[69.1] These were the extreme opinions delivered upon that occasion, but there were many which took the middle ground between the two. For some of the senators favoured remitting the debts of those only who had nothing, permitting the money-lenders to seize the goods of the debtors, but not their persons. Others advised that the public treasury should discharge the obligations of the insolvents, in order both that the credit of the poor might be preserved by this public favour and their creditors might suffer no injustice. Certain others thought that they ought to ransom the persons of those who were already being held for debt or were going to be deprived of their liberty, by substituting captives in their stead and assigning these to their creditors. [2] After various views such as these had been expressed, the opinion that prevailed was that they should pass no decree for the time being concerning these matters, but that after the wars were ended in the most satisfactory manner, the consuls should then bring them up for discussion and take the votes of the senators; and that in the meantime there should be no money exacted by virtue of either any contract or any judgment, that all other suits should be dropped, and that neither the courts of justice should sit nor the magistrates take cognizance of anything but what related to the war. [3] When this decree was brought to the people, it allayed in some measure the civil commotion, yet it did not entirely remove the spirit of sedition from the state. For some of the labouring class did not look upon the hope held out by the senate, which contained nothing express or certain, as a sufficient relief; but they demanded that the senate should do one of two things, either grant them the remission of debts immediately, if it wanted to have them as partners in the dangers of the war, or not delude them by deferring it to another occasion. For men’s sentiments, they said, were very different when they were making requests and after their requests had been satisfied.
[70.1] While the public affairs were in this condition, the senate, considering by what means it could most effectually prevent the plebeians from creating any fresh disturbances, resolved to abolish the consular power for the time being and to create some other magistracy with full authority over war and peace and every other matter, possessed of absolute power and subject to no accounting for either its counsels or its actions. [2] The term of this new magistracy was to be limited to six months, after the expiration of which time the consuls were again to govern. The reasons that compelled the senate to submit to a voluntary tyranny in order to put an end to the war brought upon them by their tyrant were many and various, but the chief one was the law introduced by the consul Publius Valerius, called Publicola (concerning which I stated in the beginning that it rendered invalid the decisions of the consuls), providing that no Roman should be punished before he was tried, and granting to any who were haled to punishment by their orders the right to appeal from their decision to the people, and until the people had given their vote concerning them, the right to enjoy security for both their persons and their fortunes; and it ordained that if any person attempted to do anything contrary to these provisions he might be put to death with impunity. [3] The senate reasoned that while this law remained in force the poor could not be compelled to obey the magistrates, because, as it was reasonable to suppose, they would scorn the punishments which they were to undergo, not immediately, but only after they had been condemned by the people, whereas, when this law had been repealed, all would be under the greatest necessity of obeying orders. And to the end that the poor might offer no opposition, in case an open attempt were made to repeal the law itself, the senate resolved to introduce into the government a magistracy of equal power with a tyranny, which should be superior to all the laws. [4] And they passed a decree by which they deceived the poor and, without being detected, repealed the law that secured their liberty. The decree was to this effect; that Larcius and Cloelius, who were the consuls at the time, should resign their power, and likewise any other person who held a magistracy or had the oversight of any public business; and that a single person, to be chosen by the senate and approved of by the people, should be invested with the whole authority of the commonwealth and exercise it for a period not longer than six months, having power superior to that of the consuls. [5] The plebeians, being unaware of the real import of this proposal, ratified the resolutions of the senate, although, in fact, a magistracy that was superior to a legal magistracy was a tyranny; and they gave the senators permission to deliberate by themselves and choose the person who was to hold it.
[71.1] After this the leading men of the senate devoted much earnest thought to searching for the man who should be entrusted with the command. For they felt that the situation required a man both vigorous in action and of wide experience in warfare, a man, moreover, possessed of prudence and self-control, who would not be led into folly by the greatness of his power; but, above all these qualities and the others essential in good generals, a man was required who knew how to govern with firmness and would show no leniency toward the disobedient, a quality of which they then stood particularly in need. [2] And though they observed that all the qualities they demanded were to be found in Titus Larcius, one of the consuls (for Cloelius, who excelled in all administrative virtues, was not a man of action nor fond of war, nor had he the ability to command others and to inspire fear, but was a mild punisher of the disobedient), they were nevertheless ashamed to deprive one of the consuls of the magistracy of which he was legally possessed and to confer upon the other the power of both, a power which was being created greater than the kingly authority. Besides, they were under some secret apprehensions lest Cloelius, taking to heart his removal from office and considering it a dishonour put upon him by the senate, might change his sentiments and, becoming a patron of the people, overthrow the whole government. [3] And when all were ashamed to lay their thoughts before the senate, and this situation had continued for a considerable time, at last the oldest and most honoured of the men of consular rank delivered an opinion by which he preserved an equal share of honour to both the consuls and yet found out from those men themselves the one who was the more suitable to command. He said that, since the senate had decreed and the people in confirm thereof had voted that the power of this magistracy should be entrusted to a single person, and since two matters remained that required no small deliberation and thought, namely, who should be the one to receive this magistracy that was of equal power with a tyranny, and by what legal authority he should be appointed, it was his opinion that one of the present consuls, either by consent of his colleague or by recourse to the lot, should choose among all the Romans the person he thought would govern the commonwealth in the best and most advantageous manner. They had no need on the present occasion, he said, of interreges, to whom it had been customary under the monarchy to give the sole power of appointing those who were to reign, since the commonwealth was already provided with the lawful magistrate.
[72.1] This opinion being applauded by all, another senator rose up and said: “I think, senators, this also ought to be added to the motion, namely, that as two persons of the greatest worth have at present the administration of the public affairs, men whose superiors you could not find, one of them should be empowered to make the nomination and the other should be appointed by his colleague, after they have considered together which of them is the more suitable person, to the end that, as the honour is equal between them, so the satisfaction may be equal also, to the one, in having declared his colleague to be the best man, and to the other, in having been declared the best by his colleague; for each of these things is pleasing and honourable. I know, to be sure, that even if this amendment were not made to the motion, they themselves would have thought proper to act in this manner; but it is better it should appear that you likewise approve of no other course.” [2] This proposal also seemed to meet with the approval of all, and the motion was then passed without further amendment. When the consuls had received the authority to decide which of them was the more suitable to command, they did a thing both admirable in itself and passing all human
belief. For each of them declared, as worthy of the command, not himself, but the other; and they continued all that day enumerating one another’s virtues and begging that they themselves might not receive the command, so that all who were present in the senate were in great perplexity. [3] When the senate had been dismissed, the kinsmen of each and the most honoured among the senators at large came to Larcius and continued to entreat him till far into the night, informing him that the senate had placed all its hopes in him and declaring that his indifference toward the command was prejudicial to the commonwealth. But Larcius was unmoved, and in his turn continued to address many prayers and entreaties to each of them. The next day, when the senate had again assembled, and he still resisted and, in spite of the advice of all the senators, would not change his mind, Cloelius rose up and nominated him, according to the practice of the interreges, and then abdicated the consulship himself.
[73.1] Larcius was the first man to be appointed sole ruler at Rome with absolute authority in war, in peace, and in all other matters. They call this magistrate a dictator, either from his power of issuing whatever orders he wishes and of prescribing for the others rules of justice and right as he thinks proper (for the Romans call commands and ordinances respecting what is right and wrong edicta or “edicts”) so, as some write, from the form of nomination which was then introduced, since he was to receive the magistracy, not from the people, according to ancestral usage, but by the appointment of one man. [2] For they did not think they ought to give an invidious and obnoxious title to any magistracy that had the oversight of a free people, as well as for the sake of the governed, lest they should be alarmed by the odious terms of address, as from a regard for the men who were assuming the magistracies, lest they should unconsciously either suffer some injury from others or themselves commit against others acts of injustice of the sort that positions of such authority bring in their train. For the extent of the power which the dictator possesses is by no means indicated by the title; for the dictatorship is in reality an elective tyranny. [3] The Romans seem to me to have taken this institution also from the Greeks. For the magistrates anciently called among the Greeks aisymnêtai or “regulators,” as Theophrastus writes in his treatise On Kingship, were a kind of elective tyrants. They were chosen by the cities, not for a definite time nor continuously, but for emergencies, as often and for as long a time as seemed convenient; just as the Mitylenaeans, for example, once chose Pittacus to oppose the exiles headed by Alcaeus, the poet.
[74.1] The first men who had recourse to this institution had learned the advantage of it by experience. For in the beginning all the Greek cities were governed by kings, though not despotically, like the barbarian nations, but according to certain laws and time-honoured customs, and he was the best king who was the most just, the most observant of the laws, and did not in any wise depart from the established customs. [2] This appears from Homer, who calls kings dikaspoloi or “ministers of justice,” and themispoloi or “ministers of the laws.” And kingships continued to be carried on for a long time subject to certain stated conditions, like that of the Lacedaemonians. But as some of the kings began to abuse their powers and made little use of the laws, but settled most matters according to their own judgment, people in general grew dissatisfied with the whole institution and abolished the kingly governments; and enacting laws and choosing magistrates, they used these as the safeguards of their cities. [3] But when neither the laws they had made were sufficient to ensure justice nor the magistrates who had undertaken the oversight of them able to uphold the laws, and times of crisis, introducing many innovations, compelled them to choose, not the best institutions, but such as were best suited to the situations in which they found themselves, not only in unwelcome calamities, but also in immoderate prosperity, and when their forms of government were becoming corrupted by these conditions and required speedy and arbitrary correction, they were compelled to restore the kingly and tyrannical powers, though they concealed them under more attractive titles. Thus, the Thessalians called these officials archoi or “commanders,” and the Lacedaemonians harmosati or “harmonizers,” fearing to call them tyrants or kings, on the ground that it was not right for them to confirm those powers again which they had abolished with oaths and imprecations, under the approbation of the gods. [4] My opinion, therefore, is, as I said, that the Romans took this example from the Greeks; but Licinius believes they took the dictatorship from the Albans, these being, as he says, the first who, when the royal family had become extinct upon the death of Amulius and Numitor, created annual magistrates with the same power the kings had enjoyed and called these magistrates dictators. For my part, I have not thought it worth while to inquire from whence the Romans took the name but from whence they took the example of the power comprehended under that name. But perhaps it is not worth while to discuss the matter further.
[75.1] I shall now endeavour to relate in a summary manner how Larcius handled matters when he had been appointed the first dictator, and show with what dignity he invested the magistracy, for I look upon these matters as being most useful to my readers, since they will afford a great abundance of noble and profitable examples, not only to lawgivers and leaders of the people, but also to all others who aspire to take part in public life and to govern the state. For it is no mean and humble state of which I am going to relate the institutions and manners, nor were the men nameless outcasts whose counsels and actions I shall record, so that my zeal for small and trivial details might to some appear tedious and trifling; but I am writing the history of the state which prescribes rules of right and justice for all mankind, and of the leaders who raised her to that dignity, matters concerning which any philosopher or statesman would earnestly strive not to be ignorant. [2] As soon, therefore, as Larcius had assumed this power, he appointed as his Master of the Horse Spurius Cassius, who had been consul about the seventieth Olympiad. This custom has been observed by the Romans down to my generation and no one appointed dictator has thus far gone through his magistracy without a Master of the Horse. After that, desiring to show how great was the extent of his power, he ordered the lictors, more to inspire terror than for any actual use, to carry the axes with the bundles of rods through the city, thereby reviving once more a custom that had been observed by the kings but abandoned by the consuls after Valerius Publicola in his first consulship had lessened the hatred felt for that magistracy. [3] Having by this and the other symbols of royal power terrified the turbulent and the seditious, he first ordered all the Romans, pursuant to the best of all the practices established by Servius Tullius, the most democratic of the kings, to return valuations of their property, each in their respective tribes, adding the names of their wives and children as well as the ages of themselves and their children. And all of them having registered in a short time by reason of the severity of the penalty (for the disobedient were to lose both their property and their citizenship), the Romans who had arrived at the age of manhood were found to number 150,700. [4] After that he separated those who were of military age from the older men, and distributing the former into centuries, he formed four bodies of foot and horse, of which he kept one, the best, about his person, while of the remaining three bodies, he ordered Cloelius, who had been his colleague in the consulship, to choose the one he wished, Spurius Cassius, the Master of the Horse, to take the third, and Spurius Larcius, his brother, the remaining one; this last body together with the older men was ordered to guard the city, remaining inside the walls.
[76.1] When he had got everything ready that was necessary for the war, he took the field with his forces and established three camps in the places where he suspected the Latins would be the most likely to make their invasion. He considered that it is the part of a prudent general, not only to strengthen his own position, but also to weaken that of the enemy, and, above all, to bring wars to an end without a battle or hardship, or, if that cannot be done, then with the least expenditure of men; and regarding as the worse of all wars and the most distressi
ng those which men are forced to undertake against kinsmen and friends, he thought they ought to be settled by an accommodation in which clemency outweighed the demands of justice. [2] Accordingly, he not only sent secretly to the most important men among the Latins some persons who were free from suspicion and attempted to persuade them to establish friendship between the two states, but he also sent ambassadors openly both to the several cities and to their league and by that means easily brought it about that they no longer entertained the same eagerness for the war. But in particular he won them over and set them against their leaders by the following service. [3] The men who had received the supreme command over the Latins, namely, Mamilius and Sextus, keeping their forces all together in the city of Tusculum, were preparing to march on Rome, but were consuming much time in delay, either waiting for the cities which were slow in joining them or because the sacrificial victims were not favourable. During this time some of their men, scattering abroad from the camp, proceeded to plunder the territory of the Romans. [4] Larcius, being informed of this, sent Cloelius against them with the most valiant, both of the horse and light-armed troops; and he, coming upon them unexpectedly, killed a few in the action and took the rest prisoners. These Larcius caused to be cured of their wounds, and having gained their affection by many other instances of kindness, he sent them to Tusculum safe and sound without ransom, and with them the most distinguished of the Romans as ambassadors. Through their efforts the army of the Latins was disbanded and a year’s truce concluded between the two states.
Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79) Page 49