Yeltsin

by Timothy J. Colton

  13 His granddaughter Yekaterina related in the late 1980s that when she asked Yeltsin’s help with a personal problem (removing the bodyguard attached to her when she enrolled in university), “The tsar resolved the problem in his own manner” and ordered the guard removed. “Sensatsionnoye interv’yu rossiiskoi ‘printsessy’” (Sensational interview with a Russian princess), Moskovskii komsomolets, January 9, 1998. The piece was first published in Paris Match in December 1997.

  14 Boris Nemtsov, first interview with the author (October 17, 2000). The exchange in Stockholm occurred on December 2, 1997, in Yeltsin’s second term.

  15 Pavel Voshchanov, interview with the author (June 15, 2000). That incident occurred in February 1992, just before Voshchanov stepped down, when he questioned a personnel decision by Yeltsin.

  16 Boris Yeltsin, third interview with the author (September 12, 2002)

  17 Aleksandr Livshits, interview with the author (January 19, 2001).

  18 Yu, M. Baturin et al., Epokha Yel’tsina: ocherki politicheskoi istorii (The Yeltsin epoch: essays in political history) (Moscow: VAGRIUS, 2001), 424.

  19 Yegor Gaidar, second interview with the author (January 31, 2002).

  20 Boris Fëdorov, Desyat’ bezumnykh let (Ten crazy years) (Moscow: Sovershenno sekretno, 1999), 131.

  21 Livshits interview.

  22 The Kremlin had constitutional authority over 30,000 positions in the executive branch (Donald N. Jensen, “How Russia Is Ruled—1998,” Demokratizatsiya/Democratization 7 [Summer 1999], 349). But the number Yeltsin attended to was several hundred.

  23 Yeltsin concerned himself with golden parachutes only for functionaries who had been close to him. In 1993, for instance, he made Yurii Petrov head of a new State Investment Corporation, in control of several hundred million dollars of capital. When Viktor Ilyushin stepped down as senior assistant in 1996, he was appointed deputy prime minister, and when he left that position he was hired as a vice president of Gazprom. But most of the departed easily found opportunities in the new private sector. As Oleg Soskovets, the ranking member of the Korzhakov group, with whom Yeltsin broke in 1996, put it, “In contemporary Russia, you can use your knowledge outside of the public service. They give you something to occupy yourself with, thank God.” Interview with the author (March 31, 2004).

  24 Officeholders are given at http://rulers.org/russgov.html. Not counted here are the new defense minister and the new head of internal security appointed in late June 1996.

  25 Baturin et al., Epokha, 339.

  26 Yeltsin allies from the democratic opposition to the Soviet regime criticized the appropriation of the health directorate. See, for example, Ella Pamfilova, “Grustno i stranno” (Sadly and strangely), in Yurii Burtin and Eduard Molchanov, eds., God posle avgusta: gorech’ i vybor (A year after August: bitterness and choice) (Moscow: Literatura i politika, 1992), 188–89.

  27 Quotation from Ivan Goryaev, “The Best of the Empires, Or Crafty Devil of a Manager,” http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/detail.asp?art_id=150. Borodin, a former CPSU apparatchik, had been mayor of Yakutsk since 1988 and met Korzhakov while a deputy to the Russian congress in 1990–91. He was named deputy director of the unreformed business department (then called the Main Social-Production Directorate) in the spring of 1993. The USSR Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the CPSU had separate business offices before 1991. The head of the party unit, Nikolai Kruchina, committed suicide after the August putsch. The presidential equivalent was then kept apart from the government’s, and the congress of deputies had its own benefits arm.

  28 Boris Fëdorov, interview with the author (September 22, 2001).

  29 The involvement in the oil trade came to light in Yevgeniya Al’bats, “Vlast’ taino sozdaët svoyu tenevuyu ekonomiku” (The authorities are secretly creating their own shadow economy), Izvestiya, February 1, 1995. Borodin is said to have asked for an oil-export quota from the Ministry of Economics after it turned down as unaffordable, and unacceptable to the Duma, his request for funds to pay for the restoration of the Grand Kremlin Palace. An unidentified ministry official recalls: “Pal Palych . . . said, ‘Then give me 5 million tons of oil.’ I agreed—where else was he going to turn?” Maksim Glikin, “Oni v svoikh koridorakh” (They are in their own corridors), Obshchaya gazeta, February 8, 2001. The quota, the same source said, was later increased to 8 million tons. That much oil would have sold in the late 1990s for the better part of $1 billion, some of which would have gone to Russian producers, to taxes, and no doubt to middlemen.

  30 Boris Fëdorov estimated that in his day 1 percent of requests for apartments and the like made their way to Yeltsin. Yeltsin usually routed them to Borodin, sometimes with a handwritten note. On one occasion, Yeltsin offered a toast at a banquet to an official in the executive office, mentioning in passing that this man’s housing conditions were poor. Borodin dealt with the problem without further ado. Fëdorov interview and Leonid Smirnyagin, interview with the author (May 24, 2001).

  31 In 1994 Borodin controlled twenty premium dachas with a chef and security guards, 150 year-round dachas without these services, and 200 summer-season dachas. Eugene Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 52.

  32 “Poslaniye Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii Federal’nomu Sobraniyu, ‘Ob ukreplenii rossiiskogo gosudarstva’” (The message of the president of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly, “On strengthening the Russian state”) (Moscow: Rossiiskaya Federatsiya, 1994), 14.

  33 Gennadii Burbulis, second interview, conducted by Yevgeniya Al’bats (February 14, 2001). The idea was not original with Burbulis. The constitutional scholar Avgust Mishin and others had been circulating it for some time.

  34 Grigorii Yavlinskii, first interview with the author (March 17, 2001).

  35 James MacGregor Burns, Transforming Leadership: A New Pursuit of Happiness (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003), chap. 10.

  36 Aleksandr Korzhakov, Boris Yel’tsin: ot rassveta do zakata (Boris Yeltsin: from dawn to dusk) (Moscow: Interbuk, 1997), 253–54.

  37 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002), 177.

  38 Baturin et al., Epokha, 423.

  39 Vyacheslav Kostikov, Roman s prezidentom: zapiski press-sekretarya (Romance with a president: notes of a press secretary) (Moscow: VAGRIUS, 1997), 12. The comparisons to a magnetic field or a snake come from my interview with Yevgenii Yasin (May 31, 2001). Gennadii Burbulis (first interview, June 14, 2000) saw a similarity to a wolf lying in ambush.

  40 Yel’tsin, Marafon, 413.

  41 Baturin et al., Epokha, 449.

  42 Mikhail Zinin,”Yel’tsina zhdët Boldinskaya osen’” (A Boldin-type autumn awaits Yeltsin), Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 18, 1991.

  43 Yasin interview. Decree No. 226 also relieved lobbying pressure on government bureaucrats. They could now indicate sympathy with the petitioner while saying their hands were tied. See Baturin et al., Epokha, 442.

  44 Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia, 73.

  45 Ibid., 40.

  46 Anatolii Chubais, first interview with the author (January 18, 2001).

  47 Mikhail Bocharov, interview with the author (October 19, 2000).

  48 Of the first position, Yeltsin writes (Zapiski, 241), “It was thought up ‘especially for Burbulis,’ to underline his special status.” The second was bestowed in part to compensate Burbulis for not being named vice president. Burbulis (second interview) said it was a “role,” not a “position.”

  49 Poltoranin had been minister of the press and information since 1991 and favored a more restrictive attitude toward the media than Fedotov. When Yeltsin, responding to parliamentary sentiment, made Fedotov minister in December 1992 (for the second time), he put Poltoranin in charge of a new Federal Information Center, which duplicated many of the ministry’s functions. Ministry and center were both dissolved in December 1993.

  50 While all were aware of Yeltsin’s dislike
of long memos, some found that they could slip in additional information in attachments and illustrative materials. One official took the art to a higher form by throwing in attachments and making references in the body of the note to them. Yeltsin never reprimanded him for this practice. Andrei Kokoshin, interview with the author (June 6, 2000).

  51 Baturin et al., Epokha, 436.

  52 Viktor Chernomyrdin, interview with the author (September 15, 2000).

  53 Oleg Poptsov, Trevozhnyye sny tsarskoi svity (The uneasy dreams of the tsar’s retinue) (Moscow: Sovershenno sekretno, 2000), 100.

  54 Boris Yeltsin, first interview with the author (July 15, 2001).

  55 Boris Yel’tsin, Zapiski prezidenta (Notes of a president) (Moscow: Ogonëk, 1994), 262–63.

  56 Oleg Lobov, interview with the author (May 29, 2002).

  57 This was made abundantly clear in my interviews with both men. Korzhakov (Boris Yel’tsin, 280) describes Soskovets and several others acquiring tape recordings of speeches of the tongue-tied premier and making fun of them.

  58 Morshchakov, fifteen years older than Yeltsin, had been his early protector in Sverdlovsk and the organizer of his duck and elk shoots when he was first secretary (see Chapters 3 and 4). Yeltsin first recruited him to work in the Russian Supreme Soviet while he was its chairman. Petrov and Lobov were somewhat younger than Yeltsin. Ilyushin, sixteen years younger, was from Nizhnii Tagil (like Petrov) and had been first secretary of the Sverdlovsk Komsomol and a member of the bureau of the obkom. Lobov was deputy or first deputy premier for four stints (in 1991, 1993, 1996, and 1996–97) and secretary of the Security Council from 1993 to 1996. Another prominent Sverdlovsker was Yevgenii Bychkov, the chairman of the state committee for precious metals and jewels until 1996, but he was appointed to this position by Gorbachev in 1985. One of his deputies after 1991 was Yurii Kornilov, the former chief of the Sverdlovsk KGB.

  59 Pikhoya was still in the UPI social sciences department when she joined Yeltsin. Burbulis was affiliated with the institute from 1974 to 1983. Three other UPI faculty members came to Moscow at the same time as Pikhoya.

  60 Lyudmila Pikhoya, interview with the author (September 26, 2001).

  61 Fëdorov interview.

  62 Yeltsin in his memoirs (Zapiski, 247) refers to Burbulis as “de facto the head of the Cabinet of Ministers” in the early months. Gaidar soon replaced him as the same. Yeltsin once or twice interceded at cabinet meetings on narrow points. At a session in December 1992, he criticized Andrei Vorob’ëv, the aging health minister, who passed out. Yeltsin fired him days later. Vorob’ëv was to help treat Yeltsin’s heart condition in 1996. Sergei Kolesnikov, Chernomyrdin’s head speech writer, interview with the author (June 8, 2000).

  63 Gennadii Burbulis, third interview, conducted by Yevgeniya Al’bats (August 31, 2001). The State Council replaced a Political Consultative Council Burbulis set up for Yeltsin as head of the Russian parliament in 1990. Besides informing Yeltsin, this earlier body was designed to help him outbid Gorbachev for the affections of the Moscow intelligentsia.

  64 The cabinet ministers were Eduard Dneprov (minister of education), Nikolai Fëdorov (justice), Andrei Kozyrev (foreign affairs), Valerii Makharadze (deputy premier), and Aleksandr Shokhin (deputy premier and labor minister). Shakhrai retained the title of state counselor when he became a deputy premier in December 1991.

  65 “The creators of the new structure . . . are inspired by the idea of ‘the constructive state,’ which they juxtapose to ‘the corrupting state’ based on apparatus ‘moves,’ ‘corridor pragmatism,’ and the system of personal connections and mutual favors. To all appearances, the leaders of the State Council see the source of this evil in the old apparatus of the Russian Council of Ministers.” Burbulis antagonized others by trying to get a clause in the State Council’s charter giving it the right to review all draft presidential decrees. Mikhail Leont’ev, “Rossiya bez pravitel’stva” (Russia without a government), Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 5, 1991.

  66 Sergei Stankevich, interview with the author (May 29, 2001). The same point was emphasized by Sergei Shakhrai, second interview with the author (January 24, 2001).

  67 Yel’tsin, Zapiski, 242.

  68 Stankevich was to be accused of corruption for an incident in 1993. He fled the country in 1995 and returned in 1999 after the charges were dropped. A group of ten or eleven presidential advisers, most of them unpaid, remained on the roster until the end of 1993. They had very little say collectively or individually. Yeltsin retained a few individuals with that rank in later years.

  69 Kostikov, Roman s prezidentom, 322. Most speculation about a supercoordinator fastened on the Security Council. Its founding secretary, Skokov, and Aleksandr Lebed, who directed it briefly in 1996, used it as a political bandstand, but its ability to coordinate was slight.

  70 See Korzhakov, Boris Yel’tsin, 140–50, who says Yeltsin wanted the house to contain a common laundry and an apartment where all the residents would have social events (neither was built). Yeltsin’s daughter has said he “spent literally a couple of nights” at the flat between 1994 and 2000. Tat’yana D’yachenko, “Papa khotel otprazdnovat’ yubilei po-domashnemu” (Papa wanted to celebrate his birthday home-style), Komsomol’skaya pravda, February 1, 2001. Vladimir Shevchenko (Povsednevnaya zhizn’ Kremlya pri prezidentakh [The everyday life of the Kremlin under the presidents] [Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 2004], 36) describes the aversion to the house in the same terms Yeltsin in his memoirs used to describe his overexposure to Gennadii Burbulis: “Psychologically, it was very difficult and untenable to see and converse with the very same people at home and at work.”

  71 Yel’tsin, Zapiski, 341.

  72 According to Korzhakov, Yeltsin was “categorically against” admitting Chernomyrdin. Korzhakov convinced him, pointing out that several deputy premiers had been accepted. Aleksandr Korzhakov, Boris Yel’tsin: ot rassveta do zakata; poslesloviye (Boris Yeltsin: from dawn to dusk; epilogue) (Moscow: Detektiv-press, 2004), 35.

  73 When I spoke to Berezovskii about Yeltsin, one of his opening points was that the president had acknowledged his worth by bringing him into the club. Berezovskii, interview with the author (March 8, 2002). Rybkin also spoke fondly about it, and a half-decade after its dissolution was still carrying a member’s card in his wallet (interview, May 29, 2001). The bylaws reserved expulsion for one offense only: betrayal (predatel’stvo), which was to be decided by unanimous vote of the members. When Korzhakov lost his job in June 1996, he was evicted from the club in simpler fashion. Chernomyrdin, a member at Korzhakov’s insistence, phoned him and told him not to come around any more. “There was nothing to do. I packed up my things and went to exercise somewhere else.” Korzhakov, Boris Yel’tsin, 36.

  74 Quotation from Valentin Yumashev, fourth interview with the author (January 22, 2007). Membership figure from Shamil’ Tarpishchev, Samyi dolgii match (The longest match) (Moscow: VAGRIUS, 1999), 294.

  75 Yurii Petrov, first and second interviews with the author (May 25, 2000, and February 1, 2002).

  76 Yeltsin emphasized his unhappiness at Petrov’s tactics in Zapiski, 297.

  77 Quotation from Yel’tsin, Marafon, 257.

  78 Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia, 58–59.

  79 In addition to three or four other policy-specific assistants, the group included service providers such as Yeltsin’s protocol chief, head of chancery, and speech writers. The guitar-strumming Lev Sukhanov, who began with Yeltsin in Gosstroi in 1988, remained until 1997. His interest in the occult made him a marginal presence in his last several years in the Kremlin.

  80 Baturin et al., Epokha, 210. Although Filatov’s organization was much bigger, the physical setup privileged Ilyushin. Filatov had his office in Kremlin Building No. 14 and Ilyushin his in Building No. 1, several doors from Yeltsin.

  81 For example, on the morning commute with Yeltsin, Korzhakov noted the first secretary’s comments about stores they had inspected along the way. He would then telephone
the party secretary for trade and services, Alla Nizovtseva, with a report. Nizovtseva, says Korzhakov, did not object to these calls, but Viktor Ilyushin, then the senior aide to Yeltsin in the gorkom, did object and accused Korzhakov of sticking his nose in other people’s business. Ilyushin was further annoyed when Korzhakov and Yeltsin developed their friendship in the summer of 1986. “He became more and more nervous when Boris Nikolayevich assigned me business falling outside the jurisdiction of the guard service.” Korzhakov, Boris Yel’tsin, 63.

  82 Aleksandr Korzhakov, interview with the author (January 28, 2002).

  83 Filatov, Sovershenno nesekretno, 233. The eavesdropping and its targets, which included Filatov and his family, Viktor Ilyushin, and members of the Chernomyrdin machine, are detailed in Igor’ Korotchenko, “Kompromat” (Compromising material), Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 12, 1996; and Valerii Streletskii, Mrakobesiye (Obscurantism) (Moscow: Detektiv-Press, 1998). The head of research of the Kremlin’s executive office was surprised when the surveillance began, associating it with Soviet ways, but thought it deterred the leaking and sale of sensitive information. Mark Urnov, interview with the author (May 26, 2000).

  84 Third Yeltsin interview.

  85 The outstanding example is Korzhakov’s letter to Chernomyrdin of November 30, 1994, about Russian oil exports, in which he advised him to turn over supervision to Soskovets. See Korzhakov, Boris Yel’tsin, 406–10; and Irina Savvateyeva, “Kto upravlyayet stranoi—Yel’tsin, Chernomyrdin ili General Korzhakov?” (Who governs Russia—Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, or General Korzhakov?), Izvestiya, December 22, 1994.

  86 See, for instance, the description by Yeltsin of Korzhakov’s advocacy of Barsukov (Marafon, 78); and details on his role in the decision on the procurator general, in Yurii Skuratov, Variant drakona (Version of the dragon) (Moscow: Detektiv, 2000), 68–70. The procurator whom Skuratov replaced, Aleksei Il’yushenko (the man who charged NTV with slander for the Kukly satire), had also been appointed at Korzhakov’s behest in 1994. Korzhakov was godfather of Soskovets’s first grandson in 1994, and at the same ceremony Soskovets himself was baptized, with Korzhakov again as godfather.