are in Johannes Lydus, De magistratibus, I.47, who names an Ὀνήσανδρος among Greek military writers, and in the Tactica of the so-called Leo,6 XIV.112, Ὀνήσανδρος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς στρατηγικὸν συντάξας λόγον. In this connexion some conclusion must be reached about the proper form of the name, which has been much in doubt. The reading of all known MSS. except F and D (see below under ‘MSS.’ and ‘Symbols’), supported by Suidas, is Ὀνόσανδρος and so the majority of editors print the name. On the other hand the earliest authorities, Johannes Lydus and the so-called Leo, of whom the latter must have had access to better sources than Suidas in this matter, give the form Ὀνήσανδρος.7 Scholars have been divided, Schwebel (in his commentary), Fabricius, Koraes, M. Haupt, von Rohden, Jähns, Bechtel (à propos of an inscription, Bezz. Beitr., 1896, XXI.236) favouring Ὀνήσανδρος, while the early editors and translators uniformly, Haase,
Köchly, K. K. Muller, Christ-Schmid, and works of reference in general employ Ὀνόσανδρος. As far as the then available evidence went it favoured slightly the spelling with η, for all the MSS. but F go back to but a single source of the tenth century,8 the period to which Suidas belongs, while the Tactica of Leo9 and the work of Johannes Lydus are respectively two and four centuries earlier. If the literary evidence is about evenly divided, then one feels inclined to decide in favour of the form Ὀνήσανδρος, because this, especially in its Doric form Ὀνάσανδρος, was a relatively common name,10 while Ὀνόσανδρος seems to occur but once, and then, as Bechtel (loc. cit.) and others have thought, by a mere stone-cutter’s error.11
Such was the status of the question until Dr. Rostagno’s collation of the Florentinus, which is incomparably the best MS., showed that it had the following subscription:
Ὀναϲάνδρου ϲτρατηγικόϲ
Plut. IV.4 f. 215v
a form of the name, which had been known, indeed, before, but because it appeared only in the late MS. B, had been rejected by Köchly with a “sic!” I have not, however, hesitated to accept it as the correct form of the name, partly because of the high value of the testimony of the Florentinus, but especially because it affords the best explanation of the other two forms, for Ὀνόσανδρος is an easy corruption of Ὀνάσανδρος, and Ὀνήσανδρος merely the Attic (or Koine) spelling.
With reference to the period in which Onasander lived, it can scarcely be doubted that the Quintus Veranius to whom the present work is dedicated was the consul of A.D. 49 who died while in command in Britain ten years later, so that 59 is the terminus ante quem for the composition of the treatise.12 If we are inclined to press a little the author’s own characterization of his work as παλαιῶν τε ἡγεμόνων κατὰ τὴν σεβαστὴν εἰρήνην ἀνάθημα (prooem. 4), and see in these words a reference to the time of composition being a moment of universal tranquility, we might accept Zur-Lauben’s suggestion (preface, ) that the treatise was composed in the year 53, this being perhaps the only one in the period for which there exists no record of military operations. But the expression employed, while certainly appropriate at a time of complete peace, does not necessarily imply quite so much, and it is better to rest content with a date shortly anterior to A.D. 59.13