Sikunder Burnes

by Craig Murray

  On 16 March they reached Khairpur, where they were entertained by Rustam Khan enthusiastically for sixteen days. Rustam repeatedly pressed Burnes for a separate treaty of friendship, which Burnes was not empowered to give. Here they were joined by their surgeon, Percival Lord. A graduate of both Dublin and Edinburgh universities, Lord had been selected for his strong linguistic skills. They became the first Europeans to be admitted to the famous fortress of Baikhar.13 When Burnes asked Rustam to act to prevent depredations on the Indus trade by the Mazari tribe, Rustam threw all the nearest Mazari leaders and their families into the dungeons of Baikhar, and Burnes had to persuade him to be more gentle.

  Mazari raids had been the pretext for a move of Sikh troops into the area around Mithankot, and on 23 March Burnes received news that Ranjit Singh had agreed to withdraw forces and leave Burnes to settle the question.14 This pre-empted a vakeel from the Khan of Kelat, the Baluch and Brahui kingdom ruled from the mountains west of Sind, who reached Khairpur on 28 March offering Kelati forces to help expel the Sikhs.15 The Envoy pointed out that Burnes’ proposed return route through the Bolan Pass to Shikarpur ran through the territory of the Khan of Kelat, and asked that he pay a courtesy visit.16 Burnes wrote to Macnaghten requesting permission to do so.17

  The party were entertained to a nautch by Jewan Baksh, a wealthy courtesan who built mosques and funded charity work among the poor. Burnes found her ‘a girl with delicate fey melancholy features. Her troupe danced into the small hours, portraying tales of soldiers, lovers and jealous husbands’, until they collapsed in alcoholic stupour.18

  To Alexander, Rustam already ‘seemed to have an excellent idea of the designs of Russia – He talked of their strategy & their designs on India, their power in Persia, their large army’. Burnes replied that Russia lacked financial muscle.19 The fear of Russian designs towards India was not a purely British preoccupation.

  From 2 to 9 April the mission stayed at Shikarpur, collecting much information from the great commercial and financial market, where Burnes found many merchants who had connections to people he knew in Kabul and Bokhara. The town was large, prosperous and 90 per cent Hindu. Burnes noted that the women were attractive. He found some caution towards the Mithankot fair from merchants who wished to protect local monopolies. British ironware was on sale in the market, and Burnes noticed: ‘our camp is pitched near a field of [poppy] – The smell near the fields is very sickening & the people employed in collecting the opium say that they are half intoxicated at night – They split the head of the top with a three pronged knife & collect the juice which exudes in a clam shell.’

  On 10 April the mission moved on to Mulaman where Burnes lectured the refractory Bundi chief, Sher Mohamed Khan, about the advantages of peace and trade. Here Burnes hired six Arab bodyguards ‘to keep away thieves and robbers’, who became closely attached to him.20 Emily Eden met these men and noted they were of Arab descent rather than from Arab lands.21 After two days’ excellent progress, they reached Gandava where Burnes sent a musical box and a map to the thirteen-year-old Nassir Khan, heir to Kelat, who was being educated there, and collected mineral samples from the Gandava Hills. Burnes noted in his journal that all the treaties Britain made about the Indus were as little known to the officials and rulers on its banks as they were in Timbuktu. He was also concerned that he had invited a great gathering of chiefs, vakeels and merchants to Mithankot to discuss the trade fair, but had still heard nothing from Wade. He learnt that Henry’s nephew, Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, who had passed through Shikarpur ahead of him, was with a caravan detained by a local war at the entrance to the Bolan Pass, which Eldred was charged with surveying. Eldred was escorted by Edul Khan of the Sind Irregular Horse, who was instructed to get him to Herat then rejoin Burnes in Kabul.22 Pottinger was travelling in the stock disguise of a horse dealer.

  Burnes himself was vexed that he had not been given the power to settle the Mazari border dispute, which he felt he could have done in ‘a couple of days’, but instead had to refer it back to Macnaghten.23 He found that no chief believed his mission was purely commercial ‘some laugh, some are silent’, and confided to his journal that history showed they were right to distrust the British.

  On 18 April they arrived at the frontier of Bhawal Khan and transferred into luxurious state barges, with an escort of forty scarlet uniformed soldiers ‘we found all the usual kindness […] and we gladly exchanged our comfortless boats for these – I must not forget to state that among the supplies for us is one boat literally full of bedsteads!!’ Scores of people were provided to haul the boats against the current. Burnes again wrote praising Bhawal Khan’s assistance and lavish hospitality, and suggesting some reciprocation from the Governor-General.24 This time the purse strings of the Raj were opened, and the Governor-General sent Bhawal Khan a small wooden orrery, an astronomical device.25

  Burnes was very happy with the progress of young Nourozji Fourdonji, who was becoming ‘a useful public servant’ quicker than expected, while Mohan Lal was ‘all I could wish […] the very person I could select to communicate with the chiefs and people I meet’, but he was becoming a little careworn. He added ‘I find a good deal of trouble in managing the details of this little mission & journey.’26

  On reaching Ahmedpur, they much enjoyed Bhawal Khan’s company, and met the commander of his regular infantry Hamish McGregor McPherson, a British officer cashiered duelling, who Burnes had helped back in 1831 (probably financially).27 Bhawal Khan sent what Burnes called the corps de ballet to keep his guests company, as noted in Burnes’ diary ‘in a big house where every whisper was re-echoed’. Presumably there were many hushed endearments.

  They proceeded with Bhawal Khan to Bhawalpur where Burnes received a ‘very friendly’ letter from Ranjit, complaining however about the border settlements. Burnes noted, ‘The Haidarabad Ameers, who deserved little, have got everything & in this we have managed to offend Roostum Khan, Bhawal Khan and Runjeet, the great, greater & greatest of our friends.’

  Burnes, Leech, Lord and Wood were at dinner in Bhawal Khan’s guest lodging with McPherson, when Benoit Argoud first arrived. Alex went out to greet him, insisting that he join their meal. Argoud had started as a drummer boy in the Napoleonic service, and worked his way up to officer rank. After Napoleon’s fall, he had served in the Turkish army before enlisting with Ranjit Singh as a Colonel in 1836. An extremely brave individual, though alcoholic, he had been the only one of Singh’s European officers to confront the Maharaja about his salary arrears. He had obtained his back pay, but also his dismissal. He was now heading for the Bolan Pass and Kandahar, to seek employment with Dost Mohammed in Kabul.

  There followed a drunken evening. Argoud in his cups liked to show his prowess as a drummer by beating out rhythms on the table, ‘and as a tenor accompaniment, made a knife vibrate between its under surface and his thumb’ to loud applause. Argoud however ‘knew not when to desist’, but fortunately soon drank himself into a stupor and they put him to bed.

  The next morning Burnes slept in, hungover. Argoud woke up, and passed Percival Lord, who was sitting in the hall performing taxidermy on a duck. Argoud, still not sober, then crashed into Burnes’ room:

  That officer was not yet dressed, on which M. Argoud called out: ‘Why sare, the battle of Wagram was fought before this hour, and you are still in deshabille? Will you take wine with me?’ ‘No,’ said Captain Burnes, ‘I never take wine before breakfast.’ ‘Then sare,’ said Argoud, ‘You insult me and I demand satisfaction.’ He ran out and soon reappeared with his small sword and asked Burnes to send for his rapier. But the latter, thinking he had humoured the fiery little Frenchman quite enough, politely requested him to continue his journey.28

  This amusing interlude could have gone horribly wrong. Argoud eventually did reach Kabul through Bolan. Burnes kept a friendly eye on him through Masson, and continued correspondence with the Frenchman, though noting, ‘poor creature he is I fear both insane and drunk’. Dost Mohammed, though
he allowed Argoud to remain in Kabul, did not offer him employment.

  But Burnes now received disappointing news:

  I have heard from Cap. Wade who is not coming to Mittuncote – How is our faith & word to be kept with the merchants & chiefs of Sinde if this meeting does not take place – I confess I do not see how and I have written so to Wade – We must await his answer – I have had a mesh of intricacies in this journey already.29

  The mission had not been idle. On 11 May Burnes sent back Lord’s reports on the mineral resources of the Gandava Hills, and on the trade of Shikarpur and Upper Sind by himself, the latest section of Indus survey by Wood, and a basic grammar of the Brahui language and a survey of Mandvi’s port by Leech. They were now progressing up river with following winds (why they had not been given the use of an Indus steam boat is unclear). At Mithankot, Burnes had been very disappointed to receive a letter from Wade proposing that Burnes continue straight up the Indus, without calling in to Lahore or seeing Ranjit Singh, in view of ‘the peculiar disposition of his Highness and his advisers’, following both Jamrud and British pressure on Ranjit not to attack Sind.30

  Burnes found Mithankot itself ‘a mean town’ of about 3,000 inhabitants, two miles from the Indus, and so prone to inundation that any fair site would need to be three miles from the river. He thought it was the wrong site. It appears from his journal the grand meeting planned with merchants and vakeels did not happen.

  The mission pushed on into Derajat. Since Burnes’ last Indus mission, the Sikhs had taken firmer control of this district. Bhawal Khan had held it as tributary of Ranjit Singh, but his forces had been pushed out and General Ventura installed as Sikh Governor. In consequence annual Sikh revenues there had increased from two and a half to eleven and a half lakhs. ‘The town of Multan has a prosperous appearance, which is altogether attributable to M. Ventura, who was until lately in charge of it. Under Bahawal Khan the officers were guilty of the greatest extortion, but since 1832, when the Sikhs recovered it, the place has greatly recovered.’31 Unlike other areas under direct Sikh control, Ventura had not suppressed Muslim religious practice or committed random atrocities.

  Burnes now received urgent news from John McNeill, written from Teheran on 13 March. McNeill told Burnes that the Shah was absolutely set on taking Herat, and that given constant Herati raids – including one in October 1834 when the Heratis took 10,000 slaves – the Persians were justified. Nonetheless, McNeill viewed this as a dangerous development given Russian influence in Persia. Representatives of Persia, Russia and Herat were all gathered at Kabul. One of the parties in Russian pay, Mir Mohammed Khan, was also in McNeill’s pay, and he had in consequence obtained copies of the entire correspondence. All the Afghan factions were vying with each other in expressing allegiance to Persia, each hoping to further their own ambitions.

  The letter which Dost Mohammed had written to the Shah of Persia is a key document. Burnes, McNeill and Masson all argued that the Emir was merely insuring himself against the expected Persian move, and reacting to the absence of offers from the British, with whom Dost would prefer an alliance. Who, they argued, could possibly prefer an alliance with Persia to one with Britain? But Dost Mohammed’s appraisal of the dangers of British alliance has a ring of sincerity:

  I have been long engaged in war with 100,000 horse and foot of the wicked infidels [Sikhs] and 300 guns, but […] I have not yet been subdued by the faithless enemy, and have been able to preserve the true faith. But how long shall I be able to oppose this detestable tribe and […] resist their aggression? […] As […] Kandahar, and the capital Kabul, and the countries bordering on Khorosan […] form part of the Persian territory and are among the Kingdoms of the King of Kings, the misery and welfare of these dominions cannot be separated from the interests of the Persian Government […] I shall persist in contending with the Seiks as long as I am able, but […] [if] I am unable to resist that diabolical tribe, then I […] must commit myself with the English, who will then obtain complete authority over the whole of Afghanistan, and it remains to be seen hereafter to what places and to what extent the flame of the violence of that nation will be carried.32

  McNeill’s own view of the policy Britain should adopt was clear: actively to promote a strong and united Afghanistan under Dost Mohammed. He urged that Britain should finance Dost to take both Herat and Kandahar and that current British policy was mistaken as ‘we cannot make Persia […] [both] strong against Russia and powerless against Afghanistan […]’33

  Burnes was buoyed that McNeill’s opinion was identical to his own. He felt he had been thrust into the centre of events in a way that justified his decision to turn down the offer of the Persia mission. He also felt that this was the time to cash in on his fame and his London contacts – including the influence with Auckland he had gained at Bowood House. On 12 May 1837, camped outside the town of Uch, Burnes wrote a letter to Auckland, not as usual through Macnaghten, the Political Secretary, but rather through Colvin, the Private Secretary. In later sending Masson a copy, Burnes stressed this was not an official letter.

  Burnes first gave Auckland the news that Dost had opened diplomatic correspondence with Persia. Burnes attributes this to British neglect of Dost and the latter’s desire for Persian aid to recover Peshawar, and to deflect any Persian attack on Kabul via Herat. Burnes then gets to the crux. He suggests Britain should promise to assist Dost to recover Peshawar and the right bank of the Indus down to Shikarpur – but only on the death of Ranjit Singh. The Emir would be a stable and commerce-friendly ruler, and if supported by Britain, a bulwark against Persian and Russian intrigue.

  Having set out his policy recommendation, the still-inexperienced Burnes overplayed his hand. He pointed out that he had discussed the matter with Charles Grant and with then Prime Minister Earl Grey. This name-dropping would scarcely awe Auckland, and was too obvious an attempt by a mere Captain to impose on the Governor-General.34

  On 6 June, from Multan, Burnes wrote his reply to McNeill, more fully than to Auckland,35 explaining his own strategy for the north-west frontier. Alexander accepted the alliance with Ranjit Singh and that it would be wrong to act contrary to his interests. But Burnes pointed out that Ranjit Singh was going to die soon.

  Burnes reasoned that Dost’s stable administration would be the best lynchpin for British commerce. His proposal was not outlandish: restore to Kabul the Indus territories down to and including Shikarpur. These had all been a part of the Dourani Empire recently, and all had a largely Muslim indigenous population. For Ranjit Singh: ‘let him keep Peshawar while he lives and meantime [let us] turn Dost Mahomed Khan’s attention towards Candahar and Herat’. This fitted with McNeill’s proposal. Burnes continued, ‘As for Suddozye ascendancy in Cabool, I consider that quite hopeless, either from Kamran, or Shoojah ool Moolk; the former, by the way, is said to be dying of dropsy, and the latter has not the head to manage anything.’

  He concluded: ‘On all these points I hope soon to be better informed, and before I get to Cabool to find myself invested with other authority than what I now hold.’ He explained to Masson, ‘As yet I have no authority beyond that of conducting a commercial Mission, but various hints […] have served to convince me that a stirring time of political action has arrived and I shall have to shew what my Govt. is made of as well as myself.’

  Letters from both McNeill and Burnes passed through Wade on the way to Auckland. Wade added comments, and on 27 June forwarded McNeill’s letter with a lengthy one from himself, arguing strenuously against the consolidation of Afghanistan. Wade argued that the division of Afghanistan made its weak rulers more susceptible to British influence, Dost’s rule would never be accepted, and if he moved against Herat then Kamran would turn to Persia.

  Burnes sent Masson copies of all the British secret correspondence; the letters to him from McNeill and the Governor-General, Wade’s report of the consequences of the battle of Jamrud, and the reports of his agents in Afghanistan and Bokhara, together with copies
of all his replies. He asked Masson for his advice, ‘well assured as I am that in putting you in possession of these important documents, I am but advancing the interests of Government’.36

  He realised that sending Masson all this diplomatic correspondence was irregular. Burnes also forwarded two letters for Masson from Pottinger, who was carrying out his promise of defying the Calcutta prohibition on his communication with Masson.

  When Burnes did receive further instructions, they told him to wait at the Indus, as active war had again broken out over Peshawar, right on Burnes’ route. But a few days later he received a letter from John Colvin in which Auckland gave him permission to go on if it appeared safe. 37 Burnes wrote to James Holland from the Indus on 5 July 1837:

  another express still cries pause, but places a vast latitude in my hands and ‘forward’ is my motto; forward to the scene of carnage where, instead of embarrassing my Government, I feel myself in a situation to do good […] I can hardly say how grateful I feel to Lord Auckland. I have not as yet got the replies to my recommendations on our line of policy38

  Burnes sent letters to Dost, to Jabbar Khan and to the religious leader Mirza Sarwar Khan urging them to come to terms with Ranjit Singh over Peshawar lest they hamstring relations with Britain. In asking Masson to deliver these letters, he said ‘it will never do to offend Runjeet Sing whose alliance we court and must cherish’.39

  Conventional accounts of the Great Game have tended to stress the role of the Imperial powers, but to ignore the existence as independent players of states like Kabul, Persia, Lahore, Kelat and Sind. While Burnes was leaving Sind, a Persian Envoy and Agent, Qambar Ali, was arriving at Kandahar for a mission there and to Kabul. His instructions were very detailed, and in many ways mirror those of Burnes, including on intelligence gathering: