Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79)

by Dionysius of Halicarnassus

  [4] τούτους ἰδόντες οἱ Σαβῖνοι καὶ γνωρίσαντες ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν σημείων ἐξέστησαν τῶν λογισμῶν καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ῥίψαντες ἐπειρῶντο σώζειν ἑαυτούς. ἦν δ᾽ ἄπορος ἡ σωτηρία τοῖς πολλοῖς περιεχομένοις κύκλῳ ὑπ᾽ ἐχθρῶν, καὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἡ ἵππος ἐπικειμένη πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἀπέκλειεν: ὥστ᾽ ὀλίγοι μέν τινες ἔφθησαν τὰ δεινὰ ὑπεκδύντες, οἱ δὲ πλείους κατεκόπησαν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἢ παρέδοσαν ἑαυτούς. ἀντέσχον δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ οἱ καταλειφθέντες ἐπὶ τοῦ χάρακος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔρυμα ἑάλω τῇ πρώτῃ ἐφόδῳ: ἔνθα σὺν τοῖς ἰδίοις τῶν Σαβίνων χρήμασι καὶ τὰ Ῥωμαίων ἅπαντα σὺν πολλοῖς αἰχμαλώτοις ἔτι ἀκέραια ὄντα τοῖς ἀπολωλεκόσιν ἀνεσώθη.

  [4] The Sabines, upon seeing them and recognizing them by their arms and their standards, were upset in their calculations, and throwing away their arms, sought to save themselves by flight. But escape was impossible for most of them, surrounded as they were by enemies, and the Roman horse, pressing upon them from all sides, hemmed them in; so that only a few were prompt enough to escape disaster, but the greater part were either cut down by the enemy or surrendered. Nor was there any resistance made even by those who were left in the camp, but this was taken at the first onset; and there, besides the Sabines’ own effects, all the possessions that had been stolen from the Romans, together with many captives, were recovered still uninjured and were restored to those who had lost them.

  [1] ὡς δ᾽ ἡ πρώτη πεῖρα τῷ Ταρκυνίῳ κατὰ νοῦν ἐχώρησεν, ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν ἧκεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν Φιδήνῃ ἐστρατοπεδευκότας τῶν Σαβίνων, οἷς οὔπω δῆλος ἦν ὁ τῶν σφετέρων ὄλεθρος. ἔτυχον δὲ κἀκεῖνοι προεξεληλυθότες ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος καὶ ἤδη ὄντες ἐν ὁδῷ: ὡς δὴ πλησίον ἐγένοντο καὶ εἶδον ἐπὶ δορατίων ἀναπεπηγυίας τὰς κεφαλὰς τῶν σφετέρων ἡγεμόνων: [p. 90] προὔτεινον γὰρ αὐτὰς οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι καταπλήξεως τῶν πολεμίων ἕνεκα: μαθόντες, ὅτι διέφθαρται τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν στράτευμα, οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεδείξαντο γενναῖον ἔργον, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἱκεσίας καὶ δεήσεις τραπόμενοι παρέδοσαν 17 ἑαυτούς.

  [52.1] After Tarquinius had succeeded in his first attempt he marched with his forces against the rest of the Sabines who were encamped near Fidenae and were not yet aware of the destruction of their companions. It happened that these also had set out from their camp and were already on the march when, coming near to the Roman army, they saw the heads of their commanders fixed upon pikes (for the Romans held them forward in order to strike the enemy with terror), and learning thus that their other army had been destroyed, they no longer performed any deed of bravery, but turning to supplications and entreaties, they surrendered.

  [2] οὕτω δ᾽ αἰσχρῶς καὶ κακῶς ἀμφοτέρων τῶν στρατοπέδων ἀναρπασθέντων εἰς στενὰς ἐλπίδας οἱ Σαβῖνοι κατακεκλεισμένοι καὶ περὶ τῶν πόλεων, μὴ ἐξ ἐφόδου καταληφθῶσι, δεδιότες ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης διεπρεσβεύοντο παραδιδόντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὑπηκόους εἶναι Ταρκυνίου καὶ φόρου τὸ λοιπὸν ὑποτελεῖς. σπεισάμενος δὴ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐταῖς συνθήκαις παραλαβὼν τὰς πόλεις ἐπὶ Σύεσσαν ᾤχετο. ἐκεῖθεν δὲ τήν τε καταλειφθεῖσαν δύναμιν καὶ τὰ λάφυρα καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀποσκευὴν ἀναλαβὼν εἰς 18 Ῥώμην ἀπῄει πλουτοῦσαν τὴν στρατιὰν ἀπάγων.

  [2] The Sabines, having had both their armies snatched away in so shameful and disgraceful a manner, were reduced to slender hopes, and fearing that their cities would be taken by assault, they sent ambassadors to treat for peace, offering to surrender, become subjects of Tarquinius, and pay tribute for the future. He accordingly made peace with them and received the submission of their cities upon the same terms, and then returned to Suessa. Thence he marched with the forces he had left there, the spoils he had taken, and the rest of his baggage, to Rome, bringing back his army loaded with riches.

  [3] ἐποιήσατο δὲ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πολλὰς ἐξόδους ἐπὶ τὴν Οὐολούσκων χώραν τοτὲ μὲν ἁπάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει, τότε δὲ μέρει τινί, καὶ λείας πολλῆς ἐγένετο κύριος. ἤδη δὲ τῶν πλείστων αὐτῷ κατὰ νοῦν χωρούντων πόλεμος ἐκ τῶν ὁμόρων ἀνέστη χρόνῳ τε μακρός: ἔτη γὰρ ἑπτὰ συνεχῶς ἐπολεμήθη: καὶ παθήμασι χαλεποῖς καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτοις μέγας. ἀφ᾽ ὧν δ᾽ αἰτιῶν ἤρξατο καὶ [p. 91] τελευτῆς ὁποίας ἔτυχεν, ἐπειδὴ δολίῳ τ᾽ ἀπάτῃ καὶ στρατηγήματι παραδόξῳ κατειργάσθη, δι᾽ ὀλίγων ἐρῶ.

  [3] After that he also made many incursions into the country of the Volscians, sometimes with his whole army and sometimes with part of it, and captured much booty. But when now most of his undertakings were succeeding according to his wish, a war broke out on the part of his neighbours which proved not only of long duration (for it lasted seven years without intermission) but also important because of the severe and unexpected misfortunes with which it was attended. I will relate briefly from what causes it sprang and how it ended, since it was brought to a conclusion by a clever ruse and a novel stratagem.

  [1] πόλις ἦν ἐκ τοῦ Λατίνων γένους Ἀλβανῶν ἀπόκτισις ἀπέχουσα τῆς Ῥώμης σταδίους ἑκατὸν ἐπὶ τῆς εἰς Πραίνεστον φερούσης ὁδοῦ κειμένη: Γαβίους αὐτὴν ἐκάλουν: νῦν μὲν οὐκέτι συνοικουμένη πᾶσα, πλὴν ὅσα μέρη πανδοκεύεται κατὰ τὴν δίοδον, τότε δὲ πολυάνθρωπος εἰ καί τις ἄλλη καὶ μεγάλη. τεκμήραιτο δ̓ἄν τις αὐτῆς τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν ἐρείπια θεασάμενος οἰκιῶν πολλαχῇ καὶ τείχους κύκλον,

  [53.1] There was a city of the Latins, which had been founded by the Albans, distant one hundred stades from Rome and standing upon the road that leads to Praeneste. The name of this city was Gabii. To-day not all parts of it are still inhabited, but only those that lie next the highway and are given up to inns; but at that time it was as large and populous as any city. One may judge both of its extent and importance by observing the ruins of the buildings in many places and the circuit of the wall, most parts of which are still standing.

  [2] ἔτι γὰρ ἕστηκεν αὐτοῦ τὰ πλεῖστα. εἰς ταύτην συνερρύησαν Πωμεντίνων τε τῶν ἐκ Συέσσης διαφυγόντων τινές, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν Ταρκύνιος κατελάβετο, καὶ τῶν ἐκ Ῥώμης φυγάδων συχνοί: οὗτοι δεόμενοι καὶ λιπαροῦντες τιμωρῆσαί σφισι τοὺς Γαβίους καὶ πολλὰς ὑπισχνούμενοι δωρεάς, εἰ κατέλθοιεν ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτε�
�α, τήν τε κατάλυσιν τοῦ τυράννου δυνατὴν ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ ῥᾳδίαν, ὡς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει συλληψομένων, ἔπεισαν αὐτοὺς συμπροθυμηθέντων καὶ Οὐολούσκων: ἐπρεσβεύσαντο γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι δεόμενοι συμμαχίας: τὸν κατὰ τοῦ Ταρκυνίου πόλεμον ἀναλαβεῖν.

  [2] To this city had flocked some of the Pometini who had escaped from Suessa when Tarquinius took their town and many of the banished Romans. These, by begging and imploring the Gabini to avenge the injuries they had received and by promising great rewards if they should be restored to their own possessions, and also by showing the overthrow of the tyrant to be not only possible but easy, since the people in Rome too would aid them, prevailed upon them, with the encouragement of the Volscians (for these also had sent ambassadors to them and desired their alliance) to make war upon Tarquinius.

  [3] ἐγίνοντο δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα μεγάλοις στρατεύμασιν εἰς τὴν ἀλλήλων γῆν εἰσβολαὶ καὶ καταδρομαὶ μάχαι τε, ὅπερ εἰκός, τοτὲ μὲν ὀλίγοις πρὸς ὀλίγους, τοτὲ δὲ πᾶσι πρὸς πάντας, ἐν αἷς πολλάκις μὲν οἱ Γάβιοι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους τρεψάμενοι μέχρι τῶν τειχῶν [p. 92] καὶ πολλοὺς καταβαλόντες ἀδεῶς τὴν χώραν ἐπόρθουν, πολλάκις δ᾽ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τοὺς Γαβίους ὠσάμενοι καὶ κατακλείσαντες εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀνδράποδα καὶ λείαν αὐτῶν πολλὴν ἀπῆγον.

  [3] After this both the Gabini and the Romans made incursions into and laid waste one another’s territories with large armies and, as was to be expected, engaged in battles, now with small numbers on each side and now with all their forces. In these actions the Gabini often put the Romans to flight and pursuing them up to their walls, slew many and ravaged their country with impunity; and often the Romans drove the Gabini back and shutting them up within their city, carried off their slaves together with much booty.

  [1] συνεχῶς δὲ τούτων γινομένων ἠναγκάζοντο ἀμφότεροι τῆς χώρας ὅσα ἦν ἐρυμνὰ τειχίζοντες φρουρὰν ἐν αὐτοῖς καθιστάναι καταφυγῆς τῶν γεωργῶν ἕνεκα: ὅθεν ὁρμώμενοι τά τε λῃστήρια, καὶ εἴ τι ἀποσπασθὲν ἴδοιεν μέρος ὀλίγον ἀπὸ πολλοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ οἷα εἰκὸς ἐν προνομαῖς ἀσύντακτον διὰ καταφρόνησιν, κατιόντες ἀθρόοι διέφθειρον: καὶ τῶν πόλεων ὅσα ἦν ἐπίμαχα καὶ ῥᾴδια ληφθῆναι διὰ κλιμάκων ἐξοικοδομεῖν τε καὶ ἀποταφρεύειν δεδοικότες τὰς αἰφνιδίους ἀλλήλων ἐφόδους.

  [54.1] As these things happened continually, both of them were obliged to fortify the strongholds in their territories and to garrison them so that they might serve as places of refuge for the husbandmen; and sallying out from these strongholds in a body, they would fall upon and destroy bands of robbers and any small groups they might discover that had been detached from a large army and, as would naturally be expected in forages, were observing no order, through contempt of the enemy. And they both were obliged in their fear of the sudden assaults of the other to raise the walls and dig ditches around those parts of their cities that were vulnerable and could easily be taken by means of scaling-ladders.

  [2] μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὁ Ταρκύνιος περὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐνεργὸς ἦν καὶ τῆς πόλεως τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Γαβίους φέροντα τοῦ περιβόλου διὰ πολυχειρίας ἐξωχυροῦτο τάφρον ὀρυξάμενος εὐρυτέραν καὶ τεῖχος ἐγείρας ὑψηλότερον καὶ πύργοις διαλαβὼν τὸ χωρίον πυκνοτέροις: κατὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδόκει μάλιστα τὸ μέρος ἡ πόλις ἀνώχυρος εἶναι, πάντα τὸν ἄλλον περίβολον ἀσφαλὴς ἐπιεικῶς οὖσα καὶ δυσπρόσιτος.

  [2] Tarquinius was particularly active in taking these precautions and employed a large number of workmen in strengthening those parts of the city walls that looked toward Gabii by widening the ditch, raising the walls, and placing the towers at shorter intervals; for on this side the city seemed to be the weakest, the rest of the circuit being tolerably secure and difficult of approach.

  [3] ἔμελλε δ᾽, ὃ πάσαις φιλεῖ συμβαίνειν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐν τοῖς μακροῖς πολέμοις δῃουμένης διὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς τῶν πολεμίων εἰσβολὰς τῆς γῆς καὶ μηκέτι τοὺς καρποὺς ἐκφερούσης, [p. 93] σπάνις ἁπάσης τροφῆς ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ἔσεσθαι καὶ δεινὴ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀθυμία: κάκιον δὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐπίεζεν ἢ τοὺς Γαβίους ἡ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔνδεια, καὶ οἱ πενέστατοι αὐτῶν μάλιστα κάμνοντες ὁμολογίας ᾤοντο δεῖν ποιήσασθαι πρὸς τοὺς Γαβίους καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἂν ἐκεῖνοι θέλωσι διαλύσασθαι.

  [3] But, as is apt to happen to all cities in the course of long wars, when the country is laid waste by the continual incursions of the enemy and no longer produces its fruits, both were bound to experience a dearth of all provisions and to feel terrible discouragement regarding the future; but the want of necessaries was felt more keenly by the Romans than by the Gabini and the poorest among them, who suffered most, thought a treaty ought to be made with the enemy and an end put to the war upon any terms they might grant.

  [1] ἀδημονοῦντος δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι τοῦ Ταρκυνίου καὶ οὔτε διαλύσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον αἰσχρῶς ὑπομένοντος οὔτ᾽ ἀντέχειν ἔτι δυναμένου, πάσας δὲ πείρας ἐπιτεχνωμένου καὶ δόλους παντοδαποὺς συντιθέντος, ὁ πρεσβύτατος αὐτοῦ τῶν υἱῶν Σέξτος ὄνομα κοινωσάμενος τὴν γνώμην τῷ πατρὶ μόνῳ καὶ δόξας τολμηρῷ μὲν ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγματι καὶ μέγαν ἔχοντι κίνδυνον, οὐ μὴν ἀδυνάτῳ γε, συγχωρήσαντος τοῦ πατρὸς ποιεῖν ὅσα βούλεται, σκήπτεται διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα περὶ τῆς καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου:

  [55.1] While Tarquinius was dismayed at the situation and neither willing to end the war upon dishonourable terms nor able to headland out any longer, but was contriving all sorts of schemes and devising ruses of every kind, the eldest of his sons, Sextus by name, privately communicated to him his own plan; and when Tarquinius, who thought the enterprise bold and full of danger, yet not impossible after all, had given him leave to act as he thought fit, he pretended to be at odds with his father about putting an end to the war.

  [2] μαστιγωθεὶς δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ῥάβδοις ἐν ἀγορᾷ καὶ τἆλλα περιυβρισθείς, ὥστε περιβόητον γενέσθαι τὸ πρᾶγμα, πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἑταίρων τοὺς πιστοτάτους ἔπεμπεν ὡς αὐτομόλους φράσοντας τοῖς Γαβίοις δι᾽ ἀπορρήτων, ὅτι πολεμεῖν τῷ πατρὶ διέγνωκεν ὡς αὐτοὺς ἀφικόμενος, εἰ λάβοι πίστεις, ὅτι φυλάξουσιν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐκ Ῥώμης φυγάδας καὶ οὐκ ἐκδώσουσ
ι τῷ πατρὶ τὰς ἰδίας ἔχθρας ἐλπίσαντες ἐπὶ τῷ

  [2] Then, after being scourged with rods in the Forum by his father’s order and receiving other indignities, so that the affair became noised abroad, he first sent some of his most intimate friends as deserters to inform the Gabini secretly that he had resolved to betake himself to them and make war against his father, provided he should receive pledges that they would protect him as well as the rest of the Roman fugitives and not deliver him up to his father in the hope of settling their private enmities to their own advantage.

  [3] σφετέρῳ συμφέροντι διαλύσεσθαι. ἀσμένως δὲ τῶν Γαβίων τὸν λόγον ἀκουσάντων καὶ μηδὲν εἰς αὐτὸν παρανομήσειν διομολογησαμένων παρῆν ἑταίρους τε [p. 94] πολλοὺς καὶ πελάτας ἐπαγόμενος ὡς αὐτόμολος καὶ ἵνα δὴ μᾶλλον αὐτῷ πιστεύσειαν ἀληθεύειν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπόστασιν, ἀργύριόν τε καὶ χρυσίον πολὺ κομίζων: ἐπισυνέρρεόν τ᾽ αὐτῷ πολλοὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως φεύγειν τὴν τυραννίδα σκηπτόμενοι,

  [3] When the Gabini listened to this proposal gladly and agreed not to do him any wrong, he went over to them as a deserter, taking with him many of his friends and clients, and also, in order to increase their belief in the genuineness of his revolt from his father, carrying along a great deal of silver and gold. And many flocked to him afterwards from Rome, pretending to flee from the tyranny of Tarquinius, so that he now had a strong body of men about him.