[4] τῆς ψηφοφορίας ἀπαιτεῖν. τό τε φιλόχρηστον καὶ μισοπόνηρον οὐκ ὀλίγον ἀπέφηνεν ἐκ τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐσόμενον, καὶ ἔτι πλεῖον τούτου, ὃ πρὸς τὰς τύχας πάσχειν τι τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας καὶ ἐλεεῖν οἶδε τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἀξιώμασιν, ὅταν εἰς ταπεινὰ πέσωσιν αὐτῶν αἱ
[4] He showed them also that there would be no small element among the populace which loved the right and hated the wrong, and an even larger number who knew how to sympathize with human misfortunes and to feel compassion for men in position of honour when their fortunes have suffered reverse.
[5] τύχαι. ὁ δὲ πλείων λόγος ἐγίνετο αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν Μάρκιον παράκλησιν ἔχων νουθετήσει μεμιγμένην καὶ δέησιν ἀνάγκῃ. ἠξίου γὰρ αὐτόν, ἐπεὶ διιστάναι τὸν δῆμον ἀπὸ τῆς βουλῆς αἰτίαν ἔχει καὶ τυραννικὸς εἶναι διαβάλλεται διὰ τὴν αὐθάδειαν τοῦ τρόπου, δέος τε παρέστηκεν ἅπασι, μὴ δι᾽ αὐτὸν ἀρχὴ γένηται στάσεως καὶ κακῶν ἀνηκέστων, ἃ φέρουσιν ἐμφύλιοι πόλεμοι, μὴ ποιεῖν ἀληθεῖς καὶ κυρίας τὰς κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ διαβολὰς μένοντα ἐν τῷ φθονουμένῳ τοῦ βίου, ἀλλὰ σχῆμα ταπεινὸν μεταλαβεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγουσι τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ σώματος παρασχεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν ἄδικον ἔγκλημα λόγῳ μετὰ δίκης ἀπολυόμενον.
[5] But the greater part of his speech was addressed to Marcius himself, in which he joined exhortation to admonition, and entreaty to compulsion. For he begged of him, since he was accused of dividing the populace from the senate and also charged with being tyrannical by reason of his arbitrary manner, and since all men were filled with fear that because of him there would spring up sedition and all the irreparable evils which civil wars bring in their train, that he would not make true and valid the accusations against himself by persevering in his invidious way of life, but would change it to an humble deportment, submit his person to the power of those who complained of being injured, and not decline to clear himself by a just defence of an unjust charge.
[6] ταῦτα γὰρ αὐτῷ πρός τε σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλέστατα εἶναι καὶ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν, ἧς ὀρέγεται, λαμπρότατα καὶ τοῖς προυπηργμένοις [p. 85] ἔργοις ἀκόλουθα. εἰ δ᾽ αὐθαδέστερος ἔσται μᾶλλον ἢ μετριώτερος, καὶ τὴν βουλὴν ἀξιώσει πάντα κίνδυνον δι᾽ ἑαυτὸν ὑπομένειν, κακὴν μὲν ἧτταν, αἰσχρὰν δὲ νίκην τοῖς πεισθεῖσι προσάψειν αὐτὸν ἀπέφαινεν: ἦν τ᾽ ἐνταῦθα πολὺς ὀλοφυρόμενος καὶ τῶν καταλαμβανόντων κακῶν τὰς πόλεις ἐν ταῖς διχοστασίαις τὰ μέγιστα καὶ φανερώτατα ἐπιλεγόμενος.
[6] For that course was not only for saving his life the surest, he told him, but also, as regarded the reputation he coveted, the most brilliant, and it was in keeping with the deeds he had already performed; whereas, if he should show himself arrogant rather than moderate and expect the senate to expose themselves to every danger for his sake, he declared that the defeat he might bring to those who had listened to him would be disastrous, while a victory would be disgraceful to them. He then indulged in many lamentations and enumerated the most important and the most obvious evils that befall states in times of dissension.
[1] διεξιὼν δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων οὐ προσποιητῶν καὶ πεπλασμένων, ἀλλ᾽ ἀληθινῶν, ἀνὴρ ἡλικίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀξιώσει προὔχων, ὡς ἔμαθε κινούμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις τὸ συνέδριον, ἐκ τοῦ τεθαρρηκότος ἤδη τὸ λοιπὸν ἐξύφαινε τῶν λόγων: εἰ δέ τινες ὑμῶν, ὦ βουλευταί, λέγων, ταράττονται δοκοῦντες ἔθος εἰσάγειν πονηρὸν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἐὰν τῷ δήμῳ συγχωρήσητε ψῆφον ἐπιφέρειν κατὰ τῶν πατρικίων, καὶ ἐπ᾽ οὐδενὶ ἀγαθῷ νομίζουσι τὴν τῶν δημάρχων ἐξουσίαν πολλὴν ἰσχὺν λαβοῦσαν γενήσεσθαι, μαθέτωσαν ἁμαρτάνοντες τῆς δόξης καὶ τἀναντία ἢ
[55.1] When he had related all these evils with many tears — tears that were not feigned and affected, but genuine — this man who was eminent for the dignity both of his years and of his merits, perceiving that the senate was moved by his words, proceeded then with confidence to deliver the remainder of his speech. “If any of you, senators,” he said, “are disturbed by the thought that you will be introducing a pernicious custom into the commonwealth if you grant the populace the power of giving their votes against the patricians, and entertain an opinion that the tribunician power, if considerably strengthened, will serve no good purpose, let them learn that their opinion is erroneous and their surmise is the opposite of what it should be.
[2] προσῆκεν ὑπειληφότες. εἰ γάρ τι καὶ ἄλλο σωτηρίας αἴτιον ἔσται τῇ πόλει τῇδε καὶ τοῦ μηδέποτε τὴν ἐλευθερίαν μηδὲ τὴν ἰσχὺν ἀφαιρεθῆναι, ὁμονοοῦσαν δ᾽ ἀεὶ καὶ μιᾷ γνώμῃ περὶ πάντων χρωμένην διατελεῖν, ὁ δῆμος αἰτιώτατος ἔσται συμπαραληφθεὶς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα: καὶ τὸ μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν διοικοῦσαν τὰ κοινὰ πολιτείαν ἄκρατον μήτε μοναρχίαν μήτ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίαν [p. 86] μήτε δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μικτὴν ἐξ ἁπασῶν τούτων κατάστασιν, τοῦτο ὑπὲρ ἅπαντα ἡμᾶς ὠφελήσει.
[2] For if anything is going to be the means of preserving this commonwealth and insuring that she shall never be deprived of her liberty or her power, but shall ever continue to be united and harmonious in all respects, the most effective instrument will be the populace if taken as partners in the administration of affairs; and what will benefit us above everything will be, not to have a simple and unmixed form of government administering the state, whether monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy, but a constitution combined out of all of these.
[3] ῥᾷστα γὰρ εἰς ὕβρεις ἀποσκήπτει καὶ παρανομίας τούτων ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτευμάτων αὐτὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ γινόμενον, ὅταν δ᾽ ἀνακερασθῇ πάντα μετρίως, τὸ παρακινοῦν μέρος αἰεὶ καὶ ἐκβαῖνον ἐκ τοῦ συνήθους κόσμου ὑπὸ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος καὶ μένοντος ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ἤθεσι κατείργεται. μοναρχία μὲν ὠμὴ καὶ αὐθάδης γενηθεῖσα καὶ τυραννικὰ διώκειν ἀρξαμένη ζηλώματα ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ὀλίγων καὶ ἀγαθῶν καταλύεται.
[3] For each of these forms by itself alone very easily ends in wantonness and lawlessness; but when all of them are duly combined, the element which is inclined at any time to make innovations and to overstep the customary bounds is held in check by the element which is self-restrained and remains true to its own character. Thus monarchy, when it becomes cruel and insolent and begins to pursue tyrannical measures, is overthrown by a few good men.
[4] ὀλιγαρχία
δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀνδρῶν συνεστηκυῖα, ᾗ χρῆσθε καὶ ὑμεῖς νυνί, ὅταν πλούτῳ καὶ ἑταιρίαις ἐπαρθεῖσα δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς μηθένα ποιῆται λόγον, ὑπὸ δήμου φρονίμου καταλύεται. δῆμος δὲ σωφρονῶν καὶ κατὰ νόμους πολιτευόμενος ὅταν ἀκοσμεῖν ἄρξηται καὶ παρανομεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατίστου ἀνδρὸς βίᾳ καταληφθεὶς δικαιοῦται.
[4] And an oligarchy composed of the best men, which is your present form of government, when it has become elated by reason of its wealth and its bands of partisans, and pays no regard to justice or to any other virtue, is overthrown by a prudent democracy. And when a democracy that is moderate and governs in accordance with laws begins to be disorderly and lawless, it is taken in hand by the strongest man and set right by force.
[5] ὑμῖν δ᾽, ὦ βουλή, μονάρχου μὲν ἐξουσίας, ἵνα μὴ τυραννὶς γένηται, τὰ δυνατὰ εὕρηται βοηθήματα. δύο τε γὰρ ἀνθ᾽ ἑνὸς ἀποδείξαντες τῆς πόλεως κυρίους καὶ τούτοις οὐκ ἀόριστον χρόνον ἐπιτρέψαντες ἔχειν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνιαύσιον οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀποδείκνυτε φύλακας αὐτῶν τριακοσίους ἄνδρας ἐκ τῶν πατρικίων τοὺς κρατίστους τε καὶ πρεσβυτάτους, ἐξ ὧν ἥδε ἡ βουλὴ συνέστηκεν: ὑμῶν δ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἵνα μένητε [p. 87] ἐν τῷ προσήκοντι κόσμῳ, φυλακὴν οὐδεμίαν ἄχρι τοῦδε φαίνεσθε πεποιημένοι.
[5] You, senators, have devised all the precautions possible to prevent the monarchical power from degenerating into tyranny, for you have invested two men instead of one with the supreme power of the commonwealth, and though you have entrusted this magistracy to them, not for an indefinite time, but only for a year, you nevertheless appoint, to keep watch over them, three hundred patricians, at once the best and the oldest, of whom this senate is composed. But you do not seem as yet to have appointed any to watch over you yourselves, to insure your remaining within proper bounds.
[6] καὶ περὶ μὲν ὑμῶν οὔπω ἔδεισα, μὴ διαφθαρῆτε τὰς διανοίας ὑπό τε μεγέθους καὶ πλήθους ἀγαθῶν, οἳ τυραννίδος τε πολυχρονίου ἠλευθερώκατε τὴν πόλιν ἔναγχος καὶ οὔπω σχολὴν ἐσχήκατε ὑβρίζειν καὶ τρυφᾶν διά τοὺς συνεχεῖς καὶ μακροὺς πολέμους: περὶ δὲ τῶν μεθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἐσομένων ἐνθυμούμενος ὅσας ὁ μακρὸς αἰὼν φέρει μεταβολὰς δέδοικα, μή τι παρακινήσαντες οἱ δυνατοὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ συνεδρίου λάθωσιν εἰς μοναρχίαν τὸ πολίτευμα περιστήσαντες τυραννικήν.
[6] Now as for you, I have no fear so far that you will permit your minds to be corrupted by the magnitude and number of your blessings, since you have only recently delivered the commonwealth from a long tyranny and because of the long and continuous wars have not yet had leisure to grow insolent and wanton. But with regard to your successors, when I consider how great changes the long course of time brings with it, I am afraid that the men of power in the senate may introduce some change and, unnoticed, transform the government into a tyrannical monarchy.
[1] ἐὰν οὖν κοινωνήσητε καὶ τῷ δήμῳ τῶν πολιτευμάτων, οὐθὲν ὑμῖν ἐνθάδε φύσεται κακόν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιῶν καὶ τῆς βουλῆς προσεταιρισάμενος τὸν βουλόμενον συννοσεῖν καὶ συναδικεῖν: πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰκότα χρὴ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένους προνοεῖν: κληθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν δημάρχων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος ὁ μέγας ἐκεῖνος καὶ σεμνὸς ἀποδώσει τῷ δήμῳ τῷ φαύλῳ καὶ ταπεινῷ λόγον ὧν πράττει τε καὶ διανοεῖται, κἂν ἀδικῶν φαίνηται δίκης, ἧς ἂν ἄξιος ᾖ, τεύξεται.
[56.1] “If, then, you admit the populace also to a share in the government, no evil will arise for you here. But the man who aims at greater power than the rest of his fellow-citizens and has formed a faction in the senate of all who are willing to share his disaffection and his crimes (for when we are deliberating concerning the commonwealth we ought to foresee every likely contingency), this great and august person, I say, when called upon by the tribunes to appear before the popular assembly, before the lowly and humble people, will have to give an accounting of both his actions and his purpose, and if found guilty, suffer the punishment he deserves.
[2] αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν δῆμον, ἵνα μὴ τρυφᾷ τηλικαύτης ἔξουσίας γενόμενος κύριος, μηδ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν κακίστων ἐκδημαγωγούμενος τοῖς κρατίστοις πολεμῇ: καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὄχλῳ φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι τυραννίς: φυλάξει τε καὶ οὐδὲν ἐάσει παρανομεῖν ὁ διαφέρων φρονήσει ἀνὴρ δικτάτωρ ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν αἱρεθείς, ὃς αὐτοκράτορι καὶ ἀνυπευθύνῳ χρώμενος [p. 88] ἐξουσίᾳ τό τε νοσοῦν ἐξελεῖ τῆς πόλεως μέρος, καὶ τὸ μήπω διεφθαρμένον οὐκ ἐάσει κακωθῆναι, ἔθη τε καὶ νόμιμα καὶ ζηλώματα βίων τὰ κράτιστα μεθαρμοσάμενος ἀρχάς τ᾽ ἀποδείξας ἃς ἂν ἡγῆται σωφρονέστατα τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιτροπεύσειν: καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐντὸς ἓξ μηνῶν διοικησάμενος ἰδιώτης αὖθις ἔσται τὸ τιμᾶσθαι μόνον ἐκ τούτων λαβών, ἄλλο δ᾽ οὐθέν.
[2] And lest the people themselves, when vested with so great a power, should grow wanton and, seduced by the demagoguery of the worst men, make war upon the best citizens (for it is in the masses as a rule that tyranny springs up), some person of exceptional sagacity, created dictator by you, will guard against this evil and will not allow them to do anything lawless; for, being invested with absolute and irresponsible power, he will cut off the diseased part of the commonwealth and will not permit that which is as yet uninfected to be contaminated; he will reform in the best manner possible the habits, usages and aims of the citizens, and appoint such magistrates as he thinks will govern the south with the greatest prudence; and having effected these things within the space of six months, he will again become a private citizen, receiving no other reward for these actions than the honour.
[3] ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐνθυμηθέντες καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας τοῦθ᾽ ἡγησάμενοι κράτιστον εἶναι μηθενὸς ἀπελαύνετε τὸν δῆμον, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἀρχὰς ἀποδεικνύναι τὰς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἡγησομένας τῆς πόλεως, καὶ νόμους τοὺς μὲν ἐπικυροῦν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀναιρεῖν, καὶ περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης διαγιγνώσκειν, ἃ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατά ἐστι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπραττομένων, μεταδεδώκατε αὐτῷ καὶ οὐθενὸς τούτων αὐτοκράτορα πεποιήκατε τὴν βουλήν: οὕτως καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων μεταδίδοτε, καὶ μάλισθ᾽ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἄν τις αἰτίαν ἔχῃ τὴν πόλιν ἀδικεῖν στάσιν εἰσάγων ἢ τυραννίδα κατασκευαζόμενο
ς ἢ περὶ προδοσίας τοῖς πολεμίοις διαλεγόμενος ἢ τοιοῦτό τι ἄλλο κακὸν ἐπιχειρῶν πράττειν.
[3] Do you, then, bearing these things in mind, and believing that this is the most perfect form of government, debar the populace from nothing, but, even as you have granted them the right of choosing the magistrates who are to preside each year over the commonwealth, as well as confirming or invalidating laws, of declaring war and making peace — which are the greatest and the most important matters that come up for action in the commonwealth — and have not invested the senate with authority over any one of these matters, in like manner give them also a share in the courts, and particularly in the trials of those who are accused of crimes against the state by raising a sedition or aiming at tyranny or discussing a betrayal of the state with the enemy or attempt us some other mischief of like nature.
[4] ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν φοβερώτερον κατασκευάσητε τὸ παραβαίνειν τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἔθη κινεῖν τοῖς ὑβρισταῖς καὶ πλεονέκταις, πολλοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ φύλακας αὐτῶν ἀποδείξαντες, τοσούτῳ κρεῖττον ὑμῖν ἕξει τὰ κοινά.
[4] For the more formidable you make it for the overbearing and self-seeking to transgress the laws and to alter your customs, by appointing many eyes to watch and many men to keep guard over them, the better will be the condition of your commonwealth.”
Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79) Page 595