Book Read Free

Crucible of a Generation

Page 28

by J. Kenneth Brody


  pean and Asiatic wars. Its counsels and advice were rejected at each step

  by the government. But the time for discussing that is past. We are now

  at war. It is the duty of the government to prosecute that war with all the

  energy of the nation. It is equally the duty of every citizen to stand behind

  the government to the uttermost in that task. 33

  To which former President Herbert Hoover added:

  The President took the only line of action open to any patriotic American.

  He will and must have the full support of the entire country. We have only

  one job to do now and that is to defeat Japan. 34

  *

  Japanese Americans had a special stake and a special vulnerability in the nation’s

  response to the Pearl Harbor attack. In Los Angeles the Anti-Axis Commit-

  tee, representing seventeen different chapters of the Japanese-American Citizens

  League, issued the following statement through Chairman Fred Tayama:

  The United States is at war with the Axis. We shall do all in our power to

  help wipe out vicious totalitarian enemies. Every man is either friend or

  foe. We shall investigate and turn over to authorities all who by word or

  act consort with the enemy.

  We must and will mobilize maximum energies to facilitate America’s

  war program. We must not play into the enemies’ hands.

  Every loyal American must be permitted to render his services. The

  enemy will try to sabotage our usefulness by inciting race hysteria. Let us

  be vigilant.

  The die is cast. We face the issue with grim determination. America,

  we are ready. 35

  The Los Angeles city schools took such sentiments to heart, advising calm to

  its 300,000 students. They would deal realistically with unfounded rumors, many

  vicious, embarrassing to loyal Nisei students who might come to school with trep-

  idation. The board counseled principals to face any problems openly and honestly,

  calling assemblies where necessary to make appropriate explanations. The spirit in

  the schools was best expressed in these words: “The children are Americans, and

  we owe them a square deal.” 36

  *

  All wars at all times involve excruciating moral and ethical issues deeply felt by

  ministers of religion. At a meeting of the Chicago Congregational Union in the

  Palmer House, Dr. Ernest Graham Guthrie, General Superintendent, said that

  174 First Week at War: December 8–13, 1941

  the business of Christ’s church could not go on as usual. It would require deeper

  depths and more heroic heights from those who knew and loved the million

  Christian leaders and people of Japan. Dr. Georgia Harkness of Garrett Biblical

  Institute urged the church to continue its task under any circumstances and main-

  tain fellowship among Christians across international boundaries and interests. At

  a meeting of Lutheran pastors, Dr. Charles F. Boss, Jr., agreed with Dr. Guthrie

  that the church must be above the battle, that the church must not be used in

  preparation for war but instead in the promulgation of peace. The character of

  war, he said, was not changed by the fact that America was in it. Dr. Boss had

  been a member of the Ministers’ No War Committee, which would continue to

  function he said, but under a new name. 37 Most telling was Dr. Boss’s invocation that the “church adhere to its basic position and not bless war or call it holy.”

  The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace had a proprietary inter-

  est in peace. It had once adopted a resolution commending the administration

  FIGURE 16.2 “Going down with colors flying.”

  Cartoon by Rollin Kirby. By permission of the Estate of Rollin Kirby Post. Courtesy of Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, LC-USZ62-129793.

  Tuesday, December 9, 1941 175

  for its efforts to find a peaceful solution for U.S.–Japanese antagonism. Now it

  condemned Japan for “a betrayal of one of the most fundamental principles of

  international law.” 38

  Another organization whose principles collided brutally with reality was the

  National Council for the Prevention of War, the oldest American pacifist organi-

  zation. It said plaintively that it had worked for twenty years to prevent the disaster

  of war. Under drastically changed circumstances, the Council said it would, with-

  out obstructing the war effort, emphasize programs for the study of a negotiated

  peace and postwar reconstruction. Acknowledging that the war could end in

  victory, in general exhaustion or through a negotiated peace, the Council opted

  for peace through negotiation at the earliest possible moment that negotiations

  became feasible. 39

  That time never came.

  America at War: Broadsides

  As is normal in wartime, both sides invoked the blessing of the Deity upon their

  arms. The Los Angeles Times headlined its editorial in these terms: “We Will

  Triumph—So Help Us God.” The declaration of war, it said, had removed any

  obstacle to achieving “the victory which the President solemnly pledges shall,

  with God’s help, ultimately crown our untarnished shield. ” 40

  Bullocks, a downtown Los Angeles department store, expressed similar senti-

  ments in a full-page ad in the Los Angeles Times . Surmounting a Star-Spangled

  Banner were these words: “We will gain the inevitable triumph, so help us God.” 41

  Other editorial writers adopted the closely related theme of righteousness; The

  Washington Post ’s leading editorial was headlined “Righteous Might,” echoing the Houston Chronicle ’s “In Their Righteous Might” 42 and The Oregonian ’s “Ours The Right and the Might.” 43

  In a more secular response, The New York Times editorial was captioned “United

  We Stand,” 44 while the Chicago Tribune echoed that theme under the less emotional headline: “Japan’s Perfidy Unites the American People.” 45

  Broadsides amplified these sentiments. The Council for Democracy, under the

  chairmanship of radio broadcaster and analyst Raymond Gram Swing, took a full-

  page ad in The New York Times to declare:

  We shall not abandon our Democratic faith, either during this war, or

  when this war is done. No matter what we must face, we mean to see that

  Democracy shall live and grow. The issue is grimly plain. But we shall

  go forward—not in vengeance, not merely to destroy, but to build a free

  world for all men. 46

  In another full-page New York Times ad, the department store John Wanamaker

  issued a “Call to Arms. . . . ringing today in the ears of every single American

  in this land. To men, to women, to youngsters and oldsters alike—every single

  one of us has his part to do.” So, cloaking commerce with a mantle of patriotism,

  176 First Week at War: December 8–13, 1941

  Wanamaker’s announced its Lowered Price Policy, which would require more

  careful shopping to avoid the costly and wasteful return of goods. Patrons were

  advised to carry home small packages and, for the Lowered Price Policy to suc-

  ceed, to pay certain charges for services formerly free.

  Winning the war, Wanamaker advised, wasn’t simply a matter of loading and

  firing a gun. It went farther and deeper than that and shopping Wanamaker’s Low-

  ered Price Policy could be viewed as a significant form of patriotism
. 47

  China had always enjoyed the favorable opinion of large segments of the

  American public. One reason was the powerful group of advocates who had

  pleaded its cause in the long war with Japan. Speaking for China, a full-page New

  York Times advertisement for United China Relief headlined: “You Can Help a

  Great People . . . and Help Beat Japan.” The list of supporters named in the ad

  was impressive. Pearl S. Buck was the mega-best-selling author of novels of Chi-

  nese peasant life. Henry Luce placed his publications, Time ,

  Fortune , and Life in

  enthusiastic support of China and the Chinese. William C. Bullit had been U.S.

  Ambassador to China. Paul G. Hoffman, the President of Studebaker; financier

  Thomas W. Lamont; advertising man Raymond Rubicam; movie maker David O.

  Selznick; 1940 presidential candidate Wendell Willkie; and John D. Rockefeller III

  all subscribed their names to support China’s cause.

  The National Advisory Committee of United China Relief contained another

  glittering list of supporters headed by honorary chairman Eleanor Roosevelt. Its

  membership included Miss Katherine Cornell of the stage; Mrs. Dwight W. Morrow,

  mother-in-law of Charles Lindbergh; America’s sweetheart Mary Pickford Rogers;

  Yale president Charles Seymour; journalist Vincent Sheehan; novelist of Indiana life

  Booth Tarkington; steel man Myron C. Taylor; Mrs. Herbert Lehman, wife of New

  York’s Governor; New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia; author and news reporter

  John Gunther; financier Felix Warburg; and historian James Truslow Adams. Zoo

  curator Roy Chapman Andrews was a fitting addition to this star-studded list. 48

  Henry Luce was China’s greatest and perhaps most influential champion. It

  was, therefore, coincidental that in the same edition of The Times as the United China Relief ad there appeared the obituary of his father, the Reverend Dr. Henry

  Winters Luce. A longtime Presbyterian missionary in China, Dr. Luce had been

  president of Yen Ching University in Peiping, a founder of Shantung Christian

  University, a leader in the movement for unifying the boards of Christian colleges

  in China and a leader, too, in educating American religious leaders in the study

  of Asiatic civilizations and cultures. 49 There had been an intimate connection between the life and career of Henry Winters Luce and Henry Luce’s champion-ing of China as the fulcrum of U.S. policy in the Far East.

  America at War: War with Nazi Germany

  Although all eyes were focused on Japan and its rampaging conquests, there

  was a keen appreciation that Japan was not the only game in town. Georgia

  Representative Carl Vinson expressed this succinctly: “We should have extended

  the war declaration to all three aggressor nations.” In his opinion, Congress

  Tuesday, December 9, 1941 177

  was ready to act since participation in the conf lict with Germany and Italy was

  “inevitable.” We might as well, he said, finish the job. 50

  Germany, Italy and Japan shared not only dictatorial regimes and histories of

  aggression. They were in fact united as parties under the September 27, 1940, Tri-

  partite Pact binding each party to come to the aid of another party that was under

  attack. This raised the question of the meaning of the word “attacked” in Article

  III of the Pact. Germany claimed in 1941 that its attack on the Soviet Union had

  preempted a Soviet attack on Germany, which would qualify as an attack under

  the Pact. The Japanese had not then accepted that invitation to declare war on

  Russia. It was now speculated that the parties to the Pact would enter into another

  new deal guaranteeing a declaration of war on the United States in the com-

  ing spring with the aim of reducing or totally stopping Lend-Lease deliveries to

  Britain. It was in the ancient tradition of wars of conquest that it was bruited

  about that Japan might be rewarded in the event of an eventual declaration of war

  against Russia by being allowed to keep Eastern Siberia as far to the west of Irkutsk

  Province as she could conquer. 51

  In Berlin, a German government spokesman could not tell where a German pol-

  icy might tend but promised that a “clarifying document” would “soon” be issued.

  A hint of future action might be found in an announcement of the cancellation of

  an opera performance in the Kroll Opera House, a customary venue for important

  announcements by the Nazi hierarchy. 52 If, for the moment, the Nazi leadership remained silent as to Germany’s further course of action, it did allow that they were

  impressed by the size and speed of the Japanese attack; and they paid tribute to the

  Japanese armed forces “for their traditional bravery and military strength.” 53

  German reticence notwithstanding, there was a well-founded suspicion in

  Washington that Hitler had pushed Japan into war with America in order to

  lessen its support of Britain, and there was a sober appreciation of how unlikely

  it was that the United States would fight one member of the Axis openly in the

  Pacific while not engaging in what was essentially the same war with another Axis

  partner in the Atlantic. 54

  A gauge in the state of relations between the United States and Japan’s other

  Axis partners could be found in the FBI roundups of aliens, not only Japanese, but

  also Germans and Italians, citizens of countries with which, for the moment, no state

  of war with the United States existed. Although several Japanese and a few Italians

  were arrested, it appeared that the action was concentrated on Germans, the object

  of search and arrest in parts of Connecticut and in San Francisco. The FBI staff

  indicated that its orders had come direct from the U.S. Attorney General’s office.

  The scene did not lack for drama. In New York the arrested aliens were taken to

  the Barge Office on the Battery, from which they would proceed to Ellis Island. The

  Barge Office was surrounded by Coast Guardsmen carrying rifles with bayonets

  fixed while police cars cruised back and forth in front of the building. Such actions

  would contribute to an atmosphere of the inevitability of further hostilities. 55

  At this date, one thing was clear: the nation was united as it had rarely been

  before. Whatever the extent of the Japanese victory at Pearl Harbor, the unity

  of the American nation would one day tilt the scales fatally for Japan. It was

  178 First Week at War: December 8–13, 1941

  therefore a pregnant question asked by Harold Brayman of the Houston Chronicle .

  What if Japan moved southward—or in many other available directions—without

  engaging the United States? What would America do in the case of a Japanese

  takeover of Malaya, Thailand or the Dutch East Indies? America had stood aside

  observing, but not engaging itself against, German conquests of Poland, of France

  and now of Russia. There had been intense sympathy for blitzed and besieged

  Britain, but no one had seriously suggested direct military intervention. The truth

  was that America had never in reality made up its mind; now Japan had made

  America’s mind up for it, and the country waited to see how far and on how many

  fronts it would be engaged. 56

  A Widening War

  Winston Churchill was as good as his word. He had always said that the day the

  United State
s entered the war, it would be followed the next day by Britain’s dec-

  laration of war against America’s enemies. So it was that on December 8, 1941,

  Great Britain declared war against Japan and in parallel Australia, New Zealand,

  the Netherlands, the Free French, Yugoslavia, and several South American coun-

  tries issued their declarations of war on Japan. In this round robin of declarations

  China declared war on Germany, Italy, and Japan, which, of course, had been

  in an actual state of war against China since 1931. This dramatic expansion of

  the war’s dramatis personae enabled the American people to take a proprietary

  interest in the expanded war. No longer was it “their war.” It had become “our

  war.” Thus it would give satisfaction to American newspaper readers to learn that

  the German armies, which had embarked with such panoply on the invasion of

  Russia, and after immense initial victories of encirclement had captured Rus-

  sian forces by the millions, were now stopped, frozen solid on the front before

  Moscow. Reports from Italy confirmed that there would be no further Ger-

  man offensives until springtime. The tables were indeed turned as Soviet forces

  attacked the German lines in Eastern Crimea and the Caucasus, while gaining

  important ground around Taganrog. 57 In Libya, Axis forces were fighting a rear-guard action against British attacks from three directions. 58

  On the home front the Supply Priorities Allocation Board, the nation’s top

  economic planning authority under the leadership of Vice President Henry Wal-

  lace, was preparing to submit to the President its gigantic “Victory Program” call-

  ing for expenditures of some $4 billion a month in 1942 and 1943—this in a time

  when a billion dollars was really a billion dollars. This was no longer a “defense

  program”; it was now a “Victory Program.” Its purpose was stated:

  To bring every possible man, machine and material into an all-out produc-

  tion effort to repulse the Japanese and continue Lease-Lend aid to other

  nations resisting the Axis.

  From now on every action by this Board and by the related civilian

  agencies of the government must be keyed to one goal—complete victory

  in this war which has been thrust upon us.

  Tuesday, December 9, 1941 179

 

‹ Prev