1918

by Matthias Strohn

  23In general terms, for every battle death, there were just over two deaths through disease, with a higher proportion on the Ottoman side. An estimated 800,000 Allied troops were listed sick at some point in the campaign, although the majority returned to duty. It is thought that almost 90,000 died. Ottoman losses are unknown precisely but estimates are some 60,000 deaths from combat and 325,000 casualties overall.

  24Lieutenant General Sir George McMunn and Captain Cyril Falls, Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine, vol. I (London: HMSO, 1927–9), pp. 355, 356.

  25Ibid., p. 357.

  26Matthew Hughes (ed.), Allenby in Palestine (Stroud: Sutton, 2004), p. 8.

  27Robertson to Allenby, 1 August 1917, 8/1/67, Robertson Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, London.

  28Cyril Falls and A. F. Becke, Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine, vol. II (London: HMSO, 1930), p. 50.

  29Ibid., p. 56.

  30Ibid., p. 59.

  31Ibid., pp. 66–9.

  32Ibid., p. 64.

  33Ibid., pp. 95–101.

  34Sir William Robertson, Future Operations in Palestine, 26 December 1917, CAB/24/37/12, The National Archives.

  35Cited in Grigg, Lloyd George, p. 344.

  36Otto Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1927), p. 211.

  37Falls and Becke, Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine, vol. II, p. 337.

  38Ibid., p. 346.

  39T. E. Lawrence, XXXVIII, ‘The Destruction of the Fourth Army’, Arab Bulletin No. 106, 22 October 1918, available at http://www.telstudies.org/writings/works/articles_essays/1918_destruction_of_the_fourth_army.shtml (Accessed 18 July 2017).

  40T. E. Lawrence, XXXVIII, ‘The Destruction of Fourth Army’, dated 22 October 1918, originally in T. E. Lawrence, Secret Despatches from Arabia [compiled by his brother] (London: Golden Cockrell, 1939) and reproduced in Malcolm Brown (ed.), T. E. Lawrence in War and Peace (London: Greenhill, 2005), pp. 171–2. This source does not contain the whole document (unlike the source in footnote 38), but it provides some useful additional context.

  41Wilson to Allenby, 7 December 1918, Wilson Papers, Imperial War Museum, HHW2/33B/1.

  42This refers to Général de Division Franchet D'Esperay, the French commander in the Balkans.

  Chapter 8

  1Address by Admiral Sir David Beatty on board HMS Lion, 24 November 1918, cited in B. McL. Ranft (ed.), The Beatty Papers. Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, vol. I, 1902–1918 (Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1989), p. 570.

  2Beatty memo on ‘The Situation in the North Sea’, 29 December 1917, cited in Paul Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (London: UCL Press, 1994), p. 404.

  3See the Admiralty memos of 29 March 1918 and 5 April 1918, in Gerhard Granier (ed.), Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung im Ersten Weltkrieg, vol. 2 (Koblenz: Bundesarchiv, 2000), pp. 158–9, 162–4.

  4Cited in Halpern, Naval History, p. 418.

  5All figures from: Joachim Schröder, Die U-Boote des Kaisers: Die Geschichte des deutschen U-Boot-Krieges gegen Großbritannien im Ersten Weltkrieg (Lauf an der Pegnitz: Europaforum-Verlag, 2000), p. 430.

  6Ibid., p. 429.

  7Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. V, 1918–1919: Victory and Aftermath (New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 12–13, 23–30.

  8Cited in Halpern, Naval History, p. 449.

  Chapter 9

  1An example of one of these artillery direction code sheets from 1917 is found in the Latvian National Military Museum archives.

  2The new artillery methods of 1917–18 are described in Nick Lloyd, Hundred Days: The End of the Great War (London: Penguin, 2016), pp. 34–6. For a very detailed explanation of the typical 1918 fire plans and methods see David Zabecki, Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the Birth of Modern Artillery (Westport: Praeger, 1994).

  3Gen der Kavallerie Ernst von Hoeppner, Deutschlands Krieg in der Luft (Leipzig: Koehler and Amelang, 1921) provides a good overview of the German Air Service on all fronts. On German air photography see p. 108.

  4The operational planning maps for the September 1917 German attack still exist and the maps show every Russian position on the Riga front carefully mapped by the German Air Service. Latvian National Military Museum. Files: 2-174-DK_p; 2-175-DK_p; 2-174-DK_p2-179-DK_p; 2-177-DK_p; 2-184-DK_p; 2-189-DK_p; 2-241-DK_p. On the German fire plan, which included assignments for the air squadrons, see Georg Bruchmüller, Die Artillerie beim Angriff in Stellungskrieg (Berlin: Verlag Offene Worte, 1926) pp. 54–71.

  5Zabecki, Steel Wind, pp. 63–6.

  6A good example of the operational doctrine is: Kommandierende General der Luftstreitkräfte, Weisungen fűr den Einsatz und die Verwendung von Fliegerverbänden innerhalb einer Armee (Instructions on the Mission and Utilization of Flying Units Within an Army), May 1917. For translated text see James Corum and Richard Muller, The Luftwaffe’s Way of War (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Press, 1998) pp. 48–65.

  7John Buckeley, Air Power in the Age of Total War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 63–4.

  8A translation of this manual is found in H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, vol. IV (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), Appendix: Chief of Staff, German Field Army, ‘Employment of Battle Flights’ (20 February 1917).

  9Ibid. para. 2.

  10Commanding General Armies of the North and Northeast, Instruction sur l›action offensive des grandes unités dans la bataille (31 October 1917).

  11Ausbildungsplan der Infanteriekommandos (January 1918), in Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv BA/MA PH 17/98.

  12See Kommandierender General der Luftstreitkräfte, Hinweise für die Führung einer Fliegerabteilung in der Angriffschlacht und im Bewegungkrieg (10 February 1918). This pamphlet gives advice on how to organize the fighter and ground attack groups for close air support during different phases of the ground battle.

  13Richard Hallion, Strike from the Sky (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989), p. 20.

  14Chief of Staff, German Field Army, 1917 ‘Employment of Battle Flights’, para. 27.

  15Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarague, A History of French Military Aviation (Washington: Smithsonian, 1986), pp. 125–30.

  16Kenneth Munson, Aircraft of World War I (Garden City: Arco Publishing,1977), pp. 93–4 and Richard Hallion, Rise of the Fighter Aircraft 1914–1918 (Annapolis: Nautical and Aviation Press, 1984), p. 117. Brigadier General William Mitchell, Memoirs of World War I (New York: Random House, 1960 reprint of 1926 ed.), p. 306.

  17John Morrow, The Great War in the Air (Washington: Smithsonian, 1993) pp. 298–9.

  18Morrow, Great War in the Air, p. 371.

  19Ibid.

  20Christienne and Lissarague, French Military Aviation, p. 157.

  21For a good overview of the German aircraft industry see Terry Treadwell and Aslan Wood, German Fighter Aces of World War I (Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2003).

  22From 1 August to 1 November the RAF lost 2,692 planes at the front, and received 2,692 planes from industry. See Morrow, The Great War in the Air, p. 312.

  23Zabecki, Steel Wind, pp. 116–18.

  24Ibid.

  25Reichsarchiv, Abt. B., Ref., Luftstreitkräfte Study of 1918 Air War (2 April 1926), in BA/MA 2/2195, p. 5.

  26Ibid.

  27P. J. Daybell, ‘The Marne Retreat of 1918: The Last Battle of the Royal Flying Corps’, Air Power Review 1:1 (1998), pp. 86–101.

  28Brereton Greenhous, ‘Evolution of a Close-Ground Support Role for Aircraft in World War I’, in Military Affairs (February 1975), pp. 26–7.

  29Reichsarchiv Study of April 1926, in Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv BA/MA RH 2/2195, pp. 12–14.

  30H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, vol. V (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), pp. 424–7.

  31Christienne and Lissarague, French Military Aviation, pp. 290–1.

  32See James S. Corum, ‘Starting from Scratch: The Luftstreitkräfte B
uilds a Bomber Doctrine, 1914–1918’, Air Power Review 6:1 (Spring 2003), pp. 61–78 and William Fischer, The Development of Military Night Aviation to 1919 (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1998), pp. 73–7, 84.

  33Ibid.

  34Morrow, Great War in the Air, p. 310.

  35Revue De L’Aeronautique Militaire, July/August (1925).

  36Alistair McCluskey, Amiens 1918: The Black Day of the German Army (Oxford: Osprey, 2008), p. 18.

  37For a good overview of the RAF at Amiens see Alfred Price, ‘The Battle of Amiens 8–11 August 1918’, Air Power Review 4:4 (Winter 2001), pp. 118–34.

  38Oberstleutnant Baron von Loewenstern, ‘Die Luftstreitkräfte in der Abwehrschlacht zwischen Somme and Oise vom 8 bis 12 August 1918’, in Militär-Wochenblatt, No. 6, 1938.

  39Price, ‘The Battle of Amiens’, p. 131.

  40John Terraine, White Heat (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1982), p. 305.

  41James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War 1918–1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), pp. 42–3.

  42Ibid., p. 91.

  43David Bonk, St. Mihiel 1918 (Oxford: Osprey, 2011), p. 90.

  44Robert Ferrell, America’s Deadliest Battle: Meuse–Argonne, 1918 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), p. 44.

  45Ibid., pp. 45–6, 69, 122–24.

  46Luftstreitkräfte Staff, ‘Tätigkeit der Amerikanischen Fliegerverbände in Zusammenhang mit den Operationen bei St. Mihiel September 1918’, Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv BA/MA PH 17/I-55.

  47Morrow, Great War in the Air, p. 302.

  48Ibid., p. 303.

  49Ibid., pp. 316–17.

  Chapter 10

  1See, for example, Peter Hart, 1918: A Very British Victory (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2008) and David Stevenson, With our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London: Allen Lane, 2011). Gary Sheffield’s Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities (London: Headline, 2001), although wider in scope, devotes a weighty chapter to ‘1918 Victory on the Western Front’. Both Hart and Sheffield focus predominantly on the achievements of the BEF; those of the French and the US Armies receive far less attention. Surprisingly, such eminent British military historians accord scant importance to the US-led Meuse– Argonne offensive (26 September–11 November 1918).

  2For reasons of limited space, in this chapter examples are only given from the British, French, and German armies.

  3Lieutenant General the Earl of Cavan commanded the first British deployment to Italy (XIV Corps, comprising the 23rd and 41st divisions), which was quickly followed by XI Corps (5th, 7th, and 48th divisions) under Lieutenant General Sir Richard Haking. With the deployment of the latter corps, General Sir Herbert Plumer departed the Western Front on 10 November 1917 to assume overall command of British forces in Italy. His Second Army in Flanders was renamed Fourth Army on 20 December 1917, commanded by General Sir Herbert Rawlinson.

  4Plumer and his staff returned to the Western Front on 10 March 1918. Headquarters Second Army was reactivated on 13 March 1918 under Plumer’s command.

  5See Lieutenant Colonel Paolo Capanni, ‘Italy’, in Colonel John Wilson (ed.), The First World War Battlefield Guide, vol. 2, The Forgotten Fronts, 1st ed. (Andover: [British] Army Headquarters, November 2016), pp. 60–4. The two British divisions returned were the 41st and the 5th, which completed their moves back in France on 13 and 27 March 1918, respectively. The 41st, placed in GHQ reserve prior to 21 March, was subsequently committed to IV Corps of Byng’s Third Army.

  6Developed from Brigadier General Sir James E. Edmonds, History of the Great War: Military Operations France and Belgium, 1918, vol. II, March–April: Continuation of the German Offensives (London: Macmillan, 1937), p. 470.

  7Ibid.

  8Ibid.

  9Described by Mungo Melvin, Sevastopol’s Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin (Oxford: Osprey, 2017), pp. 367–8.

  10General Erich Ludendorff, My War Memories 1914–1918 (London: Hutchinson, 1919), p. 622.

  11For details of this largely unknown Crimean campaign, see Melvin, Sevastopol’s Wars, pp. 369–77.

  12Ludendorff, War Memories, p. 625.

  13Brigadier General Sir James E. Edmonds, History of the Great War: Military Operations France and Belgium, 1918, vol. I, The German March Offensive and its Preliminaries (London: Macmillan, 1935), p. 337.

  14Ibid., p.549 and Edmonds, History of the Great War, vol. II, p. 486.

  15B. H. Liddell Hart, Foch: The Man of Orleans (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1931), p. 280.

  16The battle for Villers-Bretonneux on 4 April 1918 involved the Second Army’s 9th Bavarian Reserve Division, operating on the right (northern) flank of Eighteenth Army. A second battle, which took place on 24–27 April, a supporting attack to Operation Georgette, was also a Second Army action. This battle involved the first tank vs. tank engagement.

  17Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Foch in Command: The Forging of a First World War General (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 300–7.

  18General Sir Hubert Gough, The Fifth Army (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1931), p. 283.

  19Colonel T. Bentley Mott (trans.), The Memoirs of Marshal Foch (London: William Heinemann, 1931), p. 305.

  20Jonathan Bailey, ‘The First World War: A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare’, in Major General Mungo Melvin (ed.), The First World War Battlefield Guide, vol. 1, The Western Front, 2nd ed. (Andover: [British] Army Headquarters, June 2015), p. 187.

  21Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray (eds), Changing War: The British Army, the Hundred Days Campaign and the Birth of the Royal Air Force, 1918 (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

  22Captain Wilfred Miles, History of the Great War. Military Operations France and Belgium 1917, The Battle of Cambrai (London: HMSO, 1948), p. 14.

  23Ibid.

  24J. B. A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford: The Military Press, 1989), p. 142, f. 35.

  25G.H.Q. Memorandum on Defensive Measures issued with O.A.D. 291/29 dated 14 December 1917. Reprinted as Appendix 6 of Edmonds, History of the Great War (1935), p. 22.

  26Ibid., p. 23.

  27SS 135 (January 1918) contained less than two pages (7–8) on defensive operations. It warned presciently, however, that ‘attackers will seek … to demoralize defenders’ by ‘overwhelming artillery fire, trench mortars, gas’; and by ‘a surprise attack’, probably consisting of ‘a short bombardment, followed up by masses of troops pushed forward regardless of loss’.

  28The final paragraph of GHQ’s Memorandum of 14 December 1917 drew particular attention to official British translations (SS 561 and SS 621) of two German documents: The Principles of Command in the Defensive Battle in Position Warfare dated 1 March 1917, which had absorbed the German learning from the battles of Verdun and the Somme the previous year; and General Principles of the Construction of Field Positions, 3rd ed., dated 15 August 1917. GHQ advised that ‘the principles laid down by [the enemy] are thoroughly sound and should be carefully studied’.

  29Williamson Murray, ‘Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German Experiences’, in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Military Intervention in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 20. Significantly, Murray fails to mention the evolution of the British Field Service Regulations during the period 1920–35.

  30For an extreme version of this view, see John Laffin, British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1988).

  31See, for example, Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916–18 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994), Chapter 10, ‘Doctrine and Training’.

  32Gary Sheffield and John Bourne (eds), Douglas Haig. War Diaries and Letters 1914–1918 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), p. 390.

  33Strictly speaking this represented Mangin’s third chance as he had also been sacked as a divisional commander in 1916 for refusing to undertake an
attack ordered by his corps commander, declaring ‘it was for the gallery’.

  34John Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti-Myths of War 1861–1945 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980), p. 184, compares Mangin favourably to Pétain: ‘he was [his] exact opposite … always aggressive, eager to attack. He was also highly professional, and in 1918 the combination of these qualities made the Tenth Army the most effective of the French Order of Battle’.

  35Significantly, Hubert Essame devotes an entire chapter of his The Battle for Europe 1918 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972) to Mangin, and a following one to the ‘Eighteenth of July’ – the counter-stroke at the Marne (Chapters 6 and 7, respectively). Furthermore, the British Ministry of Defence deemed the French counterstroke at the Marne as worthy of detailed examination in the early 1980s. It was one of a number of historical studies undertaken to assist the development of the defensive battle then being planned by 1st (British) Corps of NATO’s Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). See Correlli Barnett, ‘A Successful Counter-Stroke: 18 July 1918’, in Anthony Trythall (ed.), Old Battles and New Defences: Can We Learn from Military History? (London: Brassey’s, 1986), p. 33.

  36Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre (Paris: Service Historique de l’État Major de l’Armée, 1923), Tome VII, vol. 1, Annexe 9, p. 16.

  37I am grateful to Dr Tim Gale for providing me with a detailed description of Pétain’s Directive No. 5, together with permission to quote from his translated excerpts and advice on other matters.

  38From data given by Barnett (‘A Successful Counter-Stroke’, p. 43), Tenth Army comprised 16 infantry divisions (including two US), three cavalry divisions, 1,500 hundred guns, and 346 tanks, supported by 581 aircraft. Sixth Army contained eight infantry divisions (two US), nearly 600 guns, and 147 tanks, with 562 aircraft. Each of the four US divisions involved was double the size of their French and German counterparts. This impressive Allied grouping faced ten German divisions in the line and a further six in support, but no tanks.

  39In his memoirs (Memoirs of Marshal Foch, trans. Bentley Mott, p. 412), Foch noted tactfully of Pétain: ‘Although he shared my confidence, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies, in more direct contact with the events on the battlefield, was especially preoccupied by the German advance south of the Marne in the direction of Epernay, and to cope with it, he contemplated drawing on the troops designated for the counter-attack and thereby postponing its preparation.’