The Super Summary of World History

by Alan Dale Daniel

  General Guenther Blumentritt stated that Heinrich von Brauchitsch, Franz Halder, and Gerd von Rundstedt were all against the plan to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941. According to General Blumentritt:

  All three realized the difficulties presented by the nature of the country from their experiences in the 1914-1918 war—above all, the difficulties of movement, reinforcement, and supply. Field Marshal von Rundstedt asked Hitler bluntly, “Have you weighed up what you are undertaking in an attack on Russia?”

  The original date for the invasion was May 15, 1941, but bad weather and Italy’s Balkans problem postponed the date. Mussolini decided to invade Greece, for prestige mostly, and purposefully failed to inform Hitler of his plan. Italy’s invasion ran into trouble right away, its troops fell back, and Greek forces were soon poised to invade Italian territory. Then the English landed troops in Greece. Unable to stand idly by while his weak ally (dumb too) was invaded and his oil supplies threatened, Hitler sent his panzers into Yugoslavia and Greece. The action ended quickly as Britain fled before the Wehrmacht. Greece surrendered after German troops neared Athens. This operation was an additional example of the Wehrmacht’s superb fighting ability in 1941. On the heels of this victory, Hitler allowed a German parachute army to invade Crete. The Germans won a close fight, but the losses were heavy.[247]

  Did this diversion cost precious time? The invasion date for Barbarossa moved to June 22; accordingly, about a month was lost on top of wear and tear on equipment, loss of men, fuel, and other resources. However, the German generals said bad weather delayed the invasion date, and weather histories confirm their claim.

  The battles in the USSR determined the outcome of WWII. Germany was tackling a giant. It needed an excellent plan of attack, outstanding leadership, and good luck at every turn. They received none of the above. The German leadership in the field was extraordinary, and the German generals and their troops performed skillfully; but, Hitler created a shoddy plan, made farcical decisions during the struggle, and the Soviets received the luck—like the worst winter in decades.

  Barbarossa’s scale was unimaginable. Barbarossa easily overshadows the D-Day invasion, Battle of the Bulge, or the entire Pacific campaign. The Germans attacked the USSR with 3.5 million men, 3,400 tanks, and 1,945 aircraft. The Soviet forces comprised 2.5 to 4.7 million men, 20,000 tanks, and 7,700 aircraft. The Germans caught the USSR by surprise, which is astonishing in itself because Stalin received numerous warnings of the coming assault; however, great spies are one thing, believing their information is another. Whatever the cause, the Russian Army suffered shocking losses because Stalin lacked good sense. The USSR lost 1,200 aircraft the first day, and subsequent Luftwaffe operations continued to destroy numerous outdated Soviet aircraft. As the offensive went forward German close air support of their troops was the difference between victory and defeat in numerous battles. Entire armies of Soviet troops were surrounded by the Germans and forced to surrender (six hundred thousand plus at Kiev alone); however, the German encirclements never managed to bag enough Russian troops to shatter their ability to resist. Many Russians avoided capture because of porous Wehrmacht lines. The Soviet losses of men and equipment became staggering. Stalin’s orders to shoot any man falling back helped the Germans bag a lot more men.

  In spite of these majestic German victories, the Russians continued to counterattack consistently. The Russian’s secret tank, the T-34, surprised and astounded the German troops. Initially, nothing stopped the clanking monster. After discovering the awe-inspiring 88 mm flack cannon could demolish the Soviet T-34, morale improved; nonetheless, meeting a squadron of T-34s set German commanders on edge. The well-developed combined arms doctrine, and the Wehrmacht’s superb leadership, carried the offensive forward.

  At first, the German invasion went well, killing or capturing millions in Soviet troops and spectacular amounts of equipment. As the drive proceeded the generals became more optimistic, and they made statements that they won the war in the first six weeks. An impartial observer can understand why. The Germans killed, captured, or wounded perhaps six million Russians and destroyed over one year’s worth of equipment production, enough to man and equip an army almost twice as large as the German invasion force. The estimates of USSR losses: 802,000 killed; 3,000,000 wounded; 3,300,000 captured; 21,200 aircraft destroyed; and 20,500 tanks destroyed. Major cities and industrial areas rich with raw materials fell to the invaders as well as thousands of square miles of farmland. This kind of damage would destroy any nation, right?

  Figure 55 Operation Barbarossa 1941

  After the war, Gerd von Rundstedt explained why the German Army failed to conquer the Soviet Union in 1941:

  “Long before winter came the chances had been diminished owing to the repeated delays in the advance that were caused by bad roads, and mud. The ‘black earth’ of the Ukraine could be turned into mud by ten minutes rain—stopping all movement until it dried. That was a heavy handicap in a race with time. It was increased by a lack of railways in Russia—for bringing up supplies to our advancing troops. Another adverse factor was the way the Russians received continual reinforcements from their back areas, as they fell back. It seemed to us that as soon as one force was wiped out, the path was blocked by the arrival of a fresh force.”

  In spite of terrible losses the USSR continued to counterattack Nazi units, and Soviet troops defended mother Russia fanatically, but the diverging three German drives continued. Then Hitler ordered a halt to Army Group Center’s advance in October of 1941. For two months that summer, General Bock’s troops sat at the Desna river. Worse, Hitler ordered huge numbers of troops redirected away from the advance on Moscow to battles of encirclement far to the south. Hitler failed to understand how difficult it was to move thousands upon thousands of men and their equipment in a new direction over land with very poor roads. The encirclements worked and bagged large numbers of Soviet troops, but the drive to Moscow stalled.

  Leningrad was within the reach of the northern German thrust, but Hitler ordered a stop and that gave the Russians time to reinforce the city. When the German drive resumed they failed to make good headway. Hitler then ordered a siege, because fighting in a city was not his army’s prowess (he said in 1941—how soon he would forget). Leningrad would hold, although Soviet soldiers and civilians endured a 900 day siege producing inestimable famine and suffering. Hitler again, for reason unknown, threw away a key opportunity for victory.

  General Guenther Blumentritt was convinced that the German Army could have taken Leningrad in 1941. He stated,

  “Leningrad could have been taken, probably with little difficulty. But after his experience at Warsaw in 1939 Hitler was always nervous about taking big cities, because of the losses he had suffered there. The tanks had already started on the last lap of the advance when Hitler ordered them to stop—as he had done at Dunkirk in 1940. So no genuine attack on Leningrad was attempted in 1941, contrary to appearances—although all preparations had been completed, including the mounting of long-range artillery that had been brought from France.”

  As the Wehrmacht advanced, special killing squads (Einsatzgruppen) advanced behind the front killing Jews, Gypsies, and Slavs just for breathing. These roaming death squads murdered perhaps hundreds of thousands of civilians, but the numbers are uncertain. People initially welcoming the Germans as liberators, and eager to help overthrow Stalin, turned against the invaders and began resisting in every way possible. War is brutal in any event, but this war became more brutal by the hour. This was modern total war, a war of annihilation, devoid of mercy. No civilians and no soldiers, in the classical sense, existed any longer—only the living and the dead. And the living were in the business of creating many more dead.

  Stalin allowed 2 million people to leave Moscow as the Germans drew close, but he stayed. Everyone who could walk assisted in building defenses for the communist capital. The world held its breath as the fascist slogged toward victory . . . then it began to snow. The temperat
ure dropped like a stone, and the German advance froze—literally. With few winter clothes (poor logistical planning again), little shelter, and the wrong oil for their vehicles and guns, German troops froze to death as their equipment failed. Tank engines refused to run, machine guns jammed, and freezing, dog-tired men huddled in trenches trying to survive. Horses, the mainstay of the German supply system, died by the thousands. The Wehrmacht was finished. Not even Hitler’s towering rage could get freezing, worn out men to move in these conditions, especially after months of constant warfare.

  German logistics experts predicted the greatest extent of the German advance. Before the invasion started, and not knowing the specifics of the various plans, they accurately predicted how far the Wehrmacht could progress before a long halt would be necessary.[248] Calculating the Russian railroads were a different gauge than Western European railroads (necessitating building new railroads from the Russian border on), the supplies available, fuel resources, amount of fodder required for the horses, the number of tires, the maintenance requirements, and so on, the logistic experts got it right. It was predictable. Hitler’s plan should have considered these estimates, but it did not. Modern military leaders know that amateurs study strategy and tactics, professionals study logistics. Hitler was an obvious amateur, and he made the fundamental error of downplaying logistics and ignoring the professionals. As in World War I, Germany now faced a long two-front war without sufficient resources, and military experts knew it. Hitler directed Germany to its doom, but it would take time for the ax to fall. Nonetheless, it was falling. Hitler had lost.[249]

  As if to put an exclamation point on the fact, the Soviets launched an offensive in December of 1941 with fresh armies of Siberian troops who were quite used to winter conditions. Hitler issued his customary “no retreat!” order. The German forces fell back two hundred miles in spite of the order, but the Soviet offensive finally stalled. German losses were great, but they had held. The great professionalism of the German Army came through during the Siberian offensive. Freezing, starving men, operating near frozen equipment, shot the Soviet Siberian armies to pieces. Superior German tactics and field leadership accomplished a miracle. However, the German Army was clearly diminished by the ordeal. Never again would the German Army be the force it was in June of 1941. Its equipment improved, but the men were gone. Irreplaceable men, who successfully fought from Poland to Norway, France to the Balkans, and then to Moscow’s gates were gone forever, and with them the unbeatable Wehrmacht.

  No Retreat

  A controversy has arisen over Hitler’s “no retreat” order given as the Siberian Army’s offensive began. Many great historians (Shier, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, for one) argue this order saved the German Army. They believe that without this order the German Army would have disintegrated and suffered a butchering, just as Napoleon’s army retreating from Moscow had in 1812. I do not agree. The German Army of 1941 was not Napoleon’s army. The Wehrmacht would have prevailed because of its impressive leadership and discipline. In fact, a general retreat might have saved more men and equipment. [250] We can never know what may have occurred without the order. Hitler did give the order, and no rout occurred; that much we know. Nevertheless, why did no rout occur? Was it the order, or was it the men carrying it out? The men were the key, not the order.

  Thus, the German Army faltered against terrific odds and it lost significant combat power. The Wehrmacht captured a large part of the Soviet Union in 1941, and should have gone over to the defense. Most postwar generals, and the German generals in 1941, think that would have been the wise move. Germany’s Army would be on the defense, and using its superior mobility with reserves still available could have imposed significant additional casualties on the attacking Soviets. It could take years, but a moderately successful defense might have pried peace overtures out of the Soviet Union. Hitler—ever the blockhead—demanded the outright conquest of the USSR and threw away this defensive advantage.

  Moving Soviet Factories to the Urals

  The Soviets accomplished numerous miracles in WWII; however, the movement of their heavy industry to the Ural Mountains stands out. When it became apparent the Germans would overrun large parts of the western USSR, the Soviets dismantled their heavy factories and moved them east, well past Moscow, to the Ural Mountains. The Soviets accomplished this feat of innovation in record time, quickly putting the factories back in production. The loss of these manufacturing facilities would have extensively harmed Soviet logistics capabilities. While moving their aircraft factories, they retooled them to produce up-to-date aircraft superior to their Nazi counterparts. This was another foundational decision extensively contributing to the Soviet victory over Germany.

  Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, WWII was taking another turn for the worst against the Axis, but for over a year it did not look that way.

  Japan Enters the War December 7, 1941

  Background

  Japan had planned for a war against the United States since at least 1905[251] (the date of the Russo-Japanese War), and by 1930 America was the inevitable enemy. After 1930, militarist factions took over Japan’s government and began urging the conquest of the Far East. Even when the civilian government in Tokyo firmly opposed expansion the military did what it wanted. With Tokyo’s blessing, Korea was “annexed” as the diplomats would say at the League of Nations, and operated as a fiefdom of what was now Imperial Japan.

  In September 1931, the Japanese military invaded Manchuria, winning control in six months. Many date this invasion as the true start of the Second World War because it was brutal fascist aggression that set the stage for future events. The Japanese formed a puppet state and requested its recognition by the League of Nations. The League refused, and Japan walked out. Japanese overseas troops were staging “incidents” to incite short but victorious conflicts with China, which Japan would settle after China granted Japan’s territorial demands. After conquering Manchuria, the Japanese triggered another “incident” at the Marco Polo Bridge which lead to another armed conflict with China. This time China refused Japan’s demands for territory and repatriations. By August of 1937 an all-out war raged in northern China, and the war was spreading. In November of 1937, Japanese troops occupied Nanking[252] and began a remorseless orgy of murder, rape, and plunder. Reports of these savage acts went by without real protest, and no action from the League of Nations and the Western Democracies.

  In December of 1934 Japan allowed the Washington Naval Treaty (an arms limitation agreement) to expire. September of 1940 saw the Japanese government sign the Tripartite Pact with Hitler. It was a protective treaty with each guaranteeing to support the other in case of war. For Japan, the treaty’s main purpose was threatening the Soviet Union with a two front war if it attacked Japan. It was not a real military alliance in the normal sense of the word, but it took America by surprise and heightened the sense of confrontation with Japan.

  A significant but little discussed event took place on the northern border of Manchuria in July 1938 when the Soviets and Japanese clashed at the Battle of Lake Hassan. The USSR, under Zhukov, beat the Japanese easily, and inflicted high casualties. In 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had quickly defeated Russia (pre-communist) on land and sea causing a stir in Europe. Thirty-three years later the Soviets handed the Japanese their heads in this one-sided land engagement. The Soviets expertly used numerous tanks and stunning new combined arms tactics, easily outclassing the Japanese in every phase of the battle. Soviet tanks made the Japanese equipment look like junk. Japanese antitank weapons proved useless against Soviet armor (wonder how the Germans missed this?).

  Studying this battle extensively, the stunned Japanese determined that competing against the Soviets required a complete reworking of their armed forces, its equipment, battle tactics, and strategy. Japanese generals calculated it might take five years plus millions of dollars to remake its army. This was too much time and far too much money. Thus, Japan decided
it must avoid attacking the Soviet Union. The push into China would continue, but to attack north was simply out of the question. The Japanese looked south after this battle for conquests. This decision held great consequences for the Western Democracies, especially the United States of America.

  Japan’s military believed the war with China would be over within a few months after the Marco Polo Bridge incident, but China snubbed surrender and territorial concessions. Chiang Kai-Shek, the Nationalist Chinese leader, retreated into China’s hinterland, fought delaying battles, and allowed China to swallow the Japanese. Chinese Nationalist troops were poorly armed and led, and were often loyal to the local warlord rather than the central government. However, Chiang realized he did not have to defeat the Japanese. He only had to avoid a total defeat himself. The Chinese Communists were also present in force; nonetheless, they chose to sit out the war in their strongholds in the Northern provinces while allowing their Nationalist opponents and the Japanese to destroy one another. Later, they could step in, destroy the “winners,” and claim China as a communist state (it worked). The communists and the Nationalist had been fighting a brutal civil war for years before the Japanese invasion, which is one reason China was so weak.