Lucullus

by Lee Fratantuono

  40. Cf. Keaveney, 2009, p.94: ‘Acknowledging that Lucullus benefited by the advice of an alleged whore, we should be equally ready to admit that many a man has come to grief because of the advice of a good woman.’ Keaveney interprets the episode as an example of the ‘indirect influence’ of otherwise disenfranchised women in Roman politics. It is important to note that Plutarch does not specify if Lucullus had a sexual liaison with Praecia, even if one might be tempted to assume that he did; see further here A.K. Strong, Prostitutes and Matrons in the Roman World (Cambridge, 2016), p.71. Strong comments on certain aspects and features of Plutarch’s language that point to the emphasis on the example of female agency in traditionally male political endeavours. The Praecia affair is exactly the sort of salacious, gossip-laden tale that appeals to some students of social history; in point of fact, that matter may have been quite boring indeed, and merely an example of Lucullus taking careful note of who had influence over Cethegus. We do well to remember, too, that the Romans were not particularly bothered by liaisons with ‘courtesans’ – but they were more than happy to ridicule those (like Cethegus?) who were especially infatuated with a given high-priced call girl. In the end, what mattered most to Lucullus was securing his Asian command. It is interesting to note that for all the criticism we know that Lucullus received throughout his career, the Praecia episode does not seem to have been used against him.

  Chapter 4: The Third Mithridatic War

  1. On the vexed question of when the war started, note B.C. McGing, ‘The Date of the Outbreak of the Third Mithridatic War’, Phoenix 38.1 (1984), pp.12–18, with argument in favour of the ‘negative conclusion that the spring of 74 is impossible’. Most valuable is Appendix II of Keaveney, 2009, pp.255 ff., with exceptionally detailed appraisal of all the surviving evidence (both literary and numismatic). Keaveney concludes that the two consuls, Lucullus and Cotta, both departed for Asia in 74, with the war perhaps already in progress. Cotta left first, then Lucullus.

  2. Cotta’s duties are neatly described by McGushin, 1994, p.163: ‘As his specific task in the campaign against Mithridates the proconsul M. Aurelius Cotta had undertaken in 73 the reduction of the Pontic coast and the siege of Heraclea, in which he was to be assisted by Lucullus’ naval commander C. Valerius Triarius when the latter had finished his tasks in the Aegean (Memnon, 42–3). The siege of Heraclea lasted two years.’ Cotta was essentially responsible for the Heraclea operation, and Triarius for actions in the Aegean. Some of Mithridates’ naval forces consisted of units returning from his earlier reinforcement of Sertorius; historians debate exactly why the ships were on their way back to the king now – possibly because Sertorius had died. Memnon (chapter 27.5) notes that when Mithridates sailed past Heraclea, he was not admitted to the city, though the inhabitants did provide supplies. His naval commander eventually arranged for the kidnap of two leading citizens, and the Heracleans were forced to provide the king with five triremes. The Romans were thus disposed to consider the Heracleans to be enemies; when the tax collectors arrived in Heraclea, they attemped to impose harsh indemnities on the residents. The Heracleans are said to have been persuaded by some of the more daring men of the city to kill the Romans and to make sure that the bodies were well hidden.

  3. Historiae III, fr.16 Ramsey.

  4. Orosius is the fourth-fifth-century AD author of the Historiarum adversus Paganos Libri VII, an important, late source of information for historiography. Book VI preserves significant details of Lucullus’ dealings with Mithridates. The most convenient edition is the three-volume Budé set of Orose: Histoires contre les Païens (with critical Latin text, French translation and brief commentary), edited by Marie-Pierre Arnaud Lindet; the second volume contains Books IV-VI (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1991).

  5. Vita Luculli VII.

  6. Historiae III, frr.19–20 Ramsey.

  7. X.71.

  8. For the Bastarnae, see especially McGing, 1986, p.61. ‘The most powerful peoples to the north and north west of the Black Sea were the Sarmatians and the Bastarnae … In connection with the Third Mithridatic War the Bastarnae are called the bravest of his troops and specific Sarmatian tribes are named among his forces.’ Cf. Appian XII.69 and 71.

  9. See Lavery, 1994, p.270, for the argument that dignitas was perhaps an ‘overdeveloped’ quality in Lucullus’ personality. Lavery, p.273, concludes that ‘Lucullus suffered truly egregious injustices, but even this kindly biographer [i.e., Plutarch] cannot always see him as victimized.’

  10. Cyzicus was remembered for its loyalty to Rome; it became a prominent city of Mysia, and one of the greatest cities of Asia Minor.

  11. Historiae III, fr.21 Ramsey.

  12. Some of these events are recorded in Epitome XCIII of Livy. Livy was inevitably epitomized in antiquity; his original work was 142 books in length. We have the so-called Periochae of the entire work; these epitomes are actually summaries of what was already an abridged version of Livy.

  13. XI.72.

  14. Vita Luculli IX.1.

  15. For the Magius affair, see especially Keaveney, 2009, p.105.

  16. Sallust, Historiae fr.III.25 Ramsey; Frontinus, Strategemata III.3.16; Florus, Epitome I.40.16; Orosius, Historia VI.2.14.

  17. Orosius has a similar story: Lucullus Mithridatem Cyzicenos obsidentem fossa cinxit eumque quod faciebat pati compulit atque ad ipsos Cyzicenos, ut bono animo essent, nuntium misit unum ex militibus natandi peritum, quo duobus utribus suspensus mediam ipse regulam tenens plantisque subremigans septem milia passuum transmeavit (VI.2.14). Cf. also Frontinus, Strategemata III.13.6, amid the author’s discussion of inventive ways to send and to receive messages.

  18. XI.73.

  19. Cf. Sallust, Historiae fr.III.36.

  20. And for the story of how noise was heard on Mount Dindymon that sounded like a Bacchic revel, as if the gods were making their departure from the cause of their former favourite, see Keaveney, 2009, pp. 110–11 – another example of alleged divine intervention and commentary on events.

  21. Appian XII.76.

  22. Historiae fr.III.31 Ramsey.

  23. Historiae fr.III.32 Ramsey.

  24. Memnon provides a straightforward account (chapter 29) of subsequent developments. Cotta proceeds from Chalcedon to face the king at Nicomedeia; Triarius comes of his own accord. Mithridates manages his escape, though a storm wrecks some of his vessels. Mithridates gains control of Heraclea by a subterfuge of alcohol and feasting to cover his de facto conquest. A garrison is established in the city of 4,000 of the king’s men under Connacorex. Mithridates proceeds to Sinope. Lucullus, Cotta and Triarius prepare to invade Pontus. After hearing about the situation at Heraclea, Lucullus decided to turn against Cappadocia and leave Heraclea to Cotta; Triarius would manage naval affairs and block any attempt of the king’s allied ships to arrive from Spain and Crete. Mithridates, meanwhile, planned for his own alliances, of which only his overtures to the Armenian Tigranes would be received favourably. Diophantus and Taxiles were the king’s generals in ground operations against the Roman armies, with a force of 40,000 infantry and 8,000 horse. There were nearly daily skirmishes, and two larger-scale cavalry engagements; the Romans won the first, the king’s men the second. Lucullus sends men for supplies in Cappadocia; the king’s two generals send 4,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry to check them. The Romans won handily, and the generals eventually fled the rout of their camp, bringing news of the defeat to Mithridates. The bad tidings were followed at once by the king’s decision to have the women of the royal household slain.

  Memnon, chapters 32 ff. detail the aftermath of events for Cotta and Triarius. Cotta eventually marched against Heraclea, where he met with limited success in his siege operations. Triarius set out from Nicomedeia to confront the king’s naval forces; Roman fortunes were significantly better on water than on land. Cotta continued to prosecute his siege of Heraclea, with some unsuccessful attempts at securing diplomatic alliances from the kings of the Bosporus. Trirarius eventually arrives with naval su
pport to aid in the operations. Mithridates’ commander Connacorex eventually decided to betray the city not to Cotta (whom he considered untrustworthy and oppressive), but to Triarius. The plan was eventually common knowledge in Heraclea; Connacorex was able to escape by sea, but not before engaging in successful deception of the Heracleans – he told them all would be well, and that Mithridates would soon appear with Tigranes to save them. The Heracleans essentially awoke to the news that the city had been betrayed to the Romans; Triarius’ forces arrived en masse, and there were atrocities as the Romans took revenge for the long and difficult siege operations. Those who could flee made their way to Cotta, and he learned of the disaster from them. There was nearly an outbreak of civil war, as Cotta’s forces felt cheated of their rightful glory. Cotta was no kinder to the Heracleans than Triarius; he ransacked even the contents of sacred precincts and temples, including a statue of Heracles. Cotta eventually sent his infantry and cavalry to Lucullus, dismissed his allies and prepared to return to Rome by ship; in a detail that no doubt gave Memnon pleasure to record, some of the ships were sunk under the weight of the stolen treasures of Heraclea. Triarius meanwhile went in pursuit of Connacorex, who had captured Tius and Amastris; Connacorex was allowed to flee, with the cities taken without a blow being struck.

  Cotta would eventually be hailed as Ponticus imperator (Memnon, chapter 39) for his efforts at Heraclea. Cotta was criticized, however, for his plunder of the city; even after he handed over much of the loot to the treasury, he was still accused of avarice. The prisoners of Heraclea were released; Cotta was accused in the assembly by the Heraclean Thrasymedes. Cotta was spared exile, but he was expelled from the ranks of the senators. The Heracleans were given back their land, and exempted from any threat of slavery. Thrasymedes would eventually become instrumental in the attempt to rejuvente Heracles (Memnon, chapter 40); he is credited with having gathered together some 8,000 settlers.

  25. Cf. Orosius VI.2.15, where he begins a grim catalogue of the king’s losses: Mithridates inopia laborans partem copiarum instructam atmis domum abire praecepit; quam Lucullus excipiens universam disperdidit: nam amplius quindecim milia hominum tunc interfecisse narratur (Plutarch says 20,000, not 15,000, were slain). At VI.2.19, Orosius notes the plague and pestilence, and the general lack of supplies; vast numbers are citied as having died in consequence (nam plus quam trecenta milia hominum fame et morbo in eadem obsidione amisisse fertur).

  26. XII.76.

  27. Vita Luculli XII.1–2.

  28. Orosius: Marius postera die de spelunca, ubi latebat, extractus meritas hostilis animi poenas luit (VI.6.22).

  29. XII.77.

  30. For an overview of the entirety of the post-Cyzican operations, note especially McGushin, 1994, pp.98–100, with coverage of how after Cyzicus, Mithridates went by sea to Parium, while he sent a land contingent to Lampsacus; the king’s subsequent attempt to create a diversion with the forces of the Sertorian general Marius; his failed attempts to regain access to the Mediterranean and communication ultimately with his allies in Spain and elsewhere; the storm that nearly destroyed him and his subsequent building up of new forces; and Lucullus’ preparations to invade Pontus.

  31. Vita Luculli XIII.

  32. XI.78.

  33. Vita Luculli XV.

  34. Vita Luculli XV.3–4.

  35. XII.80.

  36. XII.79.

  37. Stratagemata II.5.30.

  38. On how the Romans managed to find the manpower for the conflict with Spartacus, cf. McGushin, 1994, pp.146–47.

  39. Eutropius is a source for the Spartacus War (Breviarium VI.7), which is otherwise not as fully documented as we might wish; while quite specific in some regards – e.g., there were seventy-four escaped gladiators from the school at Capua, and an eventual servile army of almost 60,000 – the account credits Crassus with the final victory, with no mention of Pompey’s aid, or of the forces of Marcus Lucullus. Otherwise Eutropius is careful to note the ongoing Macedonian operations of Lucullus’ busy brother. For how it would have been more appealing to the Romans to credit the ultimate victory over Spartacus to Pompey precisely because he was returning from other campaigns – in other words, the defeat of the slaves was achieved as if it were some minor footnote to ‘real’ campaigns – see Greenhalgh, 1980, p.64: ‘[A]nd if it was Crassus who erected an impressively macabre monument to his victory by crucifying six thousand captives along the Appian War from Capua to Rome, it was Pompey who was the hero of the day.’

  40. XII.81.

  41. The story is also mentioned by Memnon (chapter 30 of Jacoby’s edition), who notes that after Mithridates had ordered the princesses of the royal house to be slain, he was pursued in his attempted escape by some Gauls, who did not realize who he was. They stopped to plunder the treasure mule, and Mithridates was able to escape. Mithridates was able to reach Armenia, though Lucullus did send Marcus Pompeius after him.

  42. ‘Then, since he recognized that Pontus was now lost, the half-Hellenized king revealed the oriental side of his character in his determination that his womenfolk should not fall into the victors’ hands’, Keaveney, 2009, p. 122. Scholars who emphasize the humanity of Lucullus are fond of citing episodes such as this in praise of their subject.

  43. Of course for all things Heraclean we have the evidence of the historian Memnon.

  44. Vita Luculli XVIII.6.

  45. Vita Luculli XVIII.6.

  46. Epistulae II.2.26–40. There is a full commentary in C.O. Brink, Horace on Poetry, Epistles Book II, The Letters to Augustus and Florus (Cambridge, 1982). Brink takes the poet’s reference to a miles or ‘soldier’ to refer to a specific individual in Lucullus’ army; he offers notes on the evidence of the passage in terms of the question of Lucullus’ relationship with his soldiery.

  47. Vita Luculli XXII.1.

  48. Memnon (chapter 31 of Jacoby’s edition) notes that Mithridates was treated with the customary signs of hospitality, and received a bodyguard – though Tigranes refused to meet him.

  49. On the vexed question of the year of Sertorius’ death, see e.g. Spann, 1987, pp.129 ff.

  50. Memnon (chapter 22.10) notes that Sulla would have destroyed Athens, had senatorial forces not intervened to check his intention.

  51. Keaveney, 2009, p. 124 n.49, makes the important point that where Sulla was obeyed in the matter of the plundering of Athens, Lucullus did not enjoy the same command over his men – that Sulla was the one who determined just how savage the seizure of the city would be, not his men. It is impossible to determine for certain how much of this difference between the men depended on their respective command abilities and the relative loyalties of their men, and how much was a concomitant of just how long Lucullus’ men had spent under arms. Sulla’s had certainly been away from home for far shorter and less difficult a time.

  52. The business of the fire and the wish of Lucullus to save the city from the flames is also cited by Orosius: Lucullus miserorum hostium intestina clade permotus celeri occasu inmissum restinxit incendium. Ita misera civitas versa vice hostium sociorumque unde defendenda disperdita et unde disperdenda servata est (VI.3.2).

  53. Vita Luculli XXIII; XII.82.

  54. Chapter 37 of Jacoby’s edition.

  55. Memnon also notes that Mithridates had entrusted Sinope to one Leonippus, who had offered to betray the city to Lucullus. Leonippus was himself betrayed to the people of Sinope by his colleagues Cleochares and Seleucus; the people did not believe the report of Leonippus’ treachery because of his generally good reputation – and so the other officers had him ambushed and slain in the night. The people were annoyed by the murder, but Cleochares and his associates seized control of the city government and acted in a tyrannical fashion in the hope of maintaining order. Their tyranny only increased in savagery and cruelty after they defeated a Roman fleet of fifteen triremes under the command of Censorinus (the ships were bringing grain from the Bosporus to feed Lucullus’ forces). Eventually, Cleochares and Seleucus disagreed over
strategy; the former wanted to maintain the war, while the latter opined that they could kill all the citizens of Sinope and hand over the city to the Romans for a handsome profit.

  56. Cf. Rawson, 1975, p.53: ‘There are echoes in the speech [i.e., the Ciceronian Pro Lege Manilia] of the reform programme of 70, especially on the need for clean provincial government: Pompey is irreproachable in such matters (so, it seems, had Lucullus been, but Lucullus had been too intent on defending the provincials against Roman tax-farmers and businesses to please that class).’

  57. Lavery, 1994, p.265, argues that ‘History’s verdict must highlight, even in preference to Lucullus’ notable military conquests, his rescue from almost total economic collapse of the Roman province of Asia.’

  58. XII.83.

  59. Vita Luculli XXIV.1.

  60. Cf. Eutropius: Ergo Lucullus, repetens hostem fugatum, etiam regnum Tigranis qui Armeniis imperabat ingressus est (Therefore Lucullus, seeking his enemy who had fled, also entered the kingdom of Tigranes who was ruling over the Armenians) (Breviarium VI.9.1). Eutropius moves at once to the capture of Tigranocerta.

  Chapter 5: Armenia

  1. For the problems of timeline, see Keaveney, 2009, p.135.

  2. XII.84.

  3. For the situation in Syria at the time, note T.C. Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, Volume II (Oxford, 2000), p.410.

  4. Josephus briefly mentions the need for Tigranes to return to Armenia in the wake of Lucullus’ invasion of his kingdom (Bellum Iudaicum I.116); cf. Antiquitates XIII.421.

  5. See further here J.D. Grainger, The Fall of the Seleukid Empire, 187–75 BC (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2015), pp.195–97. Grainger’s volume is the third and final in his series on the mighty successor state to Alexander’s kingdom in the Near East.