[77.1] After Larcius had effected these things, he brought the army home from the field, and having appointed consuls, laid down his magistracy before the whole term of his power had expired, without having put any of the Romans to death, banished any, or inflicted any other severity on any of them. [2] This enviable example set by Larcius was continued by all who afterwards received this same power till the third generation before ours. Indeed, we find no instance of any one of them in history who did not use it with moderation and as became a citizen, though the commonwealth has often found it necessary to abolish the legal magistracies and to put the whole administration under one man. [3] If, now, in foreign wars alone those who held the dictatorship had shown themselves brave champions of the fatherland, quite uncorrupted by the greatness of their power, it would not be so remarkable; but as it was, all who obtained this great power, whether in times of civil dissensions, which were many and serious, or in order to overthrow those who were suspected of aiming at monarchy or tyranny, or to prevent numberless other calamities, acquitted themselves in a manner free from reproach, like the first man who received it; so that all men gained the same opinion, and the last hope of safety when all others had been snatched away by some crisis, was the dictatorship. [4] But in the time of our fathers, a full four hundred years after Titus Larcius, the institution became an object of reproach and hatred to all men under L. Cornelius Sulla, the first and only dictator who exercised his power with harshness and cruelty; so the Romans then perceived for the first time what they had along been ignorant of, that the dictatorship is a tyranny. [5] For Sulla composed the senate of commonplace men, reduced the power of the tribunes to the minimum, depopulated whole cities, abolished some kingdoms and established others himself, and was guilty of many other arbitrary acts, which it would be a great task to enumerate. As for the citizens, besides those slain in battle, he put no fewer than forty thousand to death after they had surrendered to him, and some of these after he had first tortured them. [6] Whether all these acts of his were necessary or advantageous to the commonwealth the present is not the time to inquire; all I have undertaken to show is that the name of dictator was rendered odious and terrible because of them. This is wont to be the case, not only with positions of power, but also with the other advantages which are eagerly contended for and admired in everyday life. For they all appear noble and profitable to those who hold them when they are used nobly, but base and unprofitable when they find unprincipled champions. For this result Nature is responsible, which to all good things has attached some congenital evils. But another occasion may be more suitable for discussing this subject.
BOOK VI
[1.1] Aulus Sempronius Atratinus and Marcus Minucius, who assumed the consulship the following year, in the seventy-first Olympiad (the one in which Tisicrates of Croton won the foot-race), Hipparchus being archon at Athens, performed no action either of a military or administrative nature worthy of the notice of history during their term of office, since the truce with the Latins gave them ample respite from foreign wars, and the injunction decreed by the senate against the exaction of debts till the war that was expected should be safely terminated, quieted the disturbances raised in the city by the poor, who desired to be discharged of their debts by a public act; [2] but they caused the senate to pass a most reasonable decree which provided that any women of Roman birth who were married to Romans should have full power to decide for themselves whether they preferred to stay with their husbands or to return to their own cities, and also provided that the male children should remain with their fathers and the female and unmarried should follow their mothers. For it happened that a great many women, by reason of the kinship and friendship existing between the two nations, had been given in marriage each into the other’s state. The women, having this liberty granted to them by the decree of the senate, showed how great was their desire to live at Rome; [3] for almost all the Roman women who lived in the Latin cities left their husbands and returned to their fathers, and all the Latin women who were married to Romans, except two, scorned their native countries and stayed with their husbands — a happy omen foretelling which of the two nations was to be victorious in the war.
[4] Under these consuls, they say, the temple was dedicated to Saturn upon the ascent leading from the Forum to the Capitol, and annual festivals and sacrifices were appointed to be celebrated in honour of the god at the public expense. Before this, they say, an altar built by Hercules was established there, upon which the persons who had received the holy rites from him offered the first-fruits as burnt-offerings according to the customs of the Greeks. Some historians state that the credit for beginning this temple was given to Titus Larcius, the consul of the previous year, others, that it was even given to King Tarquinius — the one who was driven from the throne — and that the dedication fell to Postumus Cominius pursuant to a decree of the senate. These consuls, then, had the opportunity, as I said, of enjoying a profound peace.
[2.1] They were succeeded in the consulship by Aulus Postumius and Titus Verginius, under whom the year’s truce with the Latins expired; and great preparations for the war were made by both nations. On the Roman side the whole population entered upon the struggle voluntarily and with great enthusiasm; but the greater part of the Latins were lacking in enthusiasm and acted under compulsion, the powerful men in the cities having been almost all corrupted with bribes and promises by Tarquinius and Mamilius, while those among the common people who were not in favour of the war were excluded from a share in the public counsels; for permission to speak was no longer granted to all who desired it. [2] Indeed, many, resenting this treatment, were constrained to leave their cities and desert to the Romans; for the men who had got the cities in their power did not choose to stop them, but thought themselves much obliged to their adversaries for submitting to a voluntary banishment. These the Romans received, and such of them as came with their wives and children they employed in military services inside the walls, incorporating them in the centuries of citizens, and the rest they sent out to the fortresses near the city or distributed among their colonies, keeping them under guard, so that they should create no disturbance. [3] And since all men had come to the same conclusion, that the situation once more called for a single magistrate free to deal with all matters according to his own judgment and subject to no accounting for his actions, Aulus Postumius, the younger of the consuls, was appointed dictator by his colleague Verginius, and following the example of the former dictator, chose his own Master of the Horse, naming Titus Aebutius Elva. And having in a short time enlisted all the Romans who were of military age, he divided his army into four parts, one of which he himself commanded, while he gave another to his colleague Verginius, the third to Aebutius, the Master of the Horse, and left the command of the fourth to Aulus Sempronius, whom he appointed to guard the city.
[3.1] After the dictator had prepared everything that was necessary for the war, his scouts brought him word that the Latins had taken the field with all their forces; and others in turn informed him that they had captured by storm a strong place called Corbio, in which there was stationed a small garrison of the Romans. The garrison they wiped out completely, and the place itself, now that they had gained possession of it, they were making a base for the war. They were not capturing any slaves or cattle in the country districts, except those taken at Corbio, since the husbandmen had long before removed into the nearest fortresses everything that they could drive or carry away; but they were setting fire to the houses that had been abandoned and laying waste the country. [2] After the Latins had already taken the field, an army of responsible size came to them from Antium, the most important city of the Volscian nation, with arms, grain, and everything else that was necessary for carrying on the war. Greatly heartened by this, they were in excellent hopes that the other Volscians would join them in the war, now that the city of Antium had set the example. [3] Postumius, being informed of all this, set out hastily to the rescue before all the enemy’s f
orces could assemble; and having led his army out by a forced march in the night, he arrived near the Latins, who lay encamped in a strong position near the lake called Regillus, and pitched his camp above them on a hill that was high and difficult of access, where, if he remained, he was sure to have many advantages over them.
[4.1] The generals of the Latins, Octavius of Tusculum, the son-in-law or, as some state, the son of the son-in-law of King Tarquinius, and Sextus Tarquinius — for they happened at that time to be encamped separately — joined their forces, and assembling the tribunes and centurions, they considered with them in what manner they should carry on the war; and many opinions were expressed. [2] Some thought they ought to charge the troops under the dictator which had occupied the hill, while they could still inspire them with fear; for they regarded their occupation of the strong positions as a sign, not of assurance, but of cowardice. Others thought they ought to surround the camp of the Romans with a ditch, and keeping them hemmed in by means of a small guard, march with the rest of the army to Rome, which they believed might easily be captured now that the best of its youth had taken the field. Still others advised them to await the reinforcements from both the Volscians and their other allies, choosing safe measures in preference to bold; for the Romans, they say, would reap no benefit from the delay, whereas their own situation would be improved by it. [3] While they were still debating, the other consul, Titus Verginius, suddenly arrived from Rome with his army, after making the march during the very next night, and encamped apart from the dictator upon another ridge that was exceeding craggy and strongly situated. Thus the Latins were cut off on both sides from the roads leading into the enemy’s country, the consul encamping on the left-hand side and the dictator on the right. This still further increased the confusion of their commanders, who had chosen safety in preference to every other consideration, and also their fear that by delaying they should be forced to use up their supplies of food, which were not plentiful. When Postumius observed the inexperience of these commanders, he sent the Master of the Horse, Titus Aebutius, with the flower both of the horse and light-armed troops with orders to occupy a hill which lay close beside the road by which provisions were brought to the Latins from home; and before the enemy was aware of it, the forces sent with the Master of the Horse passed by their camp in the night, and marching through a pathless wood, gained possession of the hill.
[5] The generals of the enemy, finding that the strong places which lay in their rear were also being occupied, and no longer feeling any confident hopes that even their provisions from home would get through to them safely, resolved to drive the Romans from the hill before they could fortify it with a palisade and ditch. [2] And Sextus, one of the two generals, taking the horse with him, rode up to them full speed in the expectation that the Roman horse would not await his attack. But when these bravely withstood their charge, he maintained the fight for some time, alternately retiring and renewing the attack; and then, since the nature of the ground offered great advantages to those who were already in possession of the heights, while bringing to those who attacked from below nothing but many blows and ineffectual hardships, and since, moreover, a fresh force of chosen legionaries, sent by Postumius to follow close upon the heels of the first detachment, came to the assistance of the Romans, he found himself unable to accomplish anything further and led the horse back to the camp; and the Romans, now secure in the possession of the place, openly strengthened the garrison there. [3] After this action Mamilius and Sextus determined not to let much time intervene, but to decide the issue by an early battle. The Roman dictator, who at first had not been of this mind, but had hoped to end the war without a battle, founding his hopes of doing so chiefly on the inexperience of the opposing generals, now resolved to engage. For some couriers had been captured by the horse that patrolled the roads, bearing letters from the Volscians to the Latin generals to inform them that numerous forces would come to their assistance in about two days, and still other forces from the Hernicans. [4] These were the considerations that reduced their commanders to an immediate necessity of fighting, though until then they had not been of this mind. After the signals for battle had been raised on both sides, the two armies advanced into the space between their camps and drew up in the following manner: Sextus Tarquinius was posted on the left wing of the Latins and Octavius Mamilius on the right; Titus, the other son of Tarquinius, held the centre, where also the Roman deserters and exiles were posted. And, all their horse being divided into three bodies, two of these were placed on the wings and one in the centre of the battle-line. [5] The left of the Roman army was commanded by Titus Aebutius, the Master of the Horse, who stood opposite to Octavius Mamilius; the right by Titus Verginius, the consul, facing Sextus Tarquinius; the centre of the line was commanded by the dictator Postumius in person, who proposed to encounter Titus Tarquinius and the exiles with him. The number of the forces of each army which drew up for battle was: on the side of the Romans 23,700 foot and 1000 horse, and on that of the Latins and their allies about 40,000 foot and 3000 horse.
[6.1] When they were on the point of engaging, the Latin generals called their men together and said many things calculated to incite them to valour, and addressed long appeals to the soldiers. And the Roman dictator, seeing his troops alarmed because they were going to encounter an army greatly superior in number to their own, and desiring to dispel that fear from their minds, called them to an assembly, and placing near him the oldest and most honoured members of the senate, addressed them as follows:
[2] “The gods by omens, sacrifices, and other auguries promise to grant to our commonwealth liberty and a happy victory, both by way of rewarding us for the piety we have shown toward them and the justice we have practised during the whole course of our lives, and also from resentment, we may reasonably suppose, against our enemies. For these, after having received many great benefits from us, being both our kinsmen and friends, and after having sworn to look upon all our enemies and friends as their own, have scorned all these obligations and are bringing an unjust war upon us, not for the sake of supremacy and dominion, to determine which of us ought more rightly to possess it, — that, indeed, would not be so terrible, — but in support of the tyranny of the Tarquinii, in order to make our commonwealth enslaved once more instead of free. [3] But it is necessary that you too, both officers and men, knowing that you have for allies the gods, who have always preserved our city, should acquit yourselves as brave men in this battle, remembering that the assistance of the gods is given to those who fight nobly and eagerly contribute everything in their power toward victory, not to those who fly from dangers, but to those who are willing to undergo hardships in their own behalf. We have many other advantages conducive to victory prepared for us by Fortune, but three in particular, which are the greatest and the most obvious of all.
[7.1] “First, there is the confidence you have in one another, which is the thing most needed by men who are going to conquer their foes; for you do not need to begin to-day to be firm friends and faithful allies to one another, but your country has long since prepared this boon for you all. For you have been brought up together and have received the same education; you were wont to sacrifice to the gods upon the same altars; and you have both enjoyed many advantages and experienced many evils in common, by the sharing of which strong and indissoluble friendships are wont to be formed among all men. [2] Secondly, the struggle, in which your highest interests are at stake, is common to you all alike. For if you fall into the enemy’s power it will not mean that some of you will meet with no severity while others suffer the worst of fates, but all of you alike will have lost your proud position, your sovereignty and your liberty, and will no longer have the enjoyment of your wives, your children, your property, or any other blessing you now have; and those who are at the head of the commonwealth and direct the public affairs will die the most miserable death accompanied by indignities and tortures. [3] For if your enemies, though they have received no injury, gre
at or small, at your hands, have heaped many outrages of every sort upon all of you, what must you expect them to do if they now conquer you by arms, resentful as they are because you drove them from the city, deprived them of their property, and do not permit them even to set foot upon the land of their fathers? [4] And finally, of the advantages I have mentioned you cannot, if you consider the matter aright, call this one inferior to any other — that the forces of the enemy have not proved to be so formidable as we conceived them to be, but are far short of the opinion we entertained of them. For, with the exception of the support furnished by the Antiates, you see no other allies present to take part with them in the war; whereas we were expecting that all the Volscians and many of the Sabines and Hernicans would come to them as allies, and were conjuring up in our minds a thousand other vain fears. [5] But all these things, it appears, were only dreams of the Latins, holding out empty promises and futile hopes. For some of their allies have failed to send the promised aid, out of contempt for the inexperience of their generals; others, instead of assisting them, will keep delaying, wearing away the time by merely fostering their hopes; and those who are now engaged in making their preparations will arrive too late for the battle and will be of no further use to them.
Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79) Page 50