Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79)

by Dionysius of Halicarnassus

  [4] τοσαύτης ἄρα αὐθαδείας τὸ ἀνόητον οὗτος ἐμπέπληκε τῆς πόλεως ἀνὴρ πρεσβύτερος καὶ πάσας κεκαρπωμένος τὰς παρ᾽ ὑμῶν τιμάς. ἆρ᾽ ἦν σοι ἄξιον, Οὐαλέριε, καθ᾽ ἑτέρων τὰ μὴ προσόντα ὀνείδη λέγειν τοιαύταις ὄντι κατηγορίαις ἐνόχῳ;

  [4] With so much arrogance has the senseless multitude been inspired by this old man who has enjoyed every honour you could confer upon him. Did it, then, become you, Valerius, to utter against others the reproaches they have not deserved, when you yourself lie open to such accusations?

  [1] καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὰς ὑπὸ τούτου ῥηθείσας διαβολὰς ἀρκεῖ τὰ εἰρημένα, ὑπὲρ δ᾽ ὧν βουλευσόμενοι συνεληλύθατε δοκεῖ μοι δίκαιά τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἄξια καὶ συμφέροντα ὑμῖν, οὐ μόνον ἃ ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἀπεφηνάμην, ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἐπιμένων ἀποφαίνομαι, μὴ συγχεῖν τὸν κόσμον τῆς πολιτείας, μηδὲ κινεῖν ἔθη πατέρων ἀκίνητα, μηδ᾽ ἀναιρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πίστιν ἱερὸν χρῆμα, μεθ᾽ ἧς ἅπασα πόλις [p. 353] οἰκεῖται ἀσφαλῶς, δήμῳ τε μὴ εἴκειν ἀγνώμονι ἀδίκων ἔργων καὶ ἀθεμίτων χρῄζοντι:

  [61.1] “As for the calamities which this man has uttered against me, what I have said suffices. But concerning the subject which you have met to discuss, it seems to me that what I not only proposed at first, but even now, continuing of the same opinion, still propose, was just, worthy of the commonwealth, and advantageous for yourselves, namely, not to disturb the form of our government nor to alter the unalterable customs of our ancestors, nor to banish from among men good faith, a sacred thing, through the possession of which every state dwells in security, nor to give way to a stupid populace which desires unjust and unlawful things.

  [2] καὶ οὐχ ὅπως ὑποκατακλίνομαί τι τῆς γνώμης φόβῳ τῶν διαφόρων, οἳ τὸ ἐν τῇ πόλει δημοτικὸν ἐπ᾽ ἐμοὶ συνιστάντες δεδίττονταί με, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ἔρρωμαι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ ἀγανακτῶ τοῖς αἰτήμασι τοῦ δήμου διπλασίως: ὑμῶν τ᾽ ὦ βουλή, τὸ παράλογον τῆς γνώμης τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιτρέψαντες αὐτῷ, ὅτε οὔπω φανερὸς ἦν πολέμιος, χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς καὶ κατακριμάτων ἀφέσεις αἰτουμένῳ, νῦν ἐπεὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ πολεμίων δρᾷ, ταῦτ᾽ εἰ συγχωρήσετε βουλεύεσθε καὶ ὅ τι κἂν ἄλλο τι αὐτῷ δοκῇ: δόξει δὲ δήπου, καὶ πρῶτον ποιήσεται τῶν ἀξιουμένων, ἰσότιμον εἶναι καὶ

  [2] And not only do I not retract any part of my opinion through fear of my adversaries, who endeavour to frighten me by rousing the plebeians in the city against me, but I am much more than ever confirmed in my resentment, and my indignation at the demands of the people is doubled. And I am surprised, senators, at the inconsistency of your judgment, in that, after refusing to grant to the people at their request an abolition of their debts and a discharge from the judgments against them before they were as yet openly your enemies, you now, when they are in arms and are committing acts of hostility, deliberate whether you will grant these demands and anything else they may think fit. They will think fit, of course, and will make it the first of their demands to have an equal share of honours with us and to enjoy the same privileges.

  [3] τῶν αὐτῶν ἡμῖν μετέχειν. οὐκοῦν εἰς δημοκρατίαν περιστήσεται τὰ πράγματα τὴν ἀμαθεστάτην, ὥσπερ ἔφην, τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτειῶν καὶ ὑμῖν ἀσύμφορον τοῖς ἀξιοῦσιν ἄρχειν ἑτέρων; οὐκ, ἐάν γε σωφρονῆτε ὑμεῖς. ἢ πάντων ἂν εἴητε ἀφρονέστατοι, εἰ πρὸς ἑνὸς ἄρχεσθαι τυραννικοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὐκ ἀνασχετὸν ἡγησάμενοι δήμῳ τυραννίδι πολυκεφάλῳ νῦν ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς παραδώσετε, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ οὐ μετὰ χαρίτων αὐτῷ πείθοντι συγχωρήσετε ὑπό τ᾽ ἀνάγκης κρατηθέντες καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἐξὸν ἄλλο τι δρᾶν νῦν ἡμῖν παρὰ γνώμην [p. 354]

  [3] Will not the government then be transformed into a democracy, which of all human constitutions, as I said, is the most senseless and the least expedient for you who presume to rule over others? It will not be, if you are in your right senses. Otherwise you would be the most foolish of all men if, after regarding it as intolerable to be governed by one tyrant, you should now deliver yourselves up to the populace, a many-headed tyranny, and grant these things to them, not as a gracious concession to their pleading, but constrained by necessity and, on the assumption that it is not in our power to do anything else now, yielding against your will.

  [4] εἴξαντες. ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀνόητον ἀντὶ τοῦ κολάζεσθαι ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἂν πλημμελήσῃ καὶ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι δι᾽ αὐτὰ προσλάβῃ, πῶς δοκεῖτε αὔθαδες ἔσται καὶ ὑπερήφανον; μὴ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαίρεσθε, ὡς μετριάσει περὶ τὰς ἀξιώσεις ὁ δῆμος, ἐὰν φανερὸν αὐτῷ γένηται, ὅτι ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἐψηφίσασθε οὕτως.

  [4] And when this senseless multitude, instead of being punished for its offences, even obtains honours as a reward for those offences, how headstrong and arrogant do you think it will become? For do not encourage yourselves with the hope that the people will moderate their demands if it becomes known to them that you all concurred in this resolution.

  [1] ἀλλὰ πλεῖστον δὴ ἐν τούτῳ Μενήνιος ἐψεύσθη τῆς δόξης, ἀνὴρ σώφρων, ὃς ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ τρόπων τεκμαίρεται χρηστὰ ὑπὲρ ἑτέρων. ἐγκείσεται γὰρ ὑμῖν πέρα τοῦ δέοντος βαρὺς ὑπό τ᾽ αὐθαδείας, ἣ φιλεῖ περὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἀφροσύνης, ἧς πλεῖστον ὄχλος μετέχει μέρος: κἂν εἰ μὴ ἐν ἀρχαῖς, χρόνῳ γοῦν ὕστερον καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ χρήματι, ὧν ἂν δεηθεὶς μὴ τύχῃ, τὰ ὅπλα λαβὼν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑμῖν σοβαρῶς ἐπιθήσεται. ὥστ᾽ εἰ τὰ πρῶτα συγχωρήσετε συμφέροντα εἶναι νομίσαντες, ἕτερόν τι χεῖρον εὐθὺς ἐπιταχθήσεσθε καὶ αὖθις ἄλλο τούτου χαλεπώτερον, ὡς φόβῳ καὶ τὰ πρῶτα ὑπακούσαντες, ἕως ἐκβάλωσιν ὑμᾶς τελευτῶντες τῆς πόλεως, ὡς ἐν πολλαῖς ἄλλαις καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα ἐν Συρακούσαις οἱ γεωμόροι πρὸς τῶν πελατῶν ἐξηλάθησαν.

  [62.1] “But in this matter Menenius, a prudent man who imputes good intentions to others judging them by himself, is very much mistaken. For they will urge you with an importunity grievous beyond all measure, encouraged both by arrogance, which tends always to accompany victory, and by folly, of which the multitude has so great a share. And if not at first, then certainly later, upon every occasion when their demands are not granted, they will take up arms and attack you violently in the same way
as before. So that if you yield to their first demands as a matter of expediency, you will presently have something worse imposed upon you, and then something else still harsher than that, upon the supposition that your first concessions too flowed from fear, till at last they drive you out of the city, as has happened in many other places, and, most recently, at Syracuse, where the landowners were expelled by their clients.

  [2] εἰ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνων ἀγανακτήσαντες ἐναντιώσεσθε τοῖς αἰτήμασι, τί δή ποτ᾽ οὐκ αὐτόθεν ἄρχεσθε ἐλεύθερα φρονήματα ἔχειν; κρεῖττον γὰρ ἀπ᾽ [p. 355] ἐλάττονος αἰτίας ὁρμηθέντας πρὶν ἢ βλαβῆναί τι ἀποδείξασθαι τὸ γενναῖον, ἢ πολλὰ ὑπομείναντας τότε ἀγανακτεῖν περὶ τῶν γεγονότων καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τὰ λοιπὰ καὶ ὀψὲ ἄρξασθαι νοῦν ἔχειν. φοβείτω δ᾽ ὑμῶν μηδένα μήτε ὁ τῶν ἀποστατῶν ἀνασεισμὸς μήτε ὁ τῶν ἀλλοφύλων πόλεμος: μήτε καταγινώσκετε τῆς οἰκείας δυνάμεως ὡς οὐχ ἱκανῆς οὔσης διασῶσαι τὴν πόλιν.

  [2] If, then, in your indignation in those circumstances you intend to oppose their demands, why do you not from this instant begin to assume the spirit of free men? For it is better the display your proud spirit on a slighter provocation to start with and before suffering any injury, than, after submitting to many injuries, than, after submitting to many injuries, to be indignant only then at what had happened, refuse to endure any more, and begin too late to be prudent. Let none of you be terrified either by the threatening clamour of the seceders or by this foreign war; and do not disparage our domestic forces as being insufficient to preserve the commonwealth.

  [3] ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν φυγάδων βραχεῖά ἐστιν ἰσχὺς καὶ οὔτε πολὺν ἀνθέξει χρόνον διαμένουσα, ὥσπερ νῦν, ὑπαίθριος μένει ὑπὸ καλύβαις ὥρᾳ ἔτους χειμερίῳ, πορίζεσθαι δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐχ ὅπως δι᾽ ἁρπαγῆς ἔτι δυνησομένη ἐπειδὰν τὰ ὄντα ἀναλώσῃ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἄλλοθεν ὠνητὰ ἐπεισάγεσθαι διὰ πενίαν, οἷς οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτ᾽ ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν: οἱ δὲ πόλεμοι ταῖς περιουσίαις τῶν χρημάτων ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἀντέχουσιν: ἀναρχία τ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὡς εἰκὸς καὶ στάσις ἐκ τῆς ἀναρχίας ἐμπεσοῦσα ταχὺ διαχεῖ καὶ διαλύσει τὰ βουλεύματα.

  [3] For the strength of the fugitives is slight, and they will not be able to hold out long in the open in huts during the winter season, as they are now doing; and far from being able to go on securing provisions by plundering when they have consumed their present store, they will not be able even to purchase any elsewhere and convey them to their camp, by reason of their poverty, since they have no money, either individually or in common, and wars, as a rule, can only be kept up by plenty of money. Besides, anarchy, in all probability, and sedition, growing out of anarchy, will seize them and soon confound and bring to naught their counsels.

  [4] οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀξιώσουσιν οὔτε Σαβίνοις οὔτε Τυρρηνοῖς οὔτ᾽ ἄλλοις τισὶ τῶν ἀλλοφύλων παραδόντες σφᾶς αὐτούς, ἐκείνοις δουλεύειν, ὧν καὶ αὐτοί ποτ᾽ ἀφείλοντο τὴν ἐλευθερίαν σὺν ὑμῖν, καὶ μάλιστα οὐδὲ πιστευθήσονται πρὸς αὐτῶν οἱ κακῶς αὑτῶν τὴν πατρίδα καὶ αἰσχρῶς ἀπολέσαι προθυμηθέντες, μὴ οὐχὶ ὅμοια δράσειν τὴν ὑποδεξαμένην. ἀριστοκρατεῖται δὲ [p. 356] καὶ τα ἔθνη τὰ πέριξ ὑμῶν ᾶπαντα, καὶ το δημοτικὸν ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ πόλει μεταποιεῖται τῶν ἰσων, ὥστε οὐ δήπου οἱ προὔχοντες ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει τὸν οἰκεῖον οὐκ ἐῶντες παρακινεῖν ὄχλον, τοῦτον εἰσδέξονται τὸν ἔπηλυν καὶ στασιαστὴν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πατρίδα, μὴ μεταδόντες αὐτοὶ τῶν ὁμοίων σὺν χρόνῳ στερήσονται τῶν ἴσων.

  [4] For surely they will not consent to deliver themselves up to either the Sabines or the Tyrrhenians or any other foreigners and become slaves to those whom they themselves together with you once deprived of their liberty; and, most important of all, men who have wickedly and shamefully endeavoured to destroy their own country will not even be trusted by these other nations, for fear they might treat the country that receives them in the same manner. For all the nations round us are governed by aristocracies, and the plebeians in no state lay claim to an equal share in the government; so that the leading men in every state, who do not permit their own populace to make any innovations, will doubtless never receive this foreign and seditious multitude into their country, lest, by permitting them to enjoy equal rights and privileges, they themselves should one day be deprived of their own position of equality.

  [5] εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα γε γνώμης ἁμάρτοιμι καὶ παραδέξαιτό τις αὐτοὺς πόλις, ἐνταῦθα δὴ διαγινώσκοινθ᾽ ὡς ἄν πολέμιοί τε ὄντες καὶ τὰ πολεμίων πεισόμενοι. ἔχομεν δ᾽ αὐτῶν ὅμηρα πατέρας καὶ γαμετὰς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην συγγένειαν, ὧν οὐδ᾽ ἂν εὐχόμενοι κρείττονα παρὰ θεῶν αἰτησαίμεθα: οὓς ἐν ὄψει τῶν συγγενῶν στήσαντες ἀπολοῦμεν, εἰ τολμήσαιεν ὁμόσε χωρεῖν, ὡς ταῖς ἐσχάταις λώβαις διαχρησόμενοι. καὶ αὐτούς, εἰ τοῦτο μάθοιεν, εὖ ἴστε, ὅτι λήψεσθε ἀντιβολοῦντας, ὀλοφυρομένους, παραδιδόντας σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν δίχα τῶν ὅπλων, ἅπαντα ὑπομένοντας. δειναὶ γὰρ αἱ τοιαίδε ἀνάγκαι καὶ πάντας τοὺς αὐθάδεις λογισμοὺς κλάσαι καὶ καταβαλεῖν εἰς τὸ μηδέν.

  [5] But if I am mistaken after all, and any state should receive them, they would thereupon reveal themselves as enemies and men deserving to be treated as such. We have, as hostages for them, their parents, their wives, and the rest of their relations, and better hostages we could not ask of the gods in our prayers; let us place these in the sight of their relations, threatening, in case they dare to attack us, to put them to death under the most ignominious tortures. And once they understand this, be assured you will find them resorting to entreaties and lamentations, and delivering themselves up to you unarmed, and ready to submit to anything whatever. For such natural ties have remarkable power to upset all arrogant calculations and bring them to naught.

  [1] ὧν μὲν ὀὴ χάριν τὸν ἐκ τῶν φυγάδων πόλεμον οὐκ ἀξιῶ δεδιέναι ταῦτ᾽ ἐστι: τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοεθνῶν φοβερὰ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ἐξετασθήσεται μέχρι λόγου τοιαῦτα ὄντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον, ὁσάκις ἡμῖν πεῖραν ἑαυτῶν ἔδωκαν, ἐλάττω τῆς δόξης διεφάνη. [p. 357] ὅσοι δ᾽ οὐχ ἱκανὴν οἴονται τὴν οἰκείαν δύναμιν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῇδε μάλιστα ὀρρωδοῦσι τὸν πόλεμον, μαθέτωσαν οὐχ ἱκανῶς αὐτῆς ᾐσθημένοι.

  [63.1] “These are the reasons why I do not think we should fear a war on the part of the fugitives. As to the dangers from fo
reign nations, this is not the first time those dangers will have been proved to be such in words only, but even before this, whenever they have given us the opportunity of putting them to the test, they have been found less terrible than we apprehended. And let those who believe our domestic forces to be inadequate and dread war chiefly for this reason learn that they are not sufficiently acquainted with them.

  [2] πρὸς μέν γε τοὺς ἀφεστηκότας τῶν πολιτῶν ἀντίπαλον χεῖρα ἕξομεν, εἰ βουλοίμεθα τῶν θεραπόντων ἐπιλεξάμενοι τοὺς ἀκμαιοτάτους ἐλευθερῶσαι. κρεῖττον γὰρ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν χαρίσασθαι τούτοις ἢ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων ἀφαιρεθῆναι. ἔχουσι δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἐμπειρίαν ἱκανὴν πολλάκις ἡμῖν παραγενόμενοι κατὰ τὰς στρατείας.

  [2] So far indeed as the seceders among the citizens are concerned, we shall have an adequate force to cope with them if we see fit to choose out the most vigorous of our slaves and give them their freedom. For it is better to grant these their freedom than to be deprived of our supremacy by the others. The slaves are already possessed of sufficient military skill by having attended us in many campaigns.

  [3] πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πολεμίους αὐτοί τε χωρῶμεν ἁπάσῃ προθυμίᾳ καὶ τοὺς πελάτας ἅπαντας ἐπαγώμεθα καὶ τοῦ δημοτικοῦ τὸ περιόν. ἵνα δὲ πρόθυμον ᾗ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, ἄφεσιν αὐτῷ χαρισώμεθα τῶν χρεῶν, μὴ κοινήν, ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ ἄνδρα. εἰ γάρ τι δεῖ τοῖς καιροῖς εἴξαντας μετριάσαι, μὴ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους τῶν πσλιτῶν τοῦτ᾽ ἔστω τὸ μέτριον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, οἷς οὐκ ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὰς χάριτας διδόναι δόξομεν, ἀλλὰ πειθόμενοι. ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἄλλης ἐπιδέῃ βοηθείας, ὡς ταύτης οὐκ οὔσης ἱκανῆς, τούς τ᾽ ἐκ τῶν φρουρίων μεταπεμπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀποικίαις ἀνακαλῶμεν.