p. 111. A black gunnery sergeant named Robert L. Sellers: Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings, p. 601.
p. 112. watching the 1969 movie Paint Your Wagon: Ibid., p. 570.
p. 113. A legal officer who had been watching the movie: Sherwood, Black Sailor, White Navy, p. 84.
p. 115. That’s how Carlucci found them: Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings, p. 601.
p. 116. Corporal Avina, a San Antonio, Texas, native: Ibid., p. 721.
p. 117. His hand was firmly planted on the holster: Ibid., p. 721. There is some dispute as to whether Avina was trying to draw his weapon or simply secure it during the scuffle. In the heat of the moment, and also thereafter, many black sailors insisted that Avina had tried to draw his weapon and that that is what set off the scuffle at the hatch. Avina testified that he was only trying to secure the loaded weapon after he felt someone pulling on his shoulder strap. He was not trying to draw it to use against the rioters but only to gain control of the gun once the scuffle began, he said. The sequence of events strongly suggests that there would have been no reason for Avina to choose that moment, as he was leaving and before the scuffle began, to draw his pistol.
p. 119. I’m being put to the test: Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings, p. 573. In testifying before the committee, Cloud recounted what he was thinking at the time, along with what he said to the crew and how he came to understand that his authenticity as a black man was being tested.
p. 120. I’m going to either have to throw the XO out: Ibid., p. 526.
p. 122. If he gives any more black power salutes: Ibid., p. 520.
CHAPTER NINE
p. 123. reviewed the procedures on responding to civil disobedience: Sherwood, Black Sailor, White Navy, p. 87.
p. 124. Carlucci suggested that Townsend and the XO: Ibid.
p. 124. “We’re going to have three-man patrols”: Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings, p. 602. Carlucci’s orders are presented as he recalled them during his testimony to the committee.
p. 126. “They’re at it again”: Ibid., p. 575.
p. 128. sank his teeth into the man’s flesh: Ibid., p. 805.
p. 129. “No more of this! This is the end!”: Ibid., p. 533.
p. 130. “That is an error, a mistake on the part of the Marines”: Ibid.
p. 130. Townsend told First Sergeant Binkley: Ibid., p. 603.
p. 130. He thought Townsend looked in control: Ibid., p. 576.
p. 134. “They’re killing our brothers!”: Ibid., p. 519.
p. 135. Radford was resting in his berthing area: Ibid., p. 1,003.
p. 136. “Hey, there’s the man that gave Wilson the hassle”: Ibid. The testimony in the report was altered to remove the names of those sailors who were facing criminal charges; the report has Radford referring to “Sailor 14” instead of using the man’s name. “Wilson” is a pseudonym for this sailor.
CHAPTER TEN
p. 143. The ship’s store, where sailors could buy: Some Kitty Hawk veterans report that when the ship’s officers and Navy investigators were collecting evidence following the riot, they found “negatives” from Polaroid cameras that had been stolen from the ship’s store. The rioters reportedly stole the cameras and film and used them to take pictures of each other ransacking the store, discarding the portion of the film that was peeled off to develop the photograph. These “negatives” supposedly showed some of the rioters and could have been used as evidence against them. The author’s attempt to access this material and other investigative records resulted in a letter from the Department of the Navy stating that “the entire record is missing and presumed lost.”
p. 147. The Marine stayed where he was: Because Callahan is now a mental health professional who works with people who have experienced traumatic incidents, he readily acknowledges that such people sometimes recall in vivid detail things that did not actually happen. He says he recalls this incident with the Marine quite clearly, but because it is hard to imagine that the Marine rendered no aid at all, he sometimes wonders if it really happened.
p. 150. Seaman William E. Boone: Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings, pp. 933–945. This account of Boone’s experience is taken from his testimony to the committee. Boone was facing criminal charges stemming from the riot, which he told the committee were unfounded because he was a victim, not a rioter. He was represented by counsel during his testimony. The outcome of his criminal charges is unknown.
p. 154. Boatswain’s Mate Second Class James W. Brown: Ibid., pp. 682–683.
p. 156. “We are going to do what you white honkies can’t do!”: Ibid., p. 683.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
p. 164. He also noticed that a Marine: Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings, p. 802.
p. 165. About a dozen black sailors came charging down: Ibid., p. 722.
p. 166. Anderson himself put up a good fight: Ibid., p. 802.
p. 167. Brock saw a large mob: Ibid., p. 733.
p. 168. “We’re going to kill him”: Ibid., p. 576.
p. 169. “You are not going to sleep tonight”: Ibid., p. 777.
p. 169. “You fucked the niggers”: Ibid., p. 787.
p. 171. So he told Binkley to stay with the chiefs: Ibid., p. 577.
p. 171. “They got the captain!”: Ibid., p. 578. Cloud took the statements seriously. In Cloud’s testimony to the committee, he said: “Armed with the information that I had, and the reasonableness of the situation existing as I saw it, namely, the captain being in an environment completely surrounded by a group of hostile blacks, I thought it was very, very possible that he could have been injured and it could have been very, very possible that he could have been killed at that point.”
p. 172. “This is the executive officer speaking”: Haak, Investigative Report, pp. 30, 578. The XO’s statement is reproduced as found in the Navy report, which is taken from onboard recordings of the 1MC announcements. In Cloud’s testimony to the committee, he said, “My plea over the 1MC was very impassionate,” and it is clear from the context of his statement that he meant without emotion. But the sailors who heard it uniformly report a different impression, saying Cloud sounded panicky and scared. Cloud says his announcement was justified by information he had at the time and that any senior officer would have done the same thing, “being concerned, as he would have been, for the safety and integrity of the ship.”
CHAPTER TWELVE
p. 176. Why is the XO taking over the ship?: Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings, p. 534. These thoughts are taken directly from Townsend’s testimony to the committee in which he described hearing Cloud’s message and his immediate reaction to it. Townsend went on to tell the committee, directly after those comments, that he soon realized the XO had the best intentions: “He was, I must stress, trying to do his job the best he could. He had been aboard for less than eight weeks, had limited command experience, and had limited shipboard experience at that. But he is a damn good man and working to the best of his ability.” In the heat of the moment, however, Townsend reacted very negatively to Cloud’s actions.
p. 177. Townsend was full of anger: Ibid., p. 534. It bears repeating that this was Townsend’s thinking at the time, in the middle of the crisis, but he soon softened his impressions of Cloud’s actions that day.
p. 178. he seriously considered firing Cloud on the spot: Townsend confirmed to the author that he considered dismissing Cloud on the spot. He soon changed his assessment of the XO’s actions and was satisfied he was correct in not firing him.
p. 178. “If anybody ever writes a book about this ship”: Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings, p. 534. Townsend also recounted this comment to the author. A December 11, 1972, article in Time magazine claimed the comment was made over the 1MC as Townsend was countermanding Cloud’s orders to the crew, but that is inaccurate. Town
send made the comment directly to Cloud.
p. 178. “This is the captain”: Haak, Investigative Report, p. 31. The captain’s words are rendered exactly as found in the Navy report, which is taken from onboard recordings of the 1MC announcements.
p. 179. “Captain, I am scared to death”: Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings, p. 785.
p. 180. Chastened by Townsend’s countermanding his orders: Ibid. The conversation between Cloud and Townsend is based on his recollection of it to the committee. The words are not exact quotes but reflect the content and tone of what was said by the two men, according to Cloud’s testimony.
p. 181. Cloud stepped into their path: Ibid., p. 581. In his testimony to the committee, Cloud tried to put a soft spin on the incident. He said he was “knocked down to the ground, but it was a collision which was just as much my responsibility as it was theirs. It was not an assault.”
p. 182. “You know your way won’t work.” Ibid. This passage is taken from the exact words that Cloud used to recount the confrontation to the committee. He told the committee that he recognized the sailor as Avinger.
p. 183. By now he was recognizing that his urgent address: Ibid., p. 579. In his testimony to the committee, Cloud explained that he thought the announcement was the right strategy at that moment but soon started to wonder if he had acted in haste. He said that, even at the time of his testimony, he still thought it was the right strategy to try to isolate the black sailors in the aft mess deck but that “had I been armed with the information that the commanding officer was in good health, there is no doubt in my mind that I would not have made that announcement.”
p. 186. A petty officer ordered Marvin Davidson: Sherwood, Black Sailor, White Navy, p. 96.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
p. 191. “You made this mess. You fix it.” This account is provided by Robert Keel. Townsend does not recall this specific incident in detail, but he confirms that he was in a forward berthing area and at one point was searching for a black sailor he knew was respected by the crew. Garland Young recalls a very similar incident happening in his berthing area, when the captain stopped by to ask a black sailor to come help negotiate with the rioters. That black sailor also turned down the captain.
p. 192. When Cloud reached the forecastle: Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings, p. 583. The passage in which Cloud makes his dramatic speech to the black sailors is taken from his own testimony to the committee, in which he recounted in detail the mood, his actions, and his words to the crowd. Details also have been confirmed to the author by Cloud and sailors who were there. Cloud told this author he was emotional and “impassioned” in giving the speech.
p. 197. The white sailors stepped aside: Haak, Investigative Report, exhibit 168. Pettus did not know the identity of the man he saw beaten with the fog nozzle, and he was not present when Patrick was rescued, so there is no way to know with certainty that it was the same man. But there is strong reason to believe that Patrick was indeed the man Perry Pettus saw attacked with the fog nozzle. The official medical report on Patrick states that he was attacked in his bunk, but Patrick was not found in a berthing area, as one might expect if he were attacked there, but in the communications office near the forecastle, where he apparently was taken for refuge from the mob. All the records agree that Patrick was the most seriously injured man on the Kitty Hawk. Pettus remembers the beating he saw involving blows to the head that would be consistent with the injuries Patrick suffered. The author was unable to contact Patrick for confirmation.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
p. 201. Cloud made his way to a berthing area: Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings, p. 587.
p. 204. “Look, you were very helpful”: Ibid., p. 520. This conversation is taken from Townsend’s testimony to the committee, in which he recounted the conversation with Cloud, and from Townsend’s interviews with the author.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
p. 210. Found guilty of those charges: Sherwood, Black Sailor, White Navy, p. 98.
p. 211. Though there was little violence: Ibid., p. 150.
p. 211. “The subcommittee is directed to inquire”: Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings, p. 1.
p. 212. “We cannot overlook the possibility”: Ibid., p. 2.
p. 212. the attacks “went along too smoothly”: Ibid., p. 646.
p. 213. “I have the feeling it was an organized thing.” Ibid., p. 776.
p. 213. also heard from twenty-year-old seaman Charles A. Beck: Ibid., p. 996.
p. 214. “This, it seems to me, was deliberate mutiny”: Ibid., p. 889.
p. 216. “just plain thugs”: Ibid., p. 506.
p. 216. “I felt it unsafe to do that”: Ibid., p. 519.
p. 217. “The Marines were never called out”: Ibid., p. 526.
p. 217. “plans for flooding the space with khaki”: Ibid., p. 527.
p. 218. “among the black community on the ship”: Ibid., p. 554.
p. 219. “tokenism in its truest form”: Ibid., p. 555.
p. 220. “The methods that I used”: Ibid., p. 583.
p. 221. “And if for the sake of my career”: Ibid., p. 575.
EPILOGUE
p. 223. “[T]he riot on the Kitty Hawk”: “Hill Panel Criticizes Navy ‘Permissiveness,’” The Washington Post, January 24, 1973, p. A3.
p. 223. “permissiveness exists in the Navy today”: “House Inquiry Links Navy’s Racial Strife to Laxity,” The New York Times, January 24, 1973, p. 11.
p. 223. The “Command History” of the Kitty Hawk: Commanding Officer, USS Kitty Hawk, “Command History, 1972,” February 27, 1973, p. 4.
p. 226. The Navy also points out: Sherwood, Black Sailor, White Navy, p. 99. The author, Sherwood, is citing testimony to the subcommittee by Cloud but seems to agree with the assessment. Sherwood is an official historian with the U.S. Naval Historical Center.
p. 230. Within two years, the Navy: Ibid., p. 192.
p. 230. By 1977 the number of blacks in the Navy: Ibid.
INDEX
Allen, G. Kirk, 157–64, 199–200, 228
America, USS, xii
Anderson, Robert L., 128–9, 164, 166, 209
antiwar movement, 13, 36, 40, 50, 58–9, 61, 93, 113, 133, 213
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), 47–8
Attica, New York, prison riot, 133
Avina, Anthony, 112, 116–8, 165–7, 208, 236–7n
Avinger, Terry (sailor from Philadelphia):
anger at segregation of Girard College, 53–4
arrival on the USS Kitty Hawk as an airman apprentice, 55
black sailors’ anger and, 100–1, 108
brother’s death, 53, 229
brought before captain’s mast, 65–6
charges dropped for Kitty Hawk riot, 210, 228
childhood of, 51–3
confrontation with Cloud, 181–2
court-martial of, 210, 228
daughter’s attendance at Girard College, 229
discharge of, 228
drug rehabilitation of, 229
drug use of, 53, 55, 228
education of, 53–4, 228
enlistment in the Navy, 51, 54
father’s death, 53, 229
as gang member, 52–3
grief of, 229
jail sentence of, 228
leadership of, 100–1
mess cook’s dispute with, 99–100
Pettus and, 74, 100–1
role in riot, 114–5, 118, 124, 228
sentenced to the brig, 66–7
skepticism of Cloud, 126, 131
Townsend on, 181
transferred to jet shop, 66
transferred off the Kitty Hawk, 209
barbershop conversations, 27–8, 101
Beck, Charles A., 213–4
Binkley, Willie A., 128–30, 167–71, 208
Black Panther Party, 59–60, 83–4, 162, 227
&nb
sp; black power movement:
antiwar movement and, 59, 61, 93, 113, 133
Avinger and, 99, 101, 115
EM club fight and, 83
inner-city youth’s allegiance to, xiii, 59
Pettus and, 101
Sampaguita Club fight and, 87
black power salute, 114–5, 120–2, 131–2, 176, 183, 191, 193, 196, 204, 220
Boone, William E., 150–1, 237–8n
Boxer, USS, 21
Brock, Joseph A., 165–7
Brown, James W., 154–6
Callahan, John (sailor from Long Island):
application for conscientious objector status, 40
assigned to mess deck, 70
beaten in the shower, 146–8, 164
brought to sick bay, 164
as counselor, 228
enlistment in Navy, 39–40
opposition to Vietnam War, 40
on reliability of memories, 237n
at Sampaguita Club, 86, 88
witness to racial tensions, 70
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 61
captain, duties of, 14
captain’s mast (disciplinary hearings), 64–7, 235n
Carlucci, Nicholas F. (Marine commander):
assigned to Kitty Hawk, 42
encounters sailors and Marines on mess deck, 115–7, 119
escorting of Binkley, 168–9
following Marine protocols, 123, 125, 127
gathers Marines in berthing area, 123–4
issue of drug use onboard, 43
as Marine instructor, 42
ordered to post guards for Subic Bay stop, 80, 92
orders groups of three or more to be broken up, 125, 237n
phone call with Townsend, 124
primary goal of preventing sabotage, 124, 127, 165
service in Vietnam in 1967, 42
suggests collection of ID cards, 124
testimony to congressional subcommittee, 212, 236n, 237n
watching Paint Your Wagon when alerted to riot, 112
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