Sikunder Burnes

by Craig Murray

  The committee proposed to depose the Khan of Khiva and replace him with a puppet ruler, noting that this was following British precedent in Afghanistan.

  Burnes forwarded on to Simla reports from his agent Nazir Khan Ullah in Bokhara. The Russians had sent an envoy there in September 1839 to prepare the ground diplomatically for their attack on Khiva. They had attempted unsuccessfully to persuade Emir Nasrullah to release Stoddart, as Nasrullah viewed him as a hostage against a British advance on Bokhara. The Russian Envoy said that Witkiewicz’ suicide had prompted a feeling at the Tsar’s Court that a forward policy in Central Asia had indeed been neglected, and funds were now released for an expedition against Khiva. A supply depot at Mangilaluk was being stocked. The expedition would proceed by sea across the Caspian to Kir, and overland to Khiva.20

  Alex explained that he had separate intelligence that indicated Russia was indeed heavily buying provisions at the Caspian port of Mangilaluk. Strangely, Burnes does not correct Nazir Khan Ullah’s estimate of the land march from the Caspian to Khiva at four days; he himself had explored this territory and knew it to be many weeks. His agent Nazir felt in danger from the Emir in Bokhara, and requested Burnes that future correspondence be sent through his cousin Mahomed Amin Khan, and be written in Hindu script. Alex also sent on a letter from another of his agents, Qazi Mahomed Said of Herat, with intelligence from merchants who had seen a large Russian army advancing towards Khiva.21

  On 31 January 1840 Pahawar Mul, another of Burnes’ Bokhara agents, sent him an account of Dost’s arrival there with about 600 men.22 Nasrullah had sent Dost a present of robes, shawls and other costly goods, which Dost had refused, to Nasrullah’s annoyance. Nasrullah had suggested his fellow Emir await the arrival of the Russian army then marching on Khiva, and use it to reconquer Kabul. Dost disagreed, enfuriating further the short-tempered Nasrullah. The Afghan had actually decided to contact the Russians, but secretly. Then on 17 January 1840 he sent the two sons with him, Akbar Khan and Afzal Khan, to escape from what had become confinement in Bokhara and ride back into Afghanistan. Dost now had only about fifty men left with him.

  Pahawar Mul’s letter also contained the news that Colonel Stoddart, still imprisoned, had been forcibly converted to Islam, which would have included circumcision. Burnes also received a report from Balkh dated 14 January 1840 stating that according to eyewitness reports of Balkh merchants, the Russian army was encamped on the Syr Darya on the way to Khiva, and had sent messages to the Khan demanding immediate surrender.23 In handling this secret correspondence Burnes was working closely with Mohan Lal and placed great trust and responsibility in the hands of his assistant.24

  On 23 February 1840 Macnaghten wrote to Burnes reviving his proposal that they send an expedition against Bokhara to free Stoddart and counteract the Russian move. The money for it could be taken from Bokhara itself. This scheme was also vetoed by Auckland.

  On 15 March Dennie wrote to a friend:

  How are your predictions fulfilled with regard to Russia! See her now, actually at Khiva with a large regular army, and seventy two pieces of cannon! Burnes […] who is with me here at Cabool, gave this information so far back as October last, and renewed it incessantly […] but none so deaf as those who won’t hear. I am with him daily, and see and hear the men he employs, and the letters they bring him from his agents in Khiva and Bokhara.25

  Burnes, Macnaghten and Dennie all feared a two-pronged Russian spring offensive, with the Khiva force pushing over the Hindu Kush to Bamian and Kabul, and the Persian army advancing through Herat on Kandahar. But Macnaghten had doubts. On 1 April 1840 he wrote:

  I am rather sceptical as to this power of the Autocrat to push […] an army so far, in one or even in two campaigns. Burnes however is alarmed. He says we are altogether deceived by the strength of the Russian army; that it is now actually in possession of Khiva, and will shortly be in possession of Bokhara. You may imagine the anxiety with which I am looking for authentic information from the North.26

  In fact, the Russian army advancing on Khiva had been just 5,200 men, smaller than Burnes’ reports indicated, and had met with disaster. Like the British, they had experienced the unusually cruel winter of 1839/40, but unlike the British billeted in Kabul, the Russians were trying to struggle through the bitterly cold Kizyl Kum desert. Their Kazakh camel drivers had attempted to turn back saying the expedition was impossible, but Perovsky had shot two ringleaders and ascribed the opposition to Islamic fanaticism. Progress was pitiably slow, and eventually the death of virtually all their 10,000 camels caused the army to retreat, still 200 miles from Khiva. The emaciated troops reached Orenburg in March 1840; 1,000 had died in the snows and another 2,000 were crippled by frostbite.

  Macnaghten now proposed Burnes go off on various political missions, suggesting Herat, Kandahar and Bokhara. It seems he wanted to get his deputy away from the centre of power. Burnes, however, was determined to stay, and turned down all these suggestions, including the offer Macnaghten now made of Special Envoy to the Russian camp in the Kizyl Kum. Burnes wrote to Macnaghten saying he would go if given plenipotentiary powers to negotiate, but not as a simple courier. Macnaghten was indignant.

  Burnes gave too much credence to rumours sent by panic-stricken agents during this period. There was also a systemic failure which continues today. If your system of intelligence depends on paying informants, they will naturally invent something to tell you, particularly of any threat you want to believe in. Burnes had fallen victim to this common intelligence delusion.

  Macnaghten still hankered to extend British influence to the Oxus and agreed with Arthur Conolly an ambitious plan to secure the formation of a friendly Uzbek confederation of Kokhand, Bokhara and Khiva – modern Uzbekistan. This was in effect the plan of Thomas Love Peacock and the Secret Committee in London. The aim was to present a united front to Russian aggression – though with no British security guarantee – and establish a strong trading block, plus abolish slavery in the region. Britain offered nothing in return but trade and goodwill. Conolly proposed to set off on mission with Henry Rawlinson to promote this plan.

  Burnes viewed this as ill-conceived, believing that in interfering beyond the Oxus, Britain was exceeding her physical ability to influence events. He actively opposed all of Macnaghten’s schemes for sending agents, including Abbot and Conolly, into Turkestan. ‘Is England to become security for barbarous hordes some thousands of miles from her frontier?’ he asked in a minute to Auckland: ‘What are we to get from it? Nothing, I see, but to attach to ourselves just and deserved reproach for interfering with Russia on ground already occupied by her merchants, and far beyond our own line of operations.’27

  In fact, Arthur Conolly’s proposed adventure was driven by suicidal urges following a broken engagement.28 Burnes distrusted Conolly’s Christian evangelism and enthusiasm for cultural reform. To Lord, he gently mocked Conolly: ‘He is flighty, though a very nice fellow: he is to regenerate Toorkistan, dismiss all the slaves, and looks upon our advent as a design of Providence to spread Christianity.’

  Burnes argued to Auckland that Britain’s only chance to prevent Russian advance into Central Asia was for Palmerston to negotiate a comprehensive treaty that included Russia’s European and Black Sea interests, where concessions could be made. Although initially agreeing with Burnes, Auckland changed his mind under pressure from Macnaghten and Colvin, and in September 1840 Conolly started on his mission to the Uzbeks, though fortunately for archaeology Rawlinson remained in Kandahar.

  In spring of 1840 the Ghilzais attacked the communication lines between Kandahar and Kabul. General Nott sent 800 infantry, 360 cavalry and horse artillery under Captain Anderson to clear the line of the Turnuk river valley, and at Tazin they defeated a large Ghilzai force. The artillery were crucial but the infantry, an untried Hindu corps of the Shah’s contingent, performed creditably, repulsing two cavalry charges at bayonet point.

  Nott had no doubt that Saduzai misrule was the root cause
of the uprisings. He wrote:

  The fact is that the […] cruel oppression committed by the servants […] of […] Prince Timour, have […] outrage[d] the feelings of the natives […] should an opportunity offer, these cruel and shameful proceedings will be retaliated against the troops left in the country. Never in all history have I read of such plunder, cruelty, and oppression […] The houses and cornfields of the unfortunate inhabitants are entered, their property plundered, and the owners cut and wounded in the most cruel manner […] it was under the immediate eye of Prince Timour […]29

  Mohan Lal thought Shuja was playing a multiple game, and that he was encouraging uprisings in order to weaken the British. He reported, ‘the jealous and different view by the Shah who by the secret messages and sometimes by personal speech advised the Chiefs of the country to disturb the peace and oppose the British arms’.30 Lal was with Burnes overseeing a large number of agents and informers, but the country was so rife with rumour the intelligence was difficult to filter. Given the hard school of fratricidal conflict in which Shuja had been brought up, it would be surprising if he were not attempting to play all sides.

  Burnes felt pressured to produce reports validating the policies of the occupation, complaining to Lord:

  They have been at me again to write ‘on the prospects of the restored government’ […] if they really wanted truth, I would give it cordially, but it is a chiming-in, a coincidence of views, which they seek […] my conscience has not so much stretch in it as to approve of this dynasty.31

  In May, Alex rode out to visit Kohistan, whose beautiful valleys and orchards he had so much enjoyed when resident in Kabul. It was at its most delightful at this spring season in both climate and blossom. The Kohistanis had detested the firm rule of Dost Mohammed, who had brought them under royal control by expedients including the wholesale slaughter of their chiefs. They had therefore been amongst the first to rally to Shuja, and Burnes was anticipating a pleasant expedition.

  He was disappointed. He found the country laid waste by the Dourani sirdar appointed by Shuja, who had been unrelenting in tax-gathering. Many had fled to the hills, but at Shikardarra a delegation met Burnes, and gravely informed him of instances of abuse, including the imposition of taxes from which Shuja had specifically confirmed exemptions.

  A worried Burnes returned to Kabul, where he outlined the abuses he had found to Shuja. Mullah Shukhur, the vizier, denied the complaints. A Kohistani deputation, invited by Burnes, was imprisoned by royal troops. After Burnes remonstrated, they were released and obtained partial redress. This was more than the villagers had expected, and Burnes noted they ‘returned to their homes, blessing His Majesty’.32 However once they were home, the concessions were cancelled and further reprisals were taken. The truth was Burnes had almost no power to rectify bad government.

  Darcy Todd had taken over in Herat, and under a treaty33 of 13 August 1839, Britain took control of Herat’s foreign policy in exchange for an immediate payment of £10,000 and annual subsidies of £20,000. Major Sanders of the Engineers, and the colossal sum of thirty lacs, were provided for the repair and improvement of Herat’s defences.34 But Todd was so appalled by Yar Mohammed’s misgovernment that by October he was recommending that Herat be either annexed or garrisoned. He discovered that Yar was offering to acknowledge Persian sovereignty in alliance to drive the British from Afghanistan. Both Burnes and Macnaghten favoured annexation, but this was resolutely vetoed by Auckland. Then in December 1840 Hobhouse, with Palmerston’s support, urged Auckland to annex Herat to counter Russian moves against Khiva. Auckland replied to London that the expense would be ruinous; the occupation of Kabul and Kandahar had already drained the Indian treasury.

  Auckland’s alternative was to instruct Todd to offer Herat financial support to retake Ghorian. Todd handed over another £20,000; Yar pocketed the cash and did nothing.

  By the spring of 1840 Macnaghten faced so much hostility to British occupation throughout Afghanistan that he could not spare the troops for Lord’s planned expedition over the Hindu Kush. News of the disastrous Russian expedition to Khiva had removed some of the strategic urgency. On 14 May 1840 Macnaghten wrote to Lord, ‘Our policy should still be to make it appear as if an advance at least as far as Khoolm were intended, though that such an advance should take place is now more than ever improbable.’ Relying on this bluff, Lord secured a defensive alliance with Murad Ali. Mir Wali then agreed to accept Kabul sovereignty over Khulm and a British garrison, and to pay Shuja the caravan toll. In return Lord awarded Mir Wali the revenues of Saigan and Kamard, which Lord had taken. The doctor’s performance as a political officer appeared masterful.

  Dost was imprisoned in Bokhara, where Nasrullah insisted he bring his zenana, intending to extort the personal treasure carried with them. The zenana was in charge of Jabbar Khan with Mir Wali in Khulm, but hardly safe: they were squeezed between Bokhara to the north and the British to the south, and Wali’s Uzbeks might not forever resist the fortune in their midst. With Dost’s permission, Jabbar Khan therefore entered into negotiations with Lord for the surrender of the zenana, and 239 wives, daughters, concubines, children and domestic servants were handed over at Arghandi on 15 July 1840. Shuja refused to give them asylum or contribute to their maintenance – Macnaghten proposed that he be forced, but as the British were pouring in vast subsidies to Shuja the argument was a dead letter.

  The family were sent, under escort of Charles Burnes, to replace the Saduzais in Ludhiana. At Peshawar, Charlie handed them over to Lieutenant Nicolson, and received a receipt for them.

  Received from Lieutenant Charles Burnes:

  Wives of Dost Mohammed 9

  Younger Sons of Ditto 11

  Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan Grownup son 1

  Sirdar Akram Khan Ditto 1

  Wives of Afzul Khan 1

  Ditto Akber Khan 3

  Ditto Akram Khan 1

  Ditto Azeem Khan 2

  Ditto Sheer Ali Khan 1

  Ditto Hyder Khan 1

  Daughters of the Ameer 7

  Grandsons Ditto 4

  Granddaughters ditto 4

  Sons of the late Mahomed Khan 2

  Wives 4

  Female slaves for the above 102

  Male Slaves and attendants 210

  Relations 14

  P Nicolson, Lieutenant

  Peshawar Dec 18 184035

  On 6 June 1840 Burnes was created a Companion of the Order of the Bath.36 He was now Lieut Col Sir Alexander Burnes, KB, CB, FRS and still just thirty-five years old. His prospects looked tremendous. On 23 July 1840 the Army held a grand dinner to celebrate the anniversary of the capture of Ghazni. They toasted the health of poor Stoddart. It was an uproarious occasion which Arthur Conolly found a ‘vulgar outbreak’, but Burnes was in his element. He gave the speech, lampooning fellow officers, which went down well, and suggesting that if Stoddart were not released there would soon be a ‘Baron Bokhara’ to match Baron Keane of Ghazni. Conolly wrote, ‘You may imagine the accent and energy with which Burnes thundered out’ this threat.

  In the Baluch territories, British attempts to impose rule on the Murri tribe were disastrous. A force of 150 men and one gun under Captain Brown was besieged in Kahun, while a column of 160 infantry and fifty cavalry under Lieutenant Clerk was annihilated in the Nufusk pass. At Mustung, twenty-five sepoys from the garrison at Kelat were wiped out, and on 21 June 1840 the neighbouring Kakar tribe attacked the small British garrison at Quetta.

  Robert Leech, now Captain, was back at Kandahar as Political Agent with Nott, and the two made a good team. Leech successfully negotiated with the Achakzai chief, Salu Khan, whom he paid a considerable sum to reinforce Quetta, arriving just before a considerable Brahui force rolled up to besiege on 9 July. On 16 July the arrival of a further large body of horsemen organised by Leech caused the Brahuis to lift the siege. However they proceeded to besiege Kelat, where the Political Officer Loveday and the British puppet Shah Nawaz Khan were unable to depend on
the loyalty of their largely Kelati garrison.

  The son of Mehrab Khan, Nassir Khan, had been at Noshki when his father was killed, and was in the field with his Baluch Brahuis. The British tried to capture Nassir, and in doing so devastated Miranzai and Punjgur. On 28 July 1840 after a three-day siege Kelat fell to Nassir Khan. Loveday was taken prisoner, mistreated and eventually murdered, while Nassir assumed his father’s throne. Masson, who had been in Kelat, was released, by his account to carry a message.

  The British Army then suffered a further disaster in the Nufusk pass, as a relief column for Kahun of 464 infantry under Major Clibborn crossed the boat bridge across the Indus on 12 August 1840. Arriving in the pass on 31 August weak from thirst, they were attacked by the Murris. Clibborn lost 271 men killed and wounded, the remainder retreating to Pulaji. A quarter of the survivors died of thirst and exhaustion. On 28 September Captain Brown surrendered Kahun; he and his men were kindly treated and allowed to march with their guns to Pulaji, after a fruitless nine-month occupation of the Murri capital in supporting which 500 British troops had died.

  On 28 October the Baluch army crossed the Bolan pass and attacked the British base at Dadur in an effort to recover Kacchi, but was repulsed in a series of encounters. On 3 November 1840, while the Baluch army was still away, Colonel Stacey and a force from Quetta took Kalat again for the British. The Baluch and Brahui war continued with renewed vigour.