The Super Summary of World History

by Alan Dale Daniel

  The airdrop of troops into France did not go well. The pilots missed the drop zones, and some panicked in the flak and flew away from the drop zones before the men could jump. As a result, the paratroopers were scattered far away from their drop zones and objectives. The bridge crossing over the Orne River was the exception. The bridge fell to English glider and paratrooper units as the glider pilots put the aircraft down exactly where they should have, almost on top of the objective, totally surprising the guards. The rest of the paratroopers scattered behind the beaches began to mill around in the dark causing great confusion at German headquarters. Aggressive by training, the paratroopers joined themselves into ad hoc units and began attacking anywhere they could find the enemy. It was a mess, but it was confusing the Germans and causing delays—as planned.

  As the fleet approached Normandy, Allied firepower pounded the beach areas in preparation for the landings. In the British sectors the naval gunfire was accurate, and overhead the bombers were on target. The British also developed a mass of special machines to help the troops get off the beach. They worked well.[310] British troop transports started closer to the beach than their American counterparts and reached the shore faster with fewer losses. On Gold, Juno, and Sword, the troops moved off the beaches rather quickly and established themselves inland. Unfortunately, they drove slowly inland, hence, failing to attain the first day’s objectives. A key objective, the town of Caen, remained in German hands. Utah Beach was no picnic, but the units were ashore and able to traverse the marshes behind the beach because paratroopers had seized the vital causeway crossings.

  Omaha beach was appallingly different. The bombardment aircraft dropped their ordinance far behind the beach, failing to destroy German positions overlooking the landing area. Naval gunfire overshot the defenses, thus German defenses remained intact and the beach was without craters, depriving the landing troops of cover. The veteran German 352nd infantry division defended Omaha. Unlike many other units on the Normandy beaches, this was no static unit. It was sent to Normandy for rest and refit after fighting on the eastern front. These men knew how to fight. At Omaha Beach a steep escarpment overlooked the landing zones giving the defenders a grand view of the area below. Men landing here had to cross 200 to 300 yards of flat sand to reach a place capable of obstructing the swarms of German bullets roaring down upon them. German gunners directed cannon fire onto landing craft from field guns just behind the beach untouched by air attacks or naval bombardment. These cannons were firing directly into the landing craft, blowing men to atoms.

  As the ramps dropped, German machine guns opened fire with predictably bloody results. One man stated that his captain was “filled with bullets by the time he got to the bottom of the ramp.” From undisturbed positions overlooking the beach, the veteran Germans fired down onto the men crawling or running for cover across the open landscape. American casualties on Omaha were terrible.

  The so-called swimming tanks were sinking in the high waves on their way to Omaha Beach depriving the troops of needed armored support. Junior grade officers commanding a few LSTs laboring through high waves toward Omaha beach decided to deliver the tanks by running their ships onto shore. By this expedient, some tanks got to the beach and began firing on the German positions. Heavy German concrete emplacements defied the fire of such small guns, but the Germans in the trenches overlooking the beach worried about the return fire. The men of the US 1st and 29th Divisions pinned on the beach rejoiced to see at least some armor driving out of the LSTs.

  Observing the dilemma of the troops ashore moved another group of navy men to extraordinary action. American destroyers began sailing very close to shore (one thousand yards), firing their five-inch guns at the German pillboxes and trenches overlooking Omaha Beach. This naval gunfire devastated the defenders. Pillboxes and bunkers were destroyed, and the excoriating fire on the men below the cliff began to abate. Finally, small groups of men started fighting their way off the beach, up the draws and the escarpment, toward the German positions above the beach. As these draws were taken and the escarpment breached, the Americans could attack the Germans from the flanks and the pillboxes and bunkers from behind. The 352 division requested reinforcements from the German High Command, but none were sent. This was a critical error. Reinforced, the 352 might have driven the Americans off their tiny initial gains, thereby splitting the Allied forces. To the east, the British beaches could have held, but to the west Utah beach would have been isolated and difficult to hold. But, no German reinforcements arrived and the 352 lost men and material as the day marched on, which eventually caused them to buckle. This allowed the Americans to expand their beachhead, although not by much, on the first day.

  Omaha beach survived and the Allies were ashore in force. However, the day went badly in one other crucial area. General Montgomery planned to capture the town of Caen on the first day. The British and Canadian troops moving inland from Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches were unhurried, and the Germans quickly reinforced the area around Caen. The Germans knew this route was the key to gaining the open plain to Paris. By denying the invasion forces the Caen area, the Germans pulled a major coup. By the time the Allies broke out of Normandy thousands of men had died trying to capture Caen’s high ground.

  The British and Americans were also starting to encounter the unanticipated Normandy hedgerow country. After the Allies were ashore they found the country behind the beaches arrayed with massive, deep, thick hedges. The roads were narrow and somewhat depressed below the bottom of the hedges. This was superb defensive terrain, and the Germans protected it with skill and courage. A war of attrition began that cost the Allies in casualties and time. As the Allies inched forward, the Germans moved more troops into the line, thereby preventing an Allied breakout. The next few days found the Americans fighting their way across the neck of land that held the city and port of Cherbourg. The goal was to close off the peninsula then attack north and seize the port. This effort was time-consuming, but the Americans moved relentlessly forward.

  As the Americans captured the Cherbourg Peninsula, General Montgomery wanted to take Caen and the ridges beyond so he could break out into the plains behind Caen and strike for Paris. Monty mounted seven large attacks on the German positions, two of them quite large, and suffered heavy losses every time. Operations Perch, Epson, Windsor, Charnwood, Jupiter, Goodwood, and Spring were all costly failures. Operation Goodwood alone cost the Allies approximately four thousand men and four hundred tanks. Even though British troops took the town of Caen itself, the vital high ground remained in German hands. General Montgomery continued battering away at the entrenched Germans with high losses and few appreciable gains.

  In the meantime, the Americans were making progress. The port of Cherbourg fell on June 26, but German engineers ruined the port and it remained unusable until August. At least the Allies had the Cherbourg Peninsula, a large area in which they massed troops, constructed airfields, and stationed aircraft for close air support.

  Finally, the Americans decided they could break out in their sector near the town of St. Lo. After a massive air bombardment General Patton’s Third Army broke through the German lines, and the Sherman tanks, fast and reliable, were now in their element. Hitler was advised to allow redeployment to the River Seine, but predictably refused to retreat. Soon the German Army defending Normandy was in a trap. As General Patton advanced in a sweeping movement south and then north, General Montgomery advanced south soon forming a pocket around the town of Falaise. Unfortunately for the Allies, General Montgomery failed to close the pocket and a large number of German troops escaped; however, they lost their equipment and had no ability to resist the Allies effectively until rearmed and reconstituted as a fighting force.

  After the war, General Montgomery claimed it was always his plan to tie down the Germans around Caen and have the Americans break out from the west and trap the enemy. General Montgomery was covering his reputation. Pre-invasion plans clearly demonstrate Montgomery’s des
ire to capture Caen for the expected breakthrough at that point. Montgomery formed no plans prior to the invasion for a breakout from the west by American forces. This possibility arose after the offensives mounted by General Montgomery failed at Caen. These offensives were massive in scale, and certainly not the kind of operation designed for tying down enemy troops. No mention of the American move to breakout came from Montgomery’s headquarters. The idea was American; however, Montgomery did see the merit of the plan and immediately adopted it.[311]

  Once the breakout was accomplished the Germans retreated with speed until they could regroup. The Allied advance across France was very rapid. One key to the quickness of the advance was the Sherman tank and the American two and one-half ton trucks (duce and a half). Both units were reliable, fast, and fairly easy to fix if they did break. For all the problems the Sherman had in tank-to-tank engagements it was wonderful in the pursuit across France.

  Figure 71 D-Day and Beyond

  The Allies were racing to the Rhine. Paris fell rather quickly after De Gaulle’s French units disobeyed Eisenhower’s orders and diverted to the city. Eisenhower was forced to redirect troops to Paris, squandering valuable time and fuel. At least the Germans disobeyed Hitler’s orders to destroy the city. This diversion demonstrated the French war aims differed greatly from the English and Americans, and DeGaulle was going to pursue those aims no matter the cost to their fellow combatants. Because the Germans continued to hold the port cities on the Atlantic coast of France, and because a tremendous storm had wrecked one of the artificial harbors at Normandy, the Allies were having supply problems.[312] Moving fuel, ammunition, and all the rest from Normandy to the German border was expensive and time consuming (that troublesome word again, Logistics). Eisenhower wanted the port of Antwerp captured at once, but again General Montgomery dawdled, and the Germans reinforced the area thus causing the British troops delays and hard fighting after Montgomery finally directed his soldiers to take the area. Engineers worked on clearing mines and obstacles planted by the Germans to stop shipping from entering the port. All these problems caused a significant postponement in opening the vital harbor.

  General Eisenhower followed a broad front strategy for the Allied advance where the entire front moved forward simultaneously, and all sectors enjoyed an equal call on supplies. General Montgomery wanted to limit the advance to a narrow area that would demand the lion’s share of supplies. At first Ike refused the idea, but as the supply situation grew critical, he thought allowing the remaining supplies to be used for a narrow front attack could end the war sooner. Ike told General Montgomery to go ahead with Operation Market Garden, an assault with paratroopers and the British Thirty Corps designed to cross the Rhine from British positions near Antwerp. The assault was commenced on September 15, 1944.

  Market Garden was a colossal Allied defeat. The plan itself was badly put together, and vital intelligence was ignored. Crack Nazi troops were in the region for rest and refitting, and the plans for Market Garden fell into German hands early in the operation. Thirty Corps’ advance ran into deep trouble because the single road available for mechanized movement was easily defended. After days of pounding and no sign of Thirty Corps or communication from headquarters, the British paratroopers were done. Thousands of elite British paratroopers were killed or captured.[313]

  On September 19, 1944, American units began assaulting the Huertgen forest. This assault was useless from a strategic point of view. The forest was classic defensive terrain, and German paratroopers were dug in there supported by heavy artillery. For some reason, American generals Bradley and Hodges thought the forest was vital, and threw nine divisions in all into the fight, battling for three months in an area where American firepower, air control, and ability to maneuver were useless. Huertgen was taken, but the cost was enormous for the advantage (if any) gained—twenty-four thousand US soldiers dead! US Generals Bradley and Hodges were responsible for this error in judgment and fully responsible for the lives of the men they sacrificed.

  The Battle of the Bulge

  December 1944

  On December 16, 1944, Hitler launched a massive offensive through the Ardennes forest. This assault caught the Allies completely by surprise. Allied units stationed at the point of attack had either been manhandled in the Huertgen forest, or were green units moved into a quiet sector. Given the condition of the US units opposing the Germans, they fought well and delayed the initial German advance appreciably; nevertheless, the German blow made good ground in the first few days. The Battle of the Bulge was on.

  This attack was the brainchild of Adolf Hitler, forever the gambler, who staked his empire on one very risky roll of the dice. He managed to keep the assault a secret mainly because of radio silence. Allied intelligence was coming in through Ultra (the reading of Nazi radio transmissions) almost exclusively. Ultra intelligence reports were so unfailing Allied generals relied on little else. Furthermore, the Allies thought the Germans could not mount such an offensive. The Allied generals believed the Germans were finished.

  Figure 72 Battle of the Bulge, Dec 1944

  Somehow, against all odds, Germany scraped together several divisions—armored included—and enough fuel to open a major offensive. Allied air operations failed to prevent this achievement, neither had enormous German losses in men and equipment over the past months in the USSR and on the Western Front. However, the men assembled for this undertaking were not well trained. The officers and most of the noncommissioned officers were veterans, but the troops were green. Moreover, the fuel supply was short. Capturing Allied fuel was necessary to keep the advance going.

  Hitler’s plan contained other flaws. The road grid his armored divisions moved over was awful. Small winding mountain roads, with small bridges, would be tough enough to attack over in good weather; however, for the assault to work the weather must be bad—very bad. Snow and overcast weather kept the Allied air forces on the ground, and this was essential for victory. German tanks traversed slick snow-covered roads surrounded by hills and trees that could, and did, hide defenders. Knocking out the lead German tank in these conditions stopped the entire column. Bad weather, large tanks,[314] small winding roads, not much fuel, and a movement schedule that would prove impossible to keep, all added up to failure before the attack started. [315]The experienced German generals knew the results before the attack started, the loss of Germany’s reserves. Hitler had blundered again.

  On the morning of the attack, the US Army troops under fire did not see Hitler’s move as stupid. German tanks, artillery, and infantry were advancing everywhere, while American troops were falling back or fighting from encircled positions. Some German troops had a new assault rifle, the Sturmgewehr 44, developed from studies of how German troops actually fought in the field. American troops did not like this new development either. Valiant last stands seldom win wars, but American units fighting valiant, if small, last stands significantly hampered the German advance at key moments in the offensive. This proved critical as the battle developed. Hitler’s goal was the port of Antwerp. He knew his forces must reach the River Meuse, cross it, and get on to Antwerp before the weather cleared.

  The German assault soon began running out of steam. The 101st Airborne Division moved into a vital road junction at Bastogne and held on despite repeated German assaults. German units on the point of attack who were approaching the Meuse ran short of fuel and were beat up by American tanks and artillery. The flanks of the American line held at St.Vith, and American counterattacks began to threaten penetration near the base of the bulge. General Patton’s Third Army made a ninety-degree turn north in record time and began assaulting the Germans holding the area between himself and Bastogne. As the weather cleared on Christmas Day, Allied air power began to pound German tanks and supply lines while Patton’s army relieved the defenders at Bastogne. It was over. Hitler reluctantly ordered the retreat that spelled the end for Germany in the west. With his reserves destroyed, Hitler possessed nothing to hold bac
k the Allied tide.

  The Air War Over Europe

  1940 to 1945

  Thus far, we have circumvented the air war over Europe. In fact, it was a massive undertaking involving resources on a vast scale for England, America, and the Nazis. The air war, from the outset, caused controversy. Bombing of civilians was a difficult thing to justify, but it was a requirement of total war. The Nazis started it, said Bomber Harris, and the Allies would finish it in spades. “They have sown the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind,” is a well-known quote from Air Marshall Harris (known as Bomber Harris).

  “The pioneer in the air war against Germany was the RAF. The RAF experimented briefly in 1940 with daylight attacks on industrial targets in Germany but abandoned the effort when losses proved unbearably heavy. Thereafter, it attempted to find and attack such targets as oil, aluminum, and aircraft plants at night. This effort too was abandoned; with available techniques, it was not possible to locate the targets often enough. Then the RAF began its famous raids on German urban and industrial centers. On the night of May 30, 1942, it mounted its first ‘thousand plane’ raid against Cologne and two nights later struck Essen with almost equal force . . . the weight of the RAF effort, compared with tonnages later employed, was very small—sixteen thousand tons in 1940 and forty-six thousand tons in 1941 compared with 676,000 tons in 1944.” (The US Strategic Bombing Survey)

  Thus started the night-area bombing of German cities. It was a practical matter. Daylight raids were too costly, and after dark it was impossibly difficult to locate a factory complex for pinpoint bombing.[316] Britain felt it had to use its only method of striking back, so it made the decision to “carpet” or area bomb the cities producing the machines of war, and if the “civilians” who worked and lived there were harmed, so be it.

  When the Americans arrived with their B-17 “flying fortress,” they were sure they could carry out daylight raids against German industrial targets. The American’s thought by using the top-secret Norden bombsight the B-17s could put bombs right on the industrial target, thereby avoiding unnecessary civilian deaths and damaged homes. In fact, the B-17’s bombs seldom fell on the target when dropped from high altitudes. In the beginning, American losses were high but acceptable. The British raids were costing them far less in terms of crew and aircraft losses, but at times the raids missed entire towns. American airmen went forward with the daylight bombing, but the losses were climbing. Bomber Command kept trying to talk the Americans into joining the night raids, but American commanders thought they were on the right track. It went unsaid, but at first the US Airmen thought their approach avoided unnecessary civilian deaths and was therefore morally superior. This did not hold as the war progressed to firebombing entire cities, and any attempt to justify the bombing was summed up by “they started it.”[317]