Madison and Jefferson

by Nancy Isenberg;Andrew Burstein

  33. Collier, Roger Sherman’s Connecticut, 7–15, 20, 26, 58, 90, 102, 110–11, 138, 189, 194, 230, 235.

  34. Leonard L. Richards, Shays’s Rebellion: The American Revolution’s Final Battle (Philadelphia, 2002), 23, 26–27, 63, 83–88; Richard Buel, Jr., “The Public Creditor Interest in Massachusetts Politics, 1780–1786,” in Robert A. Gross, ed., In Debt to Shays: The Bicentennial of an Agrarian Rebellion (Charlottesville, Va., 1993), 51, 55.

  35. Washington to Knox, December 26, 1786; Randolph to Washington, January 4, 1787; Washington to Randolph, March 28, 1787, PGW-CS, 4:482, 501, 5:113; also Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the American Constitution (New York, 2007), 220; Richards, Shays’s Rebellion, 131–32. Washington had initially told Governor Edmund Randolph that he wished to decline appointment to Virginia’s delegation. Randolph waited three months, as the details of Shays’s Rebellion had time to disseminate. Then Washington had his change of heart.

  36. “Vices of the Political System,” PJM, 9:350; JM to Edmund Pendleton, January 9, 1787, PJM, 9:245. Madison heard the rumors of British influence in Shays’s Rebellion from William Grayson, who was serving in Congress. See Grayson to JM, November 22, 1786, PJM, 9:174–75; Richards, Shays’s Rebellion, 127–32; Stephen E. Patterson, “The Federalist Reaction to Shays’s Rebellion,” in Gross, ed., In Debt to Shays, 105.

  37. JM to TJ, March 19, 1787, RL, 1:473; Holton, Unruly Americans, 77, 155–56; Richards, Shays’s Rebellion, 16–17, 118–19.

  38. “Vices of the Political System,” PJM, 9:349–51; JM to TJ, August 12, 1786, RL, 1:430; Holton, Unruly Americans, 158; Robertson, The Constitution and America’s Destiny, 57. For Madison, New Jersey was another “salutary lesson” of the “impotency of the federal system,” demonstrating how roles were reversed between Congress and the states. As he wrote to James Monroe, Congress was forced to “court a compliance with its constitutional acts,” and what was more humiliating, it had to beg obedience from a state “not of the most powerful order.” See JM to Monroe, April 9, 1786, PJM, 9:25.

  39. JM to TJ, March 19 and June 6, 1787, RL, 1:473, 479; Ketcham, 172–73.

  40. “Vices of the Political System,” PJM, 9:354.

  41. “Madness,” “wickedness,” and “folly” were the words Madison used to describe the tiny state, where, he said, “all sense of character as well as right is obliterated.” He meant that the democratic impulse was strong and unhealthy—a matter of whim instead of reason. JM to Edmund Randolph, April 2, 1787; and “Virginia Delegates to Edmund Randolph,” April 2, 1787, PJM, 9:362–63.

  42. Monroe to TJ, July 27, 1787, PTJ, 11:631; Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity (New York, 1971), 66–67.

  43. JM to TJ, June 6, 1787, RL, 1:478; TJ to Adams, August 30, 1787, PTJ, 12:69.

  44. Speech by Randolph, May 29, Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention, 28–30.

  45. Virginia Plan, May 29, ibid., 30–31. We accept Charles F. Hobson’s argument that Randolph and Mason were “probably responsible for the milder version of the negative” in the Virginia Plan. See Hobson, “The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government,” William and Mary Quarterly 36 (April 1979): 215–35, quote at 226.

  46. JM, May 31, Notes of the Debates, 40–41.

  47. Reed and Sherman, May 31, ibid., 37, 39, 43; “Notes of Major William Pierce on the Federal Convention of 1787,” American Historical Review 3 (January 1898): 326; Robertson, Constitution and American Destiny, 124–25; Beeman, Plain, Honest, Men, 114–18; Collier, Roger Sherman’s Connecticut, 26, 194, 230.

  48. Dickinson, June 2; Dickinson and Sherman, June 7, Notes of the Debates, 55–57, 82, 84.

  49. Madison and Dickinson, June 7, ibid., 83–84.

  50. Mason, June 7, ibid., 87; James H. Hutson, “John Dickinson at the Federal Constitutional Convention,” William and Mary Quarterly 40 (April 1983): 257; Rossiter, 1787: Grand Convention, 110–11.

  51. Charles Pinckney, June 8; Madison and Pinckney, August 18, Notes of the Debates, 88, 477–78; Marty D. Matthews, Forgotten Founder: The Life and Times of Charles Pinckney (Columbia, S.C., 2004), 6, 11–12, 45; Mark A. Noll, Princeton and the Republic, 1768–1822: The Search for the Christian Republic in the Era of Samuel Stanhope Smith (Princeton, N.J., 1990), 92; JM, June 8, Notes of the Debates, 89. Richard Beeman discusses Pinckney’s later claim that he had more to do with the convention—and more original ideas—than Madison gave him credit for. See Plain, Honest Men, 93–98.

  52. Gerry and Wilson, June 8, Notes of the Debates, 89–91.

  53. Bedford and JM, June 8, ibid., 91–92.

  54. Bearly and Paterson, June 9, ibid., 94–97, 118–21, 127; Rosemarie Zagarri, The Politics of Size: Representation in the United States, 1776–1850 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1987).

  55. Bearly and Paterson, June 9, Notes of the Debates, 92. New Hampshire’s delegation was late in arriving and did not vote; Delaware’s vote was canceled because its delegates were evenly split.

  56. The New Jersey Plan was so out of sync with Madison’s viewpoint that it even rejected the idea of a bicameral Congress, which the astute Sherman found he could use as a wedge issue. By suggesting that he might be willing to consider a compromise on bicameralism, he was able to stick to his guns on more important concerns. In the days that followed, the other two Connecticut delegates, Oliver Ellsworth and Samuel Johnson, stayed on message, repeating George Mason’s words that small states deserved the right to self-defense. Sherman, June 20; Johnson, June 21 and June 29; Ellsworth, June 29, ibid., 148, 161, 211, 218.

  57. Ellsworth, June 29, ibid., 217–18.

  58. JM, King, and Bedford, June 30, ibid., 224, 228, 229–30; for Paterson’s complaint about the rudeness of Madison, see Paterson, July 5, ibid., 243; also see Robert Yates’s notes on the convention in Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Constitution of 1787 (New Haven, Conn., 1911), 1:500; for Madison’s comment on Connecticut’s refusal to pay its requisitions, see JM to James Madison, Sr., February 25, 1787, PJM, 9:297.

  59. JM, June 29 and July 14, Notes of the Debates, 214–15, 293–95. Even before the convention, he had raised the specter of the Union dividing into three sectional governments but at the time did not identify the small states as responsible. Rather, the subject was sparked by the controversy over control of the Mississippi. See JM to Edmund Pendleton, February 24, 1787, PJM, 9:259, 264.

  60. JM, June 28, June 30, and July 9, Notes of the Debates, 206, 224–25, 259; David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification (New York, 2009), 82.

  61. Morris, July 10; King, July 6; John Rutledge, July 5; Pierce Butler, July 6; Gerry, July 14, ibid., 245–47, 265, 288–89.

  62. A Georgian at the convention termed Morris “conspicuous and flourishing in public debate.” See “Notes of Major William Pierce on the Federal Constitution of 1787,” 329; and William Howard Adams, Gouverneur Morris: An Independent Life (New Haven, Conn., 2003), 96, 126, 159.

  63. JM and Mason, July 11, Notes of the Debates, 266–67, 272–73.

  64. Wilson, July 12, ibid., 279–280; also see Howard A. Ohline, “Republicanism and Slavery: Origins of the Three-Fifths Clause in the United States Constitution,” William and Mary Quarterly 28 (October 1971): 580–81. Taxing slaves would realize revenues for the states, not the central government.

  65. Morris, July 10 and July 13, Notes of the Debates, 262, 285–86.

  66. July 14, ibid., 290–91, 297.

  67. Gerry, June 29; Morris, July 5; JM, July 11; Franklin, June 28, ibid., 209–10, 217, 240, 272; Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, 177–81.

  68. At this point in the deliberations, Congress had the power to appoint the president, and if each house voted separately, the Senate could override the choice of the House. JM, July 17, July 19, July 21, August 6, August 9, August 14, and August 23; JM and Daniel Carroll, August 14; Report of the Committee of Detail, August 6, all in Notes of the Debates, 311, 326–27, 344,
386–93, 423–25, 457–59, 520; Robertson, Constitution and America’s Destiny, 148.

  69. Madison, July 23, Notes of the Debates, 352–53.

  70. The Senate, by this reading, failed to embody the popular will. When Madison used the term “popular will,” he really meant southern approval, because northern states made up the majority in the Senate in the current configuration. The Senate’s actions were not truly national in character because they were taken “by a minority of the people, though by a majority of the States.” JM, July 21 and August 23, ibid., 344, 520.

  71. It was hard to know precisely where prejudices lay on this issue. Gerry called popular election “radically vicious,” pointing to the “ignorance of the people” who would be duped by some powerful group of men to vote for its handpicked candidate. Small state defenders were also skeptical of Madison’s approach to national election. Ellsworth concluded that direct election would give the largest states the advantage in crowning a favorite son. JM, July 19 and July 25; Gerry, July 19; Gerry and Ellsworth, July 25, ibid., 327–29, 363–66, 368.

  72. Williamson, Morris, and JM, July 25, ibid., 368.

  73. King and Morris, July 24, ibid., 358, 361.

  74. JM, July 21 and July 25; Morris, July 24, ibid., 338, 361–65.

  75. August 31 and September 4, ibid., 569, 574.

  76. Only Delaware voted against Sherman’s motion. JM, September 5; Wilson and Sherman, September 6, ibid., 584, 587–88, 592.

  77. JM, July 21 and July 25, ibid., 337–43, 364–65.

  78. JM, July 17, July 20, August 15, August 17, September 7, and September 12, ibid., 311, 332, 465, 476, 599, 629; John Ferling, The First of Men: A Life of George Washington (Knoxville, Tenn., 1988), 319–20. Pierce Butler of South Carolina wrote in 1788 that the reason the delegates were willing to extend such power to the president was because they “cast their eyes towards General Washington as President.” See Rossiter, 1787: Grand Convention, 222.

  79. JM, August 13, August 16, August 24, August 25, and August 29; King, August 8 and August 22, Notes of the Debates, 409–10, 445–47, 467–68, 503–9, 530, 532, 550; Robertson, Constitution and America’s Destiny, 179–80; Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 17; JM to TJ, October 24–November 1, 1787, RL, 1:503.

  80. Randolph, June 1; Mason, June 4, Notes of the Debates, 46, 64.

  81. Mason wanted commercial treaties (or navigation acts that placed restrictions on foreign vessels carrying American exports) to require supermajorities, or two-thirds of each house, for passage. It was this issue that arguably resulted in his decision to oppose the adoption of the Constitution. It was not the absence of a bill of rights. See Peter Wallenstein, “Flawed Keepers of the Flame: The Interpreters of George Mason,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 102 (April 1994): 241–42.

  82. There were others, such as Luther Martin and John Francis Mercer of Maryland, who did not sign, having left Philadelphia before the end of the convention. Several delegates had already left for personal and political reasons. Thirty-eight of the original fifty-five delegates signed the constitution. Randolph, September 10; Randolph, Mason, and Gerry, September 15, Notes of the Debates, 612, 615, 651–52. JM to TJ, October 24–November 1, 1787, RL, 1:503.

  83. Franklin, September 17, Notes of the Debates, 652–54.

  84. Washington, September 17, ibid., 655, 659; Rossiter, 1787: Grand Convention, 237–38.

  85. Princeton dateline, as reprinted in the Columbian Herald [Charleston, S.C.], October 18, 1787.

  86. Carrington to JM, September 23, 1787; JM to Washington, September 30, 1787, PJM, 10:172, 180–81; Carrington to TJ, October 23, 1787, PTJ; Richard Henry Lee to Mason, October 1, 1787; Paul H. Smith et al., eds., Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774–1789 (Washington, D.C., 1976–2000), 24:459.

  87. JM to TJ, September 6, 1787, October 24 and November 1, 1787, RL, 1:491, 495–507.

  CHAPTER FIVE

  The Addition of Rights, 1788–1789

  1. Virginia Journal, January 1, 1788.

  2. JM to Edmund Pendleton, January 9, 1787; to Washington, March 18, 1787; and esp. to George Muter, January 7, 1787, PJM, 9:231, 245, 315; TJ to JM, January 30 and February 5, 1787, RL, 1:461.

  3. TJ to JM, January 30–February 5, 1787, RL, 1:461.

  4. TJ to George Wythe, August 13, 1786; to Washington, November 14, 1786, and August 14, 1787; to Joseph Jones, August 14, 1787, in PTJ, 10:532–33, 12:34, 36–38; JM to TJ, October 24 and November 1, 1787, RL, 1:496; for an interesting discussion of how European opinion colored Jefferson’s views, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, “Jefferson and the Constitution: The View from Paris, 1786–89,” Diplomatic History 11 (1987): 321–35.

  5. JM to TJ, October 24–November 1, 1787, RL, 1:498, 500–502.

  6. Douglass Adair was the first to stress the significance of Hume to Madison’s Federalist 10. His interpretation was challenged by Edmund Morgan, who saw how Madison built upon Hume’s view of factions but concluded that Madison had rejected Hume’s solution. See Adair, “ ‘That Politics May be Reduced to a Science’: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist,” Huntington Library Quarterly 20 (1957): 343–60; and Morgan, “Safety in Numbers: Madison, Hume, and the Tenth Federalist,” Huntington Library Quarterly 49 (1986): 95–112. For a thorough review of this debate, and his own emphasis on religion, see Marc M. Arkin, “ ‘The Intractable Principle’: David Hume, James Madison, Religion, and the Tenth Federalist,” American Journal of Legal History 39 (April 1995): 148–76.

  7. Benjamin Franklin, “Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind” (1751) and “Information to those who would remove to America” (1782), in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, ed. Leonard W. Labaree et al. (New Haven, Conn., 1959– ), 4:225–34, 8:604; JM to TJ, August 20, 1784, June 19, 1786, October 24–November 1, 1787; TJ to JM, December 20, 1787, RL, 1:340–41, 423–24, 502, 514. Even before this, when he wrote to Jefferson about access to the Mississippi (just after Jefferson had sailed to France), Madison echoed Franklin, who had reasoned that any development of a manufacturing economy would be postponed naturally as a growing population along the eastern seaboard was kept under control by healthy numbers of westward-bound emigrants. For his part, Jefferson argued in Notes on Virginia that manufacturing in Europe was not a choice but a necessity, owing to surplus population.

  Madison maintained a continuing interest in Franklin’s and later the British writer Thomas Malthus’s argument on population growth. In 1791 he wrote an essay in the National Gazette, entitled “Population and Emigration,” drawing on Franklin’s thinking. See PJM, 14:117–22; for other scholars who recognized Madison’s debt to Franklin, see Dennis Hodgson, “Benjamin Franklin on Population: From Policy to Theory,” Population and Development Review 17 (December 1991): 639–61; also I. Bernard Cohen, Science and the Founding Fathers: Science in the Political Thought of Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and James Madison (New York, 1995), 156–64; Drew R. McCoy, “Jefferson and Madison on Malthus: Population Growth in Jeffersonian Political Economy,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 88 (July 1980): 259–76; Notes on Virginia, Query XIX.

  8. For use of the terms “vicious arts” and “mutual animosities,” and a more developed statement on “factional leaders,” see “The Federalist No. 10,” in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middletown, Conn., 1961), 64.

  9. JM to TJ, October 24–November 1; TJ to JM, December 20, 1787, RL, 1:499–500, 514.

  10. TJ to JM, December 20, 1787, RL, 1:512–14.

  11. There is disagreement over the authorship of some of the essays, but the evidence favors Madison’s claim to have written the disputed numbers (50–52, 54–58, 62–63). See Cooke, Federalist, xi–xv, xxvii; JM to TJ, August 10, 1788, and “Madison’s Authorship of The Federalist: Editorial Note,” PJM, 10:259–63, 11:226–27; on the pseudonym “Publius,” see JM to James K. Paulding, July 24, 1818, PJM-RS, 1:310.

  12. Hamilton, June 4, 18–19, Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 17
87 (Athens, Ohio, 1966), 61–62, 66, 134–39, 152; Nathan Schachner, Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1946), 197–206.

  13. Hamilton, September 17, Notes of the Debates, 656; Hamilton to Washington, July 3, 1787; Washington to Hamilton, July 10, 1787, PGW-CS, 5:245, 250.

  14. Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, February 29, 1802, in PAH, 25:544.

  15. JM to Randolph, October 21, 1787, PJM, 10:199–200.

  16. “The people in Georgia and New-Hampshire would not know one another’s mind,” “Brutus” reasoned, “and therefore could not act in concert to enable them to effect a general change of representatives.” He felt that federal officials, no less flawed in character than those they governed, would be unable to resist personalizing power, and the people would be left out of public deliberations. See “Brutus I,” New-York Journal, October 18, 1787, in John Kaminski and Richard Leffler, eds., Federalists and Antifederalists (Madison, Wisc., 1987), 6–13; Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788–1828 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999), 28–31, 95.

  17. “The Federalist No. 10”; “The Federalist No. 57,” in Cooke, ed., Federalist, 62–63, 384–85; also see “The Federalist No. 46,” in which Madison stresses the need for more “impartial guardians of the public interest,” ibid., 318; and “The Federalist No. 56,” in which Madison argues that representatives will possess sufficient knowledge of state laws and local concerns to legislate for the nation; ibid., 378–86; for an excellent discussion of Madison’s debate with “Brutus,” see Emery G. Lee III, “Representation, Virtue, and Political Jealousy in the Brutus-Publius Dialogue,” Journal of Politics 59 (November 1997): 1078–83.