The Reason of Reason_How Reason, Logic, and Intelligibility Together are Evidence for God
Page 9
When someone is using a given language to communicate to others we can always presuppose that he/she wants to be understood, and usually that he/she expects to be understood. That is the whole point of language. Supposing I don’t know the language I can also presuppose that someone else does and that there is a language community. No one speaks a language that nobody else understands. For all these reasons nobody gives an entire lecture without presupposing that comprehension is possible and with the desire and expectation to be understood. Also, no audience would sit through an entire lecture they know they will not understand (unless they are forced to do so or otherwise incentivized), because the main point of being an audience for a lecture is to comprehend it. Third, an audience that demonstrates their comprehension of the content of the lecture (e.g. by way of a post-test or their performance of related functions) would prove that they understood the language.
Strictly speaking I admit that Martin’s claim is true in terms of “pure deductive logic”; it is logically possible that Martin might give a lecture to people who don’t understand him even if he knows that. But this scenario would be so nonsensical as to be laughable. The point is, logic does not take place in a vacuum and all the factors or probability must be considered. Moreover, the inductive probability of this case is every bit as commanding as the deductive case. This is the most important idea.
In example 2 there is a distractor: Yes, the endeavor is based on the presupposition that extra-terrestrial life is possible, but that is not the important one. The all-important one is that if intelligible radio signals are received (A) it would prove that extra-terrestrial life exists (B). That is how A presupposes B, and that is the missing premise. This, then, is a summary of the problems with Martin’s thinking as I see it. If you feel this is a satisfactory explanation, and if you are dis-inclined to go further into the weeds of the technical details, feel free to skip the next few pages. However, if not, and if you’re up for it I encourage you to keep reading to see precisely how the logic works.
Example 1
Here’s what I think Martin’s version of example #1 would look like as a syllogism. In order to analyze it properly we have to reduce the ideas to premises and put them in the right order.
Syllogism 1a
P1. All successful communication (A) from speaker to audience requires mutual understanding of a given language (B) such as English. (True)
P2. The speaker (Martin) is using English (B) to communicate to his audience. (True)
________________________________________________
C. Therefore, the audience understands English. (A) (Valid but not necessarily true)
Or
1b
P1. All A requires B. (A presupposes B)
P2. x is B.
________
C. Therefore x is A.
We will return to this syllogism after some discussion of its principles (logic at work).
Principles of Logic, part 1
Again, the Law of Validity demands that if the premises are valid then the conclusion must be valid, though not necessarily true. Fortunately there is another principle that helps us analyze deductive arguments: If we know the conclusion to be false then one or both of the premises must also be false. We know from common sense and experience that Martin’s simple point is true, i.e. the fact that he, the speaker, uses a certain language (English) to communicate to his/her audience does not mean that they understand him. It is true, but he is missing the real point. There is indeed something wrong with his logic. One senses this intuitively, I think, but we must identify the error. And we will.
In Martin’s first example, it is true that his usage of English entails a reasonable inference that his audience understands English, but it is not necessarily so. As he stated, they might only understand Chinese. But, since Martin is using English to communicate to this audience it follows that there is a good reason. Why? Rational people do not do this if they know their audience cannot understand them. (P3) That is the missing premise. With this in mind there are five possible explanations:
Options 1
The audience does understand English.
They do not, but there is an interpreter.
They do not, but Martin falsely believes they do.
They do not, but Martin does not care either way.
They do not, but Martin is mentally unstable.
We must ask ourselves, which of these seems to be the most likely explanation (probable)? For my money I would choose number one or two as the most reasonable. Before his speech it is most likely that Martin has knowledge of whether his audience can understand him or that there is an interpreter. So on the inductive level A does presuppose B, just not necessarily so. But we need to go a bit further.
First, Martin argues that his usage of English (A) validly requires that his audience understand English (B) but does not presuppose that they do. This is true. The way Martin sets it up, A does not necessarily presuppose B. However, the Options 1 table shows that A does strongly suggest B so much so that no other explanation is as reasonable (probable) as B. Since Martin is using English to communicate to his audience, it is very unlikely (improbable) that he would be doing so if he knew they did not understand him (i.e. if he knew they only understood Chinese). Why? Because normal people want their audience to understand them, so they do not do that; they do not use a language they know will be unintelligible to their audience. Therefore, the two most reasonable options are 1 and 2. If option 2 is eliminated, option 1 is the most reasonable one. Further, it would be very unlikely for Martin to not know what language his audience understands before he begins his address, almost unthinkable. Since Martin is mentally stable (which we have no reason to believe otherwise) and if there is no interpreter, the fact that he is using English to communicate indicates that he at least believes he knows that his audience can understand him. If he is using English we can be reasonably confident that they understand him. Therefore, that A presupposes B is very reasonable even in the inductive sense. No, A does not prove B, but it is strong enough to bet on. Here’s what this would look like as a modification of Syllogism 1a + b:
Syllogism 1c
P1. All successful communication (A) from speaker to audience requires mutual understanding (B) of a given language, such as English (E). (True)
P2. A reasonable speaker (S) would try to predetermine (K) the language of his or her audience and use (E) that language or have an interpreter. (True)
P3. The speaker (Martin) is using English (E) to communicate to his audience. (True)
________________________________________________
C. Therefore, the audience probably understands English. (E) (Valid and true)
Or
1d
P1. All A requires B. (A presupposes B.)
P2. All S entails K. (S presupposes K.)
P2. x is E.
____________
C. Therefore x is probably A.
Second, I grant that Martin’s usage of English does not require his audience’s proficiency in English, but their demonstrable understanding of the content of Martin’s lecture (without an interpreter) would. That is, if Martin is using English to communicate to his audience, and the people in that audience show that they do understand him (say, by way of a test) it necessarily follows that they understand English. To be sure, it is not Martin’s usage of the English language alone, but the successful transfer of meaning to his audience that presupposes their understanding of English (again, barring an interpreter). Their good results on a test of content would actually prove that they understand English.
That is the important, deductive point. Martin was trying to show that one thing does not presuppose another thing just because it is valid, which of course is both valid and true. But in this example he left out another vital premise related to how one verifies the language of the audience if it is in question. Therefore, if A = their good results on the test showing their understanding of the content that was co
mmunicated in English, and B = English, then it follows that A presupposes B and B is both valid and true. So I argue that Martin’s example contains a category error because it does not highlight the right relation-ship of ideas. It should look like this:
Syllogism 1e
P1. All successful communication (A) from speaker to audience requires mutual understanding (B) of a given
language, such as English (E). (True)
P2. Adequate results on a follow-up test given to the audience on the content of the lecture verify their comprehension of it (T). (True)
P3. Barring an interpreter, this is only possible if they understand English. (O) (True)
P4. The speaker used English (E) to communicate to his audience. (True)
_______________________________________________
C. Therefore the audience certainly knows English. (Valid and true)
Or
1f
P1. All A requires B. (A presupposes B.)
P2. All T entails O. (T presupposes O.)
P2. x is E.
_______________
C. Therefore x is A.
The principle I have been attempting to establish is that presuppositions are a fact of reason, a principle of logic. In the exercise of reasoning presuppositions abound. This is both normal and inescapable. Some things DO presuppose other things, or put in reverse, some things are rightly presupposed by other things. This does not mean that anything is correctly presupposed by anything else, of course, but underneath every proposition or truth claim there are and must be presuppositions. But they can be so basic and elemental as to be almost invisible. We often do not recognize them. The trick is to learn to identify and be aware of them.
The laws of logic are good examples because we readily employ them unconsciously. Once identified, a presupposition must be tested, and its relationship to premises and whole arguments must also be tested. But that can be a demanding exercise in itself. Greg Bahnsen and friends argue that the existence of logic presupposes God to which Michael Martin argues just the opposite. So, who’s right? That presupposes, of course, that there is truth as well as falsehood, that someone can be right and the other wrong, and also that they can’t both be right. I subscribe to that presupposition as I think Martin does also or there is no point in arguing. I respect Martin for that, and for laboring to prove his case in the most reasonable terms possible.
Chapter 9
Objections to the Logos Principle, part 2
In the last chapter I stated my agreement with Greg Bahnsen and friends that the very fact of logic and reason presupposes an ‘omni-God’, i.e. that we could have no logic without a Supreme Logician. But I realize I must strengthen my case if I hope to persuade Martin and other non-theists. So far I have attempted to show that Martin fails to recognize or acknowledge some of the presuppositions that were embedded in the implicit details of his sample propositions. In this chapter I continue that analysis with a new proposition:
Example 2
“Scientists listening to radio signals from outer space [A] in order to make contact with extra-terrestrial life [B] presuppose that such life is possible. But it does not follow that it is.” [C]
This one is easier to debunk because the way Martin uses it to make his point is not even valid, which I will show. However, I’m really glad he chose this example because it has instructional value of another sort that the first one did not have, which we will come to a bit later.
Syllogism 2a
P1. All intentional attempts to listen to radio signals from outer space (A) in order to make contact with extra-terrestrial life presuppose that such life is possible. (True/False?)
P2. Scientists do attempt to detect such radio signals from using technology. (B) (True)
________________________________________________
C. There is extra-terrestrial life. (False)
The way Martin uses this example in his argument elicits a gut-level assent or agreement, at least it did for me. But note the question mark after P1…is it true or false? If you’re like me you have to ponder this because it is not patently obvious. After my own pondering I saw that it hangs on the correct meaning of “presuppose” the way Martin uses it. Like most many words it can have several shades of meaning. In this example it could mean either a) that something is true or b) something is believed to be true. Or, if we can agree that presuppositions are beliefs, then by presupposing e.t. scientists might believe c) with confidence (or even a sense of certainty) that there are aliens, or d) they might moderately (or dubiously) believe in the mere possibility of aliens. But which is the correct meaning of the word in P1 according to Martin? It appears that he intends it to mean a) or c), but I will venture to say that it should be the last of the options I listed. I think it should say this:
“All intentional attempts to listen to radio signals from outer space (A)…require a belief that such life is possible (B).”
In other words, a scientist need not feel confident that there are aliens, only that it is not impossible. I think this is a very important distinction. For these reasons I assert that P1 is false in the way I think Martin uses “presuppose”. However, even if it is true the conclusion might still be false, therefore the whole syllogism is invalid, and that is the important point. He used it to show that even valid arguments can be false, but invalid arguments always false! Again, P1 is ambiguous, but I think it is false. And that affects the conclusion.
Worded as it is, it might seem as though the correct conclusion should be the following…
C. Therefore extra-terrestrial life (ET) is possible. (Invalid)
But it really should be…
C. Therefore some scientists believe that ET is possible. (Valid and True)
Or
P1. All A requires B (A presupposes B).
P2. x is B
_____________
C. Therefore x is A
You see, the way Martin uses the example is invalid in the first place. That scientists listen for e.t. radio signals does not presuppose the fact of aliens, only the possibility of aliens; or more precisely, it only presupposes their belief in the possibility of aliens, which could merely be an open-mindedness or wishful thinking. (Granted, somebody believes strongly enough to commit billions of dollars to this exercise.) The point is that Martin’s example, as I understand it, is logically flawed.
Among the other problems I’ve tried to spell out already, its most serious one is that it’s a “red herring”. This is a kind of logical fallacy, or flawed idea. (As I’ve said, I find it so interesting that ideas can be flawed because it presupposes an ideal standard of rightness to the formulation and communication of ideas in general.) A red herring is an idea that is “intended to divert attention from the real problem or matter at hand; a misleading clue.” The real question is not whether anyone believes or doesn’t believe in aliens, it’s whether there are reasons to believe in and search for them. Is there any evidence for them? In this example, there need not be actual evidence for aliens to motivate some people to search for them, but there still must be reasons to suspect their existence or they would not do it. Yes, that is a presupposition too, that actions require motivation.
The same is true for the first example about the language of the speaker and audience. What really matters is not what the speaker believes, assumes or presupposes. It is a question of the reasons for believing, assuming, or presupposing something, before and after—what’s the evidence? The language a speaker chooses to use to address his/her audience presupposes reasonable, available evidence that successful communication is probable, or at least possible. In this case there will be some evidence before the lecture regarding the audience’s capacity to comprehend it (which, again, would be expected and assumed by the speaker) and even more after it. So the important idea is actually the opposite of what Martin has put forth, the first syllogism in reverse. The audience’s comprehension of the content of the lecture (A) requires and presupposes an intelligible
language (B). Their comprehension is the evidence that the language of the speaker (or interpreter) was intelligible to them. It would look like this:
Syllogism 2b
P1. All successful communication (A) from speaker to audience requires mutual understanding of a given language (B). [i.e. intelligibility] (True)
P2. The audience has comprehension of the content of the communication. (True)
________________________________________________
C. Therefore, the audience understands the given language.1 (A) (Valid and true)2
1Or the language of the interpreter.
2Not only is it true, it is necessarily true. It is deductive certainty.
What’s more, their comprehension is the evidence for a list of other things that are so properly basic that we hardly need to think of them, such as these: 1) that a pre-existing language was used, 2) that information was conveyed through that given language, 3) that there was an intelligent agent of communication (not an animal and most likely human), 4) that there was an intelligible means of communication, 5) that the information was both coherent and correspondent to the order of reality, and still others that are so properly basic it is hard to objectify them. The most relevant propositions for this discussion would be 2-4, which are really the ones in question. Does (complex) information presuppose (superior) intelligence, i.e. an intelligent source? Yes, always. Does the fact of (complex) intelligibility always presuppose (superior) intelligence? Yep. Does (complex) communication always presuppose intelligence? Yes, of course. And the higher the complexity the higher the must be. The point is that Martin’s usage of example one is a red herring.