Lucullus

by Lee Fratantuono

  We lack definitive knowledge about the plans of Tigranes and Mithridates in this period. As so often in military history, the real question is who fired the first shot of the new (or continuing/ongoing) war. Did the two kings intend to launch their own invasions and acts of aggression? There is certainly some ancient evidence to support this, but our sources do not permit absolute certainty. A waiting game had advantages of its own, especially when Lucullus had so much land to cross, and so many potential pitfalls to avoid in pursuit of Mithridates. Lucullus was in a position of having to make clear that his war was not so much one of aggression against Armenia and its allies, as of tracking down the fugitive Pontic king.

  We do well to remember throughout that Tigranes was in a singularly difficult position. He could not eject Mithridates without running serious domestic risks. But the alternative was to risk involving himself in his father-in-law’s war. Some might criticize the Armenians for not being prepared; certainly Lucullus caught them by surprise by his rapid march to the Euphrates before the usual spring campaigning season. One of the sad truths of Lucullus’ life is that those who would accuse him of dilatory behaviour do so at the price of ignoring just how quickly he consistently moved when the strategic situation demanded it. This rapidity of movement put significant burdens on his soldiers, burdens that contributed to Lucullus’ problems in army maintenance and affection. Lucullus’ strategy was simple: the war needed to be ended quickly, and the head of Mithridates was the final goal marker. Tigranes might do better to delay, but before he knew it and could react, Lucullus was on his territory, having crossed one of the major geographical boundaries that marked his kingdom.

  Mithrobarzanes

  Was Tigranes a tyrant?19 If Plutarch can be trusted, he was certainly rash and unpredictable: the first messenger who brought news to the king that Lucullus was on his way was decapitated.20 Appian tells the same story, with hanging as the capital punishment, and the attempt at an explanation that Tigranes was trying to maintain calm in Armenia. Still, the news was important to the king’s intelligence and reconnaissance information, and he prepared a reception welcome of 2,000 cavalry under the command of Mithrobarzanes (according to Appian), or perhaps 3,000.21 Plutarch notes that Mithrobarzanes was one of the few men in the king’s palace who was willing to tell him the truth – his reward would seem to be the commission of dealing with the Romans, with the orders that Lucullus was to be brought back alive, but his army destroyed. Mithrobarzenes was the king’s representative in Sophene, and was to lose his life in the king’s service.

  For as it turned out, Mithrobarzanes would be killed in battle, and his force almost annihilated to a man. Plutarch relates that Lucullus himself saw to the organization of his camp, entrusting the task of guarding against the Armenian force to his subordinate Sextilius. Sextilius, who had some 1,600 cavalry and about as many infantry, was ordered to be cautious and to wait for the enemy – essentially to serve as a powerful sentry force to buy time for Lucullus to fortify and organize the camp for the main body of his army. Mithrobarzanes was either daring or recklessly foolish, and chose to attack – a disastrous decision. Appian relates that Lucullus met Mithrobarzanes in battle and routed him.22 Mithrobarzanes had proven himself unable to meet the challenge Tigranes had put before him; his brave willingness to tell the king what was really happening was to be his undoing.

  There may be some insight here into the workings of a despotic monarchy, one in which to tell the truth may well be fatal, but to be caught in a lie is equally deadly. The truth may well be that Tigranes was panicked; he did not expect Lucullus to be knocking at his door this quickly, and he had no road map ahead for how to settle the Roman problem that had escalated from Clodius’ embassy to Lucullus’ army being across the Euphrates. His only hopes now were to surrender his father-in-law – a prospect that was even more unpalatable now than before in terms of honour and saving face – or destroying the Roman force in a set battle. Merely buying time was no longer so viable a plan of action, especially against an opponent capable of rapid movement in the manner of Lucullus. It is likely that at some point in this period, Tigranes realized that the situation was more hazardous than he had initially gauged it to be. He may have felt that Lucullus would move more slowly and deliberately, either because of resistance or to allow his men to plunder at length and freely. Before he could possibly have been satisfactorily prepared, the Romans were in Armenia, having also crossed the Tigris.

  Tigranocerta

  The real prize in the region, however, was the great city of Tigranocerta.23 The name of the city apparently means ‘made by Tigranes’, and there were four cities with the same appellation. It was located in modern south-eastern Turkey, in the region of the country that is ethnically predominately Kurdish – the exact location is elusive, in large part thanks to the action of Lucullus. Tigranes entrusted the defence of the mighty city to Mancaeus. The king meanwhile was focused on raising a large army to face any possible threat from the Romans; he was also engaged in conflict elsewhere across the vast territory of Armenia and its neighbours. One gets the impression that Tigranes was not entirely prepared for this war. Lucullus had admittedly made great use of forced marches and had appeared in Armenia quite rapidly, but in hindsight, it is reasonable to conclude that the king could have done more to ready himself for the arrival of the Roman invasion force. The fact that Tigranes needed to give the job of defence to Mancaeus is ample evidence of how caught by surprise the Armenians truly were; Lucullus was not supposed to be anywhere near Tigranocerta this early. On the other hand, the conscription of a large force would need the king’s personal touch. There was simply insufficient time to do everything that was necessary to prepare for a battle with the main body of the Roman force. If we can believe the evidence of Pliny the Elder, Tigranocerta was situated – not surprisingly – on a lofty height (in excelso).24

  Appian says that Tigranes raised a force of a quarter of a million men and some 50,000 cavalry, of which 6,000 were eventually sent to Tigranocerta for the sake of breaking through the Roman siege lines and rescuing the king’s concubines.25 The detail is reminiscent of Mithridates’ decision to kill his female relatives and companions – Tigranes was more interested in the survival of his harem and in maintaining a lifestyle of luxury. The clear implication of the report is that the king was a decadent potentate. Tigranes was able to raise impressive numbers – his father-in-law had had the same ability – though with the problem that armies of this size were both unwieldy and difficult to train effectively. Quantity and not quality was the hallmark of the king’s forces. Tigranes was able to achieve some measure of success in rescuing his apparently beloved women. There is some confusion as to the nature of the operation, but it appears that the concubines were kept in a fortress of some sort near Tigranocerta (why they would be in a separate location, outside the city, is unclear). There is also doubt as to who commanded siege operations in the vicinity of Tigranocerta in this period. Was it Lucullus himself, waiting for the advent of Tigranes, or one of his subordinates? Were there attacks on nearby towns and suburbs of the city? Our sources are not clear.26

  Advice of an Old King

  Plutarch relates that Lucullus tried his best to keep Tigranes from amassing his reinforcements. Sextilius was sent to attack an Arab contingent that was approaching to join Tigranes’ main body; they were mostly slain. Lucullus was also focused on the siege of the splendid Armenian capital. He surmised correctly that Tigranes would never tolerate the siege of the crown jewel of his urban landscape, but would be goaded into joining battle as soon as possible. Appian reports that now and only now did Mithridates enter the king’s presence, and that his advice was simple: harass the enemy with cavalry and choke off their supplies – in no way join battle in a set piece engagement.27 One can understand why Tigranes might have disregarded the king’s advice. He had, after all, been defeated in disgrace by Lucullus, and was perhaps not the most persuasive purveyor of wisdom about what to do in the current
situation. But history would prove that Mithridates was correct. Tigranes allegedly spoke contemptuously of the size of the Roman force when first he saw it, noting that if the Romans had come as ambassadors, there were too many of them, and if as an invading army, there were too few. If Tigranes’ forces had been even moderately successful in the operation to rescue the king’s women, then his courage and daring may well have been supplemented.

  But what are we to make of Lucullus’ judgment and wisdom in dealing with Tigranes? From a military perspective, there is certainly a general acclaim for the commander’s talents. But the argument that Lucullus was utterly unprepared for managing a problem like Tigranes’ Armenia has been raised. Lucullus would have felt a pressing need at this time to return to Rome, were he to want to maintain his influence in political affairs. Military operations in the West had ended, and Pompey had returned home; Crassus and he were now the men of the hour. Crassus had achieved his victory over Spartacus, though Pompey had stolen some of the glory for that (with a small part reserved for Lucullus’ younger brother). What was clear was that a victory over Tigranes needed to come swiftly and decisively – a rabbit hunt into Armenia would simply not do.28

  We may explore further at this point the question of when exactly Mithridates and Tigranes were reconciled. Among our extant sources, only Appian places it so late in the course of affairs.29 Again, Tigranes was in the difficult straits of having every action subjected to microscopic examination. On the one hand, he had the expectations of hospitality and respect for a relative. On the other, any indulgence to Mithridates might be seen as an offence against Rome and a provocation or pretext for war. It seems more logical to conclude that Appian is in error here, and that the two kings began their discussions earlier rather than later – some of which would have been relatively easy to keep concealed from a wider audience. Tigranes seems to have settled upon the idea of moving quickly in a pre-emptive strike against the Romans – he is said to have ordered an invasion of Lyaconia and Cilicia – but it is not clear exactly what his overall strategy was. It was certainly not a plan to draw the Romans deeper and deeper into hostile territory. Mithridates was sent back to Pontus to lead his own force in an attempt to recapture his kingdom, but nothing much came of this in the end, and the king without a kingdom was soon on his way back to Tigranes.

  Did Lucullus catch Tigranes and Mithridates by surprise? This is likely, and may explain the significance of the stories of the near-miraculous fording of the Euphrates. If the kings expected to have more months to prepare, the speed with which Lucullus appeared before Tigranocerta would have quickly disabused them of their miscalculation. That said, one wonders what exactly Tigranes hoped to accomplish where Mithridates had failed. The Romans were in arguably a stronger position than before, and Tigranes had no navy with which to press a war on sea as well as land. And a defeated king was more a liability than anything.

  The local population no doubt quickly realized that Lucullus was after one thing – the head of Mithridates. He displayed no interest in seizing and holding territory. He was not motivated by greed or infected with a spirit of hateful sadism and lust for conquering force. He had a simple mission, though the aftermath of success remained unclear and uncertain. Officially, he had no complaint against Tigranes except that the Armenian king was harbouring a fugitive from Roman justice. It is likely that Lucullus made clear to the minor rulers whose realms he traversed that he had no interest whatsoever in establishing Roman rule in these far-flung would-be outposts of empire. It is also clear that while Lucullus had legal justification for pursuing Mithridates, any complaint that he was risking a major loss to the Roman army by engaging Tigranes was also reasonable: he was now deeper and deeper into potentially hostile territory, and Rome now faced an escalating foreign crisis at exactly the time when recovery in Spain and in Italy were in full vigour. The persistence of the Asian problem was in some ways more troubling for Lucullus on the home front than on the front line of battle. Mithridates and Tigranes would prove easier opponents in some regards than Lucullus’ enemies and rivals in Rome. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that the local population had any particular love for the Romans, especially as potentially longterm visitors.

  Leaving aside questions of reconnaissance and intelligence, it is reasonable to conclude that the two kings expected Lucullus to aim for Tigranocerta. It was an obvious enough target, and a citadel that could not just be ceded to the Romans without a fight. The only real question was how long it would take Lucullus to arrive there, and he had already proven that he was capable of surprisingly swift movements.

  The Advice of Mithridates and Taxiles

  Mithridates had counselled patience and a resistance to a decisive engagement, and his one-time trusted general Taxiles was also on the scene to support his employer’s wise advice. Tigranes is said to have been willing to listen, except when his Armenians and other allies began to argue that Mithridates was simply trying to deprive the king of his chance at a great victory, indeed that the deposed Pontic king was jealous of Tigranes’ great opportunity to succeed where he had failed so miserably and ignominiously. Taxiles was present at a banquet where both courtiers and kings were urging Tigranes to move quickly to attack Lucullus, and Mithridates’ general was nearly killed when he bravely interposed the view that caution was the best strategy. One of the best ways to defeat a delayer is with delay, but there were too many at Tigranes’ court who saw the king’s superiority in numbers, and the fact that the Armenians knew the terrain better, as ample reasons for striking hard and fast against what could be derided as a mere Roman expeditionary force. It is also possible that Mithridates had been tempered by multiple experiences of defeat and loss. Tigranes was relatively uneducated and inexperienced in these matters; his inclination may have been to pursue a riskier strategy than his father-in-law.

  Tigranes was certainly won over by the flattering words of his allies. He is said even to have lamented that he was heading out to face only Lucullus, and not every Roman commander together and at once.30 It is quite possible that Tigranes thought that where Mithridates had failed, he would succeed. Victory at Tigranocerta would ensure the worth of his name among even more potential allies, though a rudimentary knowledge of Roman history would have taught him that he had embarked on an exceedingly dangerous course of action, whatever the outcome of the present engagement.

  Zero Hour

  Plutarch respectfully notes that Tigranes had an impressively huge army of allied supporters, such that his confidence was not that of a madman. There is also the interesting detail that Lucullus duly noted the details about the opposing force in a missive to the senate. A politically cautious and expedient man might have cautioned the commander that by revealing the size of the enemy units before the battle had been joined, there may have been consternation in Rome at the idea that Lucullus was leading the Roman military into a dangerous and unnecessarily risky venture deep in enemy territory. No one could claim, at any rate, that Lucullus was dishonest.

  Plutarch records that Tigranes commanded 20,000 archers and slingers, 55,000 cavalry (of which 17,000 were armoured, the so-called cataphracts) and 150,000 infantry.31 The army appeared even larger than it actually was, given that Tigranes deliberately placed his engineers and other workers in the rear to augment the massive force. When the inhabitants of Tigranocerta saw the mighty army of the king massed for battle, they cheered and celebrated at the hour of their deliverance – and at once the Romans faced a difficult decision. We do well to remember that sources can be prone to exaggeration in the matter of the numbers of enemy forces. Plutarch’s figures are given the support of Lucullus’ actual senatorial dispatches, though one might wonder if the commander himself rounded the numbers up to embellish his achievement, or if he estimated incorrectly because of the misleadingly huge appearance of the enemy host. There is a fragment of the second-century AD historian Phlegon of Tralles, who was a freedman of the Emperor Hadrian. Phlegon composed a so-calle
d Olympiads in sixteen books, of which only fragments survive. He asserts that the Armenians had 40,000 infantry and 30,000 cavalry – smaller numbers than Plutarch, to be sure, and perhaps closer to the truth. But Phlegon’s numbers still point to a seriously imbalanced competition.

  Some urged that Lucullus should at once take to the field and face the army of the king in set battle. Others noted that the city was dangerous, and that to abandon the siege was to expose the main Roman body to harassment and worse from the rear. Lucullus decided to leave Murena behind to maintain the siege of the Armenian capital, with a force of some 6,000 men, while he himself would lead twenty-four cohorts, with a total of some 10,000 heavy infantry, against the king. In addition, he would bring about 1,000 cavalry, archers and slingers.

  The appearance of the Roman army brought down mockery from Tigranes’ men on the weak impression Lucullus’ force made. Soon, we are told, the king’s commanders were arguing for the honour of moving forward alone to destroy such a seemingly insignificant force. Those who had argued against Taxiles and Mithridates now seemed to have had their position amply vindicated; it was believed the Romans simply had too few troops to pose any real threat to the ranks of Armenians and their countless allies.