Sikunder Burnes
Page 34
A stream of news had reached Auckland in Simla, before Macnaghten’s return on 19 July, which cast the Afghan situation in a dark light. McNeill had been repudiated by the Shah before Herat, and the siege was going ahead under the active direction of Russian officers. Palmerston had authorised McNeill to withdraw his Embassy following the assault of a diplomatic messenger and the ransacking of his documents in Teheran. There were rumours of a Russian expeditionary force from Orenburg preparing to march on Khiva. Auckland instructed that the plan negotiated with Ranjit Singh be put into immediate effect.
On 16 July Auckland received a long despatch from Hobhouse and the Secret Committee of the EIC, dated 10 May – it had arrived remarkably quickly by the new steam packet and Suez route. This despatch supported Auckland in ordering Burnes’ withdrawal from Kabul. It also gave an update on events in Persia. But it did not even mention the possibility of a British invasion of Afghanistan.
Furthermore there was a separate despatch from the Political Committee dated 9 May 1838, signed by John Stuart Mill. The Committee made an emphatic point:
The state of Afghanistan is apparently becoming more and more unsettled, but any observations which it may be thought proper to make on this subject will be addressed to you by the Secret Committee. We approve however of the intimation you have made to Shah Shooja, that if he makes any further attempts to recover his throne by means of an armed force, he will forfeit his Asylum in the British Territories.34
The 9 and 10 May despatches, Political and Secret respectively, were based on information from Simla no later then February. On 24 October 1838 Hobhouse sent another despatch, approved by both the Secret Committee and the Cabinet, based on Simla’s information up until May. In this October despatch, Auckland was instructed to invade Afghanistan on lines extremely similar to those he was actually undertaking. So, allowing for the time lag, there was no real difference in decision-making between Auckland and the British authorities, once they had the same papers before them.
Palmerston was thoroughly of the opinion that the invasion was his policy, not Auckland’s. He wrote to brief the British Ambassador in St Petersburg: ‘Auckland has been told to take Afghanistan in hand and make it a British dependency […] we have long declined to meddle with the Afghans, but if the Russians try to make them Russian we must take care that they become British.’35
Burnes arrived in Simla with Lord and Mohan Lal on 20 July. Masson reports that Burnes told him that he was accosted by Colvin and Torrens, who urged him not to try and talk Auckland out of the invasion ‘and prayed him to say nothing to unsettle his Lordship; that they had all the trouble in the world to get him into the business, and that even now he would be glad to retire from it’. This account has been much disputed, but it is consistent with evidence of Auckland’s state of mind. It is also normal for a Private Secretary to try to pre-determine the smooth outcome of a meeting.
A difficult meeting with Auckland was recounted to James. Burnes had offered to resign:
I first gave opinions, and then asked leave to withdraw, but Lord A proved to me that it would be desertion at a critical moment & I saw so myself, but I entered on support of his policy, not as what was best, but as what was best under the circumstances which a series of blunders had produced […] I saw that I had a duty to my country, ill as the representative of that country in India had behaved to me.36
This is broadly consistent with Colvin’s account that Burnes asked for long leave but was talked out of it by Auckland.37 So ultimately Burnes agreed to assist the invasion. Why? He could not stop the invasion. He had made his opinion clear. He was still only a junior officer. In order to maintain his opposition, he would have had to resign the service, or at best return to an obscure Assistant Residency.
Burnes was a member of a disciplined service, and it was his duty to follow policy. I faced exactly the same dilemma when ordered as Ambassador to give my support to a vicious dictatorship in Uzbekistan, and downplay human rights’ abuses. In particular I had protested, twice, in formal diplomatic telegrams to the Secretary of State about our use of ‘intelligence’ passed to our security services by the CIA, but originating in the murderous torture chambers of the Karimov regime.
At meetings with the Foreign Office I was told that my intervention was regarded as ‘unpatriotic’ at a time when our country was at war, and the most intense pressure was put on me. The Foreign Office had developed a kind of collective war mentality. To voice doubt about either the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, or about the value of intelligence material from the extraordinary rendition programme, was simply not tolerated.
Burnes faced precisely the same pressures from precisely the same institution. George Buist, editor of the Bombay Times, wrote:
This was the political mania of the Foreign Office for the time. And anyone demanding an explanation of the words ‘Russian influence’, or daring to doubt the potency and malignancy of its effects, must have run the risk of having his sanity, sincerity or patriotism called into question.38
I found my sanity, sincerity and patriotism all subject to official investigation and government leaks to the media. I know exactly how Burnes felt. To turn your back on the country you serve is not easy, above all in time of war. To throw away a hard-won position, from a non-privileged background, is not easy. Burnes said privately, ‘I was afraid of being thought a deserter in the day of trial. What more could I say, when he [Auckland] tells me I am a man he cannot spare?’39 The answer to ‘why did he do it?’ is, from a sense of patriotic duty in response to a personal appeal by the Governor-General. We must also not forget that he did not come from a monied background, and was dependent on his income to support himself and subsidise his family in Montrose. He could not lightly give up his career.
But the prospect of active service perked Burnes up substantially. He was promised a major role. Burnes’ stay in Simla provided him with the opportunity to get close to the Edens and rub shoulders with the most powerful men in India. His expertise on Afghanistan was invaluable, and his charm brought easy acceptance. Alex was now part of the inner circle planning the invasion, and so was Percival. Torrens recorded, ‘I well recollect the subsequent discussions and difficulties as to execution, and in these Clerk, Wade, Colvin, Mackeson, Burnes, D’Arcy Todd, Lord and others had a share.’40 Burnes wrote he was in ‘hourly consultation’ with Auckland. Lieutenant Henry Fane, ADC to his father, General Sir Henry Fane, Commander-in-Chief, declared Burnes the most decent fellow he had ever met, and his father shared the opinion.
Auckland’s flattery had led Burnes to expect political charge of the expedition. He wrote so in a private letter on 22 August and declared that it must be ‘aut Caesar aut nullus’. The next day he had evidently learnt he would be serving under Macnaghten, as he was writing:
Of myself I cannot tell you what is to become. The commander-in-chief wants to go and to take me – but this will not be, and I believe the chief [Fane] and Macnaghten will be made a commission – Wade and myself political agents under them. I plainly told Lord Auckland that […] I am disappointed. He replied that I could scarcely be appointed with the chief in equality, and pledged himself to leave me independent quickly, and in the highest position […] It is an honour, not a disgrace, to go under Sir Henry; and as for Macnaghten, he is Secretary for all India, and goes pro tem. Besides, I am not sorry to see Dost Mohammed ousted by another hand but mine.41
General Fane wanted undivided control of the expedition, with Burnes as the senior political officer. Auckland, however, wished to have the expedition under joint civilian and military command. Macnaghten, who carried no military rank, was his choice. This scheme of divided command was an error.
Macnaghten had very little field experience, had never seen Afghanistan, and had himself recommended Henry Pottinger for the post. Auckland turned this down on the grounds of Pottinger’s notorious bad temper. In fact, Colvin had written to Macnaghten before Burnes even arrived in Simla, telling him he w
as to be Envoy Plenipotentiary and British Minister at Kabul:
The stake is so important that Lord Auckland feels that it may not become him to withhold his best card […] There must be free and confidential communication with the Government, and besides this, influence at Lahore, influence at Peshawar, over Wade, over Burnes, over every officer engaged, as well as thorough cordiality in Lord Auckland’s views regarding Sind. All this is not easy to see how to combine except in yourself.
In the same letter, Auckland stated that he had changed his mind about the British role in the invasion: 5,000 British troops might be required as there must be ‘no chance of failure’.42 Auckland delayed telling both Burnes and Fane about Macnaghten’s appointment. When he did, he kept Burnes on board by a direct assurance that Macnaghten’s role was temporary and Burnes would take over in Kabul once Shuja was established.
Like many, Burnes wondered at Auckland’s conversion from being sceptical about the ‘Russian threat’, to being so horrified that an immediate invasion was necessary. But Burnes’ habitual optimism bubbled through. He wrote to James on 7 August 1838:
I am to have a highly honorable appointment in the approaching campaign with Sir Henry Fane […] We have had a hard struggle west of the Indus & it affords me no small gratification that I saw so far into futurity long ago as to predict the current crisis – Letter after letter told me that the Governor General thought I exhibited too much of the gloomy side of the picture but times are changed! My side is now even too cheerful – Alas! To be behind the scenes & see how little Wisdom governs the world makes one wonder.43
The next day he wrote to George Jacob. Though lighthearted, this is probably the best explanation of Burnes’ thought process:
Well, next came the next act – they ask me what is to be done. I replied you have behaved infamously to Dost Mahomed Khan, but self-defence is the first law of nature, up with the Suddozyes! You will have to maintain them by the sword, and by your treasure, but Russia is at your door!44
Burnes felt a huge mistake had been made and the consequence was an alliance between Russia, Persia and the Barakzais. So forward defence was required. He was happy to be working with Fane. In Simla he was now very active in writing and despatching letters through the network of paid agents he had so assiduously cultivated, to numerous Afghan chiefs of his acquaintance. He was starting that ‘little distribution of ready money’ which he believed could ensure the restoration of Shah Shuja with little bloodshed.
Sir Henry Fane viewed invading Afghanistan as a gross strategic error. But Auckland had received a letter from John McNeill advising that Herat was most likely to fall, which would ‘destroy our position in Afghanistan and place all that country under the influence […] of Russia and Persia’.45 McNeill thought it essential to send a British force to relieve Herat. Auckland, being Auckland, had not quite agreed or disagreed. Fane therefore advised that, as potentially the army would have to face not just the Afghans but a large Russian-backed Persian force, then British regiments, both Queen’s and Company, were essential. Five brigades of infantry, one of cavalry and one of artillery were told off for the invasion. The troops were drawn from both the Bombay and Bengal Presidencies.
It was now the rainy season; the British were suffering a debilitating flea infestation, and their houses’ flat mud roofs leaked. Burnes and Lord spent eight weeks in Simla, leaving around 10 September. Infuriatingly Emily Eden’s journals for precisely this period disappeared; we do not know what she made of Burnes. Her only pen picture is of Burnes and Percival Lord in the dining room of their leaking bungalow, eating dinner ‘every day’ under umbrellas held over their heads by servants.46 This is a delightful picture of their companionship and must have been undertaken in a spirit of fun, as some more practical arrangement was surely possible.
To Percival and Alex’s delight, Auckland agreed to transfer Lord from the medical to the political service. He was ordered to report to Wade at Ludhiana, and given the vital task of persuading the tribes of the Khyber pass to come to Shuja. From September 1838 Lord began the dangerous work of riding the Khyber hills to meet with the chiefs. He received a hopeless instruction from Wade that he should only use money in the last resort but instead appeal to their patriotism.47 Thankfully he was also provided with the not insubstantial sum of Rs50,000.48
Alex did not forget Masson, and persuaded Auckland that he should be offered a formal position. Masson was treated as part of the team, with Burnes writing to him to arrange baggage mules to be sent down from Peshawar to Ludhiana.49 On 13 September Burnes wrote to Masson that Sir Henry Fane ‘would place the intelligence department under yourself from your great local knowledge and acknowledged fitness but all this we can now settle at Shirkapoor’. They corresponded frequently on sending payments to Cerron and others, and arranging publication of various of Masson’s archaeological reports.50
However, all this was not to be. Macnaghten intervened and had Masson’s appointment cancelled.51 At this, Masson resigned his position as newswriter. He thanked Burnes and claimed to be happy to concentrate on publishing antiquarian research. Burnes replied: ‘I am right glad you are so satisfied with what I endeavoured to do and I now see that you will even be free now to prosecute your researches […] No one will rejoice more in your increase of fame than myself’.52
Auckland had resolved on a way to keep Burnes motivated; on 1 September Alex wrote to a friend:
‘I mean therefore’, continued [Auckland] […] ‘to gazette you as a political commissioner to Kelat, and when the army crosses [the Indus] to regard you as an independent political officer to cooperate with Macnaghten.’ Nothing could be more delicately kind. I have permission, if I like, to send an assistant to Kelat. I start in a week, and drop down the Indus to Shikarpoor, where, with the assistance of a brace of commissaries, I prepare for the advancement of the army […] I think you will hear the result of my negotiation to be, that the British flag flies at Bukkur.53
There was enormous excitement among the army gathered for the invasion. Colonel Dennie of the 13th Light Infantry wrote home on 22 August 1838:
We are on the eve of something momentous. A great army from our northern provinces is forming […] They say we are going to fight the Persians or Russians, the latter of whom are now besieging Herat in concert with the former; and are actually not further from our frontier than these stations of Kurnaul, Meerut etc. are from Calcutta. The Russians have long conceived this gigantic design […] They have conquered Persia […] and have really stolen across this immense extent of country, without our almost being aware of their insidious advance […]54
Burnes had been sent into Sind to make preparations for the army. At Ferozepore in September 1838 he received a letter addressed to ‘Lt Col Sir Alexander Burnes’ and found official notification that he had been knighted on 6 August 1838 and raised to Lieutenant Colonel in the Company’s army.55 Most sweetly of all, the awards came as a result of the approval of the Court of Directors for his Kabul negotiations, and particularly his stance over Peshawar and offer of support for Kandahar – the very issues on which he had been reprimanded by Auckland.
Inundated with letters of congratulation, he found time to reply to his friend George Jacob:
Thanks for the gratulations! […] The Governor-General and I were at issue on the politics of Cabool, and His Lordship favored me with a wig[ging] […] of six sheets for my presuming to offer money to Candahar […] Hah! The home authorities have knighted me for it, and made me a Lieutenant-Colonel, and to the honor of the Governor-General […] His Lordship is the first man to ‘cordially congratulate me’ and ‘to say that I may in candour mention that, upon the one point where there was some difference between us, opinions for which I have the highest respect are in your favor’.56
Burnes replied to Auckland that his frank letter meant more to Burnes than the honours themselves, and ‘they are to me truly acceptable, not as empty honours, but as setting my mind at rest that my conduct in Afghanistan has be
en approved’.57 Burnes plainly was still troubled by his decision to support the invasion, and he explained again to Jacob:
I entirely disapproved of their overthrowing Dost Mahomed, but when they could not act with him, I told them they had no hope but to counteract him […] I would have backed out of the business if I durst, but that would have shown me to be but a sorry public servant […] so after a little demur I gave in my adhesion to the policy – it was only the best because we had lost other opportunities. I believe that is the reason I am not the Envoy. I am an Envoy, which is the highest compliment they have paid me.
Burnes believed it was his interception of Witkiewicz’ reports which had tipped the balance in favour of an invasion.
Russia was at us in every court between India and Persia, and they would not believe until secret service money had made it as plain as the sun – be it so, we have not taken the field a moment too soon – I have no fear of the result, but I tremble for our political consistency.
There had been typically thunderous Palmerstonian instructions on dealing with Persia over Herat. A small Company force was landed from the steamers Semiramis and Hugh Lindsay on the Gulf island of Kharg to threaten Persia. Colonel Stoddart was given instructions to inform the Shah of this and demand he immediately end the siege of Herat.58 The Shah had been sickened by repeated repulses, especially the bloody affair of 24 June 1838, while his troops were starving and many deserting.59 He immediately agreed, replying that
we accede to the demands of the British Government […] our desire was that the Affghan tribes should be prevented from plundering and ravaging our dominions – Please God we shall make an arrangement with the people of Herrat, and return speedily.60