Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79)

by Dionysius of Halicarnassus

  [1] αὗται μὲν αἱ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσαι γνῶμαι ἐλέχθησαν, ἕτεραι δέ τινες αἱ τὴν μεταξὺ τούτων ἔχουσαι χώραν συχναί. οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς μόνον ἀφεῖσθαι τῶν χρεῶν τοὺς μηδὲν κεκτημένους ἠξίουν, τὰ χρήματα ποιοῦντες ἀγώγιμα τοῖς δανεισταῖς, οὐ τὰ σώματα: οἱ δὲ τὸ δημόσιον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδυνάτων διαλῦσαι τὰ συμβόλαια συνεβούλευον, ἵνα ἥ τε πίστις τῶν πενήτων ὑπὸ τῆς δημοσίας φυλαχθῇ χάριτος καὶ οἱ συμβεβληκότες αὐτοῖς μηθὲν ἀδικηθῶσιν. ἐδόκει δέ τισι καὶ τῶν ἤδη κατεχομένων [p. 245] πρὸς τὰ χρέα καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἀφαιρεθήσεσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ῥύσασθαι τὰ σώματα, ἐκ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ἕτερα τοῖς δανεισταῖς διαμειψαμένους ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν σώματα.

  [69.1] These were the extreme opinions delivered upon that occasion, but there were many which took the middle ground between the two. For some of the senators favoured remitting the debts of those only who had nothing, permitting the money-lenders to seize the goods of the debtors, but not their persons. Others advised that the public treasury should discharge the obligations of the insolvents, in order both that the credit of the poor might be preserved by this public favour and their creditors might suffer no injustice. Certain others thought that they ought to ransom the persons of those who were already being held for debt or were going to be deprived of their liberty, by substituting captives in their stead and assigning these to their creditors.

  [2] τοιούτων δέ τινων λεχθέντων ἡ νικῶσα ἦν γνώμη, μηθὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι γενέσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν προβούλευμα: ὅταν δὲ τὸ κράτιστον τέλος οἱ πόλεμοι λάβωσι, τότε προθεῖναι τοὺς ὑπάτους λόγον καὶ ψῆφον ἀναδοῦναι τοῖς συνέδροις: τέως δὲ μηδεμίαν εἴσπραξιν εἶναι μήτε συμβολαίου μηθενὸς μήτε καταδίκης μηδεμιᾶς, ἀφεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀμφισβητήσεις πάσας, καὶ μήτε τὰ δικαστήρια καθίζειν μήτε τὰς ἀρχὰς διαγινώσκειν περὶ μηθενὸς ἔξω τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀνηκόντων.

  [2] After various views such as these had been expressed, the opinion that prevailed was that they should pass no decree for the time being concerning these matters, but that after the wars were ended in the most satisfactory manner, the consuls should then bring them up for discussion and take the votes of the senators; and that in the meantime there should be no money exacted by virtue of either any contract or any judgment, that all other suits should be dropped, and that neither the courts of justice should sit nor the magistrates take cognizance of anything but what related to the war.

  [3] τοῦτο τὸ προβούλευμα εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἐξενεχθὲν ἐμείωσε μέν τι τῆς πολιτικῆς ταραχῆς, οὐ μὴν ἅπαν γε τὸ στασιάζον ἐξεῖλεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. ἦσαν γάρ τινες ἐκ τοῦ θητικοῦ πλήθους, οἷς οὐκ ἐφαίνετο ἀποχρῶσα εἶναι βοήθεια ἡ παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἐλπὶς φανερὸν οὐδὲ βέβαιον ἔχουσα οὐδέν: ἀλλὰ δυεῖν θάτερον αὐτὴν ἠξίουν ποιεῖν, ἢ διδόναι σφίσιν ἤδη τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν χρεῶν, εἰ βούλεται κοινωνοὺς τῶν κινδύνων ἔχειν, ἢ μὴ φενακίζειν εἰς ἑτέρους ἀναβαλλομένην χρόνους: οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίας εἶναι τὰς διανοίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων δεομένων τε καὶ ἀποπληρωθέντων, ὅτου ἂν δεηθῶσιν.

  [3] When this decree was brought to the people, it allayed in some measure the civil commotion, yet it did not entirely remove the spirit of sedition from the state. For some of the labouring class did not look upon the hope held out by the senate, which contained nothing express or certain, as a sufficient relief; but they demanded that the senate should do one of two things, either grant them the remission of debts immediately, if it wanted to have them as partners in the dangers of the war, or not delude them by deferring it to another occasion. For men’s sentiments, they said, were very different when they were making requests and after their requests had been satisfied.

  [1] ἐν τοιαύτῃ δὴ καταστάσει τῶν κοινῶν ὑπαρχόντων σκοποῦσα ἡ βουλή, δι᾽ οὗ μάλιστα διαπράξεται τρόπου μηθὲν ἔτι νεωτερίσαι τοὺς δημοτικούς, ἔκρινε [p. 246] τὴν μὲν ὑπατικὴν ἐξουσίαν ἀνελεῖν κατὰ τὸ παρόν, ἑτέραν δέ τινα ἀρχὴν ἀποδεῖξαι πολέμου τε καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ παντὸς ἄλλου πράγματος κυρίαν, αὐτοκράτορα καὶ ἀνυπεύθυνον, ὧν ἂν βουλεύσηται καὶ πράξῃ.

  [70.1] While the public affairs were in this condition, the senate, considering by what means it could most effectually prevent the plebeians from creating any fresh disturbances, resolved to abolish the consular power for the time being and to create some other magistracy with full authority over war and peace and every other matter, possessed of absolute power and subject to no accounting for either its counsels or its actions.

  [2] χρόνου δ᾽ εἶναι μέτρον τῇ νέᾳ ἀρχῇ μῆνας ἕξ, μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἑξάμηνον αὖθις ἄρχειν τοὺς ὑπάτους. τὰ δ᾽ ἀναγκάσαντα αὐτὴν ἐπὶ τῷ καταλῦσαι τὸ τυραννικὸν πόλεμον αὐθαίρετον ὑπομεῖναι τυραννίδα πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα ἦν, ὑπὲρ ἅπαντα δ᾽ ὁ κυρωθεὶς ὑφ᾽ ἑνὸς τῶν ὑπάτων Ποπλίου Οὐαλερίου τοῦ κληθέντος Ποπλικόλα νόμος, ὑπὲρ οὗ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἔφην, ὅτι τὰς τῶν ὑπάτων γνώμας ἀκύρους ἐποίησε, μὴ τιμωρεῖσθαι Ῥωμαίων τινὰ πρὸ δίκης, ἐπιτρέψας τοῖς ἀγομένοις ἐπὶ τὰς κολάσεις ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν προκαλεῖσθαι τὴν διάγνωσιν ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον, καὶ τέως ἂν ἡ πληθὺς ἐνέγκῃ ψῆφον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν σώμασί τε καὶ βίοις τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχειν: τὸν δὲ παρὰ ταῦτά τι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντα νηποινὶ τεθνάναι κελεύων.

  [2] The term of this new magistracy was to be limited to six months, after the expiration of which time the consuls were again to govern. The reasons that compelled the senate to submit to a voluntary tyranny in order to put an end to the war brought upon them by their tyrant were many and various, but the chief one was the law introduced by the consul Publius Valerius, called Publicola (concerning which I stated in the beginning that it rendered invalid the decisions of the consuls), providing that no Roman should be punished before he was tried, and granting to any who were haled to punishment by their orders the right to appeal from their decision to the people, and until the people had given their vote concerning them, the right to enjoy security for both their persons and their fortunes; and it ordained that if any person attempted to do anything contrary to these provisions he might be put to death with impunity.

  [3] ἐλογίζετο δὴ μένοντος μὲν κυρίου τοῦ νόμου τοῦδε μηθὲν ὑπηρετήσειν ἀναγκαζομένους ταῖς ἀρχαῖς τοὺς πένητ�
�ς καταφρονοῦντας ὡς εἰκὸς τῶν τιμωριῶν, ἃς οὐ παραχρῆμα ὑφέξειν ἔμελλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ὁ δῆμος αὐτῶν καταψηφίσηται, ἀναιρεθέντος δ᾽ αὐτοῦ κατὰ πολλὴν ἀνάγκην τὰ κελευόμενα ποιήσειν ἅπαντας. ἵνα δὲ μηθὲν ἐναντιωθεῖεν οἱ πένητες, εἴ τις αὐτὸν καταλύοι τὸν νόμον ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ, τὴν ἰσοτύραννον ἀρχὴν ἔκρινεν ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα παραγαγεῖν, [p. 247] ἣ πάντας ἔμελλεν ἕξειν ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῇ τοὺς νόμους.

  [3] The senate reasoned that while this law remained in force the poor could not be compelled to obey the magistrates, because, as it was reasonable to suppose, they would scorn the punishments which they were to undergo, not immediately, but only after they had been condemned by the people, whereas, when this law had been repealed, all would be under the greatest necessity of obeying orders. And to the end that the poor might offer no opposition, in case an open attempt were made to repeal the law itself, the senate resolved to introduce into the government a magistracy of equal power with a tyranny, which should be superior to all the laws.

  [4] καὶ γράφει προβούλευμα, δι᾽ οὗ παρακρουσαμένη τοὺς πένητας καὶ τὸν βεβαιοῦντα τὴν ἐλευθερίαν αὐτοῖς νόμον ἀνελοῦσα ἔλαθεν. ἦν δὲ τὸ προβούλευμα τοιόνδε: Λάρκιον μὲν καὶ Κλοίλιον τοὺς τότε ὑπατεύοντας ἀποθέσθαι τὴν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἀρχήν τινα εἶχεν ἢ πραγμάτων τινῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν: ἕνα δ᾽ ἄνδρα, ὃν ἂν ἥ τε βουλὴ προέληται καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἐπιψηφίσῃ, τὴν ἁπάντων ἐξουσίαν παραλαβόντα ἄρχειν μὴ πλείονα χρόνον ἑξαμήνου, κρείττονα ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντα τῶν ὑπάτων.

  [4] And they passed a decree by which they deceived the poor and, without being detected, repealed the law that secured their liberty. The decree was to this effect; that Larcius and Cloelius, who were the consuls at the time, should resign their power, and likewise any other person who held a magistracy or had the oversight of any public business; and that a single person, to be chosen by the senate and approved of by the people, should be invested with the whole authority of the commonwealth and exercise it for a period not longer than six months, having power superior to that of the consuls.

  [5] τοῦτ᾽ ἀγνοήσαντες, ἣν ἔχει δύναμιν, οἱ δημοτικοὶ ψηφίζονται κύρια εἶναι τὰ δόξαντα τῇ βουλῇ: ἦν δ᾽ ἄρα ἡ κρείττων ἀρχὴ τῆς κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τυραννίς: τήν τε αἵρεσιν τοῦ μέλλοντος ἄρχειν τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ συνεδρίου συνεχώρησαν αὐτοῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν βουλευομένοις ποιήσασθαι.

  [5] The plebeians, being unaware of the real import of this proposal, ratified the resolutions of the senate, although, in fact, a magistracy that was superior to a legal magistracy was a tyranny; and they gave the senators permission to deliberate by themselves and choose the person who was to hold it.

  [1] μετὰ τοῦτο πολλὴ ζήτησις ἐνέπιπτε τοῖς προεστηκόσι τῆς βουλῆς καὶ πρόνοια περὶ τοῦ παραληψομένου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. ἐδόκει γὰρ αὐτοῖς δραστηρίου τ᾽ ἀνδρὸς εἰς τὰ πράγματα δεῖν καὶ πολλὴν τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀγώνων ἐμπειρίαν ἔχοντος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φρονίμου τε καὶ σώφρονος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνόητον παραχθησομένου: ὑπὲρ ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα δεῖ προσεῖναι στρατηλάταις ἀγαθοῖς ἄρχειν ἐγκρατῶς εἰδότος καὶ μηθὲν μαλακὸν ἐνδώσοντος τοἰς ἀπειθοῦσιν, οὗ

  [71.1] After this the leading men of the senate devoted much earnest thought to searching for the man who should be entrusted with the command. For they felt that the situation required a man both vigorous in action and of wide experience in warfare, a man, moreover, possessed of prudence and self-control, who would not be led into folly by the greatness of his power; but, above all these qualities and the others essential in good generals, a man was required who knew how to govern with firmness and would show no leniency toward the disobedient, a quality of which they then stood particularly in need.

  [2] μάλιστα ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐδέοντο. ἅπαντα δ᾽ ὁρῶντες [p. 248] ὅσα ἠξίουν περὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὑπάρχοντα τῶν ὑπάτων Τῖτον Λάρκιον: ὁ γὰρ Κλοίλιος ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς χρείαις διάφορος ὢν τὸ δραστήριον καὶ φιλοπόλεμον οὐκ εἶχεν, οὐδέ γε τὸ ἀρχικὸν καὶ φοβερόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιεικὴς τιμωρὸς ἦν τῶν ἀπειθούντων: ἡ δὲ βουλὴ δι᾽ αἰσχύνης ἐλάμβανον τοῦ μὲν ἀφελέσθαι τὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶχε, τῷ δὲ χαρίσασθαι τὴν ἀμφοτέρων ἐξουσίαν, μείζονα βασιλικοῦ σχήματος γινομένην: καί τι καὶ δέος αὐτὴν ὑπῄει, μὴ βαρεῖαν ὁ Κλοίλιος ἡγησάμενος τὴν ἀπαξίωσιν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὡς ἠτιμασμένος ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς ἔπειτα μεταθῆται τὴν προαίρεσιν τοῦ βίου τοῦ δήμου γενόμενος προστάτης

  [2] And though they observed that all the qualities they demanded were to be found in Titus Larcius, one of the consuls (for Cloelius, who excelled in all administrative virtues, was not a man of action nor fond of war, nor had he the ability to command others and to inspire fear, but was a mild punisher of the disobedient), they were nevertheless ashamed to deprive one of the consuls of the magistracy of which he was legally possessed and to confer upon the other the power of both, a power which was being created greater than the kingly authority. Besides, they were under some secret apprehensions lest Cloelius, taking to heart his removal from office and considering it a dishonour put upon him by the senate, might change his sentiments and, becoming a patron of the people, overthrow the whole government.

  [3] καὶ πάντα ἀνατρέψῃ τὰ κοινά. αἰδουμένων δ᾽ ἁπάντων, ἃ φρονοῦντες ἐτύγχανον, εἰς μέσον ἐκφέρειν καὶ μέχρι πολλοῦ τοῦτο ποιούντων ὁ πρεσβύτατός τε καὶ τιμιώτατος τῶν ὑπατικῶν γνώμην ἀπεδείξατο, δι᾽ ἧς ἀμφοτέρους ἐν ἴσῃ τιμῇ τοὺς ὑπάτους φυλάξας παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τὸν ἐπιτηδειότερον ἄρχειν εὕρετο: ἔφη γὰρ αὑτῷ δοκεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς κράτος ἥ τε βουλὴ διέγνωκε καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἐπεψήφικεν ἑνὶ δοθῆναι, δύο δὲ καταλείπεται βουλῆς καὶ φροντίδος οὐ μικρᾶς δεόμενα, τίς ὁ παραληψόμενος τὴν ἰσοτύραννον ἀρχὴν ἔσται καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος ἀποδειχθεὶς ἐξουσίας νομίμου, ἐκ τῶν τότε ὄντων ὑπάτων τὸν ἕτερον, εἴτε παραχωρήσαντος [p. 249] τοῦ συνάρχοντος, εἴτε κλήρῳ λαχόντα, ἑλέσθαι Ῥωμαίων ὃν ὑπολαμβάνει κράτιστα καὶ συμφορώτατα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιτρ
οπεύσειν. μεσοβασιλέων δ᾽ αὐτοῖς μηθὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῖν, οὓς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις ἀποδείκνυσθαι μονογνώμονας τῶν μελλόντων ἄρξειν ἔθος ἦν, ἐχούσης τῆς πόλεως τὴν ὅσιον ἀρχήν.

  [3] And when all were ashamed to lay their thoughts before the senate, and this situation had continued for a considerable time, at last the oldest and most honoured of the men of consular rank delivered an opinion by which he preserved an equal share of honour to both the consuls and yet found out from those men themselves the one who was the more suitable to command. He said that, since the senate had decreed and the people in confirm thereof had voted that the power of this magistracy should be entrusted to a single person, and since two matters remained that required no small deliberation and thought, namely, who should be the one to receive this magistracy that was of equal power with a tyranny, and by what legal authority he should be appointed, it was his opinion that one of the present consuls, either by consent of his colleague or by recourse to the lot, should choose among all the Romans the person he thought would govern the commonwealth in the best and most advantageous manner. They had no need on the present occasion, he said, of interreges, to whom it had been customary under the monarchy to give the sole power of appointing those who were to reign, since the commonwealth was already provided with the lawful magistrate.

  [1] ἐπαινεσάντων δὲ τὴν γνώμην ἁπάντων μετὰ τοῦτον ἀναστὰς ἕτερος εἶπεν: ἐμοὶ δ᾽, ὦ βουλή, δοκεῖ καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔτι προστεθῆναι τῇ γνώμῃ, δυεῖν ἀνδρῶν κρατίστων εἰς τόδε χρόνου τὰ κοινὰ διοικούντων, ὧν οὐκ ἂν εὕροιτε ἀμείνους, τὸν μὲν ἕτερον αὐτῶν κύριον ἀποδειχθῆναι τῆς ἀναρρήσεως, τὸν δ᾽ ἕτερον ὑπὸ τοῦ συνάρχοντος αἱρεθῆναι διαγνόντων αὐτῶν ἐν ἀλλήλοις τὸν ἐπιτηδειότερον: ἵνα αὐτοῖς περιγένηται σὺν τῷ τιμίῳ καὶ τὸ χαῖρον ἴσον, τῷ μὲν ὅτι τὸν συνάρχοντα κράτιστον ἀπέφηνε, τῷ δ᾽ ὅτι πρὸς τοῦ συνάρχοντος ἄριστος ἐκρίθη: ἡδὺ γὰρ καὶ καλὸν ἑκάτερον. οἶδα μὲν οὖν, ὅτι καὶ μὴ προστεθέντος τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦδε τοῦ μέρους, αὐτοῖς ἂν ἐφάνη τοῖς ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ποιεῖν: κρεῖττον δὲ τὸ μηδ᾽ ὑμῶν ἕτερόν τι βουλομένων.