The Oxford History of Byzantium

by Cyril Mango

  Byzantium’s reaction to this disaster was mixed. On the one hand, John V’s most gifted son, Manuel, then governor of Thessalonica, exploited the Serbs’ defeat to recover Serres. John V, conversely, drew the melancholy conclusion that he, too, must construct a modus vivendi with the Ottomans on terms of vassalage. This was arranged with Sultan Murad by treaty, according to which Byzantium was henceforth obliged to convey regular tribute (kharadj), and contribute troops to the Ottoman army on demand. In return, John hoped that Murad would restrain the Turks in Europe from attacking what remained of Byzantine territory. In any event, the consequence of this pact was a new type of coexistence between Constantinople and Bursa, one which drew the ruling elite on both sides into close contact and collaboration.

  1371/2–1394: The First Period of Vassalage to the Ottomans

  After the initial treaty of vassalage between John V and Murad I was concluded in 1371/2, Constantinople remained tributary to the Porte for a quarter of a century. On the Byzantine side this encompassed the remainder of John V’s reign (he died in 1391), the usurpation of his eldest son Andronikos IV (1376–9), the usurpation of the latter’s son John VII (summer 1390), and the early years of Manuel II, John V’s second born. Murad I’s rule continued until he was assassinated at the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, when he was succeeded by his remarkable son ‘Thunderbolt’ Bayezid, whom Tamerlane captured at the Battle of Ankara in July 1402. The significance of this interval is twofold. First, resurgent and persistent power struggles within the Palaiologan clan intensified the entanglement between Byzantium and the Ottomans, as ambitious competitors for the throne bargained with the sultans—and likewise with the Italians, variously Venetians or Genoese—for support against the incumbent emperor. In the process, the prestige of the imperial regime increasingly came to be questioned at home and abroad. Parallel to this Byzantine political decay, the Ottomans continued their steady advance into the central Balkans, establishing control largely through suzerainty over a patchwork of Christian vassals. Under Murad, the high-lights after c.1371/2 included the conquests of Sofia (1385) and Nis (1386), followed three years later by his fateful victory over a large Serb and Bosnian coalition at Kosovo, which sealed the fate of the various Serbian lordships. In 1393, Bayezid definitively annexed the core of Bulgaria to the empire. Against the backdrop of this expansionary dynamic, let us sketch, now, the Palaiologan—Ottoman interface in this first period of vassalage.

  The ruinous ‘dependency relationships’ engendered by dynastic strife emerged when John V became engulfed in a savage conflict with his son, Andronikos IV, who at that time was the designated heir to the throne. In spring 1373 the latter staged a joint rebellion with Murad I’s son, Savci Celebi, their objective being to depose their respective fathers and rule in their place. John V and Murad summarily co-ordinated strategies and forces (in the course of which Murad probably made his first crossing into Rumili), and by late September Andronikos had been captured and partially blinded (as was his 3-year-old son John [VII]), and Savci Celebi most probably had been executed.

  In punishment, Andronikos and his son were now imprisoned; John V elevated his second son, Manuel, as co-emperor; and the seeds of a long vendetta were sown. In the next episode, in July 1376, Andronikos and his son escaped, obtained Genoese and Turkish help, and returned to Constantinople to wreak vengeance. John V and Manuel were captured and put in prison, where they languished for the next three years, while Andronikos established his rule, crowning his own son John as his co-emperor. Murad evidently shifted his support from John V to Andronikos IV because the latter promised, in compensation for troops, the return of Kallipolis (which Amadeo of Savoy had captured in 1366)—and this indeed transpired by 1377. Beyond the dynamics of dynastic strife, the motives for Andronikos’ usurpation are difficult to fathom, although he may have represented a faction that rejected John V’s submission to the papacy as a humiliating return to the errors of Michael VIII.

  The pattern of Andronikos’ coup in 1376 was repeated in June 1379, when John V and Manuel escaped, predictably with Venetian help, and promptly journeyed to Bursa, offering the sultan larger tribute if he would abandon Andronikos, and back the restoration of John V. Again Murad nodded to the highest bidder, and thus in late June of that year, assisted by Venetian ships and Turkish troops, John V and Manuel attacked Constantinople, managed an entry, and re-established their regime. On this occasion, however, Andronikos evaded capture and retreated with his family and hostages to Galata, where he fought on with Genoese support until 1381. Finally, in May 1381, a family compact was reached whereby Andronikos would be forgiven and reinstated as John V’s heir, and thereafter the succession would pass to Andronikos’ son John, the future John VII.

  This arrangement, however, failed to restore peace and harmony among the Palaiologoi. Since Manuel had effectively been excluded from the succession, he angrily returned to Thessalonica in 1382, and thereafter pursued a rebellious course, embarrassing to John V’s policy of compliance with Murad. By 1383 Manuel had established suzerainty over Thessaly and Epiros, a wayward ‘expansionism’ that so alarmed the sultan that he dispatched troops to obtain the surrender of Thessalonica. This Manuel refused, and consequently, down to 1387, he was occupied defending the city from an Ottoman siege. Meanwhile, Andronikos IV and his son John had retired to their appanage centred on Selymbria, but were still embroiled in territorial disputes with John V when Andronikos died in 1385.

  The tragedy of Palaiologan political history in this decade and the next was that Andronikos IV’s conflict with his kinsmen was not buried at his death. Instead, it persisted as a legacy to his son, John [VII], who in 1385 was 15, and keenly ambitious to preserve the provisions of the 1381 succession pact. His fears that his claims might be overturned were exacerbated in spring 1387, when Thessalonica capitulated to Hayreddin Pasha, and Manuel began manoeuvring for reconciliation with his father—and likewise the sultan. Eventually in the autumn of that year John V permitted his son to return to Constantinople at Murad’s behest, whereupon Manuel’s ambition henceforth was to recover his status as John V’s co-emperor and designated successor. While the elder emperor was not unsympathetic (in 1387 he was aged 55), he resisted taking action that would push his grandson to rebellion, and thus left Manuel’s political status undetermined, relegating him to provisional exile on the island of Lemnos, where he would remain through late summer or early autumn 1389.

  For John [VII], Manuel’s progress from Thessalonica to Constantinople was sufficient cause to begin preparations for a coup against his grandfather, which he intended to accomplish with Genoese and Ottoman support. By May 1389 he was in Genoa, where he was recognized as emperor and received loans. He returned east to approach the sultan early in 1390—by now Bayezid had replaced Murad—after rumours had reached him that John V had died. In point of fact the latter had fallen seriously ill, which apparently prompted Manuel to rush from Lemnos to his father’s side—strategically positioned, as it were, for immediate succession. But John V miraculously recovered, and likewise seems to have sanctioned Manuel’s return, anticipating that war with his grandson would shortly commence. Indeed, when the younger John met Bayezid, the latter agreed to provide him with troops, though it is again unclear precisely what was promised in compensation. In any event, John’s bid for power as John VII was successful, sympathizers inside Constantinople facilitating his entry the night of 13/14 April 1390. His reign lasted only five months, however, throughout which his grandfather remained blockaded in a little fortress near the Golden Gate, and his uncle Manuel scurried for military assistance from other quarters to topple his nephew’s regime.

  John VII’s grasp on power in Constantinople was undermined by Manuel’s success in obtaining help from the Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes, for which he pawned a large stash of ecclesiastical treasures. Once he and his father had re-established themselves on the throne, their key problem was reconstructing a modus vivendi with Bayezid, and finding stratagems to keep Jo
hn VII from again subverting their rule. The latter challenge would occupy Manuel, off and on, down to John VII’s death in 1408. An accommodation was reached with Bayezid, part of which involved the dismantling of the Golden Gate fortification, and documentary evidence suggests that the sultan did not oppose Manuel’s succession to John V, when he at length died in February 1391. Thereafter down to 1394, Manuel behaved himself towards Bayezid as a loyal vassal, however much psychological and ideological turmoil it caused him (as is evident from his writings). Conversely, whatever reconciliation he achieved with his nephew was transitory and superficial.

  More than anything else, the political tergiversations that unfolded between 1373 and 1394 underscore how very much the fate of the Palaiologoi depended on the will of foreigners, principally Italians and Turks, and how profoundly incapable that clan was in articulating power amicably within its ranks for the general welfare of its subjects. It exhibits, furthermore, how skilfully Murad and Bayezid manipulated the family rivalries of their Christian vassals to maximize their advantage.

  1394–1424: Rebellion and Precariously Recovered Autonomy

  Manuel II’s rationale for breaking with his father’s long-standing policy of subordination to the Ottomans is profoundly mysterious, particularly since his material and military resources at the time were as slender as ever. It is evident, however, that in 1393/4 Manuel had been negotiating with John VII for a formal reconciliation, the crux of which entailed a redefinition of the succession order, and that John betrayed this to Bayezid, who was furious. Indeed, during the assembly of vassals Bayezid convened at Serres in 1393/4, after the reduction of Trnovo, he reportedly ordered Manuel’s execution, but then relented. Manuel himself asserts that this episode destroyed his ‘friendship’ with the sultan, and a further provocation may have arisen when Bayezid demanded the construction of a new mosque, installation of a kadi, and establishment of a large Turkish colony in Constantinople. Whatever the background, Manuel broke his ties with the Ottomans in about spring 1394—in essence, refusing to pay the kharadj, provide troops, or simply answer the sultan’s summons. From the Ottoman perspective this was an act of rebellion, the first of its type by a tekfur (tributary prince) of Constantinople.

  Bayezid’s response was necessarily military, and he now launched an attack on Constantinople that was to last, off and on, for about eight years. As is evident from Manuel’s own writings, Bayezid’s initial objectives, or at least professed objectives, were not to displace Palaiologan rule, but rather to reinstall John VII as the sultan’s loyal lieutenant. Whatever the case, his assault on Constantinople certainly played a role (though hardly a decisive one) in stimulating Philip the Bold of Burgundy and Sigismund of Hungary to organize one of the last great international crusades. From spring 1394 to autumn 1396, the Ottoman action at Constantinople was more a blockade than a determined siege. However, following Bayezid’s spectacular victory over the aforementioned crusaders at Nicopolis on 25 September 1396, a major contingent of Ottoman forces was positioned at the walls, and a full-scale siege unfolded. The situation quickly became desperate, but Manuel persevered in organizing defences through late 1399, at which time he was persuaded by Marshal Boucicaut, who had earlier arrived with minor relief, that he should journey to France and appeal for more serious help from the West. Through Boucicaut’s good services, John VII and Manuel were reconciled, and John, incredibly, was left in command of Constantinople while his uncle sailed west.

  Manuel’s subsequent travels in Europe (from 10 December 1399 to 9 June 1403) involved fascinating state visits to Venice, Padua, Milan, Paris, and London. Throughout he was generously entertained, and he regarded King Henry IV as a particularly charming and likeable host. Even so, his negotiations with the western princes resulted in no appreciable aid or military commitments. Indeed, during the year and a half he resided in the Louvre as guest of Charles VI, perhaps his most significant accomplishment was writing a lengthy treatise on the Orthodox view of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

  In the Byzantines’ own view, Constantinople was saved by the timely intervention of the Virgin Mary, and indeed it was a kind of deus ex machina, in the person of Timur (Tamerlane), that averted its surrender in 1402. In late July of that year, while Manuel was still in Paris, the great khan’s decisive clash with Bayezid took place at the legendary battle of Ankara, in which the Ottoman army was disastrously routed, and Bayezid himself was captured. It appears, moreover, that John VII had negotiated with Timur in summer 1401, offering Byzantine solidarity against the Ottomans. In the aftermath of Bayezid’s defeat, the Ottoman assault on Constantinople evaporated, and early in 1403 a peace treaty was drawn up between John VII and other local Christian powers, on the one side, and Bayezid’s successor in Rumili, Süleyman Çelebi, which was favourable to Byzantium. The emperors were formally absolved of tributary obligations and moreover recovered Thessalonica, Mount Athos, a stretch of the Black Sea coast from Constantinople to Mesembria or Varna, and a few Aegean islands. When Manuel himself returned to Constantinople, the treaty was reconfirmed, and he additionally gave his illegitimate niece, Theodora, in marriage to Süleyman.

  The mood in Byzantium after 1402 was one of renewed, albeit qualified, optimism about future chances for survival. Not only had the threat of Bayezid been eliminated, his empire was now in ruins—deconstructed to its earlier dimensions by Timur, and reduced to chaos by protracted wars of succession among Bayezid’s sons, played out between 1403 and 1413. By the latter date Mehmed I had triumphed, with generous Byzantine support. Mehmed’s sole, undisputed reign continued down to May 1421, and throughout these years a stable coexistence prevailed between Constantinople and the Ottomans. Much of this was due to the even hand of Manuel II, as well as the willingness of Mehmed to refrain from resurgent expansionism.

  Bird’s-eye view of Constantinople in Cristoforo Buondelmonti’s Liber insularum, c.1422. This is the only delineation of the city before the Turkish conquest that bears any relation to reality. It survives in many different versions, none of which is the original.

  This period of peace quickly disintegrated in late 1421, largely owing to a change of leadership in Constantinople. By 1420 Manuel II was an exhausted man of 70, and had resolved to withdraw from public life. In 1421 he surrendered the helm to his eldest son, John VIII, whose attitude to the Turks was less restrained and diplomatic than his father’s. Simultaneously there was a change of leadership on the Ottoman side, when Mehmed I died in May 1421 and was succeeded by his son Murad II. The latter’s attitude towards the Byzantines was hardly accommodating and the stage was set for confrontations that ultimately would restore the status quo ante 1403.

  When John VIII and his advisers learned of Mehmed’s death, they stupidly resolved to incite an internal rebellion against the new sultan. To that end, in August 1421, they backed the pretensions of a certain Mustafa, who claimed to be a long-lost son of Bayezid, and indeed gathered some support in Europe. Murad II’s reply, however, was swift and decisive. In January 1422 his army smashed Mustafa’s troops, and Mustafa was captured and hanged. The following June he dispatched an army to attack Constantinople, and another to besiege Thessalonica. In the face of these disasters Manuel counselled yet another trouble-making stratagem to divert Murad—namely, supporting the claims of his brother in Anatolia, Küçük Mustafa. After a general assault on Constantinople failed on 24 August, Murad withdrew in early September to deal with Mustafa, who by now was besieging Bursa. Eventually, in February 1424, Manuel and Murad negotiated a settlement whereby Constantinople was again reduced to tributary status—the price for survival, according to the historian Doukas, now being 300,000 silver coins per year.

  In essence, the entire interval from 1394 through 1424 was shaped by Manuel II’s vision of liberation from ‘servitude’ to the Ottomans, and its genuine successes, aside from the accidents of fortune or divine intervention, rested on his savoir-faire as a statesman tempering the headiness of rebellion and recovered autonomy with the pra
cticalities of coexistence and accommodation. His epigones were, unfortunately, made of lesser stuff.

  The Muradiye Camii (1424–7) at the hot springs of Bursa was built by Sultan Murad II. It has an Italianate arcaded façade incorporating many Byzantine marble elements.

  Far left: Portrait medal of John VIII Palaiologos by Pisanello made from sketches executed at the time the emperor attended the Council of Ferrara—Florence (1438–9). Pisanello was much taken by the exotic costumes and accoutrements of the Greek delegation.

  Left: Portrait medal of Mehmed II by Costanzo da Ferrara, who was sent to Constantinople at the sultan’s invitation by King Ferrante of Naples. The medal is dated 1481, the year of Mehmed’s death at the age of 49.

  1424–1453: Restored Vassalage and Final Defeats

  Given the nastiness of the conflict that had unfolded between 1421 and 1424, the Ottomans could hardly help but regard Palaiologan Constantinople as a liability, the direct absorption of which was by now, if not before, a prime desideratum. Nonetheless, throughout the remainder of Manuel II’s reign (he died in 1425), the sole rule of John VIII (1425–48) and the early years of Constantine XI (1449–51) Murad II left Constantinople in peace, and the terms of the 1424 treaty were observed. The critical shift in attitude came with the accession of Mehmed II, in February 1451, for whom the conquest of the city was a driving ambition.

  John VIII’s reign was suffused with a mood of profound apprehension and repeated disappointments. While Constantinople enjoyed a measure of peace and security after 1424, what remained of Byzantium elsewhere was in a state of chronic threat. As a punitive gesture, the Morea (which, under despot Theodore II (1407–43) had begun to expand at the expense of the Latins) was ravaged by the troops of Turahan Beg in late May 1423. In Macedonia, the siege of Thessalonica that Murad had launched in 1422 continued with such intensity the following year that famine was endemic. Under these dire circumstances, the Byzantines surrendered the city to the Venetians (September 1423), who were quickly overwhelmed by the costs of its defence. Finally in spring 1430 Murad II resolved to take Thessalonica once and for all, and personally led an enormous army into Macedonia, which achieved its objective. Since its leaders had refused to surrender peacefully, Thessalonica was now subjected to a fearful three days of destruction and plunder; the captives unable to secure ransom were sent to the slave markets of Rumili and Anatolia. When the canonical three days of license had passed, Murad immediately enacted measures to reconstruct the city. At that time, the former second city of the empire numbered around two thousand inhabitants.