Stalin

by Ian Grey

  Although the Duma was formally dissolved, its members refused to disperse. They elected a provisional committee which assumed power. But the committee was at once faced with the rivalry of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, which had been active briefly during the Revolution of 1905 and was now hurriedly revived. The deputies were said to have been chosen on the basis of one for each 1,000 workers and one for each army company, and they claimed to be representative of the insurgents and left-wing elements. The Provisional Committee and the Executive Committee, known as Excom, of the Soviet cooperated to a limited degree, and on March 16 agreed to set up a provisional government. Kerensky, a lawyer of great energy and ability, was to become head of this government. But although a revolutionary socialist in politics, he was moderate and humane and lacked the implacable fanaticism of Lenin, Stalin, and Trotsky, and he failed to understand the mood of the country.

  Arriving on March 12 in Petrograd, Stalin went at once to the Alliluyev home, where he received a warm welcome. The whole family was present: Sergei and his wife, Olga, their son, Fedor, their elder daughter, Anna, whose memoirs provide the record of this homecoming, and the younger daughter, Nadya, then a schoolgirl aged sixteen. He answered their questions about life in Siberia, and using his talent for mimicry, he made them laugh about the peasants who had met the train at every station from Krasnoyarsk to Petrograd. The spokesman of each group would orate grandiloquently that “holy revolution, long-awaited, dear revolution had arrived at last” and salute the returning political exiles as warriors from a field of battle. They seemed to think that Revolutsiya (Revolution) was a person and a successor to the tsar, just as in 1825, many of the troops had believed that Konstitutsiya (Constitution) was the wife of Constantine, who was thought to be succeeding Alexander I to the throne.

  The following morning, Stalin set out by tram for the office of Pravda. Fedor, Anna, and Nadya went with him. They were looking for accommodation nearer to the city center. When they parted, Stalin called out: “Don’t forget to keep a room for me in the new apartment! Don’t forget!”

  Party headquarters had been set up in a mansion, which had belonged to the ballerina Mathilde Kschessinska. There he met with a rebuff. The Bolshevik organization was coming to life again. The Russian Bureau of the Central Committee was directing party affairs and taking in various members as they emerged from prison or exile. On March 12, the day of his return to Petrograd, the bureau considered the question of Stalin’s admission to its membership. According to the minutes of this meeting, the bureau received a report that he had been an agent of the Central Committee and would be a desirable member. It is strange that the bureau should have required a report on Stalin and that its minutes should have described him merely as an agent of the Central Committee, when he had been a member of it and of the bureau as well as editor of Pravda. Then came the extraordinary decision that “in view of certain characteristics inherent in him, the Bureau expressed itself to the effect that he should be invited with an advisory vote.”

  The reference to “certain characteristics” presumably concerned his uncomradely aloofness in Turukhansk. Further, Kamenev was to be allowed to write for Pravda, provided that his articles were unsigned. The decision must have been all the more offensive, since Matvei Muranov, a former Bolshevik deputy, who had no special abilities or record of service to the party, but who returned from exile with them, was admitted at once to full membership.

  The leading members of the bureau at this time were Aleksandr Shlyapnikov and Molotov. They were clearly troubled by the prospect of being displaced by Stalin and Kamenev. Shlyapnikov explained later that the bureau’s attempt to exclude them from its inner counsels arose from disapproval of their ambivalent attitude toward the provisional government and the war. It was a specious excuse, for Muranov was known to support the government and the policy of continuing the war.

  Stalin acted at once, showing a new authority. He was the senior party member present, and in ability, he towered over Shlyapnikov and Molotov, whom he swept aside. Three days after his return, he was elected to the bureau’s Presidium with full voting rights and was appointed Bolshevik representative on the Executive Committee (Excom) of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ Deputies. With Kamenev, he also took over Pravda, which had resumed publication on March 5, 1917, under the editorship of Molotov.

  Stalin dominated the party during the three weeks until Lenin’s return. Recognizing that Lenin’s violent opposition to the war and to the provisional government would antagonize most party members and people outside the party, he pursued a moderate policy. He advocated limited support for the provisional government on the ground that the bourgeois-democratic revolution was not yet complete and that there would be a period of years before conditions were ripe for the socialist revolution. It made no sense, therefore, to work to destroy the government at this stage. In his policy toward the war, he was equally common-sensed, writing that “when an army faces the enemy, it would be the most stupid policy to urge it to lay down arms and go home.” In response to the general demand among Social Democrats, he was even prepared to consider reunion with acceptable elements in the Menshevik party, and on his initiative, the bureau agreed to convene a joint conference.

  Pravda reflected this policy of moderation. Articles received from Lenin were edited, and the abusive references to the provisional government and to the Mensheviks were toned down or cut. According to Shlyapnikov, jaundiced by his summary displacement, the “editorial revolution was strongly criticized by Petrograd workers, some even demanding the expulsion of Stalin, Kamenev and Muranov from the party.” But, while there may have been a few radicals who took this line, the mass of the party supported the moderate policy, as was shown in the general response to Lenin’s pronouncements during the following weeks.

  Late on the evening of April 3, Lenin arrived at the Finland Station in Petrograd. It was a tumultuous occasion, effectively stage-managed with festoons of red banners, guards of honor, and a military band. Describing the scene, Sukhanov observed that “the Bolsheviks, who shone at organization and always aimed at emphasizing externals and putting on a good show, had dispensed with any superfluous modesty and were plainly preparing a real triumphal entry.” In promoting Lenin as the hero of the masses, however, the party had a special purpose. Lenin had traveled from Switzerland through Germany, aided by the enemy government. Patriotic and anti-German feelings were still strong among Russians, and the party was anxious to counteract rumors that Lenin was a German agent, a charge which was to cause the Bolsheviks serious embarrassment in the months ahead.

  “All the comrades groped about in darkness until the arrival of Lenin,” one Bolshevik noted. Disregarding the fanfare of welcome, he plunged at once into the business of revolution. He made an immediate impact on the party both by his implacable fanaticism and by the drastic, urgent policy he expounded.

  At the Finland Station, Lenin ignored Chkheidze and the Excom delegation who had come to greet him and at once harangued the crowd about the futility of defending the capitalist fatherland and the need to negotiate an immediate peace. On the way to party headquarters, he stopped repeatedly to address the people, railing against the war, the provisional government, and the Mensheviks as “traitors to the cause of the proletariat, peace, and freedom.” His speeches disturbed many of his listeners. “Ought to stick our bayonets into a fellow like that. . . . Must be a German,” Sukhanov overheard one angry soldier remark.

  Lenin was clearly out of touch with the mood of the city. But he was impatient. He sensed, after conspiring and struggling all his life, that power was within his grasp. He hammered home his policies, and aided by the increasing anger over food shortages, the disasters of the war, and the crisis of leadership, he began to gain support. His message was simple: The party must press forward to immediate socialist revolution. He ruled out union of any kind with the Mensheviks, or support for the provisional government, or for any continuation of the war. He set out this
policy in his Theses, which he urged upon the party conference in April.

  The party was shaken by his aggressive demand for immediate revolution. Pravda denounced it as “unacceptable in that it starts from the assumption that the bourgeois democratic revolution is ended.” Kamenev, Zinoviev, and other leading Bolsheviks as well as many ordinary members opposed not only his main thesis but also his ban on relations with the Mensheviks. Inexorably he wore down their opposition and ranged the party behind him.

  In May, Trotsky arrived from abroad and greatly strengthened Lenin’s position. They had had many disputes, but fundamentally they were in agreement. At the time of his return to Russia, Trotsky was not even a member of the Bolshevik party, but he was soon to be welcomed with enthusiasm and elected at once to the Central Committee.

  From the moment of Lenin’s arrival in Petrograd, Stalin slipped into the background. His moderate approach had been overruled, and like so many others in the party, he must have pondered deeply over the new policy of immediate revolution. Apparently, however, he accepted with equanimity his own personal displacement. He had always recognized Lenin as the leader, and if he had had any thought of challenging his position, this might have been the time to do so. Far from challenging, however, he appreciated that Lenin’s policy, which would have been madness earlier, was becoming practical and necessary in the growing chaos to which both the provisional government and the Soviet were contributing. He now gave Lenin his full support.

  During the coming months, Stalin appeared to be overshadowed by Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and others. Sukhanov described him as a “grey blur.” Trotsky with customary malice and excess described him as a “plebian democrat and oafish provincial forced by the spirit of the times to assume the Marxist tinge.” At this time, Stalin was entrenching himself as a moderate and dependable leader, and with Kamenev, he remained editor of Pravda. While the others were making speeches and contending for center stage, he was always present, stable as a foundation stone, working within the party organization. Far from being a “grey blur,” he was gaining the respect and confidence of members, as was shown at the Seventh Party Conference in late April when he received the third highest number of votes after Lenin and Zinoviev in the secret ballot for the Central Committee.

  At this conference, Stalin delivered his report on the nationalities. It was no longer a matter of theory but had become an urgent practical problem. The Finns, Poles, and Ukrainians were demanding independence or at least a degree of autonomy. Stalin spoke on the right of all nationalities to self-determination and even secession. This may have given him some difficulty, for he instinctively favored a strongly centralized and united Russian state. But he handled the session convincingly and gained the support of the conference. Grigori Pyatakov, Ukrainian by birth, and Feliks Dzerzhinsky, a Pole, had both disagreed, fearing that the disintegration of the Russian empire would damage the class struggle and the cause of revolution. Stalin defeated them in debate but tried to reassure them that in the free socialist republic which would take the place of the empire, the nationalities would have no desire to secede.

  Seeking every weapon to help him seize power, Lenin now proclaimed his support for the Soviets of Workers’, which were sharing power with and dominating the provisional government. He had been impressed by their popularity, and recognizing that they held the real power, he reversed the policy he had advocated from Switzerland. Now he argued that the party must work to create “a republic of workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ deputies in the whole country.” The slogan “All power to the Soviets” was born.

  Alarmed by the mounting anarchy and the threats of a violent popular upheaval, and influenced by Kerensky’s fervent appeals, the Excom of the Petrograd Soviet and the provisional government formed a coalition. At first, Kerensky was the dominant leader in the coalition. He was still committed to continuing Russia’s participation in the war, and he threw himself into whipping up support for a new military offensive. It began on July 1 and swept forward triumphantly against the Austrians. But then German troops halted the advance. The Russian armies collapsed. Thousands of desperate, undisciplined men surged eastward. For Kerensky and other moderate revolutionaries, this rout put an end to all hopes of negotiating peace from a position of strength and of restoring stable government. Russia was not fated to follow a moderate course.

  A tide of violent disorder swept over the country, exploding in the “July Days.” Fear gripped the city. Some 20,000 sailors from Kronstadt and 30,000 Putilov workers joined the general violence. Mass hysteria led to mass killings and destruction. But, as Sukhanov wrote, “The blood and filth of this senseless day had a sobering effect by evening and evidently evoked a swift reaction.”

  The upheaval, which had seemed spontaneous, had, in fact, been instigated by the Bolsheviks. But its fury had taken Lenin by surprise. He had made no plans to take over the city or to depose the provisional government, and the demonstration had grown so explosively that the party could not control it.

  The city reacted sharply. The provisional government, with the support of the Petrograd Soviet, accused the Bolsheviks of attempting to destroy the Revolution and reduce the country to anarchy. The Ministry of Justice released documents purporting to prove that Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders were, in fact, German agents. The accusation made an immediate impact. The Bolshevik party became the object of popular hatred. Pravda was closed down. Trotsky, Kamenev, and Lunacharsky were arrested, but Lenin and Zinoviev had already gone into hiding. At this time, public opinion was severely critical of Lenin on political and moral grounds. Within the party, too, voices were raised accusing him of abandoning his comrades and being concerned only for his personal safety.

  Lenin’s hiding place was the new apartment of Stalin’s friends, the Alliluyev family, on Rozhdestvenskaya Street. There he occupied the room that had been kept for Stalin’s use. The question now was whether Lenin and Zinoviev should surrender to trial in order to counter the criticism that they had deserted their comrades and to answer the government’s charges.

  On the night of July 7, Stalin, Krupskaya, Ordzhonikidze, and others gathered in the apartment to discuss the question with Lenin. The chief fear was that if he surrendered, government agents would kill him before he reached prison, let alone trial. Stalin and Ordzhonikidze tried to negotiate with the Mensheviks in the Petrograd Soviet guarantees that, if they surrendered, Lenin and Zinoviev would be protected and given a public trial. At this time, however, when Bolshevik fortunes were at such a low ebb and when Lenin himself was the subject of virulent criticism, he would not risk his personal safety or limit his freedom of action. It became necessary to change his hiding place. Sestroretsk, a small town on the Gulf of Finland, was chosen. Great care was taken with his disguise. Stalin acted as barber and shaved off his beard and mustache. Wearing a cap and a long coat, lent by Sergei Alliluyev, Lenin looked like a Finnish peasant, as he made his way, accompanied by Stalin and Alliluyev, to the Primorsky Station, where he boarded the crowded train to Sestroretsk.

  With so many of its leaders under arrest or in hiding, and surrounded by hostility, the Bolshevik party was at the nadir of its fortunes. It demonstrated, however, an extraordinary resilience. The few remaining members were dedicated and unshakable. Moreover, Stalin was at liberty, and he provided a leadership which, although less dynamic and visionary than Lenin’s and less dramatic than Trotsky’s, was rocklike in its strength and determination.

  Early in August, the Sixth Party Congress met secretly in Petrograd. In the absence of Lenin, Stalin delivered the Central Committee’s report to the 267 delegates, displaying great skill and persuasiveness. Many delegates were on edge after the July Days’ hysteria and confused by Lenin’s change in tactics. He had now abandoned the slogan “All power to the Soviets” because, he declared, the Soviets had become counterrevolutionary in supporting the government against the Bolsheviks.

  In presenting the Central Committee’s report, Stalin showed that
he had moved away from his moderate policy. He now condemned the provisional government as “a puppet, a miserable screen behind which stand the Kadets, the military clique, and allied capital - three pillars of counter revolution.” Before the July Days, a transfer of power to the Soviets without violence might have been possible, but now “the peaceful period of the revolution has ended; the non-peaceful period, the period of clashes and explosions, has come.” At the same time, he was careful not to expound the new policy in the blunt terms of an ultimatum, which was Lenin’s way. He was sensitive to the fact that many delegates were reluctant to cast aside the Soviets, while others still believed that it was premature to think of an immediate socialist revolution. It was in large measure his achievement that the resolution approving the policy was adopted with only four abstentions.

  In the discussion on the final part of the draft resolution, Stalin made a spontaneous contribution which illustrated his individual approach and pointed to his future policy. Dissenting from a proposal that revolution was possible “on condition of a proletariat revolution in the West,” he said that “the possibility is not excluded that Russia will be the country that blazes the trail to socialism. . . . It is necessary to give up the outworn idea that Europe alone can show us the way. There is a dogmatic Marxism and a creative Marxism. I stand on the ground of the latter.”

  Stalin’s handling of the Sixth Party Congress raised his prestige and authority. In the elections to the Central Committee, he came after Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky in the number of votes polled. When the Central Committee elected the editorial board of Pravda, Stalin received the most votes and Trotsky failed to gain election. When it was decided to elect a ten-man inner cabinet of the enlarged Central Committee, Stalin again prevailed in the balloting.