The Lost Colony of Roanoke

by Fullam, Brandon

  It was not until John Lawson’s expedition in 1700–01 that further information about the Coree/Coranine came to light. During his 600-mile trek through Carolina, Lawson kept a journal in which he recorded the many native Indian tribes he encountered. Included in Lawson’s A New Voyage to Carolina was his “Map of Carolina” which provided the most detailed information to date about the territory of the Coree/Coranine Indians.

  Lawson’s map identified three locations as “Coranine.” The first is an area located at the north end of the peninsula just below the mouth of the Neuse River. The second is the Coranine Sound, separating the mainland from the barrier islands. The sound still bears the name Core Sound, and the barrier islands extending from Ocracoke Inlet to Cape Lookout are known today as the Core Banks. The third is the Coranine River, which was called the Newport River by the early 18th century.

  A related point of interest on Lawson’s map is the Weetock River just south of the Coranine. Weetock, like Coranine, is the name of both the river as well as the tribe that occupied the area. The Weetock River is the present-day White Oak River where the village of Swansboro is located. Local historical tradition traces the origins of Swansboro to an abandoned Algonquian site.31 If that tradition is accurate, the close proximity of an Algonquian tribe to the immediate south of Coree territory as well as the Algonquian Croatoans along the barrier islands to the north further suggests that the Coree/Coranine were at least affiliated in some way with their neighboring Algonquians.

  Lawson assigned two villages to the Coree/Coranine Indians in 1701: Coranine and Raruta. He also mentioned that the Coranine Indians “dwell near Cape Lookout” and “on the Sand Banks” as well as “a Branch of the Neuse River.”32 Lawson’s reference to the Sand Banks is supported by the archaeological record suggesting that the Coree established temporary hunting and fishing camps on the Outer Banks,33 strong evidence that the Coree were likely associated with the Croatoans. Charles Paul, in his 1965 thesis on the origins of Beaufort, North Carolina, stated that one of these villages named by Lawson “was located on the north side of the Straits of Core Sound which separates Harkers Island from the mainland, a location not more than seven miles east of the present site of Beaufort nor more than eight miles north of Cape Lookout. The other village was located on the west side of Newport [Coranine] River, but the exact spot cannot be given.”34 All of these Coree locations—the villages of Coranine and Raruta, Cape Lookout, the Sand Banks—were located in what is now Carteret County.

  Detail from John Lawson’s 1709 “Map of Carolina” showing Coranine locations.

  The Coranine location only vaguely described by Lawson as on “a Branch of the Neuse River,” is not known. Lawson’s conversation with the Coree Indian Enoe-Will seems to place that particular branch close to the mouth of the Neuse. It should also be noted that by the time of the Tuscarora War in 1711 there was, as referred to earlier, a large native Indian village called by Christopher de Graffenried “Core Town,” which was located north of New Bern.35 This would place a portion of the Coree/Coranine territory in present-day northern Craven County at the outbreak of the Tuscarora War, but the location there may have been fairly recent in 1711. Coastal tribes had been gradually pushed inland by the influx of white settlers over the previous decade. What was called “Core Town” by 1711 may have been the inland site where the Coree/Coranine had relocated after being driven from their traditionally coastal territories. This would also account for their closer proximity to, and association with, the Tuscarora during the war.

  Further complicating matters is White’s placement of “Cwareuuock” on the northern shore of the Neuse River. Although the map is geographically imprecise, a Coree/Coranine presence there would extend the Coree territory into present-day Pamlico County. However, Grenville’s (and White’s) 1585 excursion into Pamlico Sound—on which that portion of the map was based—did not reach the Neuse, and consequently the Cwareuuock location may be an imprecise approximation based on information related to White by Manteo and the Croatoans.

  Nevertheless, from all that is known with any degree of certainty, when the Lost Colony left Roanoke, the Coree/Coranine occupied the peninsula and coastal areas south of the Neuse River in present-day Carteret County. The White/de Bry map suggests that the Coree/Coranine may have occupied an area just north of the Neuse as well, although that is less certain. If the Coree/Coranine retreated inland at the beginning of the 18th century, as seems historically accurate, then the later Core Town site described by de Graffenried is most likely unrelated to the earlier Coranine territorial locations, and therefore irrelevant to any connection the colonists may have had with them when they departed from Roanoke in 1588. It is clear, however, that the Coree/Coranine had previously occupied the coastal areas, and were temporary visitors to Outer Banks. A settlement location on the peninsula south of the mouth of the Neuse in Coree territory may have been seen as a mutually beneficial arrangement for all parties involved: the Coree/Coranine, the Croatoans, and the colonists.

  It has already been proposed that the Lost Colony initially settled on the mainland to the south of Roanoke and west of the Wokokon inlet, and present-day Carteret County is certainly one possibility. As Henry Mouzon noted on his An Accurate Map of North and South Carolina, there was “a good channel” leading directly from the Wokokon/Ocracoke inlet all the way to the mouth of the Neuse River.

  The CORA tree “theory” is also associated with a resettlement location in present-day Carteret County, but that must be viewed as a separate hypothesis altogether. As interesting and compelling as that hypothesis may seem, the final verdict on the plausibility of the CORA tree premise will be made by science. The CORA tree will remain an enigma until scientific dating of the tree—and particularly its inscription—can affirm or refute its connection to the Lost Colony.

  Regardless of exactly where that settlement was located, what is certain is that by the end of September 1588, the colonists were faced with an existential crisis. Their survival, certainly as an English colony at least, depended upon regular contact and resupply from England … but White had failed to return as promised.

  8

  A Critical Gamble at Sea

  September 1588–August 1589

  It would be difficult to gauge the level of desperation that pervaded the mainland settlement as autumn approached in 1588 and all hope for White’s return had evaporated. The colonists would have considered the possibility that White and the supply ships had been lost in a storm, or perhaps were captured or destroyed by the Spanish. As mentioned, it is very likely that the lookouts at Croatoan would have seen the Gonzalez ship on its way to the Chesapeake just a few months earlier, and they must have wondered if White and the supply ships could have fallen into the hands of the Spanish. That prospect would have been a particularly bitter one for at least a few of the colonists, since the new settlers White was supposed to bring almost certainly included relatives and spouses, initially left behind in England until the settlement was established. It is not known how many new colonists planned to sail with Grenville’s fleet had it not been recalled, but, as mentioned, White wrote that there were fifteen settlers (eleven according to Diaz) who sailed on the failed voyage of the Brave and the Roe in 1588. In any event the situation had dramatically changed by late summer of 1588 as the colonists came to the stark realization that they were isolated and abandoned.

  White’s failure to return left the entire colony in a critical situation. Their continuing existence, certainly as a viable English colony, depended upon the arrival of periodic supply fleets, the first and most crucial of which was more than two months overdue. Cut off from England, they would now be forced to sustain themselves for at least another year, with supplies and materials running low and perhaps becoming increasingly dependent on the native tribes. Their only prospect—a very uncertain one—was that English ships might possibly arrive the following year. Given these circumstances and their now dim prospects in “Virginia,” the colonists
would almost certainly have turned to the one remaining option available to them of reconnecting with England: their seaworthy pinnace.

  We know from White’s accounts that the 1587 colony was in possession of several small boats plus a pinnace which was capable of ocean travel. The pinnace was nowhere to be seen when White finally returned in 1590, in spite of the fact that he searched the shore of Roanoke “to see if we could find any of their botes or Pinnesse, but we could perceiue no signe of them.”1 The pinnace White searched for was the same one commanded by Captain Edward Stafford and had already made the 1587 voyage, as part of the three-vessel group including the flagship Lyon and the unnamed flyboat captained by Edward Spicer. Pinnaces, though relatively small vessels, were frequently utilized for ocean crossings, usually—but not always—accompanied by larger ships. White’s failed attempt to reach the colony in 1588, for example, consisted of just two pinnaces, the Brave of 30 tun capacity and the Roe of 25 tuns. In 1579, it will also be recalled, Gilbert sent the diminutive 8 tun Squirrel and a small crew under the command of Simon Fernandez on a solo reconnaissance voyage across the Atlantic. The Squirrel is referred to as a pinnace, but it was even smaller, more in the range of a frigate, which was lighter and faster and usually rated at about 10 tuns. The frigate designation would also account for its remarkably quick three-month round trip voyage to Newfoundland and back.

  Faced with the reality of their abandonment in the fall of 1588, most of the colonists must have been discouraged enough with their prospects in Virginia that they would have been anxious to attempt a voyage, regardless of the risk involved, which might bring them home to England. The possibility of a successful voyage home would have seemed far more alluring than the certainty of abandonment. Yet to be decided, however, was who would go and who would be left behind, since the pinnace could not accommodate everyone.

  The capacity of a pinnace or any 16th century vessel was estimated by its “tunnage,” the volume (not weight) of its cargo-carrying capacity. The term is derived from a “tun,” which was a large cask of wine containing 252 gallons.2 Since the Brave was rated at 30 tuns, and the Roe at 25 tuns, for example, they had the capacity of carrying thirty and twenty-five of these large casks respectively. By comparison, the aforementioned Lyon was rated at 120 tuns. It should be noted, too, that although “tons” was often substituted for “tuns” by later writers, as in the excerpt below, tunnage and the later term “tonnage”—based on weight and displacement—are not synonymous.3

  Unfortunately, the pinnace that remained with the 1587 colony was neither named nor described in terms of tunnage in any of the accounts, so its size and capacity are unknown. Furthermore, vessels referred to as “pinnaces” varied considerably. According to the papers of the Navy Records Society of Great Britain,

  The “pinnace” in the English Service [in 1585–7] … were of two classes—decked and undecked—or, as we should now say, first and second class. The former were always counted as independent units of a fleet; the latter were attached to, and even carried, by the larger ships. They ranged generally from 20 to 60 tons [tuns].4

  The key consideration relating to the abandoned colonists, however, would have been the vessel’s passenger capacity for a trans-ocean voyage, and tunnage does not say much in that regard. The following two voyages, for example, illustrate the range of tunnage/passenger variables of very early 17th century trans-ocean fleets.5

  1. Martin Pring’s 1603 voyage from England to present-day Maine and New Hampshire consisted of two vessels: The Speedwell, rated at 50 tuns, carried thirty men. The Discoverer, at 26 tuns, carried thirteen men.

  2. The 1607 voyage that established the Jamestown settlement consisted of three vessels: The Susan Constant, rated at 100 tuns, carried seventy-one persons. The Godspeed, rated at 40 tuns, carried fifty-two persons. The Discovery (a pinnace), at 20 tuns, carried twenty-one persons.

  The 1603 two-vessel Pring fleet carried an average of one man per 1.77 tuns, the remaining space used primarily for the considerable food stores, supplies, and equipment necessary for a lengthy trans-ocean voyage. On the other hand, the 1607 Jamestown fleet was more crowded, carrying an average of one person per 1.1 tuns. Of all the individual vessels involved in both voyages, the Godspeed carried one person per .76 tun, the largest proportion of people per tun of the five vessels mentioned. It is probable, then, that the Susan Constant and the Discovery carried most of the food stores and supplies. Using the Godspeed’s most crowded passenger calculator (one person per .76 tun), a 30 tun vessel might be capable of carrying about forty persons with a minimum store of food and necessities.

  As noted, the pinnace in the possession of the 1587 colony was not named nor its tunnage mentioned, but White made three references to it which are instructive. The first was on July 1, 1587, at St. John’s Island where White organized a party to go ashore for salt. He wrote, “The Gouernour … appointed thirty shot, tenne pikes, and ten targets, to man the Pinnesse.”6 The second was on July 22 at Hatorask as White prepared to go to Roanoke to look for the small group of men Grenville had left there the previous year and “the Gouernour went aboord the pinnesse accompanied with fortie of his best men.”7 The third reference occurred on July 30 when “Master Stafford, captain of the pinnace, and twenty of our men passed by water to the Island of Croatoan.”8 The 1587 pinnace, then, could apparently accommodate 40 to perhaps 50 persons on short day trips requiring little or no room for provisions. A solo trans-ocean voyage would have to carry far more food stores and supplies and proportionately fewer colonists.

  Given these references and the earlier examples, it seems reasonable to estimate the total volume capacity of the 1587 colony’s pinnace at about 30 to 35 tuns. If the average passenger capacity of the Jamestown fleet (one person per 1.1 tun) is applied, the estimated capacity of the 1587 pinnace on a trans-ocean voyage comes to between twenty-seven and thirty-two persons. It is immediately evident, then, that the pinnace available to the 1587 colony, while certainly capable of an ocean voyage, could transport not quite a third of the colony, which it seems fair to say probably consisted of at least 100 people by the fall of 1588.

  The twenty-seven to thirty-two passengers would have had to include an experienced crew with the nautical expertise to manage an ocean voyage. It is known that Edward Stafford, captain of the pinnace on the voyage to Roanoke in 1587, was not among the list of colonists who remained at Roanoke, but there must have been crew members among the Lost Colonists. Author Andrew Powell addressed this point in his chapter discussing the makeup of the 1587 colony.

  The high number of single men may have resulted from some of them, perhaps up to twenty-five or so, being crew members of the pinnace. The concept of these men being crew members or mariners is not so far-fetched as it may seem. If we go back a moment to Hakluyt’s Discourse, we will find that it contains a clear instruction that the colony should have “pinnaces with expert Seamen.” It is therefore highly improbable that the colony would have been left an empty pinnace without an experienced crew to sail her.9

  The crew that was left at Roanoke with the pinnace was most likely made up of the same able seamen who had sailed her to Roanoke under Captain Stafford, and these same sailors would most likely have been among the most anxious to depart. It would seem, then, that the colony had a qualified crew capable of an ocean voyage, but it is also clear that the pinnace could only transport between twenty-seven and thirty-two persons, including the crew, on an extended trans-ocean voyage.

  Could the 1587 colonists have considered building an additional vessel or vessels in order to transport most, if not the entire colony? That possibility is not as unlikely as it may seem at first, and there are several contemporary instances of such an occurrence. On the way to Roanoke in 1585, Grenville’s men stopped at Moskito Bay on St. John’s Island in the Caribbean and constructed a fortification there. Grenville had lost one pinnace during the Atlantic crossing and, “we began to build a new pinnesse within the Fort, with the timber tha
t wee then felled in the country.”10 Grenville’s 1585 fleet at Moskito Bay consisted of six vessels (excluding the lost pinnace) and would have carried enough spare rigging, sails, casks of pitch and tar, etc., all the required materials for outfitting another vessel should the necessity arise. In addition, Grenville’s combined ships’ complements would have included skilled shipwrights, carpenters, sawyers, and laborers to accomplish the task.

  A more remarkable example had occurred in 1562–63, when Jean Ribaut left about twenty-four soldiers at the new French settlement of Charlesfort on present-day Parris Island, South Carolina. Ribault departed in June of 1562, leaving no vessel behind at the settlement, and promised to return in six months with additional supplies and colonists. When he reached France, however, the country was embroiled in a civil war. Ribault ended up in England, where he spent two years in prison. In the meantime, after Ribault failed to return to Charlesfort as promised, the abandoned men decided to build a boat and try to sail to France. It is noteworthy that there were no sailors or shipwrights among the stranded Frenchmen, but they managed to build a vessel with makeshift sails and set off across the Atlantic. Although they eventually resorted to cannibalism by drawing lots, the emaciated survivors actually completed the 3,500 mile voyage and were finally rescued by an English vessel.11

  The best and most comparable example occurred in 1609, when the Sea Venture, flagship of the so-called “third supply” to Jamestown, was separated from the fleet during a hurricane and was grounded on a reef off Bermuda. The 153 castaways made it ashore and would spend the next nine months stranded there. The decision was made to construct a pinnace capable of transporting perhaps half of the settlers to Jamestown, after which the plan was to send a vessel back to Bermuda and rescue the remaining castaways. Construction on the pinnace began on August 28. It is significant, however, that a major controversy arose about who would be left behind, a situation that may well have troubled the Lost Colonists in 1588. For the castaways at Bermuda it was feared that the more elite among them would take the skilled workmen and the best mariners and sail to safety, leaving the rest behind perhaps forever.12 The stranded Lost Colonists, of course, could only speculate about White’s failure to return as promised, but, as proposed earlier, they knew that the Spanish were searching for them at the Chesapeake Bay and they very likely had observed the Spanish ship captained by Vincente Gonzalez as he slowly made his way north along the coast the previous June. The Lost Colonists must have considered the possibility that White and the supply ships were lost to the Spanish, and—like the stranded colonists at Bermuda—they must have been distressed about the likelihood that those who were not chosen to sail with the pinnace would be abandoned forever.