Book Read Free

Sikunder Burnes

Page 37

by Craig Murray


  Then Auckland strikes:

  In compliance with what he believes to be your present wish, he grants to you leave to proceed to Bombay for the recovery of your health […] He has sincerely regretted to hear that your health has been impaired by the weight of the labours and cares […] imposed upon you. You will make over charge of the Residency to Lieut Eastwick […]21

  All the correspondence had been copied to the Secret Committee in London, and further censure for Pottinger’s behaviour was initiated by Hobhouse. Thomas Love Peacock wrote to Auckland that ‘We do not therefore see with what propriety Coll Pottinger could censure Sir A Burnes on the 18th December, for an act which he had suggested to him on the 23rd November, and in terms we regret but ill-calculated to maintain […] cordiality and good feeling between our functionaries.’22

  The Bombay Government formally notified Hobhouse that: ‘On the 29th of January, Colonel Pottinger tendered his resignation as Resident in Sinde, in consequence of Sir Alexander Burnes’s proceedings.’23 But Henry Pottinger was to pop up in Sind again just a few months later.24

  Burnes had a further enemy in Charles Masson. Masson now blackened Burnes’ name with the officers of the Army of the Indus. On 31 January 1839 Henry Durand noted in his diary at the camp at Shikarpur:

  [Masson] gave us a very amusing account of Burnes’s rencontre with Captain Vicovich at Cabul. This Russian officer reached Cabul ‘with a pair of black kid gloves, a French translation of Burnes’ travels, and a long Persian epistle, well powdered with gold leaf, purporting to be from the Emperor of Russia.’ The Afghans, of whom Mr Masson speaks highly, laughed at this soi-distant envoy, and discredited him in toto. Had Burnes had the sense to laugh too, all would have gone well; but he took the thing seriously, lost his head, and was himself the person who induced the Afghans to consider Captain Vicovich in the light of an accredited envoy.25

  In his subsequent book, Durand alleges that Burnes, in his Kabul mission, had not behaved with the ‘decorum, which in a Muslim country is seldom departed from’, and that this had caused loss of influence. Masson was the source of Durand’s information. Durand’s account has been crucial in the established historical view of Burnes’ womanising in Kabul. But all such allegations seem credibly to be traced back to Masson as a single source.

  We might also consider Masson’s curious movements after Burnes left him at Peshawar in May 1838. After hearing that Burnes had failed to gain him a political post, Masson sent in his resignation as newswriter and headed deep into Afghanistan, north over the Hindu Kush to Bamian. He claimed he was returning to his excavations. Even for Masson this was eccentric when the imminence of the invasion was well-known to the Afghans, but Bamian was the obvious place to go if he needed to communicate with Russian agents through Bokhara. Thereafter, he returned to Ferozepore and joined the Army of the Indus, despite holding no position. There he spread negative stories about Burnes and again sought to cast doubt that Witkiewicz really was a Russian Envoy. Masson travelled with the Governor-General’s camp, and then on Fane’s barge – with no obvious reason for either – until leaving for several months’ residence with Pottinger. A spy could not have placed himself better.

  Still worse for Burnes, in January 1839 the following article was published in London in the Oriental Intelligencer:

  SIR ALEXANDER BURNES AND THE GOVERNMENT

  Much umbrage it ias said has been taken by the Government at the recusancy of Sir Alexander Burnes, who will insist on taking the views his ample experience and natural ability present to him, of the proposed restoration of Shah Shooja. Captain B affirms that of all the race, His Lordship’s protege is the vilest, most despised and most hated by the Affghan tribes; the most tyrannical, indolent and useless; a coward and a fool. In every point of view [Dost Mohammed] offers the most favourable contrast to the Company’s protege. He is brave, honest, frank and beloved […] and it is said that the Captain is not very reserved on it or his general views of our proceedings.26

  Similar articles had been appearing in the Indian papers, and may have contributed to a cooling of Auckland’s regard for Burnes. Alex’s enemies sought to pounce using these publications. These anonymous letters were sent to John Cam Hobhouse:

  Portland Place Jan 1 1839

  Sir,

  […] If Captain Burnes […] could be guilty of such rashness and insubordination what an example – I am not aware that Lieutt Burnes, Assistant to Col. Pottinger, performed any great military or civil service. He made researches in Cabul and Bohara was liberally rewarded – made a Captain – sent home on full pay never examined and his Brother given a Cadetship. Upon being appointed on a special mission to Cabul - and which by the way wholly failed and hence this disastrous and ruinous war! – he was by the Whig Government given the Brevet rank of Lieutt Colonel and a Knighthood […]

  What has been done for Mr Macnaghten […] and what will be done for the gallant and intrepid young Lieutt. Pottinger surely he will be made a Lieut Coll and receive a Knighthood if Burnes has […] Is it becoming in this crisis that one as young untried and apparently conceited as Captain Burnes should publish opinions which may be of incalculable mischief both in India and at home? He is said to be a ‘leetle’ hot and hasty […] a most ambitious young man […]

  I have the Honour to be

  Your very obedt. Servant

  Zeta27

  Two months later another was sent, in a different handwriting but evidently from the same interest:

  Whig Justice!

  Lieutt Burnes sent home his notes and […] a Book of his Travels was brought out. No one could gainsay it for it was a new country to us – He was made a Captain sent home on full pay but never examined, given a cadetship for his Brother […] by anticipation of what he was to do but which proved a failure was gazetted brevet Lieutt Colonel and given a Knighthood. What was the feeling erected amongst all old officers who have fought and bled to see Lt Burnes get so much and they all passed over – contrast this with Lieut Eldred Pottinger […] He is Lieutt still whilst a book which […] may or may not have been written by Burnes, and may or may not be true, has raised him above all old officers – and […] Alexander Burnes does not scruple to publish his opinions as being directly opposed to the determination of Government and the Governor-General […] neglect of the long service of Colonel Pottinger and of the ability of Mr Macnaghten the Government Secretary none of whom receive honour or reward […]

  An Old Indian

  Oriental Club

  Hanover Square Febr 27 1839.28

  Surely these letters originated with the Pottingers? Hobhouse also the same month received open campaigning for honours by the Pottinger family:

  Feb 7 1839

  Sir,

  I have the honour to enclose […] statements of the services of my brother Colonel Pottinger and my son Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger […] as a further claim of my family to the distinctions I have requested I beg to state that I lost four brothers on service in the last war […] and that I have two brothers […] [in] Her Majesty’s 6th Foot and four sons […] still in the service. I also served for fifteen years in H.M.s 8th Hussars […] all my family for the last two hundred years have been either soldiers or sailors in the service of their country.

  Under all these circumstances I look with confidence to Her Majesty’s Government to confer the rank of Baronet on Colonel Pottinger and on Eldred Pottinger the defender of Herat […]

  I have the honor to be

  Your Most Obedient Servant

  Thomas Pottinger29

  But Burnes’ securing of the crossing of the Indus brought him a further commendation from the Court of Directors.30 Then at Shikarpur Burnes again faced a crisis of conscience about the deposition of Dost Mohammed ‘with whom we have dined, and who has treated us as private friends’.31 He told Macnaghten that he did not wish to accompany the army into Afghanistan, but would rather remain at Shikarpur to oversee relations with Sind and the army’s supply lines, with Mohan Lal as his ass
istant. Macnaghten agreed. The 1,800-mile Karachi to Kabul supply line, none of which was in British territory although the British seized key military points, would be vital to the prospects of the Army of the Indus. In December 1839 the Secret Committee ordered the urgent construction in Bombay of six more specially designed Indus steamers, to support the army and later for use in the expected Indus trade. Key parts were sent out from the UK.32

  Burnes was talked into accompanying the invasion by Fane, who persuaded him that the army needed him. It appears that Burnes’ conscience was sufficient to overcome his ambition, but not when reinforced by personal appeals to his patriotism. So the Bombay Gazette of 3 April 1833 reported: ‘Lieutenant Eastwick has been appointed to the political charge of upper Scinde in place of Sir Alexander Burnes, who seems determined to push on with Sir Willoughby Cotton.’ Eastwick in turn was replaced at Haidarabad by Burnes’ carthorse companion Leckie – and the Residence clerk was their old assistant Pitumba.

  Burnes’ agents in Afghanistan were sending him reports on Dost’s preparations to resist the invasion. The Emir was concentrating on the strengthening of the fortress of Ghazni, indicating that Dost knew the British were coming via Kandahar and not Jalalabad. Burnes also reported that Mehrab Khan of Kelat was a firm ally, but rather wished British protection than to become a vassal of Shah Shuja.33

  In the Khyber pass, Lord wrote to Burnes for assistance and advice. The tribal leaders wanted both to hedge their bets and increase their price. Typical was Bahadur Khan, who had helped escort Burnes and Lord through the pass in 1837 and to whom Lord now gave a letter from Burnes. Bahadur congratulated the British on their role in turning back the Persians before Herat, but added that he had received a message from Dost saying: ‘I hear you are in communication with Shah Shuja and Sikunder Burnes. What harm have I done you? If you want more money, say so. But remember that you are an Afghan and a Musulman, and that the Shah is now the servant of the Kafirs.’

  Bahadur continued that he received Rs8,000 annually from Dost. What were the British offering? Lord added that Bahadur in truth received about half this. Negotiations with the Khyber chiefs were rich in goodwill expressions, but centred on cash.34 Burnes provided Lord with briefing notes on how to deal with each of the chiefs, for example:

  Qutab-Alam […] is a clever, shrewd fellow; and his father being with the Shah gives him an interest in doing good. He is, however, very thick with Avitabile. That has its advantages and its disadvantages.35

  To secure the army supply route from Bombay, the British annexed the port of Karachi, which remained British territory for the next 107 years. Their excuse was that the harbour fort had fired on the Company warship Wellesley. The Karachi authorities claimed it was a single shot salute with no ball, and Henry Pottinger travelled to investigate, reporting that the Sindi explanation was true and there were no guns in the fort capable of firing in anger. Despite Pottinger,36 Auckland insisted on the annexation of coastal Sind in spring 1839.37

  With the news that the Persians had abandoned the siege of Herat, the British realised they would not be fighting the Russian-officered Persian Army, still less the Russians themselves. The size of the Bengal contingent was therefore reduced, and Fane, in poor health, decided not to go. He now drew lots to decide which two of the five Bengal Divisions should be left behind. Fane did not want to be blamed by eager officers left out. The results were foolish: for example, of the Royal regiments the 13th, which had lost 180 men to cholera, was selected, while the fresh Buffs were stood down.

  Sir John Keane, commanding the Bombay Division, had arrived in Sind on 25 November on the Company’s new paddle steamer, the Semiramis. At 1,000 tons against the Hugh Lindsay’s 400, and with twin 180-horsepower engines, it was a major improvement.38 Pottinger had been put in charge of the disembarkation of Bombay troops by the acting Governor of Bombay, James Farish. This had a strange consequence. Pottinger was obsessed with proving Burnes wrong about the potential of Karachi, and insisted the force land at Sanda instead. Here men, stores, guns and horses had to be transshipped into small boats and brought over the sandbar and surf. The dangerous process took weeks and brought losses. The force’s chief surgeon, Edinburgh’s Richard Kennedy, noted:

  Sir Alexander Burnes, who knew more of Sind and the Indus than any other person […] had recommended Kurachy as the point that should have been first occupied. But his superior knowledge […] [was] overruled […] The subsequent events most fully demonstrated that Kurachy should have been the point selected […] Lord Keane himself expressed the same opinion.39

  They had limited supplies and almost no baggage animals. For two months no part of this force was capable of moving, and would have been endangered by any attack.

  On 30 November 1838 Fane handed overall command to Keane. Under him Sir Willoughby Cotton commanded the Bengal infantry, and General Wilshire the Bombay infantry. The Bombay and Bengal cavalry were combined under General Thackwell and the artillery likewise under Brigadier Stevenson. The Chief Engineer was Major Thomson. This was the Army of the Indus proper. The Shah’s contingent under Brigadier Simpson and the Sikh contingent under Sheikh Basawan, and assorted Afghan irregulars, were not formally part of the Army, though under Keane’s operational command. Lt Col Sir Alexander Burnes was not on the Army’s roll, being present as a diplomatic Envoy.

  The final composition of the force was 21,100 men. There were 9,500 of the Bengal Army, 5,600 of the Bombay Army, and 6,000 of Shah Shuja’s contingent. Approximately 19,000 marched through the Bolan pass into Afghanistan. In addition Claude Wade was to invade through the Khyber pass with an allied army of 10,800, consisting of 4,800 irregulars under Shazada Timour, Shuja’s Crown Prince, and 6,000 Sikh troops. There were reserves of 4,500 Bengal troops at Ferozepore and Ludhiana and 3,000 Bombay troops in Sind.

  It was a small army with which to attempt to subjugate Afghanistan – though any larger an army could not have been fed. The Army of the Indus was tiny compared to the 81,000 regular foot, 10,000 regular and 23,000 irregular cavalry which the British had mobilised as the Grand Army of Hindustan in 1817 to finish Mahratta resistance and Pindari brigandage. The Army of the Indus was also substantially smaller than the forces used in the contemporary invasions of Nepal and Burma.

  Rather than starting immediately through the Bolan for Afghanistan, Cotton with Fane’s concurrence, advanced on Haidarabad with the bulk of his Division, to support Keane. Cotton’s and Keane’s Divisions were unable to communicate with each other. On 6 February 1839 Macnaghten wrote to John Colvin, Auckland’s private secretary:

  The state of our intelligence department is lamentable in the extreme. We are utterly ignorant of Sir John Keane’s movements and motives, whether he is at Jurruck or Tatta, whether he has retreated, and if he has, whether from deficiency of means, or to lead the enemy on; and we know nothing as to what the Ameers are doing, where they are, or what terms have been offered them.40

  Macnaghten was furious at Cotton’s moving on Haidarabad. He feared the campaign in Sind might delay the expedition an entire year. The Amirs of Sind had a reputation for vast wealth and Macnaghten suspected that the soldiers were motivated by prize money. He also had doubts about Cotton: ‘Sir Willoughby is clearly gone on a wild goose chase. He cannot possibly, I think, be at Hydrabad under twenty five days from this date, and he seems to be travelling by a route which has no road. He will soon, I fear, find himself in the jungle.’

  Sir Willoughby did precisely that. Macnaghten wrote imploring him to invade Afghanistan. This had no effect, particularly as Cotton was supported by Fane, who was drifting on a ‘magnificent boat’41 down the Indus alongside Cotton’s troops, in a sickbed. Fane continued to issue detailed advice on logistical and strategic arrangements. Burnes and Pottinger had both advised the move on Haidarabad. They and Fane were right, and Macnaghten was wrong. For Cotton to have marched off, leaving the unsubdued 25,000 strong army of Sind blocking Keane would have been irresponsible. It was unknown if the Amirs would c
omply with British demands or attack Keane.

  News arrived from London that the Government were not inclined to agree to Fane’s request to resign. He was lifted from his bed and placed on his horse to march on Haidarabad. At the head of the advancing column rode Alexander Burnes and Mohan Lal.42 Prize money was a very real consideration. Even the sack of the minor city of Kittur in 1824 brought £100,000 in prize money of which the customary one-eighth share, a fortune, went to the Commanding Officer, Colonel Deacon.43

  Macnaghten had crossed the bridge of boats with the artillery on 9 February44 to get the march into Afghanistan underway. Fuming at the delay, he wrote a peremptory letter to Cotton:

  I […] require you to furnish me with such a force as shall be sufficient to enable me to give effect to His Lordship’s plans in Afghanistan. I have already urged in the strongest terms your crossing over to this side of the river with your whole force. Of Sir John Keane’s army there can be no apprehension.

  This caused fury from Fane, which resulted in Macnaghten being rebuked by Auckland. Joint civilian and military operational command in war was a recipe for disaster. This lesson was not taken. The Amirs’ intelligence was rather better than the British, and they knew Cotton was coming and that Khairpur had capitulated. Facing combined British armies of 13,400 men against their own feudal forces of 25,000, virtually without artillery, Sind surrendered. Keane had accepted the submission of the Amirs just as Cotton had set off for Haidarabad.

 

‹ Prev