Witness to the German Revolution

by Victor Serge

  The KPD criticizes itself

  The German proletariat arrived at the threshold of revolution, but did not cross it. Is it the fault of the KPD?

  To talk of mistakes after the situation has been wound up is all too easy. But it must be done. We need constant, vigorous, detailed self-criticism. For us yesterday’s retreat is never anything but a roundabout route to tomorrow’s action. We leave to the old democratic parties the cult of irresponsibility. Let us ask the question clearly: does the responsibility for the October retreat fall on the leaders of the KPD, and to what extent? We shall see in a moment how the central committee of the KPD itself replies.

  German militants readily take the blame for having underestimated the force of inertia of the social democrats in general, and for having overestimated the extent of Communist influence on the left social democrats. Their duty is to be hard on themselves. And yet! Was it possible to foresee in advance the failure of the left social democrats ? These Saxon workers with their old-style socialist education, bureaucratic and stuck in a rut, have nonetheless already given the party of the revolution a number of excellent fighters. Didn’t they seem at last to be committing themselves all the way? Was it not reasonable to hope for a decisive awakening on their part? And if so, was it not right to gamble on the greatest hope, that is, to show daring?

  No, that wasn’t the mistake, or if it was a mistake, it was certainly not the fundamental one. Did the fault lie in not acting in spite of everything? That is the thesis of certain comrades from the left of the party. I don’t think they are correct. Alone in the face of all the forces of bourgeois society—Reichswehr, police, black Reichswehr, fascists, civil servants, servile social democrats, more than a million reactionaries with better weapons—the Communists could not count on any serious chance of lasting success.

  We should take into consideration the party’s technical inadequacy. “This technical inadequacy,” it is said, “became apparent only at the last moment.” Indeed, and that is what is serious. Here we have found the weak point. That indicates defective intelligence, presumptuousness and lack of foresight, at least as far as concrete preparations were concerned. But let’s try to be fair. Never, whatever its state of organization, will a revolutionary workers’ party before the insurrection be, not better armed, but even as well armed as a modern army. In any circumstances, we must expect a substantial technical inadequacy. Arms could have been taken from the enemy. If the mass movement had developed in the desired proportions, the inadequacy would have been remedied by emptying the arsenals of the Reichswehr…

  On the eve of the October Revolution, Lenin recalled the elementary rules of revolutionary strategy, already formulated by Karl Marx. One of the most important of these is: “Concentrate a great superiority of forces at the decisive point and at the decisive moment.”215 The extreme decentralization of Germany, as well as its geographical position, make the application of this rule very difficult—hence a certain loss of confidence in everyday action. That must be taken into consideration.

  The October retreat seems to me to have been perfectly justified. Nonetheless it is true that in social war, as in all warfare, the defeated leaders—whatever their talents—are usually removed. A new majority has been formed on the central committee of the KPD which has, in “Theses on the October retreat and the present tasks of the KPD” (Correspondance internationale, January 3, 1924), specified in severe terms its opinions on the errors of the Party:a. The party failed to recognize in time the scope of the great mass actions of the proletariat in the Ruhr, in Upper Silesia, and throughout Germany (general strike against the Cuno government) and as a result failed to adapt its tactics to the situation that these struggles had created […]

  b. The party did not begin its preparations for armed uprising at the very moment when it observed the decay of democracy (at the time of the Cuno government and the invasion of the Ruhr), but only a few days before the reactionary dictatorship came on the scene. Hence short-term military preparations, made hastily, inadequate arming of workers in the decisive days.

  c. The party tried to hold back unprepared mass movements that occurred before the October events, in order to postpone them until the moment when the decisive blow was due to be struck […] The party failed to closely link its ultimate aim, the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the demands of the transitional period and to partial actions.

  d. The party failed to recognize the role and nature of the leaders of the left of the SPD […]

  e. Although it could have done so, the party did not take advantage of the advanced positions it held in the governments of several German states, in order to bring the mobilization of the masses to a successful conclusion with a view to organized resistance.

  f. The gravest error in the strategic plan of the party, however, consisted in not making preparations for anything other than the “last fight” for the conquest of political power, while refusing and even opposing the organization of partial actions or sustained actions for partial demands with less aggressive means and methods of struggle.

  g. This cardinal error was taken as the basis for an abstract calculation of the forces confronting each other, without taking the trouble to recognize and examine the true situation in this respect. But the study of forces confronting each other can be done usefully only in the course of the action, on which the date fixed for the final offensive will also depend. Thanks to this purely theoretical false strategy, struggle was always evaded.

  h. Finally, during the decisive days for the party, excessive importance was attributed to the number of rifles while there was an underestimation of the subjective strength and enormous spirit of sacrifice that the proletarian vanguard brought to the struggle. (See the lessons of the battles of Hamburg.)

  i. The rigid plan which conceived of the decisive action as developing solely from the defense of positions in central Germany was based on a false calculation. The consequence, after the reactionary forces entered central Germany, was a complete disorientation of the way comrades saw things.

  We must insist on one point: a workers’ combat party, at a turning point such as the one Germany is going through, is obliged to be very harsh with itself. From these detailed paragraphs set out like a legal verdict I think we should pick out in particular the following points:

  The revolutionary situation developed more rapidly than the party. Despite its revolutionary experience, richer than any except the Russian proletariat, the KPD was not able to adapt to a collapse of German capitalism so severe that within six months it found itself on the threshold of revolution. Overall, it will be seen that these criticisms apply to the general tactics of the party much more than to its attitude at the very moment of the German retreat.

  In Chapter III of the same theses it is said that “retreat without fighting was a mistake” because it disoriented, and somewhat demoralized, the most combative of the German proletariat. The mistake of “retreat without fighting” extends over the whole period of struggle that goes from the fall of the Cuno cabinet to the Chemnitz conference. The mistake of the German revolutionaries was to lack initiative, to fail to continually harass the enemy, to fail to resist the enemy at every step with the maximum of energy, but rather to bide their time for a great final offensive, conceived in a rather abstract fashion… Such, at least, is the judgment suggested by the most qualified among us.

  The objective revolutionary situation has ripened much more rapidly than the class consciousness of the majority of the German proletariat. The organized elite of this proletariat—the KPD—was not at first able to adapt itself to the increased speed of events, and subsequently, carried away by its faith and enthusiasm, did not have a clear awareness of the enormous weight of the social democratic mass which had to be shaken… For my part I shall offer only these conclusions.

  The retreat is not a defeat

  It is nonetheless true that over a period of six weeks to two months, the KPD has made an extraordinary effort. Not a sing
le one of its three to four hundred thousand members remained inactive. There was not a town in the land where they did not prepare for battle with the conscientious concern of people determined to give everything for their cause. Not a day without bitter toil, not a night without its special task. No problem was neglected. I know comrades who for weeks on end did not have a full night’s sleep. I have seen faces furrowed with overwork. The stubborn eyes never lost their burning intensity. It was magnificent. In what country (apart from Russia) has anything similar been done? We are not afraid to assert that the German Communist Party has given the world proletariat the new and precious example of the awesome process of preparing for a revolution.

  That also of the greatest devotion of proletarians to their class. Each time it was necessary, in Saxony, Thuringia, the Rhineland, Westphalia, Hamburg, to mobilize the workers’ hundreds for action, everyone was at their post. Nobody deserted or hesitated. There was absolute unanimity in the voluntary accomplishment of duty. Now each of the workers called to service by his hundred always knew that he was risking his liberty, his life, the last piece of bread of his family. If the signal had been given, the whole KPD would have marched as one person, despite the objective opinions of some individuals as to the probable outcome of the struggle, despite internal disagreements, despite the inadequacy of arms—despite everything.

  This party has been dissolved.216 Its 40 daily papers have been suppressed. Its leading committee is on the run. Its assets have been seized. Ebert’s police are offering up to fifteen thousand gold marks for the capture of some of its activists. Some of its arms have been seized. Some of its men have been killed. How many of its comrades are in prison? They can be counted in thousands. But nevertheless…

  All the branches of this party are alive and active. The circulation of its illegal press is growing week by week. On several occasions it has put tens of thousands of demonstrators onto the prosperous thoroughfares of Berlin. It has kept its arms and that is no secret. It continues its preparation. It has huge broad-ranging departments (prisoners’ aid, ambulances, liaison, research), training schools, a complex and flexible network of organization against which the military dictatorship has shown itself to be powerless. Is this a defeated party?

  The October retreat was not a defeat. The rulers of Germany know this better than anyone. They do not enjoy the security of true victors. And that is what preserves, in Germany, a last remnant of the Republic…

  The situation is still revolutionary

  The threshold has not been crossed. We have even taken a step back. But we are still at the threshold.

  The situation in Germany remains profoundly revolutionary. While the military dictatorship gives the upper bourgeoisie some significant strategic advantages, it offers merely possibilities of salvation. In a very few days everything may be called into question again for the German bourgeoisie. The unity of the Reich is a political myth. Neither the Rhine, nor the Ruhr, nor Bavaria, accept the authority of the central government, to which the working-class centers show scarcely greater respect.. Parliamentarism, democratic institutions, constitution, citizens’ rights are pure fictions which no longer deceive anyone. The financial situation has never been so serious as today. The gold loan and the credits in Rentenmarks granted to the Reich have been exhausted. State employees, reduced to real starvation pay, can be paid each fortnight only thanks to the invention of new expedients. In December, the cost of living, despite the stabilization of exchange rates and wages, showed a rise of at least 25 to 30 percent. The dilemma facing the state is now whether to resort immediately to a new inflation of vast proportions or to stop making payments of all kinds. No rapid tax collection can get it out of this situation, since no tax can produce sufficient sums. The country people fear that the Rentenmark will fall in value, and since they are still obliged by law to accept paper marks, they are raising their prices, and restricting the sale of foodstuffs. The winter months will very probably not go by without bringing further grave crises of food supplies for the towns, and in their wake food riots, looting and the massacre of the hungry. The aim of heavy industry is at all costs to impose on the country a resumption of intensive production, at the expense of the workers alone. That’s their road to salvation. But the German plants are old and worn out, except in the Rhineland regions, where the great plutocrats have intelligently maintained them; but these are regions lost to the Reich, for that very reason (Stinnes, Vögler, Wolff, Klöckner and Krupp are concerned not to have in tow behind them a national industry which is in a very bad way; they would rather plunder it). Everywhere, even in the Rhineland, the labor force is worn out by years of hunger, overwork and acrimony. Finally, German production has become strictly dependent on the international situation; for all the great industrial powers of Europe, its revival would mean the reappearance of a competitor. It will scarcely get any help. In these circumstances, will not the tycoons of industry try to continue a policy which is in some senses feudal, merely enriching their own firms from the general ruin? The endless poverty of the working masses is well-known, the extent of unemployment too (one million, five hundred thousand unemployed, two and a half million on short time). Now proletarianization is attacking new layers of the middle classes, state employees who until now were the most reliable supporters of the social order. The problem of unemployment is insoluble: the state cannot, in the immediate future, either feed the unemployed or promise them work. The states, towns and districts are bankrupt. Fascism in the strict sense, a movement of the impoverished middle classes, armed and utilized by the big employers, is in decline, eroded by disappointment. The disintegration of the democratic parties is continuing. It would be a very big mistake to imagine that the SPD will emerge strengthened from the November crisis. It is obvious that at the next Reichstag elections, it will lose—to the advantage of the Communists—a large part of its vote.217 Whole regions are slipping away from its influence. Dittmann recently noted in Vorwärts “that a handful of young Bolshevik journalists are setting the fashion for Saxon social democrats.” The party’s unity, and its power, are myths, like the unity and the power of the Reich. The ADGB, the big reformist trade union organization, can no longer pay its full-timers and sees its membership melting away before its eyes. The SPD itself is living on the generosity of the British Labour Party. It scarcely any longer represents an active political factor: it is still significant as an inert mass. Its power lies solely in inaction, and it can no longer either require respect from the bourgeoisie or block the progress of communism.

  This internal situation in Germany, a revolutionary one, will necessarily last for at least a few months. With the support of foreign capitalism, by means of a clever and cruel class dictatorship, and by agreeing to pay a major part of the expenses itself, the German bourgeoisie may in the end succeed in consolidating its positions. Our comrade E. Pavlovsky,218 an experienced observer of economic affairs, admits this is true. For the moment the hostile classes remain confronting each other. On their level of consciousness, their will, their intelligence, still depends the outcome of the struggle in which social democratic inertia gives the victory to the reactionaries in October and November.

  At this moment we need to remember that social revolutions need, in order to ripen and be completed, not weeks and months, but years: the French Revolution stretched out, with leaps forward, stabilizations and political storms, over about fifteen years. Prepared beforehand by long struggles, the Russian Revolution joined its first great battle in 1905 and only completed its victories in 1920-21.

  Postscript

  Brandler and Thalheimer, the most authoritative representatives of the former majority on the KPD central committee, in their theses, accuse the Executive Committee of the Communist International and the KPD of an “erroneous estimation of relative strength of the forces confronting each other.” In particular they claim that the Comintern Executive did not take sufficient account of the observations of the KPD. The International will not fail to
clear up this point.219 The left of the party, of which Ruth Fischer220 is one of the best-known leaders, has a diametrically opposite point of view. It considers that it was possible to take power in October, but criticizes the party for having failed, before the discussions in Moscow on the German question, to make preparations for revolutionary action. Its opinion is that “the party should have taken on the struggle even at the risk of defeat, for this would have given the German proletariat fine revolutionary traditions attached to the name of the KPD, in this way preparing a future victory.” This point of view seems to me to be difficult to maintain. A Communist rising crushed in Germany by the military dictatorship and the fascist bands would, it seems to me, have provided the German bourgeoisie with a sense of security and victory which it is far from having at present. The losses it would have inflicted on the working class would not have been easy to make up for, despite the reputation for heroism which would have remained for the KPD. There are irreparable losses: we need only name Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, leaders whom the German Revolution has not yet replaced, although it is justly proud of their magnificent memory. The 1871 Commune also made an impression of epic proportions on history: but the bloodshed inflicted by the Versailles forces on the working people of Paris nonetheless weakened it for many long years. However convinced we may be of the ultimate victory of the working class, we cannot maintain that all its defeats are necessarily stages towards victory. It may be claimed of certain defeats after having soberly assessed the consequences; it is very rash to talk in the same way of a hypothetical defeat, one which would certainly have been very bloody, very expensive, and very much exploited by an enemy prepared to stake everything.