Enemy at the Gates

by William Craig

  That plan was already in jeopardy. While the Germans questioned Krupennikov, Russian soldiers were blocking further passage to the Kessel by the 6th Panzer Division. Unable to move beyond Vassilevska, only forty miles south of Stalingrad, the German tankers tenaciously held to their bridgehead on the northern bank even though their supply problems had become truly desperate. They had run out of drinking water as well as gasoline. Now, almost crazed with thirst, they crammed dirty snow into their mouths while they huddled inside their immobilized Mark IV panzers. Unable to move, they were easy targets for enemy gunners and Russian infantrymen, who probed to within fifty feet of Colonel Hunersdorff’s command post before he personally led a counterattack that drove them away.

  So many wounded Germans lay unattended, officers wondered where they could put them in case an order came for retreat. While shells whined overhead, some of the less seriously hurt men suddenly stopped moaning and died. The subzero temperature had claimed them.

  Teletype conversation General Schmidt—General Schulz:

  21 Dec. 42-1605 hrs. to 1705 hrs.

  +++ Here General Schmidt.

  +++ Here Schulz.

  [The general had vital questions for Sixth Army:] 1. What is your present fuel supply? Give the amounts of Diesel and Auto separately.

  2. How many kilometers does that mean? Does this amount of fuel suffice to extend the pocket toward the south while still holding the remaining fronts?

  3. If the fuel situation permits you to advance that far, can you do it in view of the available troops?

  4. How much fuel is used up daily for the most urgent supply trips within the pocket? Can you answer these questions right away?

  [Schmidt had the answers within minutes:] +++ 1. The presently available amount is about 130 cubic meters Auto and 10 Diesel, including today’s air supply and the amounts needed for supply trips during the next few days.

  2. This amount would permit the combat troops to advance 20 km including assembly for attack.

  3. Even considering the troop situation we could make 20 km, but we cannot hold the breakthrough front [south] and the fortress for any length of time without the troops committed in the attack and, in particular, not without the armored vehicles. On the contrary, we need replacements in the fortress in the very near future, if we are supposed to hold it. Any sortie with the inevitable casualties involved will jeopardize the defense of the fortress itself.

  4. The daily amount used for supply trips is 30 cubic meters.

  [Schulz countered with bad news:] +++ The Supreme Command of the Army still has not given approval for Donnerschlag [“Thunderclap,” the complete evacuation of the Kessel]…

  In view of the number of troops committed by the enemy,

  it is doubtful whether a speedy advance toward the north [by Hoth’s relief force] is possible, as long as the enemy does not feel the counterpressure against his forces from the pocket of the Sixth Army. It is therefore necessary that the Sixth Army starts Wintergewitter ["Winter Storm,” the physical linkup of the relief force with the Sixth Army] as soon as possible. When can you form up for the attack?

  The question was almost impossible to answer. Sixth Army was trying to form up for the attack, but Paulus’s uncertainty about an actual date for the breakout, plus his worries about the lack of gasoline, caused confusion among his troops. The new recruit from Boblingen, Pvt. Ekkehart Brunnert, suffered from one of these command failures.

  When his regiment was chosen to lead the attack to the south, all unneeded cars, trucks and motorcycles were quickly destroyed. For his part, Brunnert was delighted. The destruction of cumbersome equipment signaled a decisive attempt to break out, and he had noticed one special truck, filled with warm clothing sent by German civilians to men at the front. The vehicle would have to be burned, but its contents—fur boots, warm gloves, and scarfs— obviously would be distributed among the soldiers. Standing in line at the door of a huge convoy bus, Brunnert ogled the giftfilled vehicle, until a soldier poured gasoline on it and set it afire.

  Brunnert could not even scream his rage as the precious cargo was consumed in the blaze. Instead, he boarded the bus, sat down heavily on his assigned seat and began to cry. Suddenly bitter, lie fumed: “As long as our superiors are well clothed, nothing else seems to matter.”

  Outside the bus, seven Russian Hiwis waited for seats. When four of them found they were to be left behind, they rushed to a senior sergeant and begged for a ride. He refused. Wailing in terror, they got down on their knees and pleaded with him. The sergeant kicked one in the groin and walked away, leaving the distraught Hiwis huddled together at the side of the road. Their heads lowered, they tried to ignore their three comrades happily packing for the trip out of the Kessel.

  Inside the bus, Brunnert had regained his composure and was ready to go. With his rations lying under the seat, he dismissed a momentary fear of Russian sniping and was relaxing for the first time in weeks. Suddenly an officer stuck his head inside the door and shouted: “Unpack everything!” Paulus had changed his mind again.

  The disgusted Brunnert picked up his rations and walked slowly out of the bus. He had lost all hope of being saved.

  Still not totally aware of the dangers posed by the collapse of the Italian Eighth Army, General Schmidt continued his teleprinter dialogue with Schulz.

  +++ If we are to form up regardless of whether the fortress can be held or not, the earliest date for such an attack would be 24 December.

  By then we hope to have received the necessary fuel to have the re-grouping for the assembly of the attack forces completed. However, the General [Paulus] is of the opinion that the fortress cannot be held if the breakthrough involves major casualties and loss of armored vehicles. If there is no prospect of relief in the near future, it would be more advisable to refrain from the sortie and, instead, to bring in sufficient supplies by air, so that the men may regain their strength and we may have sufficient ammunition for defensive operations over a longer period. In that case we believe we can hold the fortress for some time even without relief.

  [Schulz replied:] +++ I shall immediately report your opinion to the Fieldmarshal and it will also be submitted to the Supreme Command of the Army. Have you any other questions regarding the situation?

  [Schmidt answered:] +++ Of the forces considered for the attack, we were already compelled to commit one battalion on the west front, since there were heavy casualties in that section during the recent days and there were already some gaps. One of these days we must also move up another battalion to the city of Stalingrad, because the units committed there are also constantly decreasing in number and, since the Volga is covered by solid ice, that front must be manned more closely. The Russians engage in lively combat activities in the city, which cost us numerous casualties. This decrease of fighting capacity is the main reason why the General [Paulus] considers a sortie extremely dangerous, unless contact is established immediately after the breakthrough and the fortress is reinforced by additional troops. We believe that the breakthrough is more promising if Winter Storm is immediately followed by Thunderclap since, in that case, we can withdraw the troops from the other fronts. However, on the whole, we are of the opinion that Thunderclap is an emergency solution, which, if possible, should be avoided, unless the general situation requires such a solution. It must also be kept in mind that in view of the present physical condition of the men, long marches or major attacks would be extremely difficult.

  At the Barrikady and tractor factories, the slag heaps lay under a thick blanket of snow that masked the ugly scars of war. Rusted gun barrels, twisted girders, and railroad tracks had also disappeared, along with the frozen corpses of the unburied and forgotten.

  Inside the cavernous rooms, German soldiers lived as best they could. For warmth, they ripped up wood flooring and lit tiny fires. The oil-soaked wood produced a sooty smoke that turned everyone’s face black.

  In Tool Hall 3C at the Barrikady, an ordinary turner’s lathe began to
attract unusual attention from lonely Germans after someone discovered that the machine had been manufactured in a town southeast of Stuttgart. Men slipped quietly into the room to stand beside it and read the small name plate: “Gustav Wagner, Reutlingen.” Former machinists softly caressed the metal created by German hands. Others just stared at the machine, and through it were transported home in their fantasy world of memories.

  They wondered openly whether the lathe could still be used. “Would it work again for the Russians if?…” Or, “Where is Reutlingen?” asked those from the Rhineland and further north.

  Gustav Wagner’s lathe became a shrine.

  Thirteen hundred miles to the northwest, at the Wolf’s Lair in East Prussia, a tragic war of nerves was being played out. Chief of Staff Gen. Kurt Zeitzler had dropped his role of sycophant as he desperately sought approval for Operation Thunderclap. Deeply committed to saving the Sixth Army, Zeitzler even insisted on reducing rations at the officers’ mess as both a tribute to the beleaguered men in the Kessel and a reminder that it was OKW’s responsibility to bring them out alive. In his daily conferences with the Führer, Zeitzler began acting like his predecessor, Franz Halder, badgering Hitler to endorse Thunderclap. When the annoyed dictator waved his entreaties aside, the frustrated Zeitzler often walked back to his office in a towering rage.

  He and Manstein, at least, were of one mind on the issue, and he had promised the field marshal that Hitler would eventually relent. But when Gen. Arthur Schmidt’s figures on auto and diesel supplies landed on Hitler’s desk, Kurt Zeitzler lost his battle. Schmidt’s report of Sixth Army’s having only about 140 cubic meters of fuel, which he had given to General Schulz in the teleprinter conversation of December 21, had been forwarded quickly to East Prussia. And his statement that the Sixth Army could only move twenty kilometers (twelve miles) toward a linkup with the German relief force created a negative reaction to Zeitzler’s argument for Thunderclap. For if the Führer had ever entertained any thoughts of granting Paulus permission to pull back with his entire army, Schmidt’s report swept them away.

  Facing the stubborn Zeitzler with the report in his hand, Hitler scornfully asked: “But what exactly do you wish me to do? Paulus can’t break out and you know it!”

  Zeitzler had no rebuttal. The evidence was too damning and as he left the room, he thought about the tragedy that was developing. Now, at this very moment, Hitler was correct about Sixth Army’s inability to break out. But his earlier mistakes and adamant refusal to let Paulus escape when the Kessel was first formed thirty days earlier had created this disaster.

  At Army Group Don Headquarters in Novocherkassk, Erich von Manstein prepared a final summation in hopes of changing Hitler’s mind.

  Document Army Group Don 39694/5

  Teletype

  22 Dec. 42

  TOP SECRET, “Chefsache,” transmittal by officers only

  TO: Chief of General Staff of the Army

  1. The development of the situation on the left flank [Italian sector] of the Army Group makes it necessary to move up forces there very soon….

  2. This measure means that the Sixth Army cannot be relieved for some time and that, as a consequence, the Army must be adequately provided with supplies for a long time. In order to maintain the physical strength of the Army through adequate nutrition and to enable the Army to engage in defensive operations, an average daily supply of at least 550 tons is required…. According to the opinion of Richthofen [the Luftwaffe general] in this area we can but expect an average of 200 tons, considering the long distance to be covered by the aircraft…. Unless adequate aerial supplies can be ensured… the only remaining alternative is the earliest possible breakout of the Sixth Army.

  In pointing out the patent impossibility of meeting the required air supply, Manstein was reminding Hitler once again that the total withdrawal of Sixth Army from the Kessel was the only alternative left.

  Convinced he had made the options clear, the choice obvious, the field marshal ordered the message sent to East Prussia and turned to his other problems.

  Meanwhile, the teleprinter from Novocherkassk to Stalingrad kept up a steady chatter. Its stark vocabulary failed to underline the fact that the hours left for deliverance had vanished.

  Teletype: General Schmidt—General Schulz

  22 Dec 42-1710 hrs. to 1945 hrs.

  Here is General Schulz. Hello, Schmidt. I want to report on the situation:

  Hoth’s 6th and 17th Armored Divisions at Vassilevska [on the Mishkova south of the Kessen] were engaged all day today in repulsing strong enemy attacks from the southeast, east and north, so that the armored divisions were not able to make the intended thrust toward the north.

  It is planned to make this thrust as soon as the impetus of the Russian attacks has been stopped. Developments will show whether that will already be possible tomorrow…. Unfortunately, during the last 24 hours weather conditions were such that no air supplies were made because of the danger of icing and fog. No air reconnaissance was possible either. We must hope for an improvement of weather conditions in the near future. The 175 “Ju” aircraft for an increase of air supplies are on their way. This much on the situation.

  The field marshal requests that the following question, which is of importance for an estimate of the Army’s supply situation, be clarified. According to the report of the quartermaster Sixth Army, there are still about 40,000 horses in the pocket. This report is contradicted by Major Eismann, who reported that the divisions had only about 800 horses left. Can you tell me the exact number of existing horses; if possible state number of ponies [Panjes] and normal-sized horses separately? This is very important, and have steps been taken on your side to ensure that the horse meat is used sparingly for the provision of the troops?…

  Schmidt had slightly more than 23,000 horses left, only enough to feed the Army until mid-January. The general soon gave Schulz this total. He had been giving other statistics to higher headquarters all day.

  …Ration strength on 18 December: 249,600 (including 13 thousand Rumanians) 19,300 auxiliary volunteers [Russian Hiwi laborers] and approximately 6,000 wounded.

  …Battle strength: In front line… infantry 25,000, engineers, 3,200….

  …Ammunition: Stocks in Army reserve are low and include 3,000 rounds for light field howitzers, 900 rounds for heavy field howitzers, and 600 rounds for other guns….

  …Health: Men have been on half rations since 26 November…. Under present conditions they are incapable of undertaking long marches or engaging in offensive action without a large number falling out….

  End

  At 6:30 A.M. on December 23, the 6th Panzer Division renewed its offensive to widen the bridgehead at Vassilevska on the Mishkova River south of the Kessel. Six hours later, at 12:30 P.M., 57th Corps commander, General Kirchner, arrived in the area “to obtain firsthand information…” on what was going wrong. For in the intervening time, 6th Panzer Division had been unable to move any closer to Stalingrad.

  A short time later, at 1:05 P.M., the teleprinter clicked out a message from OKW in Rastenburg. Field Marshal Manstein expected it to be the answer to his plea for giving the code word Thunderclap. It was not.

  PERSONAL AND IMMEDIATE

  Following from Führer begins: The railway junction Morosovskaya and the two air bases at Morosovsk and Tatsinskaya will be held and kept in operation at all costs…. Führer agrees that units of 57th Panzer Corps be transferred across the Don…. Army Group Don will report measures being taken….

  Zeitzler

  Hitler was ignoring Manstein’s carefully worded warning of the dangers of leaving Paulus inside the Kessel. In fact, Hitler had not even alluded to Operation Thunderclap. Instead he was telling Manstein to strip combat units from Hoth’s relief force and save the situation at the threatened Italian front.

  Astonished that Hitler had never given Paulus a chance to escape, Manstein dispatched a fateful order to 6th Panzer Division at the Mishkova River: “The divis
ion will be taken out of the bridgehead tonight. Trail guards will be left behind….”

  The order spread gloom among the staff officers of the 6th Panzer Division, but they had to agree with its logic. It had become clear that “it would be impossible to break through to Stalingrad without the assistance of added troops which were not available….”

  One-hundred-fifty miles northwest of Gumrak, the steppe lay under two feet of snow. The sun, reflecting off its frozen wavy crust, cast a shimmering haze. Across the bleak landscape wound a black column of prisoners, the Italian survivors of Kalmikov, Meshkov, and the Don River approaches. They shuffled painfully, haltingly through the subzero wilderness.

  When patrolling Russian guards shouted, “Davai bistre!” (“Hurry up!”), the prisoners tried to walk a little faster. But their pace was still slow, and the men groaned constantly as the biting cold froze fingers and toes.

  Felice Brazzi walked in the middle of this ragged line. He staggered on, like an automaton, one foot in front of the other, again and again. Almost unconscious from the cold, he barely heard the hoarse commands of the guards and the grim croaking of black ravens that circled overhead. One sound always brought Bracci out of his reverie: single rifle shots, which cracked loudly in the clear air as guards shot men who stumbled out of the column to seek rest. For two days, Bracci had listened to this symphony of murder. And on the trail from Kalmikov, both sides of the path were now marked by two irregular patterns of corpses. Bracci had figured out that the Italians were marching north toward the Don, because evidence of harsh fighting was everywhere. Pieces of uniforms, cases of unused bullets, submachine guns, 210-millimeter artillery, arms, legs, the wreckage of his Eighth Army littered the steppe.