Young William James Thinking
Page 14
ture.” He observed its “atheistic . . . tendency,” calmly noting that such a
proposition “ causes alarm to many excellent people.” He himself noticed its
shortcomings because “the theory leaves much of our moral experience un-
accounted for,” and as he had observed in his notebooks, such exclusive fo-
cus on natu ral facts is better at answering questions of “How? ” rather than
questions of “Why? ” However, he added that such a naturalistic view may
“prove to be a necessary step in the way to a larger, purer view of the Super-
natural.” James offered a speculative “prophecy,” which was laced with the
spirituality of his father: instead of assuming nature’s difference from the
super natural, which persisted even among those who sought mediation of
these distinct realms, “we shall be driven to look for final causes on some
deeper plane under lying the whole of Nature,” suggesting ultimate mean-
ings embedded within the natu ral world. This panentheistic idea resembled
his father’s empirical spirituality and suggested that his inquiries in science
would reinforce spiritual insights because “both sides,” the scientific and the
First Embrace of Science 71
religious, would be “satisfied [with] the exclusively naturalistic tendency of
modern thought. ”64
When he sent a draft of his Huxley essay to Norton, James suggested that
his “analytico- synthetical disquisition,” with his critique of scientific confi-
dence and his search for purposes deep in nature, were part of his “Program
of the Future of Science.” Bypassing both scientific materialism and tradi-
tional religion, this review offered a portrait of his own scientific hopes; by
contrast, “the poor foolish public has been gulled so long by these clap- trap
affairs” of Huxley’s brand of scientific program, and so “it was worth while
[ sic] to speak a little severely of them. ”65 The program for science that James described in 1865 would include endorsement of the naturalism central to science without reduction to materialist ingredients, as well as confidence that
such work could actually support spiritual perspectives.
James addressed another Darwinian in his review of Alfred Russel Wal-
lace’s 1864 Anthropology Review article, “The Origin of Human Races and
the Antiquity of Man deduced from the theory of ‘Natu ral Se lection.’ ” The
British explorer and scientist, who in de pen dently developed the theory of
natu ral se lection, discussed polygenesis and monogenesis, the contrasting
theories of the separate creation or descent of human races versus their
common heritage. Although he did not mention Agassiz in his review, his
teacher was a leading example of a “polygenist,” who argued for the “origi-
nal diversity of mankind” with a “permanence of human types” manifest in
separate races. James was more persuaded by Wallace’s proposition that
natu ral se lection can account for the “divergence of types” varying from a
common stock, the basis for the British scientist’s “monogenist” position.
But James acknowledged that from “any former epoch” of mankind polyg-
enists can find at least some evidence of the same “well marked va ri e ties” of
pres ent races. With such evidence, polygenist views lent scientific respect-
ability to the racist theories of Southern nationalists Samuel Morton and
Josiah Nott in defense of slavery. But, instead, James supported the “the-
ory of Natu ral Se lection [which] supplies an answer to . . . the polygenists.”
While selective pressure can readily explain the origins of humanity in
general over enormous stretches of time, James following Wallace main-
tained that the origins of human differences such as racial traits can also
be explained by “change in a comparatively short space of time,” which
undercut belief in the separate creation of races. 66 James supported
monogenesis based on his pursuit of the evidence and in defiance of the
ideologies of racial hierarchy. Those natu ral facts from science would be
72 Young William James Thinking
his starting point for addressing the moral questions about human
differences.
“Social and sympathetic” interactions in historic times meant, as James
observed in the Wallace review, that, for the human animal, “the causes of
variation are no longer active.” With “division of labor . . . and mutual as-
sistance, . . . the action of natu ral se lection is therefore checked.” Thanks
to humane cultural standards, “the weaker, the dwarfish, those of less ac-
tive limbs or less piercing eyesight, do not suffer the extreme penalty which
falls upon animals so defective” by brute natu ral standards. So, while other
animals have changed “in their whole structure, . . . man’s body will have
remained . . . the same, while his . . . brain alone will have under gone modi-
fication.” That human distinction, the sophistication of human intellect,
which has allowed adaptation to global geographic diversity, has in turn
encouraged racial differentiation. Here is biological unity of the human
race, while culturally “man . . . adapts himself to his new circumstances, for
the most part by his intellect alone.” For Wallace, the sophistication of the
human mind suggested that natu ral se lection was limited to human bodies,
as with selective pressure at work in the rest of nature, but he insisted that
humanity’s “intellectual superiority” shows the impress of forces beyond
natu ral se lection. James disagreed. Wallace used the distinctiveness of the
human mind to propose its exemption from evolution. James used the same
human distinctiveness, which he had already evaluated in comparison with
the spider monkey, to argue that humanity’s intellectual superiority, with all
its powers of selective attention and array of subjective interests, is indeed
the product of evolution and contributes to adaptation and survival. James
not only disagreed with Wallace on human intellect and thoroughly defied
Agassiz’s type of polygenist science generally but also considered some spec-
ulations that even went beyond Darwin: “Why may there not be . . . some
princi ple as fertile as Natu ral Se lection, or more so, to make up for its insuffi-
ciency (if insufficiency there be) in accounting for all organic change?” Even
as he endorsed Darwinism, James could not treat it as a fixed absolute; fur-
ther facts and insights, and further scientific inquiry as he was witnessing
more from Wyman than from Agassiz, might produce yet further scientific
innovation. 67 Just as James’s response to Huxley showed his commitment to
naturalism without materialism, so his Program of Future Science would
also include, as displayed in his review of Wallace, an endorsement of scien-
tific inquiry without expectations of its certainty.
First Embrace of Science 73
After the Amazon expedition, James continued his medical studies, his
wide- ranging reading, and his study of physiology in Germany starting in
1867. Reflections in the midst of exposure to cultural differences on three
continents spurred his 1868 commentary on “The Pro gress of
Anthropol-
ogy.” In this review of Armand de Quatrefages’s Rapport sur les progrès de
l’anthropologie en France, he noted that the facts gathered in the field are “as
yet in almost ludicrously small quantity,” with a “large portion so uncertain
that they are liable any day to correction or contradiction”; and so, as with
his critique of Huxley, he lamented that the author’s tone was “rather more
that of an advocate than of a judge.” Returning to “the question of the origi-
nal unity (‘Monogenism’) or diversity (‘Polygenism’) of our species,” James
noted that the scientific controversy had spilled over into “general popu lar
interest,” an understatement for the racial debates that competing scientific
theories amplified. He focused on the role of religion in these controversies,
expressing disappointment that they had become inflamed by “zeal for and
against orthodoxy.” Despite the insistence of religious traditionalists, James
was convinced with Darwin “beyond doubt . . . that man existed at an age
remoter than the greyest antiquity which tradition rec ords”; and despite
Wallace’s challenges, he was already persuaded by “the applications . . . of
Darwin’s hypothesis to man.” However, James did not use his Darwinism
to critique religion but instead to support an inquiring approach to science in
contrast with the “absurd broth of dogmatism on both sides.” The French
anthropologist offered a case in point: his “vast range of special informa-
tion” added to scientific understanding, but James found his absolute con-
viction of “the truth of the monogenistic conception” merely a “brilliant piece
of pleading”— a particularly ardent example of his distaste for certainties con-
sidering that he even endorsed the same theory himself. Insisting on a method
that left scientific theories open to correction, James maintained that, “ until
further proofs compel us,” he would rather see science “refrain, . . . from the
dismal croaking in which so many writers have indulged,” including he added
in light mockery, with “4fage’s” book. Instead, patient inquiry shows “how
extremely cautious one must be in generalizing. ”68 He was already interpret-
ing his scientific education on his own terms.
In the years after his return from Brazil, while working on his medical
degree, James kept exploring Darwinist ideas. He was so eager to review
Darwin’s latest book, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestica-
tion, that he composed two separate essays in 1868. James wrote that this
74 Young William James Thinking
new book forms “the first considerable instal[l]ment of that more detailed
evidence in support of Mr. Darwin’s theory of Natu ral Se lection, which he
announced in the ‘Origin of Species’ to be in course of preparation.” With
his own perception of the limits of theorizing, James appreciated Darwin’s
cautious path: “What ever may be thought of his generalizations, no one can
deny to the author the merit of painstaking and conscientious industry in
the accumulation of facts.” Even as he remained committed to the gather-
ing of evidence, James admired “the instinctive guesses of men of genius
and large practical experience.” The genius of Darwin was the “bold sur-
mise and delicate ingenuity” of his theory, but “in the pres ent state of sci-
ence, it seems impossible to bring it to an experimental test. ”69 Even genius
should not sanction certainty.
Without proof, James maintains, the theory of natu ral se lection “at best
helps to accumulate a probability.” With this recognition that Darwin’s
theory was not provable but highly probable, James distinguished himself
from both antagonists and enthusiastic supporters of evolution. Philosophi-
cal reflection during scientific study prompted his impulses to examine the
method embedded within the theory, in par tic u lar, “the nature of the rea-
soning on which Darwin’s hypothesis is based.” He proposes that “it is no-
where of strictly logical cogency, for the conclusions drawn from certain
premises are assumed in their turn as true, in order to make those same
premises seem more probable.” In addition to Darwinism’s methodological
elusiveness, it also reveals basic difficulties of fact gathering: “Perhaps from
the very nature of the case, and the enormous spaces of time in question, it
may never be any more pos si ble to give a physically strict proof of it, com-
plete in every link.” While detractors and supporters of Darwinism would
debate the truth or falsehood of the theory, James praises natu ral se lection
for its usefulness: “[T]he great value of the hypothesis [is] in setting natural-
ists to work, and sharpening their eyes for new facts and revelations.” James
was therefore satisfied with “the pres ent book” because like Darwin’s ear-
lier work, it “harrows and refreshes, as it were, the whole field of which it
treats.” His conclusion anticipates modern support for theories establishing
research programs: “[I]t is doubtless provisional, but none the less ser-
viceable for that.” Such plausible theories, based on facts, generate “fit matter
for [still more] investigation,” while, by contrast, the anti- Darwinians “veto . . .
the research in advance.” Despite the unprovability of Darwin’s theory,
James found it convincing and persuasive, especially in comparison with
the spiritual science of Agassiz; he even said that “the more I think of Dar-
First Embrace of Science 75
win’s ideas the more weighty do they appear to me” and, by contrast “I be-
lieve that that scoundrel Aggassiz [ sic] is unworthy either intellectually or
morally for him to wipe his shoes on.” 70 With its probabilistic truths and
practical applications, Darwinism supplied James with a model for future
science not tethered to materialist (or idealistic) assumptions; and for him
and other members of the Metaphysical Club, these methods offered key
ingredients for pragmatic thinking and still more philosophical
reflection.
Q
During William James’s first embrace of science in the 1860s, he was not
only studying many diff er ent fields but also learning the ways of rigorous
scientific inquiry, with keen fidelity to facts and careful application of
method. In the midst of his studies, however, he was more immediately
concerned with the difficulties of vocational choice. He sometimes felt he
was just rummaging through one field after another, even though his di-
verse studies would gradually add up to a broad scientific education in
chemistry, physics, anatomy, medicine, physiology, and psy chol ogy— and a
still- wider education from extensive learning outside science, especially
philosophy. The diversity of his education gave him not only the expertise
that would earn him re spect in a world where science was gaining greater
authority but also a critical perspective on science in general. His friend
Charles Peirce observed that even in his young adulthood James was at once
“deeply read in the old Philosophies” and “thoroughly a scientific man.
”71
From his reading, reflection, and discussions with Peirce and others, James
brought these strands of his education together with speculation about the
limits of scientific certainty and formulation of practical ways to make
abundant use of science without those certainties.
For all his immersion in the work and thinking of science, James did not
abandon the assumptions of his father. The self- competency of nature, rein-
forced by the practice of scientific work on natu ral facts, suggested aspects
of nature that could not be reduced to its materialist components. His scru-
tiny of nature suggested that matter, as his father believed, was not simply
“material.” In his early private writings, in his natu ral history field work,
and especially in his first review essays, he began to express his own pro-
gram for science, which included mastery of scientific method and fact
gathering, practical use of science rather than focus on its iconic certainty,
and hopes for new forms of rigorous investigation into nature that would be
wedded to neither religious faith nor scientific materialism.
76 Young William James Thinking
The scientific education that James began so idealistically at the urging
of his father had taken on a life of its own so that by the middle 1860s, he
was thoroughly in the embrace of natu ral science, even as his approaches
included awareness of its limits and abundant use of science despite its lack
of certainty. Within his scientific studies, his focus on medicine, with its
healing potentials, kindled the “feeling of philanthropy in wh. we [he and
his father] both indulge.” 72 As he worked toward his M.D. in 1869, James
also encountered another version of the tensions he had encountered since
he had started studying science. The medicine of his professional education
was becoming increasingly comfortable with a materialist brand of science,
especially as innovations in clinic and laboratory brought hopes for improved
diagnoses and treatment. By contrast, sectarian medical therapies, practiced
widely, including in the James family, provided pictures of health also
based on bodily facts but without reduction to materialist terms. In other
words, its prac ti tion ers were critical of materialist medicine in the same