MI5 in the Great War

by Nigel West

  In June the police forwarded to MO5 the returned letter from Brussels with the information that Apel had left Barrow, and his whereabouts were unknown. In July enquiry revived since it was obvious that Apel was still in touch with the Germans.

  Since 9 June 1913 he had been on the SWL under the heading ‘Arrest’ and he was detained on 4 August and searched. He possessed nothing but what he stood up in, and nothing incriminating was found at the search. He was charged with contravening the Official Secrets Act, but the charge was not proceeded with. He was interned under the Aliens Restriction Order and taken to Preston Prison.

  The case is interesting as an illustration of the first form of attack upon the private shipyards, an attack which was anticipated in May 1911. It was then proposed to draw up a list of all foreigners employed in private yards doing work for the government. Whether the list was so drawn up and whether, in consequence, the clause which prohibits foreigners from being employed upon works of defence was inserted in government contracts does not appear. But it is clear that the harmonious action of MO5, Vickers and the Barrow police completely blocked Fredrik Apel so far as direct access to information was concerned. The whole of his case, however, cannot be understood unless it is related to a wholesale attack upon the personnel of the British Navy, an attack which reached its climax in 1913.

  ‘Carl Cornelson’ and ‘A. Sampler’ were two of the pseudonyms of a person or persons directing this movement, which had for its object the making of traitors in the Royal Navy; they were also in touch with Apel who, it will be remembered, had complained of the insurmountable difficulty of his German nationality. Owing to this difficulty, the attack upon the navy had been extended to the personnel of the dockyards and private yards and it was no doubt part of Apel’s business to supply the names of Britons who could and would give information. They would then be approached directly by letters from Brussels, Copenhagen, Petersburg, etc. All through 1913 such letters were coming into the country in quantities. In October, Sampler had sent three of them and this led to an enquiry at Brussels undertaken by a British agent.

  This seems to be the explanation of the ‘unimportant letter’ to Apel of 19 November which the agent had seen and wished stopped. He had seen three documents in Sampler’s portfolio and had evidently related their contents with each other, but his detailed report did not come in until 12 December, too late for action in the case of Apel.

  The documents here referred to are the following:

  1. An empty envelope, stamped with an unused Belgian stamp and addressed to F. Apel, c/o W. Ossterlein, etc.

  2. A postcard (address and addressee not given but the context seems to show it is for Apel), in which Sampler begs for news and threatens the recipient with the displeasure of someone in Petersburg: he tries to arrange for a meeting and has sent money.

  3. A postcard in Russian addressed to Mons. Boyle, p.a. Mme Sievers, St Petersburg, running: ‘Prospects in Barrow are good: hope to be able soon to place at your disposal English collaborators’.

  In February the gentlemen in Petersburg had obtained some part at least of what they wanted; they were in direct communication with someone at Barrow. It is very tempting to connect the contents of this letter of Sampler to Apel with one from Josephine Steer, giving the address 1 Newington Crescent, London, but bearing the postmark Barrow-in-Furness, and addressed to Mr J. Steer, Pannierstrasse 2/3, Neuholin, Berlin, in which the writer says, ‘So Leon got to Berlin alright, he is not to be trusted five minutes alone, ‘Leon’, it will be remembered had written to Apel from Brussels in terms showing that he was a subordinate of ‘Herr C’.

  Apel’s reply to Sampler was returned evidently as a result of the exposure of Frederick Gould. Brussels was suspect and no doubt for a time Sampler dared not collect his letters. Apel communicated next with Antwerp, although he had been told that that address was no longer in use. In dealing with the case at this point, MO5 took Hugo Murscheid’s letter to the missionary seriously, although it seems rather to have been a blind. In any case Apel’s change of work which followed soon after receipt of Sampler’s letter of February 1914 may quite well have been connected with a change of intention. Early in his career he had promised to discover secret processes of hardening steel, a task which would have been more easily carried out by an employee in the steel works than from the box of a butcher’s cart.

  If idle, Apel was also cautious; he veiled his visits to Hamburg by spending a few days at Manchester on the way. By July, he may really have obtained a recruit and information from the steel wire works and have veiled his intention by leaving that employment for the apparently harmless paper pulp works. The fact that nothing was found at the search does not preclude his being in possession of valuable knowledge. This however, is mere conjecture; he may have remained incurably feckless and certainly he was destitute.

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  Izzel bin Aladdin was one of a group of Turkish naval officers who went through a gunnery course at Whale Island (HMS Excellent) from November 1910 to March 1911. Thence he went to HMS Lord Nelson from March 1911 to September 1911. He returned to Turkey in October of that year.

  Aladdin came to London in about August 1913 and went first to the Imperial Hotel for a week and afterwards to 17 Grenville Street for a month. On 3 October he purposed to go to Portsmouth. Owing to a check on Carl Ernst’s address, MO5 became aware that Aladdin, alias Maurice, was in touch with the German Secret Service. An intercepted letter endorsed W. C. Brown of the Imperial Hotel at Russell Square and signed Foti Vassilyadi, was addressed to Mr A. Alaadin [sic] at 17 Grenville Street. The writer described a method of sending monthly remittances through the Constantinople and London branches of the Deutsche Bank. This would cause no remark as the Deutsche Bank was much used by Turkish firms and by the government. A credit would be opened in Aladdin’s name at the London branch and payment would be made to the order of a supposed relation in Constantinople.

  Aladdin’s sign-manual would prove his identity and on drawing his money for the first time he was to use a password. Aladdin communicated with the Germans via Mr Henry Adams and was also given the addresses of Bicker & Worth and M. Muller of 81 Pacheco in Brussels. Of the four letters of this correspondence Aladdin wrote one only and that was to acknowledge the instructions sent about his pay. At the same time he announced his intention of going to Portsmouth on 3 October.

  After December 1913 no further letters were intercepted. The Home Office Warrant for Aladdin’s address was taken out on 23 September and on 3 October the dockyard police at Portsmouth were asked to look out for Aladdin, but on no account to begin making enquiries. William Melville then called at the London address and obtained a description of the man, and heard that he had left saying he was going to Torquay and that letters were to be kept for him – but none had come.

  From the Admiralty, a list of Turkish officers who had been attached to the Royal Navy was obtained, and it was headed by Aladdin’s name. Inspector Savage was then seen by appointment and asked to make every effort to get in touch with the man, but he was unable to find Aladdin in Portsmouth. However, he discovered for himself the previous connection of a Lieutenant Biayuk A. Aladdin with the navy, and comparing a hearsay description of this person with that given by Melville of Aladdin, he concluded that the one might be identical with the other. The identification was established by means of a photograph supplied by Savage and shown casually to Aladdin’s landlady in London.

  The case is interesting because of the personality and nationality of the spy and of the arrangements made for remitting salary without arousing suspicion. Aladdin, so far as one can tell, wanted a little extra money for a pleasant excursion and to send to his wife back in the east. On our side the extreme caution observed by MO5 in initiating enquiries in London and Portsmouth is to be noted, as also Inspector Savage’s cleverness. Further, the case led to a fresh protective measure; Major Kell arranged with the Admiralty to furnish from time to time a list of all foreigners attached temporarily t
o our navy.

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  In 1913 a new form of attack came to MO5’s notice, under the guise of pushing the sale of a work on the navies of the world or cover for the work, and completing the work, which was to be published by a Danish, Russian or French firm. Evidently the Germans sought to gain direct contact with and information from officers and men of the Royal Dockyards. Names of naval personnel were obtained by German agents here who were directed to send in the names of officers or men who were poor, or had a grievance: with the same object in view, the daily press was scrutinised for the reports of court martial and of Admiralty enquiries, and advertisements were inserted in the daily and weekly papers announcing that manufactory agents were wanted to introduce an absolutely new article of general interest to naval circles; knowledge of special branches not necessary; only those who have a good connection with seamen need apply – offers to Soedermann, Hotel Bristol, Copenhagen.

  This advertisement appeared in Lloyd’s Weekly in December 1912 and others were published in the Weekly Dispatch, the Daily Telegraph, and the Daily Mail, in February 1913. These advertisements were answered in December and in February, respectively by five men, who were: W. Collier, Armourer’s Crew, HMS Minerva; Corporal Buckley, Royal Marines, Gosport; W. G. Benson (no occupation given), 6 Johnson Terrace, Devonport; A. Semper, Retired Ship’s Master, 12 Allison Road, Harringay; and James Kiernan, a pensioner and steward of the Beatty Club, a favourite resort of the naval officers.

  In all these cases the applicants were answered from Copenhagen by Sonderland, or Lindstrom, manager for Soedermann, under the date of 17 February. The replies therefore were dealt with in batches, and considerable delay in answering might indicate that investigation was being made on Gustav Steinhauer’s behalf into the suitability of the applicant.

  Each of the applicants, according to his status, handed in the replies received either to the police or to a commanding officer. Corporal Buckley was instructed to continue the correspondence and did so under the guidance of MO5. His case can be quoted as typical. The three Soedermann replies received by him reveal some common denominators. An agent was required to push the sale of a book which a Danish-Russian firm is about to publish on the navies of the world and purchasers were likely to be found among naval men. Precise details of the applicant’s connection with officers, petty officers and functionaries of the dockyards were required; applicants were to collaborate by writing articles demanding expert knowledge of matters relating to the British Navy, or to find some naval man who was competent to do so.

  The replies often mentioned that several novelties and modern inventions were missing, so publication had been postponed; reports on specified points were required: these had to be more explicit than newspaper articles; handsome reward was offered for introduction to competent and willing collaborators. Invariably, six questions were enclosed. The commissioning correspondent also complained that some answers sent by the applicant were too short and simple; only special information was needed; other questions were enclosed; £5 was sent for the answers already received; promise of better pay was offered for detailed answers to a second list. At this point MO5 got Buckley to close the correspondence, and they obtained for him a reward of £5 and a recommendation for promotion.

  The method followed by the Germans in setting their questions was to ask the same general questions of two different people with one or two questions of special application to the man’s circumstances. The attack begun by advertisement was quickly followed by the method of direct approach. In this case there were slight variations in the letter sent: if the Germans knew nothing beyond the man’s name and rank, he would be asked vaguely to collaborate by writing articles for the publication in question; if he were wanting money, there was a mere offer of an easy way of earning money; if he were known to be poor and efficient, he might be asked directly to write articles which would be treated as ‘Private and Confidential’ and, failing his reply, he might be written to again explaining that there was an easy way of earning money (signed Dostoyevsky and Ch. Beaumont).

  A commodore based at the Royal Naval Barracks in Devonport, who recently had been court martialed, was offered money which he need not repay, provided he would do business for a Russian house. On his reply that he would be glad to earn something, he was told that naval information would be required, and he was asked to spend the weekend at any place in Belgium he chose, and travelling expenses would be paid in advance.

  The case of Gunner J. E. Robertson, HMS Bulwark, illustrates the attack upon a man with a grievance. Robertson had been tried by court martial for drunkenness and acquitted. On 8 May 1913 a letter purporting to have been written from the Grosvenor Hotel in London was sent suggesting that he would be well-qualified to contribute articles on the artillery of the British Navy. By order of the Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, and under the guidance of the dockyard police, Robertson answered this letter and received in reply a list of questions, with the promise of £15 for satisfactory reports, secrecy as to his name, destruction of reports sent, discretion in the posting of questions, and a postal order of 20/- was enclosed. Chernakoff was the pseudonym used by the German agent.

  By far the largest number of letters was composed of the vague circulars addressed to men about whom the Germans knew no details. The recipients in most cases seem to have handed up the letters voluntarily, but the gigantic nature of the undertaking and other considerations led to the adoption of action by the Admiralty.

  On 31 December 1912 the address of Mr J. Soedermann at the Hotel Bristol, Copenhagen, and on 11 January 1913 the address of Nik Chernyakoff at the Palace Hotel in Lucerne, were sent to August Klunder on picture postcards and were thus brought to MO5’s notice. In that month, the name Chernyakoff became known to MO5 as being definitely connected with incitement to treason and then in February the advertisement ruse was reported, and Soedermann’s connection with it. Also, more names of apparently would-be traitors emerged, including those of Green at Flexborough, Yarmouth, and of Ernest Evans. Green became known through a letter returned from abroad as undeliverable, and Evans through Steinhauer’s instructions that Carl Ernst was to enquire about him. Through Evans’ correspondence the name of Carl Cornelsen became known, and on 15 March, the Daily Mail published the two letters which had been received by A. Semper and, as a result, MO5 were able to read in various intercepted letters that Soedermann had handed over his business to Chernyakoff.

  MO5 were also able to learn much from Steinhauer’s letters to his intermediaries here. He would ask, for instance, for a copy of a paper in which a particular advertisement was about to appear and addresses of various persons connected with the scheme.

  The large scale on which the Germans were going to work was indicated by their request for quantities of envelopes of different sizes and sorts: Klunder was to send sixty well-gummed envelopes; Ernst at request, send from 250 to 300 envelopes by sample post and as these were returned, he despatched 305 by parcel post. On 26 May, two letters inciting treason, signed Popoff, came through the post to Ernst and in June two letters were posted to Klunder. For special reasons the two addressed to Gunner Robertson and to George Sheppard were allowed to go through. Others that followed were stopped in the post.

  Meanwhile, MO5 had received the correspondence of Gunner Robertson, and had pointed out to the Secretary of the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, the danger of encouraging answers to the inciting letters, since the rewards offered were large and might corrupt the morally weak. They suggested that if any answer at all were sent, the opportunity of drafting it should be left to themselves. MO5 also wished that favourable notes should be taken of the action of those who handed in these letters.

  In July, the Secretary wrote to MO5 that the publishing firm was particularly active, and MO5 then requested that all letters handed in to the naval authorities should be forwarded to the bureau. Finally, with the help of MO5, a Weekly Order was drafted enjoining upon the recipient of any such letters
that he should not make any answer but hand it up together with the envelope to his commanding officer. This Order was issued about the end of July. The Admiralty had also in some cases adopted MO5’s policy of thanking the men who brought the letters to their notice.

  The letters were sent to MO5 and were collected in a file known as the Treason Box. The index bears entries of about 150 such letters, which were despatched by agents whose pseudonym changed continually. At least eighty such pseudonyms are recorded.

  Enquiry made at Brussels in October 1913 showed that the letters were sent in batches from Germany to foreign centres whence they were either posted or brought by hand to distribution centres in England. There is some reason to think that, with the exception of Soedermann and Chernyakoff, each pseudonym covered one batch only of not more than three letters. The index never records more than three letters to one name, sometimes there are two and sometimes but one. In such cases the missing letters may stand for cases of neglect, treason, or failure in the post.

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  According to his record, Ernest Evans deserted the Royal Navy in 1904, but was returned and was discharged in 1906 for having been in civil custody. He was re-engaged on September 1915 and then invalided out at Chatham, and pensioned. He then obtained employment at an explosives factory at Gretna, but was discharged following MO5G’s intervention. A check was placed on his correspondence and he was traced to Woolwich Arsenal where he was working as a gun-examiner. He left at own request and was traced to Brighton. The check on his correspondence continued from 3 August 1917 until 15 May 1918. Evans changed his name to Reginald Northcote and obtained employment as examiner at the Brighton Motor Coach Company to which he was sent by the Aeronautical Inspection Department. However, he was found to have altered his discharge certificate having erased the words ‘Civil Custody’. When challenged, Evans said that no action had been taken by the navy, no action by the Aeronautical Department, and that he had been employed at Vickers Air Works in Crayford where his conduct had been found to be satisfactory. This case arose out of the Soedermann answers. Evans had answered an advertisement but the Germans did not reply until Ernst had verified his existence.