Sikunder Burnes
Page 22
This was of course true, but no more so than of any book published by a Company officer. Elphinstone’s revisions do not appear substantive.12 Fontanier’s determination to be unimpressed wilted when invited to dinner with Burnes:
He had a quick, penetrating mind, and his society was very agreeable […] he was very unassuming and natural in his manners, and showed proof of much frankness in his conversation […] we conversed a great deal about Persia and Eastern policy.13
Fontanier surmised correctly that Burnes’ views on Persian policy came from McNeill. He found Burnes angry that the slave trade was active in Jeddah. He also found Burnes determined to continue his feud with Wolff. The latter claimed to have preached Christianity at the Mecca Gate in Jeddah which, as Fontanier put it drily, ‘appeared rather strange to those who are acquainted with Mahometans’.
Burnes was determined to prove Wolff a liar. He therefore led a curious little party, consisting of Captain Wilson of the Hugh Lindsay, a Lieutenant Buckle and Mr Frazer, fellow passengers, and M. Fontanier, in search of Malam Yusuf, with whom Wolff had lodged, to ask if the story were true. Malam Yusuf replied that nobody could ever tell what language Wolff was speaking. Sometimes it seemed to be Persian or Arabic, but the pronunciation was terrible. One day he had indeed gone to the Mecca Gate with a Bible under his arm; but when there ‘if he had spoken or gesticulated, nobody had noticed it’. Fontanier concluded that Wolff was sincere but ‘I had met that missionary, and know the strange delusion into which he had fallen, as to his oratorical abilities.’ Fontanier himself had tried to converse with Wolff in French, Italian, Persian and Turkish, without success, even though Wolff seemed to believe he was fluent in all those languages.
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
While Alex was Away
Even as Burnes had been taking ship in 1833 on his triumphant way to England, Shah Shuja had been setting off to recapture his throne in Kabul. He did so with the active connivance of Claude Wade, who had obtained for him four months’ advance on his pension, and the right to purchase weapons in Delhi tax free. By a treaty of 17 February 1833 he had financial assistance and Muslim levies from Ranjit Singh, in exchange for which Shuja made over his claim on Peshawar, Derajat and Kashmir to the Sikh.
While the Amirs of Sind were negotiating permanent release from any fealty to Kabul in return for one-off assistance to Shuja, Shuja moved with his force through Bhawalpur and occupied Shikarpur, where he extracted loans from the merchants and financiers. After a lengthy stand-off in which more followers rallied to Shuja, boosted by the universal belief he had British support, Shuja defeated the Amirs in battle near Sukkur on 18 January 1834. He then marched on Kandahar with an army of 40,000.
The Barakzais were divided. The Kandahar sirdars urged their brother Dost Mohammed to come to Kandahar to battle Shuja, with the secret intent that Sultan Mohammed Khan from Peshawar would then take Kabul. Dost Mohammed was too wily and instead seized Jalalabad. He then turned back towards Kandahar, arriving just in time to defeat Shah Shuja before its walls, in a battle in which 90,000 troops were theoretically involved but few actually fought, with most chiefs waiting to see who had the advantage. Shuja fled prematurely and decided the battle.
Shuja fled virtually alone, as fast as possible – which happened to mean on Alexander Burnes’ horse, given him by Ranjit Singh. Burnes had ridden it to Ludhiana, Simla, Delhi and Peshawar, and there he had parted with it before his journey to Bokhara, as he did not want an expensive horse to draw attention in Afghanistan. He donated it to two mullahs who had helped him with letters of introduction. They had given it to their father, residing at Shuja’s court-in-exile in Ludhiana. Shuja had seized it, and its speed and endurance now saved his life as he fled to the fortress of Kelat, hotly pursued for over a week. At Kelat the ruler, Mehrab Khan, explained to the pursuers that the law of hospitality obliged him to defend his guest. Kelat being a strong citadel, they gave up.
Going through the wreck of Shuja’s camp, Dost Mohammed discovered letters from Claude Wade, advising various chiefs that support for Shah Shuja would be appreciated by the British government.1 Dost Mohammed had received Burnes’ protestations of friendship only two years before, and his faith in the British must have been severely shaken.
Shortly after, in March 1834, the British extended their intelligence network by sending their newswriter, Mir Karamat Ali, to Kandahar. He had a monthly salary of Rs250, plus Rs50 per month for qasids, writing materials and travel.2 His postion must have been difficult and dangerous. In accordance with the secret agreement with Shuja, the Sikh general Hari Singh ‘seized’ Peshawar from Sultan Mohammed Khan, (who was in on the plot), a terrible blow to the Afghan state. Dost Mohammed must have regarded the British as implicated in the loss of Peshawar. Indeed, the bilateral treaty of 1834 between Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja contained an open reference to British involvement:
Regarding Shikarpore and the territory of Scinde […] the Shah agrees to abide by whatever may be settled as right and proper, in conformity with the happy relations of friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Maharajah through Captain Wade.3
The British subsequently denied it; but Wade had assisted Shuja’s attempt. One result was that Dost Mohammed sent an Ambassador to Russia, requesting assistance over Peshawar. If the British were hostile, perhaps help might come from their rivals.
The authorities in London took a dim view, rebuking Bentinck:
We think that this indulgence ought not to have been granted to Shah Shoojah ool Moolk. The arms, though stated by you to be intended ‘for the protection of his person on his intended journey’, must to all intents and purposes be regarded as purchased for the purpose of invading Caubul with a view to the recovery of his throne. And the exemption of these arms from the ordinary duties constitutes, so far, a virtual breach of the neutrality […] the British Government ought, and professes to, observe.4
At Kandahar one mercenary corps had fought hard for Shuja, under a soldier of Scots and Indian parentage named William Campbell. Campbell had fought against the British at the siege of Baratpur, and in 1826 had entered Ranjit Singh’s service, but been dismissed in a dispute over women. Campbell had raised a regiment of Hindu infantry for Shuja. At Kandahar, he was seriously wounded and captured, but Dost had him treated and engaged in his own service, together with his regiment; they were to feature in the final act of this story.
Dost returned to Kabul. On 4 September 1834 he took part in a solemn ceremony to legitimise his rule. With a stern escort of irregular cavalry including none of his Shia Qizilbash bodyguard, without feasting or show, Dost Mohammed rode out from Kabul. Alongside him rode the hereditary head of the Sunni clergy of Afghanistan, Mir Waiz, to the Sufi shrine of Siah Sung. There, Mir Waiz delicately placed a few blades of grass into the turban5 of a stooping Dost Mohammed.
The ruler of Kabul thus became the Emir al-Muminin – the Commander of the Faithful, Dost Mohammed Ghazi. Dost was now ruler rather than Governor, but with the religious title of Emir rather than the secular one of Shah. He was declaring jihad against the Sikhs of Ranjit Singh, a holy war to win back Peshawar.6 His religious asceticism appeared genuine, his dress and diet became still plainer, his pomp still less, access for complainants still easier.
Dost now had coins struck in his own name, and was referred to as the ruler in Friday prayers in all his lands’ mosques. These were the traditional marks of a ruler in Muslim lands. He never made a claim to hereditary Kingship, or took the title of Shah. But he was staking a stronger claim, that of leadership in holy war. The Qazi having ruled it was legal to force infidels to pay for jihad, Shikarpuri bankers throughout Afghanistan were tortured and extorted into making contributions. There was a tremendous response to Dost’s call of jihad and on 2 January 1835 he left Kabul at the head of a vast army for Peshawar.
On 4 May 1835 at Noushera, the Emir lost Peshawar without a blow being struck. Sultan Mohammed, with all his troops, deserted to Ranjit Singh after days of neg
otiation. The numbers on each side now roughly equal, Dost Mohammed realised he had no chance against the Sikh artillery and made an ignominious retreat back to Kabul. Sultan became again Sirdar of Peshawar – his agreement with Ranjit Singh renounced all family claims and accepted that he and his Peshawar levies would fight with the Sikhs if they attacked Jalalabad, Kandahar or Kabul. It was the ultimate treachery to his family, his faith and his country. As the Emir retreated without a fight, his ghazi supporters pillaged the baggage and deserted in disgust.
A curious Russian counter to Burnes’ visit to Bokhara had occurred while Alex was enjoying London. Claude Wade had reported to Macnaghten information received from Bokhara.7 Dr Martin Honigberger in May 1834 reached Bokhara in a caravan conducted by kafilbashi Hyat, the same man who had led Burnes. Honigberger reported to Wade that a Russian Ambassador, a Muslim Russian subject named Mirza Jafer, was in Bokhara. His purpose was to obtain the Emir’s agreement to a Russian military expedition against the Khanate of Khiva. Jafer also revealed that Persia, with Russian aid, would soon attack Herat.
The Bokharan authorities arranged for Honigberger to depart for Russia with Jafer. Honigberger noted, ‘Besides Persian and Arabic he speaks Italian very fluently and is a good-looking and intelligent man. I shall have an agreeable companion on my journey to Russia.’8
Honigberger realised ‘Mirza Jafer’ was not really a Muslim, and to Honigberger he represented himself as a Frenchman, Baron Demaison, in disguise in the service of Russia. He had been denounced by Tartar merchants in Bokhara, who were themselves Russian subjects but resentful of their overlords. He had responded by producing written testaments of theological credentials from Kazakh mullahs, and Honigberger was present when they were examined by the Kush-Begi. Jafer was a hair’s breadth from execution; rather peculiarly Honigberger suggested to the Kush-Begi that an examination of his skin and hair colouring might give the answer. Jafer escaped this test because he had given ‘large presents’ to the Kush-Begi.
Who Demaison was remains a mystery. Years later, after dining with Witkiewicz, Burnes reported that the Pole definitely ‘is not that Mirza Jaffir who was at Bokhara some years ago […] The true name of that person is Maizon and he is Arabic.’9 Rumours of the mysterious Russian agent Maison or Demaison had been picked up a few years earlier by British intelligence.10
Honigberger discovered that Burnes’ visit to Bokhara had damaged the Kush-Begi’s view of Britain substantially:
His first inquiry was, whether I knew Jussuff Wolff and Alexander Burnes? ‘Wolff’ continued he, ‘was a very good-hearted man, but as for Burnes he was a deceiver, because he told me […] that his intention was to go to England, via Russia, whereas he returned to Hindostan, via Khiva.’ He was convinced that Burnes was a spy […]11
Burnes’ deceit had an impact on the later Bokharan treatment of Stoddart and Conolly.
Masson’s appointment as newswriter would have enhanced his local standing. It also meant that Wade had an alternative expert to Burnes to put forward in policy battles. However Wade’s relationship with Masson was stormy, and he did not pass on the originals of Masson’s reports to Macnaghten and Auckland, but rather summaries which often distorted Masson’s views.
Masson had been in correspondence with British officials before Wade appointed him. He had then held no official position and supposedly was interested only in antiquarian research, yet was continually pumping Pottinger for diplomatic information. For example on 3 October 1833, plainly in response to a request from Masson, Pottinger had replied:
I have not been at Bombay since I left it this time two years […] I am not able to tell you how the Vakeels from Kabul were treated, or whether they succeeded with their object.12
Honigberger, Masson and Gerard had sent back reports and drawings to the Asiatic Society in Calcutta along with numerous coins and artefacts. This occasioned great excitement. It was the first understanding that a Hellenic civilisation had flourished in Central Asia for centuries after the passing of Alexander. A grant of Rs1,500 and annual stipend of Rs1,000 had been sent to Kabul by the Asiatic Society; Honigberger and Gerard having quit the scene, it all went to Masson. Pottinger obtained a further grant of Rs1500 for Masson from the Government of Bombay.13 He also noted he had sent Masson another Rs300 as a personal donation. He was still not aware of Masson’s true identity, as he wrote to Lord Clare recommending Masson as an ‘American gentleman’. Masson’s archaeological excavations were not only well-financed by the British but also by Dost Mohammed’s son Akbar Khan, a fact worth bearing in mind when reading British accounts of ‘Afghan savages’. In April 1834 Masson bagged a further Rs500 as a personal donation from Sir James Campbell, departing British Envoy to Persia.14
According to government historians: ‘Though Honigberger mentions Masson only casually, it appears that the latter accompanied him as far as Orenburg.’15
I hesitate to mention the possibility that Maison was Masson, lest this long shot devalues much more definite evidence of Masson’s Russian connections. It would require collusion by Honigberger – not impossible as he worked for Ranjit Singh. The Doctor mentions only Maison/Jaffer going with him to Orenburg, and Masson is very peculiarly absent from his memoir in general. Masson was fluent in French – how is unknown – and appears in a nineteenth-century Paris ‘Biographie Nationale’ as a Frenchman.16
Through their correspondence on antiquarian studies, Pottinger had become enthralled by Masson. In September 1834 Pottinger was offering to organise publication of his works. At this stage the British authorities had officially been aware who Masson/Lewis was for a year, as Pottinger gushed:
I beg to assure you, that if I can be the medium of making your most interesting discoveries known to the world […] my sole object will be obtained.
On the subject of your MSS I told you in my last, that if you would entrust them to me, I would undertake that they should be published either under the auspices of the Bombay Government, or by one of the learned societies of Great Britain, any of which would gladly snatch at such a prize.17
The authorities now moved to regularise communication with Masson. Not only had Pottinger been informing Masson continually of the movements and views of Company officials, but also Masson had started to draw large sums of extra cash on bills of exchange he was signing off in Kabul as redeemable on a variety of British officials. On 27 February 1835 Pottinger wrote to Masson to say that if one substantial bill for Rs500 on Claude Wade were not honoured, then Pottinger himself would pay it. In the same letter Pottinger encloses for Masson a copy of an instruction from the Governor-General’s office, forbidding Pottinger to continue his correspondence with Masson. In future all contact between Masson and the British government was to be through Claude Wade. Pottinger denied the authority of the Governor-General to prevent non-official correspondence:
I have no idea that the Supreme Government will offer the smallest objection to my continuing to correspond with you on antiquarian and literary subjects which would in truth be an interference with our private actions.18
It seems that Calcutta was unhappy about the amount of intelligence Pottinger was giving Masson; Pottinger told Masson he had replied that ‘my correspondence with you has been, and is, of a purely literary nature’. This was a downright lie; Pottinger had told Masson of British naval movements, of views on Russia and the prospects of war, of the detailed affairs of the British mission to Persia, and other sensitive subjects. Pottinger enclosed a hundi for yet another Rs1,000 from the government of Bombay for Masson’s researches.
In January 1836, two years after ‘Mirza Jafer’, Witkiewicz had ridden to Bokhara on an open mission,19 to negotiate the release of detained Russian merchants. But like Burnes, he was in secret studying armed forces and fortifications, and surveying possible routes for a Russian army, as well as looking for evidence of British activity. Witkiewicz reported back to St Petersburg:
The British have their man in Bukhara. He is a Kashmiri called Nizamuddin and
has been living in Bukhara for four years now under the pretext of trade […] He is a very clever man […] and entertains the Bukharan noblemen; at least once a week he sends letters with secret messengers to Kabul, to the Englishman Masson […] The most curious thing is that Dost Mohammed is aware of Masson’s activities […] but leaves the spy alone, saying; one man cannot harm me […] This man lives in Kabul under the pretext of looking for ancient coins.
Nizamuddin was doing a good job:
Nizamuddin sought my acquaintance as soon as I arrived and asked me […] about Novo-Alexandrovsk, the New Line, our relations with Khiva etc. Having been forewarned, I did not give him any definite answers. All the same he sent a letter to Kabul the very next day.20
The arrival of a Russian envoy in Bokhara was vital strategic news. But Masson did not pass on Nizamuddin’s letter to Wade or to Calcutta. It is possible that Masson had never received the letter from Nizamuddin, but the qasids were a distinct profession who were trained from childhood and could trot fifty miles a day. It was fundamental to their working practice that they must return with a reply or acknowledgement.21
Shortly after this, Masson came under suspicion from Claude Wade. I have not discovered precisely of what Masson was accused. According to Burnes, Pottinger was also amongst Masson’s accusers.22 It led to an official investigation, and it appears that Masson’s defence was that he had been tricked or misrepresented into a false position. Burnes submitted a testimonial in Masson’s support, and on 9 March 1836 Burnes, in his first direct communication with Masson, wrote: