Bernie Ecclestone

by Terry Lovell

  In formally opening the board meeting, Jones began by asking if there were any apologies, an invitation Paladini comically misunderstood. ‘You think I fucking apologise to you!’ he fumed. The outburst caused Jones to leave the meeting. Several months later, in September 2004, he resigned. ‘I had always said that I would leave once we had got new investors, and that had been achieved,’ he said. By then, in July, Davies had already departed with a pay-off of £95,000, a decision which infuriated fans, but which Power justified by claiming that protracted legal action to end his contract would have proved more costly.

  The supporters’ trust had their own reasons for viewing Paladini’s arrival with some suspicion. QPR 1st were concerned that if his shareholding was increased to 51 per cent it could lead to a takeover. Just five months earlier, as part of a consortium, he had made a bid for the Second Division side Port Vale, but this had been blocked by a majority of the board after protests by fans who feared that he intended to move the team to another stadium and sell the ground, Vale Park, to a property developer who was a member of the consortium.

  But if Paladini wasn’t in the millionaire class, he knew people who were, and it was his link to their money that would soon enable him to achieve what had been his ambition all along – control of QPR. His principal contact was fellow Italian Antonio Caliendo, 61, a former door-to-door encyclopaedia salesman who became one of Italy’s leading football agents. Caliendo claimed to represent 12 of the 22 players in the 1990 World Cup final between West Germany and Argentina.

  The following year he was arrested after a raid on his offices by Italian tax officials. A few days later he agreed a deal with the tax authorities and was given a ten-month suspended sentence after pleading guilty to attempted corruption. A year later, in July 1992, he was arrested and remanded in custody following a lengthy tax investigation into the collapse of Hellas Verona football club, but was released without prosecution.

  Paladini’s association with Caliendo went back more than 30 years, and both men were skilled in the black arts of football politics and finances. Caliendo agreed to arrange through two New York-registered companies, Barnaby Holdings and Wanlock, representing Monaco-based consortiums, further investments in QPR totalling £1.7 million, most of which, yet again, went to pay off the taxman. In July 2004 Barnaby Holdings paid £675,000 for a 10 per cent shareholding, and three months later Wanlock paid £1.25 million for a 19.9 per cent shareholding.

  Representing Wanlock on the board was a 34-year-old Italian named Gualtiero Trucco, a financial expert based in Monte Carlo, and, for Barnaby Holdings, one-time Brazilian international player Carlos Bledorn Verri, better known as Dunga, who was based in Japan. Moorbound Ltd was represented by his wife, Olga. Paladini was now in a powerful position. Bill Power, with a 14.6 per cent shareholding, and his ally Kevin McGrath, who bought a 8.8 per cent stake in December 2002, were outgunned.

  Officially Paladini was described as the club’s adviser, services for which a monthly cheque of £6,700 was sent to Moorbound Ltd and which, said Power, had been authorised by former chief executive David Davies. But in reality he had become the principal decision-maker. And some of the decisions he was making, particularly concerning payments to agents, alarmed Power and newly-appointed chief executive Mark Devlin, who, after being approached by Power, was hired in July 2004 to replace David Davies.

  The Football League’s lists of agents’ fees showed that, for the six months to 30 June 2004, QPR paid just £12,000, while from 1 July 2004 – three months after Paladini became the major shareholder – to 30 June 2005, the fees paid to agents rocketed to £320,935. Newspaper reports claimed that many of the payments were to Paladini’s friends or former associates, and for which, in a libel action against the London Evening Standard, he received a qualified apology and £15,000 costs in December 2005. He acknowledges friendships, though, with Mele Eves, a former Wolves defender and England ‘B’ team player who, after retiring in 1989 through injury, became a licensed FA agent in the mid-1990s, as well as with well-known Midlands agent Brian Hassall, with whom Paladini says he made peace following the conclusion of a successful legal claim by Hassall referred to without detail in a Guardian story on 19 October 2005 and which both Hassall and Paladini declined to discuss.

  It was Paladini’s negotiations with Eves and Hassall that caused particular concern to Power and Devlin, although in one of them Power himself played a role. This particular deal involved the transfer from Chesterfield of 23-year-old defender Ian Evatt in June 2005 for about £200,000. But a problem arose soon after Paladini met Evatt and his agent at The Belfry hotel in Birmingham. It turned out that the agent was not registered with the Football Assocation in accordance with its regulations and therefore unable to represent Evatt.

  Evatt flew off to Majorca for a holiday while Paladini contacted Eves with an invitation to join him and Power on a trip to the Spanish holiday island to get Evatt’s signature on a contract. In an interview published on QPR’s fanzine website in April 2006, Paladini said that ‘we needed a FIFA-registered agent to come to Majorca with us and witness the transfer. You need a registered agent to witness the transfer so we took Mel… because you deal with the people you know best.’ He said he made it clear to Eves that ‘we couldn’t pay him very much and agreed £3,000’. The meeting in Majorca was successful, and, with his signature on a contract, Paladini, Power and Eves returned to London.

  On their return, the three men went into Devlin’s office to go through the transfer paperwork. Power and Paladini then left Devlin to complete it, although Eves remained behind. Devlin proceeded to complete the paperwork, with the figure of £3,000 to be paid to Eves, who both he and Power believed was acting as Evatt’s agent. At that point, said Devlin, Eves looked over his shoulder. ‘He asked me who had told me that it was £3,000. I told him it was Gianni and Bill. He went out and came back and said, “Oh, that’s actually £40,000.” I went outside and told Bill and Gianni. Gianni gave me a story, which frankly was difficult to comprehend, and Bill just shrugged his shoulders. It was then that I began to think “this ain’t right”.’

  It made even less sense to Devlin because, he claimed, QPR ended up paying more for Evatt than had been anticipated. A release clause in Evatt’s contract with Chesterfield permitted a club to approach him if a bid of not less than £70,000 was made. However, the club, said Devlin, refused to allow QPR to do so. The offer was increased to £100,000 but also refused. QPR finally paid, in Devlin’s absence and on the instructions of Paladini, £150,000, recalled Devlin, more than twice the release clause figure. He said: ‘I couldn’t for the life of me understand for the life of me why we were paying an agent. If he saves us money, then fine, then share a bit with him, but when an agent’s involvement hasn’t actually worked in your favour, then I certainly couldn’t understand what the hell we were paying £40,000 for. Going from three grand to forty grand, there was nothing illegal in it, but it just didn’t taste, smell or feel right. I had never come across this before.’

  Power said he, Paladini and Eves went to Majorca to get Evatt’s signature because they’d heard that one or two other clubs were after him. He said: ‘We didn’t want to lose out, so why not have a couple of days down there? I paid for my own ticket.’ But why was Eves paid £40,000? ‘I’ve absolutely no idea. It was certainly nothing to do with me, I can assure you.’

  Evatt had a disappointing time at QPR and after 27 appearances departed for Blackpool in January 2007. When contacted to comment on Evatt’s transfer and the £40,000 payment, Eves said he was unable to confirm the fee he was paid by QPR because it would breach his agreement with the club. He also denied that he had acted as Evatt’s agent. The player, he said, represented himself. He added that he had been contacted by Paladini in January 2005 ‘to look after the Ian Evatt situation.’ But what did he do to justify the fee? His expertise was needed, he said, ‘to get hold of the player.’ Given Paladini’s expertise as a former agent, why were his services required at all? ‘A
sk Mr Paladini. I was asked to do a job which I am licensed to do. I’ve been asked to help… because I know the boy… I’ve known him since he was a lad at Derby.’

  Devlin was no less mystified by the circumstances surrounding the signing of Dean Sturridge, who joined QPR from Wolverhampton Wanderers on a free transfer in March 2005, which also involved Eves. The 28-year-old striker was highly rated three or four years earlier until a run of injuries sidelined him. As with Evatt, Eves was asked by Paladini to ‘find out the situation’ regarding the player’s future at Wolves. He discovered that his contract, due to expire at the end of the 2004–5 season, would not be renewed and that he would be free to find another club. Like Evatt, Sturridge represented himself in talks with Paladini and managed to negotiate an excellent package: £2,500 a week salary, which put himself among the club’s top earners, a monthly payment of £2,000 towards his accommodation and living expenses, plus a £1,200 bonus for every goal scored.

  Eves, who claimed he did not recommend the player to QPR, said he was acting in a ‘consultancy role’. Eves was paid a fee of £10,000, but said he ‘received far less than £10,000’. He added that his consultancy included reports on other players as well as Sturridge.

  Devlin commented: ‘Sturridge was so injury-prone that he was the sort of player you put on a pay-per-game basis. Nobody was happy with this gamble. I was less than happy in authorizing his contract. It all smacked of something that wasn’t quite right.’ Sturridge’s injury problems continued at QPR and he made only eleven appearances without scoring a goal before leaving the club nine months later for Kidderminster Harriers in the Conference League.

  Paladini and Eves’ friendship and business relationship goes back twenty years. They had worked together on a number of transfer deals, including the £4.3 million transfer of 19-year-old Enzo Maresca from West Bromwich Albion to Juventus in January 2000. Their services were also offered through a Wolverhampton-based financial services company called FSC Investments Ltd where, on the company’s website listing its services to professional footballers, they were decribed as ‘professional introducers’, although Eves claims this was done without their permission or knowledge.

  Another signing that left Devlin puzzled was that of little-known Danish striker Marc Nygaard, 29, who joined QPR from Italian club, Brescia, on a free transfer in July 2005. This deal involved Brian Hassall. What alarmed Devlin was not just the structure of the deal but the fee paid to Hassall. He said: ‘Nygaard’s salary was right up there, with the top two or three earners, yet nobody had ever heard of him. He only attended a couple of training sessions yet Paladini was offering this guy a two-year contract on a very decent salary and with a goal bonus.’

  Hassall was paid a fee of £60,000 – the highest single fee paid to an agent during the year to July 2005 when agents’ fee rocketed to £320,935. Paladini insists that there was no connection between Hassall’s legal claim against him and the payment. Nygaard, who made 72 appearances for the club and scored 19 goals, signed a new one-year contract in July 2007, which was terminated by mutual consent in January 2008.

  Yet another signing that perturbed Devlin involved Italian goalkeeper Generoso Rossi, who signed an 18-month contract with QPR in January 2005. But this time it was not the size of the fee to the agent which caused him concern, but the manner in which Paladini agreed to pay the salary of Rossi, who was banned from Italian football for six months for his alleged part in a match-fixing scandal. Valued at £2 million two years earlier, Paladini believed, said Devlin, that, once fit, he could be sold for at least £500,000 in the summer.

  However, Rossi wanted £60,000 after tax as a salary. ‘I explained to Gianni that that was not the way we paid salaries in the UK. I said if Rossi wanted to be paid £60,000, we’d have to pay him £80-odd thousand.’ Devlin said the issue was resolved after heated discussions between Gianni and some Italians, including Rossi’s agent, Marco Sommella. Paladini, said Devlin, told him, ‘Well, we’re just going to pay him £20,000 salary, and we’re going to pay the agent £40,000 and he will sort the money out with the player.’ Rossi was at QPR for no more than a few months, playing just twice for the club. Out of contract, he left for an Italian club, Unione Sportiva Triestina, in the summer.

  Paladini, who made no comment on his role in the signing of these players, denied that he had been responsible for all the transfer deals between June 2004 and July 2005, or that he had signed the contracts.

  ‘The thing is I never signed any paper,’ said Paladini. ‘All the papers were signed by the chief executive. I worked together with them [Devlin and Power].’ But by now Paladini was effectively in control of the club, and while his signature did not appear on the contracts – he wasn’t legally empowered to sign them – it was he who had been responsible for eight of them, including the payments to agents.

  Said Power: ‘He was the major shareholder in the club. He was an adviser, but, by any other name, he was the top director at the club.’ He admits that, as chairman, he signed ‘some’ of the payments. He said: ‘I’ve seen these figures afterwards [agents’ fees]. I was of the opinion, “Don’t give him a penny”, but invariably there was always [Paladini saying] “…and the next deal I can organise for you”… I certainly signed off some of them, but … if it had been down to me, not a single new player would have come in, because I just wouldn’t have paid them, full stop.’ The rest of the payments to agents, he said, were authorised by Devlin.

  As chief executive, it was part of Devlin’s role to sign off the contracts between the club and players. ‘I wasn’t happy about various things because it was my name going on the contracts,’ he said, ‘but only children say they did something because somebody else told them to do so. When you are a man you ought to have bigger balls. If I were at a club again, seeing what people are capable of, and the way they can change from being friendly to all the animosity that went on at QPR, I wouldn’t want to get involved in anything like that again.’

  He recalls signing at least six contracts, ‘maybe eight’, in payment of agents’ fees. Paladini, he said, was behind ‘pretty much every player acquisition that came through. It was Gianni who did most of the networking with agents and the bringing in of players, and certainly dealing with players.’

  Paladini established his authority at QPR through the resignations of Blackburn, Davies and Jones, with each of whom he had had an uneasy relationship. Said Devlin: ‘He had been behind their departure, and I think Bill [Power] and the rest of the board were happy for Gianni to continue to have [that] kind of influence, at least in playing matters. Generally, things were going OK and they were willing to put up with Gianni’s rough edges.’

  But time was running out for Power and McGrath and chief executive Devlin. For Paladini believed, as he had done about Jones and Davies, that Power and Devlin had been plotting behind his back. His misplaced suspicions were caused by a visit to Loftus Road of some Greek businessmen who were keen to invest in an English club, preferably in London. An FA representative had spoken to Devlin, who reported the approach to Power. Power suggested that, although there were no shares for sale, out of courtesy they should be invited to the club and entertained at a pre-season match.

  During a 15-minute conversation with the businessmen, Power, said Devlin, confirmed there were at present no shares available but, should there be later, their interest would be kept in mind in. ‘Gianni came to the door halfway through the meeting and Bill beckoned him in, but he declined. But the following day Gianni came in screaming and shouting at me, saying that Bill and I had been trying to sell the club from under him, and how could I do that without going back to him, as he was the major shareholder. It was all nonsense, because even if Bill and I had been trying to do some sort of deal, all Bill could have sold were his shares. He couldn’t have sold the club.’ Devlin is convinced the incident led to Paladini playing his ‘trump card’ – the removal of Power and McGrath from the board, and his departure as chief executive to strengthen the Italia
n connection and his control of QPR.

  The scene was set at a boardroom meeting on 24 August 2005 attended by the five directors: Power, McGrath, Trucco, Dunga and Paladini, who had recently been appointed a director. Also present were non-board members Devlin, company secretary Chris Pennington and Caliendo. The agenda went smoothly enough until Pennington presented a financial report which forecast a year-end loss of nearly £2 million, a substantial part of it due to payments to agents.

  A few moments later Caliendo left the boardroom, to be followed by Devlin. The meeting then got down to the final item on the agenda: ‘Examination and modification of the management structure’. Trucco put forward the motion that the board had ‘no confidence in the chairman, as both chairman and as a director, and call for his immediate removal’.

  With Power as chairman disqualified from voting, it was carried by three votes to one, McGrath being the dissenting voice. A furious row ensued which ended with Power and McGrath storming out of the meeting. They returned 25 minutes later, accompanied by Devlin, to insist that the vote was invalid, citing article 81, sub-section 7 of the club’s Articles of Association, which stated that the office of a director shall be vacated if he is absent from board meetings without permission of the board for more than six months. According to Devlin, Dunga had not attended one board meeting. ‘He had once flown in for a press conference, but we never saw him again until that day.’

  This article invalidated Dunga’s vote, who had arrived from Japan to attend the meeting. His response was to claim that he had not been informed of meetings during the preceding six months. Certainly Dunga’s vote was crucial to the move to unseat Power. Article 88 stated that any director can be removed by ‘extraordinary resolution’ before the end of his period in office, providing the resolution is supported by a majority of 75 per cent. Dunga’s vote ensured that majority.