Stalin

by Ian Grey

  Concluding his report, he summarized the objectives of Soviet policy. They were, in fact, mutually incompatible. He was concerned to keep the door open to alliance with Britain, France, and the United States, yet although he roundly condemned Nazi aggression and promised Soviet support for countries subjected to Nazi threats, he did not exclude the possibility of coming to terms with Germany. “We stand for peaceful, close, and good neighborly relations with all the neighboring countries having common frontiers with the U.S.S.R.”

  On March 15, 1939, German troops invaded Czechoslovakia. Hitler announced he had taken Bohemia and Moravia under German protection. Slovakia was detached and became a puppet state. Stalin was expecting this violation of Czechoslovakia as the inevitable outcome of British appeasement, and he reacted promptly with a note of protest to Berlin.

  In the West, public opinion was outraged by the rape of Czechoslovakia. In Britain, Chamberlain had merely expressed disapproval in the House of Commons and was visibly shaken by the angry reaction. On instructions, the British ambassador in Moscow called on Litvinov to inquire how the Soviet government would react if Hitler attacked Romania. Litvinov responded the same evening with the firm proposal that representatives of Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Romania should meet without delay to concert action to avert such a danger.

  The British government rejected this proposal. Its proposition was that the four countries should issue a declaration that in the event of a further act of aggression they would consult. Although angered by this feeble alternative, Stalin agreed to the declaration, provided that Poland was also a signatory. But Colonel Beck, as anti-Russian as Chamberlain, refused to sign. He proposed a Polish-British mutual assistance pact, which could be broadened to include other powers if necessary.

  Chamberlain and earl of Halifax Edward Wood, now British secretary of foreign affairs, took an irrational plunge. On March 31, 1939, the Polish-British Pact was announced, and on April 13, it was extended to include Romania and Greece. Stalin was staggered by this British undertaking to go to the aid of countries, two of which lay between Russia and Germany, and were inaccessible to Britain. If Germany attacked Poland or Romania, Britain could do nothing without the support of the Soviet Union, and in a way, that was gratuitously insulting, both governments having carefully ignored the Soviet government. Churchill, Eden, and others were quick to point out the blind stupidity of Chamberlain’s policy.

  Next, under pressure of public opinion, the British government proposed that Soviet Russia should give unilateral guarantees to Poland and Romania. Stalin turned down this suggestion, which provided no assistance or security for Russia in the event of German invasion. He responded, however, to a French proposal for a joint Soviet-French declaration of mutual assistance, extended to Poland and Romania. On April 17, 1939, Stalin put forward the idea of a British-French-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, which would include a military convention and would guarantee the independence of all states along the Soviet frontier from the Baltic to the Black Sea. This again was a practical plan and one which would have deterred Hitler. But Chamberlain and Halifax rejected it, because it might offend Poland and Germany, and because it would commit Britain to the defense of Finland and the Baltic states. For Stalin, the inescapable conclusion was that the leaders of the British government were so blinded by hostility toward the Soviet regime that not even to avert the horrors of war would they consider an alliance with Soviet Russia against Germany.

  On May 3, Litvinov was dismissed as kommissar for Foreign Affairs and replaced by Molotov. The change aroused speculation in the West. Litvinov had been an ardent Westerner and an advocate of collective security and had many friends in the West. He was credited with being responsible for the Kremlin’s policy of alliance with the Western powers. It was not appreciated that he had always acted strictly in accordance with the instructions of the Politburo, of which he was not even a member, and that Stalin himself directed foreign policy.

  Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, the new kommissar, was hardly known abroad, but his granite-like presence and relentless pursuit of Russian interests soon made a strong impression. At the time, he was already chairman of the Council of People’s Kommissars (Sovnarkom), an office akin to prime minister, and one of Stalin’s most trusted colleagues.

  Churchill wrote of Molotov that he was a man of “outstanding ability and cold-blooded ruthlessness. . . . I have never seen a human being who more perfectly represented the modern conception of a robot. . . . His smile of Siberian winter, his carefully-measured and often wise words, his affable demeanour, combined to make him the perfect agent of Soviet policy in a deadly world.”

  Molotov’s appointment did not bring an immediate change in policy. Reporting on May 31, 1939, to the Supreme Soviet, he strongly attacked Germany and Italy and, while critical of Britain and France, he implied it was still Soviet policy to conclude a mutual assistance pact with them. In London, Chamberlain and Halifax were under increasing pressure to negotiate with the Soviet government. Toward the end of May, the British and French ambassadors in Moscow had delivered proposals for a tripartite pact, subject to League of Nations procedures, but excluding a convention on military aid and assistance to the Baltic states. Again showing patience and restraint, Stalin responded on June 2, 1939, with a draft agreement, which maintained the purely defensive nature of the proposals but specified the countries to be guaranteed against aggression and the extent of the commitment of the three signatories.

  Chamberlain seemed to approve. He expressed to Maisky, the Soviet ambassador, his interest in the draft and proposed to send a representative to Moscow to speed the negotiations. Molotov readily agreed to receive him. But, whereas Chamberlain and Halifax had gone in person to Berlin, they now sent a Foreign Office official to Moscow. It seemed a deliberate affront and, as Churchill noted, it gave “actual offence.” A courteous but pressing invitation to Halifax to visit Russia had been waved aside. The mission achieved nothing.

  Responding to public demand, the British and French governments took an initiative. Late in July 1939, Chamberlain suggested sending a military mission to Moscow. Stalin welcomed the proposal. It was hoped in Moscow that John Vereker, Lord Gort, chief of the imperial general staff, would head the mission. Chamberlain appointed an elderly retired admiral, who arrived in Moscow on August 12, 1939, without instructions. This mission, too, proved abortive. Stalin insisted a military convention must include provision for Soviet troops to pass through Poland in the event of war with Germany. The Poles declared they did not need and would not accept Soviet aid. The British and French governments rejected the provision.

  War was pressing nearer. The German Army was ready to cross the Polish frontier. Hitler hesitated only because he feared Soviet Russia would stand with Britain and France in defense of Poland. The certainty that this was the sole deterrent to Hitler must have made it all the more galling for Stalin that his repeated attempts to negotiate a tripartite pact had brought only rebuffs, humiliations, and disappointments. His foremost concern was still to gain time so that Soviet industry and the armed forces could gather strength. Reluctantly he turned now to the possibility of an agreement with Hitler.

  The first German approaches, suggesting a review of Soviet-German relations, were evidently made on May 30, 1939. The Soviet government returned a noncommittal reply, for at that time, negotiations with Britain and France were taking place. On August 4, the German ambassador in Moscow, Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, reported: “From Molotov’s whole attitude it was evident that the Soviet government was, in fact, more prepared for improvement in German-Soviet relations, but that the old mistrust of Germany persists. My overall impression is that the Soviet government is at present determined to sign with England and France, if they fulfil all Soviet wishes. Negotiations, to be sure, might still last a long time, especially since the mistrust of England is also great. . . . It will take a considerable effort on our part to cause the Soviet government to swing about.”


  A German note, delivered in Moscow on August 15, drew a more sympathetic response. Molotov replied that the Soviet government welcomed the German desire for a serious improvement in relations and proposed a trade and credit agreement to be followed by a nonaggression pact or a reaffirmation of the neutrality pact of 1926 and the conclusion of a protocol defining spheres of interest. On the evening of August 19, 1939, Stalin informed the Politburo of his intention to conclude a pact with Germany.

  Hitler was disturbed by the continued presence of the Anglo-French military mission in Moscow. He was seething with impatience to order the invasion of Poland. On August 20, he sent an urgent telegram to Stalin, asking him to receive Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, on August 22 or at latest 23. Stalin agreed. He had made his final decision to conclude the pact with Germany.

  By this date, the negotiations with the Anglo-French military mission had reached deadlock and the Poles had reaffirmed their refusal to allow Soviet troops access to Polish territory. Stalin was also influenced by the fact that fighting against Japanese troops on the Manchurian frontier continued and by the probability that he would be able to negotiate a nonaggression pact with Japan, Germany’s ally.

  On the night of August 23, 1939, Stalin received Ribbentrop and they agreed on the text of the agreement. But the meeting was cold and far from amicable. Friedrich Gauss, chief assistant to Ribbentrop, who accompanied him, recorded: “Ribbentrop himself had inserted in the preamble a rather far-reaching phrase concerning the formation of friendly German-Soviet relations. To this Stalin objected, remarking that the Soviet government could not suddenly present to their public a German-Soviet declaration of friendship after they had been covered with pails of manure by the Nazi government for six years. Thereupon this phrase in the preamble was deleted.”

  The pact was to last for ten years. Stalin and Hitler knew that it was a temporary expedient. They were enemies, and between them, war was inevitable. But their pact had the immediate result of freeing Hitler to launch his invasion of Poland and of giving Stalin more time. “If their policy was cold-blooded, it was also at the moment realistic in a high degree,” Churchill observed.

  On August 31, 1939, Molotov reported to the Supreme Soviet. He explained how attempts to reach agreement with Britain and France had failed. The new Soviet-German Pact was in accordance with the policy of peaceful coexistence, formulated by Lenin and endorsed by Stalin. It would end the enmity between the two countries. His long report was designed to quiet the anxieties of the Russian people. They were accustomed to think of their country as the bastion of antifascism and were bewildered by the abrupt reversal of policy, making them allies of Nazi Germany. But all were confident that Stalin and Molotov had the situation under control. The general reaction was that it was a shrewd move to keep Russia out of war.

  On September 1, 1939, Hitler invaded Poland. Two days later, the Anglo-French ultimatum expired, and both countries were at war with Germany. Stalin was surprised. He had expected France and Britain to back out of their treaty obligations. But war was now a reality, and he stepped up Soviet preparations. The conscription age was lowered from twenty-one to nineteen, and when the new age groups were called up during the following months, the strength of the Soviet armed forces was raised to more than 4.2 million men. On September 10, partial mobilization was decreed. Meanwhile, negotiations had started with Japan to end the fighting which had continued since 1938 along the frontier between the Mongolian People’s Republic and Manchukuo. Molotov conducted the talks with the Japanese ambassador, and they agreed to set up a commission to define frontier.

  Stalin followed the German invasion of Poland with deep uneasiness. It was a ruthless demonstration of the mechanized power and efficiency of the German Army. He knew the Red Army was neither equipped nor trained to withstand such an attack. “Victory in war,” he had pointed out in an informal meeting of the Supreme War Council, “will be won by the side that has more tanks and more highly motorized troops.” His army lagged far behind the German Army on both counts. Soviet defense industries were making gigantic efforts, and Russia was catching up. He needed time and every month counted.

  First, it was necessary to secure the Russian frontiers against approaches through Poland and through the Baltic states. Occupation of eastern Poland, as agreed in the secret protocol with Germany, would create a defense region. But Stalin delayed for two weeks before acting on Ribbentrop’s proposal, made on September 3, that, in accordance with their agreement, the Soviet forces should advance into Poland.

  On the day after the truce with Japan was signed, the Red Army crossed the Polish frontier. The Polish Army and Air Force, already shattered by the German onslaught, offered little resistance. In Moscow, Molotov spoke with contempt of “the internal insolvency and obvious impotence of the Polish state,” which had become “a fertile field for any accidental and unexpected contingency that may create a menace to the Soviet Union.” He showed no magnanimity. The Poles were enemies who in changed circumstances would have treated Russia in the same fashion.

  Stalin was anxious about the Baltic approaches into Russia. Leningrad, with a population of 3.5 million, was only thirty-two kilometers from the Finnish border and within range of artillery fire. Treaties of mutual assistance were imposed on Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Finland was not cooperative. In 1938, Soviet proposals to lease certain territory along the northern shore of the gulf were flatly rejected. On October 14, 1939, a Soviet note made firm proposals for an exchange of territory, together with a thirty-year lease of the Hangö peninsula and frontier adjustments in the Petsamo area and on the Karelian Isthmus. The Finns refused to yield at any point. Attempts to negotiate continued, but made no progress. On November 13, 1939, Stalin broke them off. His patience was exhausted. He decided to use force.

  On November 30, the Soviet attack was launched, beginning the four-months-long Finnish Winter War. The Red Army deployed twenty divisions against fifteen Finnish divisions. The Finns were, however, highly trained and well equipped. The Russian troops were poorly led and trained and inadequately armed. Their losses were appalling, and by the end of the year, the Finns were still holding the Red Army on all fronts.

  World opinion was on the side of the Finns and strongly anti-Russian. The Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations. In Britain and France, the governments even considered declaring war on the Soviet Union. Chamberlain expressed the view that there would be strategic advantage in fighting Hitler and Stalin simultaneously and “killing two birds with one stone.” In a broadcast on January 20, 1940, Churchill declared that Finland “had exposed for the world to see the military incapacity of the Red Army.”

  Stalin was appalled by the failures of the Finnish campaign. It was a humiliation, and he was sensitive to the contemptuous criticism and the anti-Soviet campaign abroad. The Germans secretly, and Britain and France openly, took pleasure in this humiliation of Soviet armed might. The fact was that by comparison with the German war machine, the Red Army was lumbering and inefficient. Stalin fumed with anger and repeatedly summoned Kirill Meretskov, who had planned the campaign, to report in Moscow. He bore in mind, too, that an alternative plan of campaign, prepared by Shaposhnikov, had warned that it would take several months to overcome Finnish resistance. Now, disturbed by the real possibility of armed intervention by Sweden, Britain, and France, and angered by the continued failure of his troops, he ordered a massive assault.

  During January 1940, Russian troops were concentrated for the great advance which began on February 11. The Finns were overwhelmed by weight of numbers and by constant bombardment. They sued for peace on March 8, and four days later, the treaty was signed in Moscow. The territories needed to secure the Baltic approaches to Russia’s frontiers had been won. Stalin did not consider occupying Helsinki or encroaching on other parts of Finland. The callousness and contempt that the Russians showed toward the Poles did not extend to the Finns, whom they respected.

 
; The Finnish war had proved a costly and humiliating operation, but it yielded important results. Stalin was quick to recognize the weaknesses of the Soviet forces. Addressing the Chief Military Council on April 17, 1940, he stated bluntly that all commanders must study modern warfare. The traditions and experience of the Civil War were simply obstacles to the understanding of war. Sweeping reforms were introduced. Zhukov was to call 1940 “the year of the great transformation.”

  The status and authority of officers were raised. The titles of general, admiral, and other ranks and also the ranks of NCOs were revived in place of the revolutionary titles. The single command system was restored and the political kommissars were subordinated to their military commanders. Lack of trained officers had been felt acutely during the war, and intensive courses for officers were instituted. More than 4,000 officers who had been sentenced during the great purge were recalled, including men like Konstantin Rokossovsky, Pavel Rotmistrov, and Fyodor Tolbukhin, who were to become marshals of the Soviet Union. Military manuals were rewritten. No trace of the old idea of equality of officers and men remained. The emphasis was on command and discipline. All of these changes bore the mark of Stalin’s authority and outlook.